In Politics I 2 (1253a18–27), Aristotle makes a controversial claim that the polis is prior in nature to the individual. The aim of this article is to reconstruct this thesis. According to recent scholarship, there are two main ways to understand priority in nature in Aristotle. It may be construed as ‘existential priority, or as ‘priority in being’. It is argued that: (a) The first option is problematic; it cannot give us a viable reading of the thesis in Politics I (...) 2. Whereas (b) The second option provides us with a sound approach to the puzzle at hand. Furthermore, it is argued that the exegetical plausibility of the suggested reading of the thesis in Politics I 2 (1253a18–27) may be bolstered if we note that, for Aristotle, the polis is a particular kind of hylomorphic whole. (shrink)

As M. Loux has recently reminded us, there are two basic strategies for explaining the character of particular objects, the ‘relational approach’ and the ‘constituent approach’. The prime example of a constituent approach would be Aristotelian hylomorphism. This article reveals three things. First, it gives a roadmap towards what the author considers to be the exegetically correct reconstruction of Aristotle’s hylomorphic theory. Second, it provides a presentation of the basic claims of a neo-Aristotelian hylomorphic theory, the one argued for by (...) M. Johnston. Finally, it argues that regardless of whatever shortcomings it may have, Aristotle’s theory has an advantage over that proposed by Johnston. Unlike Johnston’s theory, it may give us a complete account of the character of a particular object. (shrink)

Politikoje I 2 Aristotelis pateikia kontroversišką teiginį, kad polis pagal prigimtį turi pirmumą prieš individą. Straipsnyje siekiama rekonstruoti šį teiginį. Pastarojo meto tyrimai siūlo du būdus suprasti prigimtinį pirmenybiškumą Aristotelio veikaluose. Jį galima interpretuoti kaip „egzistencinį pirmumą“ arba kaip „pirmumą būtyje“. Teigiama, kad pirmasis variantas kelia problemų; jis neatveria priimtinos šio teiginio skaitymo Politikoje I 2 perspektyvos. Antroji alternatyva teikia patikimą prieigą prie šios mįslės. Taip pat teigiama, kad šios siūlomos teiginio iš Politikos I 2 (1253a18–27) interpretacijos egzegetinis tikėtinumas dar (...) labiau išauga, jei atkreipiame dėmesį į tai, kad Aristoteliui polis yra tam tikra hilomorfinės visumos rūšis. (shrink)

This paper examines Della Rocca’s critique of Aristotle’s conception of substance. The key point of the paper is that Aristotle’s homonymy principle and concept of enformed matter undermine Della Rocca’s claim that Aristotle is subject to a John Wayne moment. (To undergo a John Wayne moment is to propose an unilluminating or empty explanation, as in Wayne’s statement ‘A man’s gotta do what a man’s gotta do’.).

In Metaphysics E. 3. 1027a29–30 Aristotle states that there are some causes, the incidental ones, that are generable and destructible but they have no coming to be. Furthermore, he asserts that if we deny this thesis, then we will have to give into determinism (1027a30–32). There are three persistent puzzles surrounding this chapter. First, what does it mean to say that a cause is generable and destructible but it has no coming to be? Second, what exactly is the connection between (...) this claim and determinism? And third, if we accept that in Metaphysics E. 3 Aristotle deals with incidental causation, then how is this discussion related to the treatment of incidentalness in E. 2? This article puts forward answers for these puzzles. I argue that there is textual evidence in Physics II. 5 that shows that the claim in Metaphysics 1027a29–30 is meant to capture the non-teleological nature of incidental causation. Moreover, I argue that this same textual evidence indicates that the thesis expressed at Metaphysics 1027a29–30 is in effect Aristotle’s response to teleological determinism. Finally, I suggest that it is plausible to suppose that chapter 3 does not quite belong with the rest of Metaphysics E. (shrink)

Many commentators suppose that Anaximander subscribes to a multiple worlds thesis. In particular, they assume that: either Anaximander accepts that there are innumerable co-existent worlds, or he accepts that there are innumerable successive worlds. The first of these interpretations has been shown to be problematic. In this discussion note I present two new arguments against the multiple successive worlds reading of Anaximander, with the intent to buttress a single world reconstruction of his cosmology.

In Metaphysics E. 3. 1027a29–30 Aristotle states that there are some causes, the incidental ones, that are generable and destructible but they have no coming to be. Furthermore, he asserts that if we deny this thesis, then we will have to give into determinism . There are three persistent puzzles surrounding this chapter. First, what does it mean to say that a cause is generable and destructible but it has no coming to be? Second, what exactly is the connection between (...) this claim and determinism? And third, if we accept that in Metaphysics E. 3 Aristotle deals with incidental causation, then how is this discussion related to the treatment of incidentalness in E. 2? This article puts forward answers for these puzzles. I argue that there is textual evidence in Physics II. 5 that shows that the claim in Metaphysics 1027a29–30 is meant to capture the non-teleological nature of incidental causation. Moreover, I argue that this same textual evidence indicates that the thesis expressed at Metaphysics 1027a29–30 is in effect Aristotle’s response to teleological determinism. Finally, I suggest that it is plausible to suppose that chapter 3 does not quite belong with the rest of Metaphysics E. (shrink)

