TWENTIETH-CENTURY ETHICS. AFTER NIETZSCHE -/- Preface This book tells the story of twentieth-century ethics or, in more detail, it reconstructs the history of a discussion on the foundations of ethics which had a start with Nietzsche and Sidgwick, the leading proponents of late-nineteenth-century moral scepticism. During the first half of the century, the prevailing trends tended to exclude the possibility of normative ethics. On the Continent, the trend was to transform ethics into a philosophy of existence whose self-appointed task was (...) that of describing the human condition as consisting of choices, as unavoidable as arbitrary, without any attempt at providing criteria for making such choices. In the Anglo-Saxon countries, the heir of ethics was a philosophy of morality, that is, an analysis of the language of morality that intended to clarify valuations without trying to justify them. 1958 was the year of the normative turn that led to the Rehabilitation of practical philosophy, a turn followed by decades of controversies between distinct kinds of normative ethics: utilitarian, Kantian, virtue ethics. While the controversy was raging, a quiet revolution took place, that of applied ethics which surprisingly dissolved the controversy's very subject matter by providing methods for making convergence possible on intermediate principles even when no agreement was available about first principles. The normative turn and the revolution of applied ethics have led us, at the turn of the century, to a goal that was quite far from the starting point. Instead of scepticism and relativism that was the fashion at the beginning of the century, at the beginning of the third millennium impartial and universal moral arguments seem to hold the spot being supported, if not by a final rational foundation, at least by reasonableness, the most precious legacy of the Enlightenment. -/- ● TABLE OF CONTENTS -/- ● I Anglo-Saxon philosophy: naturalism 1. Dewey beyond evolutionism and utilitarianism 2. Dewey and anti-essentialist moral epistemology 3. Dewey and naturalist moral ontology 4. Dewey and normative ethics of conduct and function 5. Perry and semantic naturalism -/- ● II Anglo-Saxon philosophy: ideal utilitarianism and neo-intuitionism 1. Moore's critique of utilitarian empiricism 2. Moore on the naturalistic fallacy 3. Moore on the nature of intrinsic value 4. Moore on ideal utilitarianism 5. Prichard on the priority of the right over the good 6. Ross's coherentist moral epistemology 7. Ross's moral ontology: realism, pluralism, and non-naturalism 8. Ross's normative ethics of prima facie duties -/- The chapter reconstructs the background of ideas, concerns and intentions out of which Moore's early essays, the preliminary version, and then the final version of Principia Ethica originated. It stresses the role of religious concerns, as well as that of the Idealist legacy. It argues that PE is more a patchwork of somewhat diverging contributions than a unitary work, not to say the paradigm of a new school in Ethics. -/- ●III Anglo-Saxon philosophy: non-cognitivism 1. The Scandinavian School, the Vienna circle and proto-emotivism 2. Wittgenstein and the ineffability of ethics 3. Russell's and Ayer's radical emotivism 4. Stevenson and moderate emotivism 5. Stevenson and the pragmatics of moral language 6. Stevenson and the methods for solving ethical disagreement 7. Hare and prescriptivism The chapter reconstructs first the discussion after Moore. The naturalistic-fallacy argument was widely accepted but twisted to prove instead that the intuitive character of the definition of 'good', its non-cognitive meaning, in a first phase identified with 'emotive' meaning. Alfred Julius Ayer is indicated as a typical proponent of such non-cognitivist meta-ethics. More detailed discussion is dedicated to Bertrand Russell's ethics, a more nuanced and sophisticated doctrine, arguing that non-cognitivism does not condemn morality to arbitrariness and that the project of rational normative ethics is still possible, heading finally to the justification of a kind of non-hedonist utilitarianism. Stevenson's theory, another moderate version of emotivism is discussed at some length, showing how the author comes close to the discovery of the