Luther, A. R. The articulated unity of being in Scheler's phenomenology : basic drive and spirit.--Funk, R. L. Thought, values, and action.--Emad, P. Person, death, and world.--Smith, F. J. Peace and pacifism.--Scheler, M. Metaphysics and art.--Scheler, M. The meaning of suffering.

Heidegger, M. Andenken an Max Scheler.--Gadamer, H.-G. Max Scheler, der Verschwender.--Plessner, H. Erinnerungen an Max Scheler.--Kuhn, H. Max Scheler als Faust.--Dempf, A. Schelers System christlicher Geistphilosophie als Grundlage einer religiösen Erneuerung.--Scheler, M. Neun Briefe an Karl Muth.--Rombach, H. Die Erfahrung der Freiheit.--Landgrebe, L. Geschichtsphilosophische Perspektiven bei Scheler und Husserl.--Theunissen, M. Wettersturm und Stille.--Good, P. Anschauung und Sprache.--Welsch, W. Mit Scheler.--Avé-Lallement, E. Die phänomenologische Reduktion in der Philosophie Max Schelers.--Gehlen, A. Rückblick auf die Anthropologie (...) Max Schelers.--Schoeps, H. J. Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos.--Ströker, E. Der Tod im Denken Max Schelers.--Wyss, D. und Huppmann, G. Die Bedeutung Max Schelers für die Medizinische Anthropologie.--Lieber, H.-J. Bemerkungen zur Wissenssoziologie Max Schelers.--Fetscher, I. Max Schelers Auffassung von Krieg und Frieden.--Bochenski, J. M. Ist die Sprache Schelers in eine analytische übersetzbar? (shrink)

The philosophy of Max Scheler is hardly of the type that can stand compendious presentation. Obsessed by such clear distinctions as the analytic vs. the synthetic, mind vs. matter, and metaphysics vs. science, Scheler proposed still further ontological distinctions which often presented more problems than the distinctions they were designed to replace. Moreover, having renounced any diagnostic use of scientific materials, Scheler had to resort to tedious descriptions that would allow him to bridge the gap between common (...) sense and rational consistency. When the presentation of his doctrine is simply outlined, as it is in this book, the play with alternative ontological distinctions becomes conspicuously irrelevant. The rich insight so frequently hiding in descriptive detail and suggesting a myriad of fertile directions, cannot be reduced to the outline's topic headings. One wonders if any critical examination of Scheler in these terms can be fair, or even if it is worthwhile to know only that much about Scheler.--A. M. (shrink)

Many so-called “cognitivist” theories of the emotions account for the meaningfulness of emotions in terms of beliefs or judgments that are associated or identified with these emotions. In recent years, a number of analytic philosophers have argued against these theories by pointing out that the objects of emotions are sometimes meaningfully experienced before one can take a reflective stance toward them. Peter Goldie defends this point of view in his book The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration. Goldie argues that emotions are (...) meaningful in a way that is different from the meaningfulness of beliefs. He describes this meaningfulness in terms of “feeling towards,” which he identifies as a unique type of intentionality characteristic of emotions. The independence of feeling-towards from acts like believing is most clearly brought out by cases in which there is not enough time to form a belief but in which a person experiencing feelings towards an object responds emotionally in a way that is meaningful to them. Employing a similar type of argument, the phenomenologist Max Scheler argues that certain types of acts of feeling are phenomenologically prior to presentative acts of perception, representation, or imagination. Scheler supports his claim about the phenomenological priority of such acts of feeling by referring to cases in which the presented contents of an object are hidden or obscured but where the object of feeling, value, remains adequately given. I endeavor to show how Scheler draws support for his position from these cases and the great significance of his interpretation of these cases for his philosophical outlook as a whole. I close by considering some questions about his interpretation and use of these cases. (shrink)

