As object-directed emotions, reactive attitudes can be appropriate in the sense of fitting, where an emotion is fitting in virtue of accurately representing its target. I use this idea to argue for a theory of moral accountability: an agent S is accountable for an action A if and only if A expresses S’s quality of will and S has the capacity to recognize and respond to moral reasons. For the sake of argument, I assume that a reactive attitude is fitting (...) if and only if its constituent thoughts are true, and I argue for the above theory by determining thoughts partly constituting resentment and gratitude. Although others have argued that the capacity to recognize and respond to moral reasons is necessary for accountability, the argument here is significantly better in two respects. First, it does not rely on intermediary ethical principles, supplementary arguments, or assumptions about the nature of reactive attitudes specifically. Instead, it simply assumes that reactive attitudes, like all emotions, have cognitive content. Second, the argument here is more powerful because it brings to light the quality of will condition and has the resources to flesh out the capacity to recognize and respond to moral reasons. (shrink)

I argue that forgiveness is openness to reconciliation with the wrongdoer with respect to the wrongdoing. A victim is open to reconciliation with the wrongdoer with respect to the wrongdoing in vir...

A common objection to particular views of attributability is that they fail to account for weakness of will. In this paper, I show that the problem of weakness of will is much deeper than has been recognized, extending to all views of attributability on offer because of the general form that these views take. The fundamental problem is this: current views claim that being attributionally responsible is a matter of exercising whatever capacity that they take to be relevant to attributability; (...) however, weakness of will cases show that we can be attributionally responsible for actions that result from failing to exercise that capacity. I propose a novel solution that any view of attributability can and must take on board in order to be viable. The solution is to recognize that being attributionally responsible is not fundamentally a matter of exercising the attributability-relevant capacity but is rather a matter of having that capacity, so long as that capacity figures in the explanation of the action. (shrink)

I argue that divine forgiveness is God’s openness to reconciliation with us, the wrongdoers, with respect to our wrongdoing. The main advantage of this view is that it explains the power of divine forgiveness to reconcile us to God when we repent. As I show, this view also fits well with the parable of the prodigal son, which is commonly taken to illustrate divine forgiveness, and it accounts for the close connection between divine forgiveness and Christ’s atonement. Finally, I demonstrate (...) that this view is particularly well-suited, although not committed, to the idea that God forgives us without our repentance. (shrink)

I focus on the type of responsibility that an agent has for actions that express his practical identity, making it appropriate to evaluate him on the basis of those actions. This kind of responsibility is often called attributability. In this paper, I argue for a novel view of attributability—the Judgment Responsiveness View. According to the JRV, an agent is attributability responsible for an action A if and only if A results from either 1) his responding to his judgments about the (...) reasons that he has in favor of doing A by doing A or 2) his failing to exercise his capacity to respond to his judgments about the reasons that he has against doing A by not doing A. The JRV diverges from other views of attributability for actions in two significant respects. First, it is not reasonably thought of as a “deep self view.” According to deep self views, attributable actions are actions that express deep features of the agent, such as his fundamental values, cares, or commitments. As I show, thinking in terms of the deep self is too narrow for attributability. Second, unlike other views, the JRV claims—via condition 2)—that we can be attributionally responsible for actions that result from failing to exercise the attributability-relevant capacity to avoid them. My argument for the JRV thus shows that attributability is a broader and richer conception of responsibility than has been previously thought. (shrink)

I focus on the type of responsibility that an agent has for actions that express his practical identity, making it appropriate to evaluate him on the basis of those actions. This kind of responsibility is often called attributability. In this paper, I argue for a novel view of attributability—the Judgment Responsiveness View (JRV). According to the JRV, an agent is attributability responsible for an action A if and only if A results from either 1) his responding to his judgments about (...) the (normative) reasons that he has in favor of doing A by doing A or 2) his failing to exercise his capacity to respond to his judgments about the (normative) reasons that he has against doing A by not doing A. The JRV diverges from other views of attributability for actions in two significant respects. First, it is not reasonably thought of as a “deep self view.” According to deep self views, attributable actions are actions that express deep features of the agent, such as his fundamental values, cares, or commitments. As I show, thinking in terms of the deep self is too narrow for attributability. Second, unlike other views, the JRV claims—via condition 2)—that we can be attributionally responsible for actions that result from failing to exercise the attributability‐relevant capacity to avoid them. My argument for the JRV thus shows that attributability is a broader and richer conception of responsibility than has been previously thought. (shrink)