role of a pragmatic dimension of language as a basis for ethical argument. A section reconstructs the discussion from the Forties about Hume's law, mentioning Karl Popper's argument and Richard Hare's early non-cognitivist but non-emotivist doctrine named prescriptivism. -/- ●IV Anglo-Saxon philosophy: critics of non-cognitivism 1. Neo-naturalism and its objections to the naturalistic fallacy argument 2. Objections to Hume's law 3. Clarence Lewis and the pragmatic contradiction 4. Toulmin and the good reasons approach 5. Baier and moral reasons 5. Baier, social moralities and the absolute morality 6. Baier and the moral point of view 7. Baier and the contents of absolute ethics -/- ● V Continental philosophy: the philosophy of values 1. Max Weber and the polytheism of values 2. Phenomenology against psychologism and rationalism 3. Reinach and the theory of social acts 4. Scheler and the material ethics of values 5. Hartmann and the ontology of values 6. Plessner, Gehlen and the Philosophische Anthropologie -/- The chapter illustrates first the idea of phenomenology and the Husserl's project of a phenomenological ethic as illustrated in his 1908-1914 lectures. The key idea is dismissing psychology and trying to ground a new science of the apriori of action, within which a more restricted field of inquiry will be the science of right actions. Then the chapter illustrates the criticism of modern moral philosophy conducted in the 1920 lectures, where the main target is naturalism, understood in the Kantian meaning of primacy of common sense. The third point illustrate is Adolph Reinach's theory of social acts as a key the grounding of norms, a view that sketches the ideas 'discovered' later by Clarence I. Lewis, John Searle, Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas. A final section discusses Nicolai Hartman, who always refused to define himself a phenomenologist and yet developed a more articulated and detailed theory of 'values' – with surprising affinities with George E. Moore - than philosophers such as Max Scheler, who claimed to be Husserl's legitimate heirs. -/- ● VI Continental philosophy: the critics of the philosophy of values 1. Freud, the Superego and Civilization 2. Heidegger on original ethos against ethics 3. Sartre and de Beauvoir on authenticity and ambiguity 4. Adorno and Horkheimer on emancipation and immoralism -/- ●VII Post-liberal theologians and religious thinkers 1. Barth on the autonomy of faith from ethics 2. Developments of Reformed moral theology after Barth 3. Bonhoeffer on the concrete divine command and ethics of penultimate realities 4. Developments of Reformed and Catholic moral theology after world war II 5. Baeck and the transformation of liberal Judaism 6. Rosenzweig against liberal Judaism 7. Buber and religion as the vital lymph of morality 8. Heschel and Judaism as a science of actions -/- The chapter examines the main protagonists of Christian theology and Jewish religious thinking in the twentieth century. It stresses how the main dilemmas of contemporary philosophical ethics lie at the root of the various path of inquiry taken by these thinkers. -/- ● VIII Normative ethics: neo-Utilitarianism 1. The discussion on act and rule utilitarianism 2. Hare on two-tiered preference utilitarianism 3. Harsanyi, Gauthier and rational choice ethics 4. Parfit, utilitarianism and the idea of a person 5. Brandt and indirect conscience utilitarianism -/- The chapter addresses the issue of the complex process of self-transformation Utilitarianism underwent after Sidgwick's and Moore's fatal criticism and the unexpected Phoenix-like process of rebirth of a doctrine refuted. Two examples give the reader a glimpse at this uproarious process. The first is Roy Harrod Wittgensteinian transformation of utilitarianism in pure normative ethics depurated from hedonism as well as from whatsoever theory of the good. This transformation results in preference utilitarianism combined with a 'Kantian' version of rule utilitarianism. The second is Richard Hare's two-level preference utilitarianism, where act utilitarianism plays the function of the eventual rational justification of moral judgments and rule-utilitarianism that of an action-guiding practical device. -/- ● IX Normative ethics: neo-Aristotelianism and virtue ethics 1. Hannah Arendt, action and judgement 2. Hans-Georg Gadamer and phronesis 3. Alasdair MacIntyre on practices, virtues, and traditions 5. Stuart Hampshire on deliberation 6. Bernard Williams and moral complexity 7. Feminist ethics -/- Sect 1 reconstructs the post-war rediscovery of ethics by many German thinkers and its culmination in the Sixties in the movement named 'Rehabilitation of practical philosophy' is described. Heidegger's most brilliant disciples were the promoters of this Rehabilitation. Hans-Georg Gadamer is a paradigmatic example. His reading of Aristotle's lesson I reconstructed, starting with Heidegger's lesson but then subtly subverting its outcome thanks to the recovery of the significant role of the notion of phronesis. Sect 3 discusses the three theses defended by Anscombe in 'Modern Moral Philosophy'. It argues that: a) her answer to the question "why should I be moral?" requires a solution of the problem of theodicy, and ignores any attempts to save the moral point of view without recourse to divine retribution; b) her notion of divine law is an odd one more neo-Augustinian than Biblical or Scholastic; c) her image of Kantian ethics and intuitionism is the impoverished image manufactured by consequentialist opponents for polemical purposes and that she seems strangely accept it; d) the difficulty of identifying the "relevant descriptions" of acts is not an argument in favour of an ethics of virtue and against consequentialism or Kantian ethics, and indeed the role of judgment in the latter is a response to the difficulties raised by the case of judgment concerning future action. The chapter gives a short look at further developments in the neo-naturalist current trough a reconstruction of Philippa Foot's and Peter Geach's critiques to the naturalist-fallacy argument and Alasdair MacIntyre's grand reconstruction of the origins and allegedly inevitable failure of the Enlightenment project of an autonomous ethic. -/- ● X Normative ethics: Kantian and rights-based ethics 1. Dialogical constructivism 2. Apel, Habermas and discourse ethics 3. Gewirth and rights-based ethics 4. Nagel on agent-relative reasons 5. Donagan and persons as ends in themselves Parallel to the neo-Aristotelian trend, there was in the Rehabilitation of practical philosophy a Kantian current. This current started with the discovery of the pragmatic dimension of language carried out by Charles Peirce and the Oxford linguistic philosophy. On this basis, Karl-Otto Apel singled out as the decisive proponent of the linguistic and Kantian turn in German-speaking ethics, worked out the performative-contradiction argument while claiming that this was able to provide a new rational and universal basis for normative ethics. The chapter offers an examination of his argument in some detail, followed by a more cursory reconstruction of Jürgen Habermas's elaboration on Apel's theory. -/- ● XI The applied ethics renaissance 1. Elisabeth Anscombe on the atom bomb 2. From medical ethics to bioethics 3. Rawls and public ethics 3. Nozick, Dworkin and further developments of public ethics 5. Sen and the revival of economic ethics -/- The chapter presents the revolution of applied ethics while stressing its methodological novelty, exemplified primarily by Beauchamp and Childress principles approach and then by Jonsen and Toulmin's new casuistry. The chapter argues that Rawls's distinction between a "political" and a "metaphysical" approach to the theory of justice, one central part of ethical theory, is a formulation of the same basic idea at the root of both the principles approach and the new casuistry, both discussed in the following chapter. The idea is that it is possible to reach an agreement concerning positive moral judgments even though the discussion is still open – and in Rawls' view never will be close – on the essential criteria for judgment. -/- ● XII Fin-de-siècle metaethics 1. Deontic logics 2. Anti-realism 3. External realism 4. Internal realism 5. Kantian constructivism -/- The chapter illustrates the fresh start of meta-ethical discussion in the Eighties and Nineties and the resulting new alignments: metaphysical naturalism, internal realism, anti-realism, and constructivism. (shrink)