This little volume is a critical introduction to the phenomenological scene through discussion of the ideas of some of its more prominent exponents and an extensive analysis of the thought of its founder. About two thirds of the book is devoted to Husserl. It traces the evolution of Husserl's philosophy from an early interest in the psychological presuppositions of number, to the phenomenological analysis of acts of meaning, and finally to his unsuccessful attempt to construct a comprehensive system embracing the (...) presuppositions of knowledge in general. Previous acquaintance with Husserl's work is not necessary as Pivcevic gives critical expositions of the main theses of Husserl's Philosophy of Arithmetic, Logical Investigations, Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Phenomenological Philosophy. He is careful to establish particular philosophic problems through reference to the views of other philosophers, and on different issues the position of Husserl is compared and contrasted to those of Frege, Brentano, Russell, Descartes, the positivists, the classical Empiricists and Kant. The presentation of Sartre's views includes brief discussions of European romanticism, Hegel, and Marx. Besides Sartre, Scheler and Heidegger are discussed to illustrate differing applications of the phenomenological method. The final chapter is a brief critique of the limitations of this method: the problem of "other egos," the marked tendency to anti-rationalism, and the failure to achieve its aim of a presupposition-less philosophy. Pivcevic is not totally sympathetic with the phenomenologists, which is perhaps what makes possible this critical exposition of their views. But at times one wishes his clear prose would follow a philosopher's thought further into its more obscure dimensions. His criticisms are often the standard, uninspired objections to what are generally accepted as unjustified excesses of existentialist thought. Nevertheless, this is an excellent introduction to phenomenology and especially valuable for its exposition of the thought of Edmund Husserl.--M. S. H. (shrink)

The ArgumentThis paper makes use of the 1860 clash between T. H. Huxley and Richard Owen to examine the role of social context in scientific advance in the biological sciences. It shows how the social context of nineteenth-century England first favored the Coleridge-Owenite interpretation of the biological world and then, at mid-century and subsequently, allowed the Darwin-Huxley interpretation to win through. It emphasizes the complexity of the clash. Professional, personal, and generational agendas as well as scientific theory and fundamental philosophical (...) intuition were at stake. The history, ultimately, provides a useful instance of Schutz ‘s and Scheler ‘s concept of societal factors controlling and selecting between flows of idealfactoren. Although Huxley is conventionally regarded as the victor I conclude by suggesting that the issue is not yet closed and that profound philosophical issues remain unresolved. (shrink)

Phenomenology of religion can refer to three distinct groups of phenomenological projects reflecting on religion. The term is used in the field of religious studies to designate the search for patterns of religious experiences or practices across traditions and to the methodology that shows religion to be a unique human experience deserving its own field of study. Philosophical phenomenology in the Husserlian tradition also engages religious questions at times. Finally, there is a group of contemporary French philosophers who advocate a (...) phenomenology of religious experience. The first two groups are examined in this article and the third in the sequel. For the first group, the article briefly considers the projects of Rudolf Otto, Mircea Eliade, Brede Kristensen, and Gerardus van der Leeuw, as well as their contemporary interpreters in the field of religious studies. As representative of the second approach, the article considers Max Scheler, Edith Stein, and Gerda Walther as well as commenting briefly on the contemporary work of Natalie Depraz and Anthony Steinbock. (shrink)

This contribution starts from Max Scheler’s claim that modern philosophy holds two differing views on feelings. The first view, which Scheler attributes to René Descartes, presents them in their intentional role but rejects their independence; the other view, which Scheler attributes to Immanuel Kant, holds that they cannot be reduced to the rational part of the soul and thus affirms their independence, but deprives them of all cognitive powers. After considering both views, I discuss the views of (...) Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl. Husserl takes an ambivalent approach to attunement, which opens the possibility of understanding Martin Heidegger’s thought of fundamental attunement. (shrink)

Ce recueil a pour but de montrer que Heidegger n'est pas seulement, et peut-etre pas d'abord, ce penseur solitaire de Foret-Noire pretant l'oreille a la voix de l'Etre, comme on s'est souvent plu a le presenter, et comme il a sans doute lui-meme contribue a le faire accroire: c'est un penseur extraordinairement attentif aux developpements philosophiques de son temps, dont la pensee s'est elaboree en grande partie en dialogue non seulement avec les Grecs, la pensee chretienne, l'existentialisme de Kierkegaard ou (...) encore la phenomenologie husserlienne, mais egalement avec ses predecesseurs immediats (Dilthey, Brentano, Bergson, Braig, York von Wartenburg), les ecoles neokantiennes de Bade (Rickert, Lask) et de Marbourg (Cohen, Natorp, Cassirer), ainsi qu'avec certains contemporains, tels Jaspers ou Scheler. Des ses debuts, sa pensee s'avere ouverte aussi bien aux avancees de la logique mathematique (Frege et Russell) que, plus tard, aux developpements de l'anthropologie et de la biologie de son epoque (von Uexkull). Cette mise en perspective, qui nous parait plus que jamais necessaire, permet ainsi de mettre en lumiere des aspects negliges de l'oeuvre, de mieux comprendre les sources et, peut-etre, certaines limites de celui qui demeure, malgre l'ombre qui pese sa pensee, l'un des plus grands philosophes du XXe siecle. (shrink)

_The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy_ provides an annual international forum for phenomenological research in the spirit of Husserl's groundbreaking work and the extension of this work by such figures as Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer.