Stephen Darwall and R. Jay Wallace have independently argued that morality is essentially interpersonal by appealing to necessary connections between morality and responsibility. According to Darwall, morality is grounded in fundamentally second-personal accountability relations. On Wallace's view, a normative moral theory must say that agents’ attitudes towards the moral properties of their actions are reasons for responsibility reactions, which only relational moral theories can do. If either argument succeeds, non-relational moral theories are flawed. I demonstrate that neither argument succeeds. First, (...) I show that grounding morality in accountability relations is implausible. I then argue that the necessary connections that Wallace posits between responsibility and morality exist but need not be explained by moral theories. Finally, drawing on the objections to Darwall and Wallace, I show that, plausibly, no necessary connection between morality and responsibility exists that would rule out any non-relational moral theory. Hence, Darwall and Wallace's strategy does not work. (shrink)

I argue that it is in the philosophers’ best interest to rule Kallipolis because that life is the best available to them. Although the life of pure contemplation of the Forms would make them happiest, I make the case that, on Plato’s view, this life is not an option for them because of the essential psychological connections that he posits between the individual and the city. To make this argument, I first draw on Plato’s city/soul analogy to explore why it (...) is in reason’s best interest to rule the soul. The answer, I claim, rests in the interconnectedness of the three parts of the soul. If reason does not rule the soul, Plato says that reason will be ruled by another part of the soul and will be forced to serve the ends of the ruling part, which is worse for reason than ruling the soul. Similarly, the philosophers must rule or be ruled. I argue that, as we would expect from the city/soul analogy, Plato thinks that it is worse for the philosophers to be ruled by another part of the city than to rule Kallipolis. This is because, on Plato’s view, individuals internalize their culture, and if the philosophers do not rule, they internalize an unjust culture, which adversely impacts their ability to contemplate the Forms. However, if the philosophers rule Kallipolis, they internalize a just society, which best facilitates their contemplating the Forms. The upshot is that, due to the interconnections that Plato sees between psyche and city, he thinks that ruling Kallipolis is the best option available to the philosophers. (shrink)

Mark Murphy dedicates _Divine Holiness and Divine Action_ to answering two questions: What is divine holiness? And why does it matter for understanding divine action? According to Murphy, divine holiness consists in God’s having those features that make it appropriate for creatures to be simultaneously attracted to and repelled by God. This account, in turn, affords a novel framework for understanding divine action, one intended to avoid the pitfalls of alternative approaches emphasizing God’s moral goodness or lovingkindness. In this essay, (...) we express agreement with Murphy’s idea that divine holiness is crucial for understanding divine action. But we find ourselves balking at two significant junctures. First, we contend that Murphy’s characterization of divine holiness requires revision, as appeal to attraction and repulsion doesn’t adequately capture attitudes such as awe and reverence that are central to experiences of the holy. And, second, we argue that the ‘holiness framework’ for divine action fails to accomplish its aims, largely because it rejects the claim that God’s perfect moral goodness and lovingkindness ground God’s holiness. We conclude that theorists should instead embrace a framework for action that integrates God’s perfect moral goodness, lovingkindness, and holiness. (shrink)

In Atonement, Eleonore Stump develops a novel and compelling Thomistic account of the atonement and argues that Anselmian interpretations must be rejected. In this review essay, after summarizing her account, we raise worries about some aspects of it. First, we respond to her primary objection to Anselmian interpretations by arguing that, contrary to Stump, love does not require unilateral and unconditional forgiveness. Second, we suggest that the heart of Anselmian interpretations—that reconciliation with God requires reparation/restitution/satisfaction—is plausible and well-supported by some (...) of her own arguments. Third, we raise doubts about her views of the role of surrender in justification and the nature of justification itself. Finally, we question whether Stump’s account can successfully explain how the atonement deals with pre-justification sin. A central theme of our comments is that Stump’s Thomistic interpretation can be entwined with Anselmian interpretations to make a stronger account of the atonement. (shrink)

Terence Cuneo & Jada Twedt Strabbing, Samuel Fleischacker, Jonathan Rutledge & Jordan Wessling, and Sameer Yadav have generously engaged with the accounts of divine holiness and its implications offered in my _Divine Holiness and Divine Action_ (2021), criticizing its arguments and in some cases offering attractive alternative accounts. Here I respond to some of their criticisms.