RESUMEN Se aborda el pensamiento de E.M. Cioran desde la perspectiva de un sinsabor vital denominado sentimiento de muerte. El término, aunque aparece solo en su primer escrito, es transversal a toda su obra, puesto que para el autor los seres humanos nos intuimos como posesos de la muerte en cada momento de nuestra existencia. Esto cambia el tono normal de la vida, al poner frente a la persona una realidad carente de sentido y dominada por circunstancias radicales y limitantes (...) como el dolor y la agonía, que culmina en una atmósfera gobernada por la intuición trágica de la vida. ABSTRACT The article addresses the thought of E.M. Cioran from the perspective of that vital uneasiness known as the sentiment of death. Although the term appears only in his first book, the idea cuts across his entire work given that, for Cioran, human beings intuit themselves as possessed by death at every moment of their lives. When persons are faced with a meaningless reality, dominated by radical and limiting circumstances such as pain and agony, the whole tenor of life changes until it becomes a tragic intuition of life. (shrink)

As religiões de matriz africana no Brasil possuem um rico e complexo sistema de crenças, ritos e mitos que caracterizam a sua experiência religiosa. Este trabalho limita-se a estudar alguns temas religiosos do Candomblé de raiz nagô. A ideia de criação funda-se na concepção de um duplo cosmos, organizado em dois planos: o universo físico (aiyê) e o seu duplo espiritual (órum). Deus (Olorum), concebido como ser supremo e criador de todos os outros seres, estabelece relação com os seres humanos (...) pela mediação dos ancestrais coletivos (Orixás) e familiares (Egúns). Não há uma separação nítida entre os Orixás, enquanto divindades relacionadas às forças da natureza, e os ancestrais fundadores do povo. A partir dessas concepções, destaca-se o Axé como o elemento mais importante dessa tradição, perpassando todo o seu drama religioso na busca de uma experiência na participação na força vital (Deus), envolvendo a vida dos adeptos e as suas relações sociais na comunidade do terreiro de Candomblé. Palavras chave: Espiritualidade nagô. Religiosidade afro-brasileira. Axé.The religions of African origin in Brazil have a rich and complex system of beliefs, rites and myths, which characterizes their religious experience. This work aims to study some of the religious themes' Candomblé Nago. The idea of ​​creation is based on the design of a dual cosmos, organized in two levels: the physical universe (Aiye) and its spiritual double (Orum). God (Olorun), conceived as the supreme being and creator of all other beings, establishes relationship with humans through the mediation of collective ancestors (Orishas) and their families (EGUNS). There is no clear separation between the Orishas as deities related to the forces of nature, and the founding ancestors of the people. Based on these concepts, the Axe is highlighted as the most important element of this tradition, passing all his religious drama in search of an experience of participation in the life force (God), involving the lives of followers and their social relations within the community of Candomblé titled Terreiro. Key-words: Nago spirituality. Afro-Brazilian religiosity. Axé. (shrink)