The article considers the approaches to theodicy’s problem of Russian and German philosophers with clear religious orientation: Nikolai Alexandrovich Berdyaev and Max Scheler. However, for more explicit insight into our topic we found, the article provides the general overview of theodicy tradition. Standpoints of these thinkers living in different epochs are linked by the steady belief in a reasonability of the world created by God. The main obstacle to acceptance of this argumentation is the problem of evil’s existence. The (...) way of thinking that has the goal to demonstrate the world’s perfectness presumes either necessity of evil as a mean or the evil’s insignificance or even its illusiveness, which is the result of “too human” perspective. Such ways of thought have become impossible since the second half of 19th century, when the concrete person’s experience had been recognized as a main source of philosophy. In Russian culture, this attitude became widespread after F.M. Dostoevsky, in German culture – after F. Nietzsche. Berdyaev and Scheler inherit the impulse of their thought. Distinctive feature of religious philosophies of Berdyaev and Scheler is conceptualization of the assertion of God’s need in human being, for God is in the process of becoming, is in the inner move toward full self-realization. And human being, who is capable to adopt or to reject the God’s “call,” is the crucial stage of God’s formation. For this tradition of theodicy, exactly human creative act and the direction of this act have the main role in world history. (shrink)

F. W. 니체가 르상티망을 인류가 그리스도교 윤리에 지배되어 노예의 삶을 살므로 인해 생기는 것으로 보는 반면에, M. 셸러는 인류가 생명 삶에 필요한 가치들만 추구하는 가운데 경쟁·비교의 결과 격차의식으로 말미암아 생기는 것으로 본다. 그러므로 인류가 생명 삶에 필요한 물질가치·향락가치·권력가치의 추구에만 얽매이지 않고, 정신 삶에 필요한 심적 가치·정신적 가치도 어느 정도 추구한다면, 비교본능이 덜 발동하고 그로 인해 인간들간의 격차의식도 약화되며 르상티망도 해소될 것이다. 알다시피 물질가치나 권력가치는 우리들이 함께 나눠가질 수 없는 반면에 심적 가치나 정신적 가치는 함께 나눠가질 수 있다. 그래서 전자 가치의 (...) 추구에는 비교본능이 발동하는 반면에 후자 가치의 추구에는 그렇지 않다. 비교하여 열등한 결과가 쌓여 실제 사회적으로 영향을 미칠 때, 그 영향에 피해를 입고 그 피해에 대한 무기력감과 허약성을 체험한 인간들이 쉽게 르상티망에 빠질 수 있다. 그런데 비교본능이 덜 발동하는 정신적 가치를 물질가치 못지않게 추구할 때, 물질가치 추구의 결과로 생겨난 르상티망으로부터 얼마간 자유로울 것이다.BR 그럼 심적 가치나 정신적 가치를 추구하도록 하기 위해서 어떻게 해야 하나? 셸러에 따르면, 이런 가치를 추구하도록 하기 위해 이런 가치를 바라볼 수 있는 눈을 개방해야 하고, 이 눈을 개방하기 위해서 정신적 감정을 일깨워야 한다. 생명의 삶을 잘 살도록 하기 위해 생명가치를 지향·추구할 생명감정은 본능적으로 개방되어 있지만, 아직 인간은 진화 상 덜된 인간으로서 정신적 감정이 온전히 개방되어 있지 않다. 이 정신적 감정을 개방하는 일은 ‘사랑’으로 가능하다. ‘사랑하라’는 그리스도교 윤리의 실천을 통해서 사랑의 힘으로 심정의 질서를 바로 잡아, 우리 인류는 이른바 저급한 가치의 추구에만 얽매이지 않고 고급의 정신적 가치를 추구함으로써 르상티망을 어느 정도 해소할 수 있다. 이상이 현대 자본주의사회에서 르상티망에 걸려 허덕이고 있는 인류를 그리스도교 윤리의 실천으로 구원하고자 하는 셸러 사상이라 추정해보는 바이다. (shrink)