In recent years, with both the development of next‐generation sequencing approaches and the Supreme Court decision invalidating gene patents, declining costs have contributed to the emergence of a new model of hereditary cancer genetic testing. Multigene panel testing (or multiplex testing) involves using next‐generation sequencing technology to determine the sequence of multiple cancer‐susceptibility genes. In addition to high‐penetrance cancer‐susceptibility genes, multigene panels frequently include genes that are less robustly associated with cancer predisposition. Scientific understanding about associations between many specific moderate‐penetrance (...) gene variants and cancer risks is incomplete. The emergence of multigene panel tests has created unique challenges that may have meaningful psychosocial implications. Contrasted with the serial testing process, wherein patients consider the personal and clinical implications of each evaluated gene, with multigene panel testing, patients provide broad consent to whichever genes are included in a particular panel and then, after the test, receive in‐depth genetic counseling to clarify the distinct implications of their specific results. Consequently, patients undergoing multigene panel testing may have a less nuanced understanding of the test and its implications, and they may have fewer opportunities to self‐select against the receipt of particular types of genetic‐risk information. Evidence is conflicting regarding the emotional effects of this testing. (shrink)

When one communicates that they are in pain, it is often assumed that the speaker is providing an assertion or report. Call this the cognitivist stance of pain utterances. Nevertheless, many sentential pain utterances seem to have both assertive and imperatival communicative content in virtue of expressing both the speaker's pain belief and the pain experience, respectively. I call this view hybrid expressivism about pain. In this paper, I take the imperativist idea of pain seriously and show that, via an (...) expression relation, pain utterances inherit the imperative and motivational force of the pain. A hybrid expressivist stance better explains why pain utterances often have the perlocutionary effect of eliciting care from others, and it can provide a new understanding of what it means to silence one's pain. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:Autistic adults suffer from an alarmingly high and increasing unemployment rate. Many companies use pre-employment personality screening tests. These filters likely have disparate impacts on neurodivergent individuals, exacerbating this social problem. This situation gives rise to a bind. On the one hand, the tests disproportionately harm a vulnerable group in society. On the other, employers think that personality test scores are predictors of job performance and have a right to use personality traits in their decisions. It is difficult to say (...) whether these negative disparate impacts are a case of wrongful discrimination. Nevertheless, we will show that pre-employment personality tests prey on several features of autism in an unfair way, and for this reason, we suggest the contours of some regulation that we deem necessary. (shrink)

The novel coronavirus of 2019 exposed, in an undeniable way, the severity of racial inequities in America’s healthcare system. As the urgency of the pandemic grew, administrators, clinicians, and ethicists became concerned with upholding the ethical principle of “most lives saved” by re-visiting crisis standards of care and triage protocols. Yet a colorblind, race-neutral approach to “most lives saved” is inherently inequitable because it reflects the normality and invisibility of ‘whiteness’ while simultaneously disregarding the burdens of ‘Blackness’. As written, the (...) crisis standards of care adopted by States are racist policies because they contribute to a history that treats Black Americans are inherently less than. This paper will unpack the idealized fairness and equity pursued by CSC, while also considering the use of modified Sequential Organ Failure Assessment as a measure of objective equality in the context of a healthcare system that is built on systemic racism and the potential dangers this can have on Black Americans with COVID-19. (shrink)

Whether in meta-analysis or single experiments, selecting results based on statistical significance leads to overestimated effect sizes, impeding falsification. We critique a quantitative synthesis that used significance to score and select previously published effects for situation awareness-performance associations. How much does selection using statistical significance quantitatively impact results in a meta-analytic context? We evaluate and compare results using significance-filtered effects versus analyses with all effects as-reported. Endsley reported high predictiveness scores and large positive mean correlations but used atypical methods: the (...) hypothesis was used to select papers and effects. Papers were assigned the maximum predictiveness scores if they contained at-least-one significant effect, yet most papers reported multiple effects, and the number of non-significant effects did not impact the score. Thus, the predictiveness score was rarely less than the maximum. In addition, only significant effects were included in Endsley’s quantitative synthesis. Filtering excluded half of all reported effects, with guaranteed minimum effect sizes based on sample size. Results for filtered compared to as-reported effects clearly diverged. Compared to the mean of as-reported effects, the filtered mean was overestimated by 56%. Furthermore, 92% of the as-reported effects were below the mean of filtered effects. We conclude that outcome-dependent selection of effects is circular, predetermining results and running contrary to the purpose of meta-analysis. Instead of using significance to score and filter effects, meta-analyses should follow established research practices. (shrink)