Cartesian skepticism represents a fundamental element of the Cartesian method directed to find the metaphysical certainties that securely justify knowledge. Nonetheless, the Cartesian radical doubt has clearly defined limits insofar as it does not extend to the realm of vital praxis. The present paper develops the connection between Cartesian moral certainty and the notion of «practice of life» in order to show how Descartes’ methodological skepticism is framed in the academic tradition rather than in the Pyrrhonian one.

Cartesian skepticism represents a fundamental element of the Cartesian method directed to find the metaphysical certainties that securely justify knowledge. Nonetheless, the Cartesian radical doubt has clearly defined limits insofar as it does not extend to the realm of vital praxis. The present paper develops the connection between Cartesian moral certainty and the notion of «practice of life» in order to show how Descartes’ methodological skepticism is framed in the academic tradition rather than in the Pyrrhonian one.

Existen conceptos o concepciones sobre la realidad que permean asiduamente el despliegue del pensamiento y la vida en sus devenires cotidianos o fácticos. En este sentido, quien comienza a formarse en los quehaceres de la investigación filosófica, encara con alguna frecuencia la responsabilidad de confrontar aquellas nociones que, bajo la forma de precomprensiones, obstruyen las transiciones comprensivas e interpretativas propias de toda tarea investigativa. En este caso, la posibilidad de distinguir el contenido característico de las ideologías naturalistas, de aquellas otras (...) que le son propias a las filosofías trágicas o inmanentistas, quizá pueda incidir argumentalmente en las tensiones dialógicas que hoy atraviesan a las culturas cuando se pone de manifiesto el deseo de reivindicar posiciones totalitarias o relativistas en relación con esferas de la vida y del pensamiento humanos tan diversas como la política, la religión, el género, la sexualidad, la etnia, la raza, entre otras. La tarea de quien se forma en investigación filosófica consiste, en buena medida, en advertir que los conceptos filosóficos logran vivificarse cuando ceden a la interlocución vital que les proponen constantemente las contingencias propias de todo lapso histórico. En efecto, algunos asuntos se palpan en la atmósfera de un tiempo determinado; también se encuentran en las tramas tangibles de las existencias humanas. (shrink)

En este artículo se describen las dimensiones biológica y espiritual del ser humano según Max Scheler. La dualidad que aparece no es aquella entre lo físico y lo anímico, sino entre lo vital y lo espiritual. Las dos dimensiones son, según Scheler, esencialmente distintas; sin embargo, se necesitan mutuamente de una manera original.

A review of a collection of essays one meta-philosophy by fifteen philosophers, including Rorty, Castañeda and Putnam. It is a stimulating collection, useful reading for those who want to go beyond the caricatures of today's philosophy in America, for those interested in the discussion on the origins of the split between continental philosophy and Anglo-American philosophy and for the philosopher who does not disdain a moment of "self-consciousness". The editors, both teaching at Tel-Aviv University, have proved able to manage this (...) small transoceanic enterprise with originality; it is a symptom, like those represented by many other books of Israeli philosophers published in recent years in German and much more in English, of the vitality and openness to the outside world of this small philosophical community. (shrink)

Nossas motivações e leituras de mundo sustentam-se no pressuposto de que as moralidades geram eticidades e as eticidades geram juridicidades. Tal correspondência une o destino a um modo ancestre de decidir sobre as situações do presente. Pensar ou exercitar uma epistemologia a partir da ancestralidade significa adotar uma postura ética frente a uma camada questionável de pensamentos e saberes identificáveis como africanos e diaspóricos. Isso implica numa mudança na carga teórico-epistemológica em que são construídos estes conceitos. A ancestralidade pode ser (...) lida como uma categoria de alteridade. Mais que isso, uma categoria de trans-alteridade, posto que se referência no local de relação, ou seja, do encontro da diferença. Uma ancestralidade como referência e fundamento de uma nova utopia em nome de uma ética da sobrevivência e do equilíbrio com a natureza. Esta é uma das dimensões da experiência afrodiaspórica no Brasil. Uma experiência que deve ser vista também no campo da justiça política. Esta ancestralidade pode ser lida também numa perspectiva normativa não religiosa. O instituto da morte aparece como fator decisivo para a objetivação dos conceitos definidores do ancestral. Assim como, o estado de união vital dos elementos naturais e sociais constitutivos do homem caracteriza sua manifestação no mundo terrestre. A dissolução dessa união estabelece um novo estado existencial. A morte, portanto, permite a última transfiguração do homem. Neste caso, a ancestralidade influencia um universo mais amplo da existência e das forças físicas e metafísicas possuindo um poder normativo maior. O controle do mundo visível e invisível confere à ancestralidade um status de fenômeno jurídico. Os mandamentos ancestrais referenciam-se como fontes axiológicas sobre um conceito de justiça construído coletivamente. Tratar os princípios ancestrais como parte dos estudos da hermenêutica jurídica nos leva ao diálogo dos métodos e procedimentos para alcançar esta possibilidade. A valorização dos nossos próprios mitos e caráter identitário é uma sugestão poderosa para retomarmos o fio da história e das interpretações possíveis de liberdade e justiça para a realidade jurídica brasileira. Palavras chaves: Ancestralidade, Epistemologia, Moralidade, Ético, Normativo. (shrink)