In Metaphysics E. 3. 1027a29–30 Aristotle states that there are some causes, the incidental ones, that are generable and destructible but they have no coming to be. Furthermore, he asserts that if we deny this thesis, then we will have to give into determinism (1027a30–32). There are three persistent puzzles surrounding this chapter. First, what does it mean to say that a cause is generable and destructible but it has no coming to be? Second, what exactly is the connection between (...) this claim and determinism? And third, if we accept that in Metaphysics E. 3 Aristotle deals with incidental causation, then how is this discussion related to the treatment of incidentalness in E. 2? This article puts forward answers for these puzzles. I argue that there is textual evidence in Physics II. 5 that shows that the claim in Metaphysics 1027a29–30 is meant to capture the non-teleological nature of incidental causation. Moreover, I argue that this same textual evidence indicates that the thesis expressed at Metaphysics 1027a29–30 is in effect Aristotle’s response to teleological determinism. Finally, I suggest that it is plausible to suppose that chapter 3 does not quite belong with the rest of Metaphysics E. (shrink)

One of the unresolved issues in Aristotle’s hylomorphism is the part-whole puzzle. Some scholars suppose that in Metaphysics Z 17, 1041b11-33 he endorses non-mereological hylomorphism. This kind of interpretation, however, has been challenged by K. Koslicki who argues that if the evidence in Metaphysics Z 17 is combined with some related textual and conceptual considerations, then a convincing case can be made for a mereological construal of Aristotelian hylomorphism. This paper does four things. First, it scrutinizes these opposing approaches to (...) Aristotle’s theory. Second, it suggests that to adjudicate the dispute at hand one ought to determine how Aristotle deals with what has come to be known as ‘Ackrill’s problem’. It is proposed that if we consider Aristotle’s theory in light of some distinctions drawn in contemporary discussions of hylomorphism, then it transpires that he does have a solution to Ackrill’s problem. Third, it is shown that his solution to this problem suggests a particular way of settling the debate over the part-whole puzzle. And finally, it is argued that the suggested reconstruction of Aristotelian hylomorphism is consistent with the textual evidence in Metaphysics Z 17 and its associated texts. (shrink)

Perceptual experience is one of our fundamental sources of epistemic justification—roughly, justification for believing that a proposition is true. The ability of perceptual experience to justify beliefs can nevertheless be questioned. This article focuses on an important challenge that arises from countenancing that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable. -/- The thesis of cognitive penetrability of perception states that the content of perceptual experience can be influenced by prior or concurrent psychological factors, such as beliefs, fears and desires. Advocates of this (...) thesis could for instance claim that your desire of having a tall daughter might influence your perception, so that she appears to you to be taller than she is. Although cognitive penetrability of perception is a controversial empirical hypothesis, it does not appear implausible. The possibility of its veracity has been adduced to challenge positions that maintain that perceptual experience has inherent justifying power. -/- This article presents some of the most influential positions in contemporary literature about whether cognitive penetration would undermine perceptual justification and why it would or would not do so. -/- Some sections of this article focus on phenomenal conservatism, a popular conception of epistemic justification that more than any other has been targeted with objections that adduce the cognitive penetrability of experience. (shrink)

The objective of this paper is to articulate a distinction between habit and bodily skill as different ways of acting without deliberation. I start by elaborating on a distinction between habit and skill as different kinds of dispositions. Then I argue that this distinction has direct implications for the varieties of automaticity exhibited in habitual and skilful bodily acts. The argument suggests that paying close attention to the metaphysics of agency can help to articulate more precisely questions regarding the varieties (...) of automaticity exhibited in overt action. (shrink)

Combining philosophical and political analysis, this study offers a comprehensive reassessment of Castoriadis' contribution to critical theory in and through his critical confrontation with both the crisis of the traditional Left and the crisis of modern capitalist societies. The key concepts of 'crisis' and 'critique' are considered throughout the text and Castoriadis' ideas are situated in a critical debate with other radical thinkers, such as Lefort, Pannekoek, Arendt, Althusser, Axelos, Papaioannou and Marx. The study supplies an extensive analysis and explores (...) the contemporary relevance of Castoriadis' views regarding the Russian Revolution of 1917, the Hungarian revolt of 1956 and the events of May 1968 in France. It argues for a re-radicalization of his thought in light of the current capitalist crisis and seeks to trace his radical alternative to crisis by critically examining and further elaborating his positions with respect to socialism, autonomy and revolution. (shrink)

A sample of 259 South African managers completed a survey originally administered by Nel (1992). The results of the current study indicated a favourable move on four of the 15 questionable actions used to assess each group's ethical predisposition. Furthermore, the grand means for the two temporal-based samples also provided anecdotal evidence of a positive transition. Virtually identical results were in evidence when the segment of 89 top managers was compared to the sample of its higher level peers from the (...) earlier study by Nel. The results support the premise that today's South African managers have a more ethical predisposition than did their peers of some 20 years prior to them. However, the study concurrently documents the reality that there is ample room for further improvement. (shrink)

An Introduction to basic metaepistemological debates and positions.

Several authors have argued that the things one does in the course of skilled and habitual activity present a difficult case for the ‘standard story’ of action. They are things intentionally done, but they do not seem to be suitably related to mental states. I suggest that once manifestations of habit are properly distinguished from exercises of skills and other kinds of spontaneous acts, we can see that habit raises a distinctive sort of problem. I examine certain responses that have (...) been given, as well as responses that could be given on behalf of the standard story to the problems presented by habitual activity. These responses rely on the idea of a kind of intention that does not ensue from conscious thought or deliberation. I raise three different objections to this line of response. The conclusion is that habit explains aspects of human behavior that cannot be accounted by ascribing intentions of any kind. (shrink)