"Jada's working on her science project. She's finding out whether plants grow best in water, milk, juice, or soda. There's just one problem--she keeps getting interrupted. From her cousin texting and her friends stopping by to her little brother playing with the plants, Jada runs into one obstacle after another. Find out how [she] relies on grit to keep on going"--Back cover.

In a recent paper, Strabbing (2020) argues that forgiveness is openness to reconciliation relative to a relationship level. In this paper, we argue that the openness-to-reconciliation account of forgiveness does not constitute an improvement on the forswearing-resentment account. We argue that it does not fit well with our ordinary practices of forgiving and cannot allow for plausible cases of forgiveness without reconciliation. We also argue that the features Strabbing identifies as distinct advantages of her account are features of (...) the forswearing-resentment account as well. (shrink)

Abstract Sankara's philosophy fails definitively at the point where he leaves the human experience??sinning and suffering??unaccounted for. What in each of us, he asks, sins and suffers? Is it the antahkarana, the ?mental organ? giving rise to the series of mental states (buddins) that file by illumined by the atman? Impossible, he says, for the antahkarana by itself is material (jada,) and therefore unconscious (acit). Then is it the ?tman, upon which the antahkarana is superimposed? Inconceivable, he says, for (...) the atman is identical with Brahman, and Brahman is by definition pure bliss?consciousness, as far removed from sin and suffering as can be imagined. Then is the atman in conjunction with the antahkarana?a partnership that Sankara calls the jiva (or soul)?the sinner and sufferer? Yes, he says, as long as you remember that the sin and suffering are ultimately illusory, as illusory as the antahkarana itself. I show why Sankara's answer fails and what the failure implies, then suggest a fruitful way to approach Sankara and teach his philsophy to our students. (shrink)

Artikkel lähtub Hegeli filosoofilise süsteemi mittemetafüüsilisest tõlgendusest ja keskendub ühele aspektile Hegeli dialektilise meetodi juures, mille iseloomustamiseks oleks autori arvates kõige adekvaatsem kasutada narratiivi mõistet. Artikli tees on kokkuvõtlikult järgmine: Hegeli arvates ei ole filosoofiline tõde väljendatav ühe lause või propositsiooniga, vaid see nõuab tervet väidete jada, kusjuures mõistete määratlused selles väidete jadas peavad suutma teiseneda --- nii nagu kirjandusliku jutustuse käigus võivad teiseneda tegelaste iseloom ja arusaamine asjadest . Lisaks neile kahele omadusele on narratiivile iseloomulik talle omaste struktuurielementide (...) abil loodud terviklikkus, mis võimaldab tal anda edasi sellist mõtet, mis ei sisaldu üheski narratiivi moodustavas lauses üksikult võetuna. Need kolm omadust võimaldavad Hegeli "dialektilisele" meetodile narratiiviteooria vahenditega uut valgust heita ja spekulatiivse tõe loomust paremini mõista. The paper discusses the nature of Hegel's dialectical method and criticizes its wide-spread interpretation according to the thesis-antithesis-synthesis formula. It is argued that there is no evidence of triadic structures in Hegel's works. Rather, the elements or "determinations" ) that make up the body of Hegel's texts, are organized as "series" that form circles, in which, as Hegel maintains, the last element leads us back to the first. If synthesis means creating something new by using the initial elements then it is problematic whether anything becomes synthesized in Hegel texts. The paper argues against interpreting the every third element of the series or the end-points of the series as synthetic unities. Instead, the paper proposes that Hegel's speculative method uses the form of narrative for creating a vessel that is able to express the "speculative truth" which is "fluid" and which requires a "plastic" form of presentation. Narrative can accomplish what a singular proposition and a deductive system cannot, because it consists of a series of claims that is able to express the movement of what is said in each claim, and because its ending creates a point at which the story as a whole obtains a meaning that is not expressed in any particular sentence constituting the story. (shrink)