Este no es un libro de filosofía, ni de astrología, ni de esoterismo. No hay en él ninguna pretensión más allá de la simple expresión de un recorrido intelectual y vital, de una búsqueda y un encuentro. Desde este punto de vista se intentan exponer tres esferas distintas del ser y del conocer, de forma separada pero con las oportunas referencias cruzadas, y manteniendo siempre la jerarquía que las diferencia. La primera de ellas es la que aquí se considera como (...) un tipo de exoterismo, es decir, un ámbito externo de considerar las cosas (en referencia a los dos siguientes): la filosofía; con la razón como facultad analítica y reflexiva por excelencia, pretende buscar las razones de ciertas problemáticas mediante el pensamiento discursivo. El segundo ámbito, el intermedio, definido como el del simbolismo, de la analogía universal o del anima mundi, es tratado aquí en referencia a una ciencia tradicional y sagrada: la astrología. Y el tercero y último es aquel dominio correspondiente a la Metafísica integral, en el sentido profundo que apunta hacia la Trascendencia misma, como núcleo de toda forma espiritual; se presentará aquí desde el esoterismo tradicional en la línea de los trabajos de René Guénon, pero principalmente desde la tradición más reciente (la islámica) y la considerada por muchos más primordial (la hindú). (shrink)

The question of whether the entrepreneur is born or made, forces us to respond that the entrepreneurial culture clearly breaks with the myth that entrepreneurs are born. Currently, it is considered that entrepreneurial skills can be acquired like any other discipline and that is why it should be taught. Their teaching and learning are key to the well-being of the teacher and to the positive achievement of the students. The entrepreneurial culture is an educational objective of developed societies and has (...) its origin in the business culture. There are two current models, American and European. The one that develops in the Extremadura region, based on the European model, tries to create a vital state in the participating students that enhances competences such as creativity, personal initiative or self-confidence, elements that try to generate a true motivation to undertake. The motivated, accomplished and positive teacher contributes to that achievement and achieving it favors the well-being of teachers. It’s a round trip. It is a “do ut des.” In our research, we evaluated four entrepreneurial culture programs in the classroom: “Junioremprende,” “Teenemprende,” “Experemprende,” and “Youthemprende.” The teachers involved in the programs are 356, and the valid questionnaires are 154. The students enrolled in the programs are 4800, and the questionnaires valid 1198. In the questionnaire, one of the key questions is “general teacher satisfaction,” with 17 common questions for all the programs. An essential question posed is: “I am satisfied with the achievements obtained by my students to participate in the program” The results of our research, according to a seven-point Likert scale, gives a very high degree of teachers’ satisfaction. Their satisfaction was centered on the perception of their teachings are conducive to the achievement of his students. The degree of teacher satisfaction for each of the programs and significantly means differences were found with Junior program resulted the more satisfied for teachers. For students, participation in the programs resulted in high development of entrepreneurial competencies. Similarly to teachers results, Junior program was found more significant in developing students’ entrepreneurial competencies indicating that entrepreneurial education is very appropriate for children. Findings of this study suggest that entrepreneurial education should be encouraged for students at every stage of education. (shrink)

This book develops Non-Identity Theodicy as an original response to the problem of evil. It constructs an ethical framework for theodicy by sketching four cases of human action where horrendous evils are either caused, permitted, or risked, either for pure benefit or for harm avoidance.

In her book Specifications Grading, Linda B. Nilson advocates for a grading regimen she claims will save faculty time, increase student motivation, and improve the quality and rigor of student work. If she is right, there is a strong case for many faculty to adopt some version of the system she recommends. In this paper, we argue that she is mostly right and recommend that faculty move away from traditional grading. We begin by rehearsing the central features of specifications grading (...) and providing two examples of how to implement it in philosophy classes. In light of the examples, we argue that specifications grading fulfills two of Nilson’s central desiderata but not the third. Since specifications grading generates two benefits that when combined increase student learning, without adding or increasing burdens, we conclude that student learning increases when courses are revised to include aspects of specifications grading. (shrink)

Abstract:Francesco Vitale discusses with Rodolphe Gasché the history of Heidegger reception in France and Germany, and more.

Towards biodeconstruction -- Between life and death: différance -- The absolute programme -- The text and the living -- Between life and death: the bond -- Beyond life death: autoimmunity -- Living on: the arche-performative.

This paper intends to verify the extent and effectiveness of the transforming appropriation of the Derridean concept of ‘differance’ by Stiegler with respect to the problems that, according to Stiegler, make this creative critical operation necessary; in particular with respect to the most recent question concerning the possibility of thinking about and putting into practice a ‘neganthropological différance’ capable of facing the ecological crisis that today seems to threaten the very existence of life on earth. The paper goes back to (...) Technics and Time 1. to analyze the distinction between ‘vital difference’ and ‘noetic difference’ that constitutes the condition of possibility of the ‘neganthropological différance.’ In this perspective, the distinction proposed by Stiegler seems to re-propose the hierarchically oriented oppositional structure that characterizes metaphysical thought and in particular the opposition between man and animal, attributing to the human being the ability to free himself from the constraints of his biological-natural condition. Finally, the paper attempts to account for the repercussions of this approach on the very possibility of an effective response to the ecological crisis, concluding with a provocation regarding the role that theory can and must play with regard to such an urgent and far-reaching problem. (shrink)

Work defines the lives of most people. Many people work overtime, work second jobs, or bring work home with them. It is often difficult to know when work stops and the rest of life begins. In a culture where work is central to our identities, good work is increasingly difficult to find. This article argues that one of the impediments to imagining a future beyond work is the productivist logic that predominates today, which determines labor and production to be key (...) activities and values. To sketch a path beyond work, the author turns to Marx, arguing that Marx provides an important critique of productivism and gestures toward a postwork future in his own writings. To do so, the author defends Marx against critiques of productivism. (shrink)

Examines the relationship of Derrida’s writings on architecture to his methodology of deconstruction and to deconstrutivism in architecture. Between 1984 and 1994 Jacques Derrida wrote and spoke a great deal about architecture both in his academic work and in connection with a number of particular building projects around the world. He engaged significantly with the work of architects such as Bernard Tschumi, Peter Eisenman, and Daniel Libeskind. Derrida conceived of architecture as an example of the kind of multidimensional writing that (...) he had theorized in Of Grammatology, identifying a rich common ground between architecture and philosophy in relation to ideas about political community and the concept of dwelling. In this book, Francesco Vitale analyzes Derrida’s writings and demonstrates how Derrida’s work on this topic provides a richer understanding of his approach to deconstruction, highlighting the connections and differences between philosophical deconstruction and architectural deconstrutivism. “Although there has been some discussion of the intersection of deconstruction and architecture in the past, mostly among architects and architectural critics, Vitale’s work is distinguished by the fact that it is written by a true philosopher who has a much more acute sense than has usually been the case of the philosophical underpinnings of Derrida’s exchanges with Tschumi, Eisenman, and others. Vitale is throughout concise, precise, insightful, and often brilliant.” — Geoffrey Bennington, author of Interrupting Derrida. (shrink)

Work defines the lives of most people. Many people work overtime, work second jobs, or bring work home with them. It is often difficult to know when work stops and the rest of life begins. In a culture where work is central to our identities, good work is increasingly difficult to find. This article argues that one of the impediments to imagining a future beyond work is the productivist logic that predominates today, which determines labor and production to be key (...) activities and values. To sketch a path beyond work, the author turns to Marx, arguing that Marx provides an important critique of productivism and gestures toward a postwork future in his own writings. To do so, the author defends Marx against critiques of productivism. (shrink)

Work defines the lives of most people. Many people work overtime, work second jobs, or bring work home with them. It is often difficult to know when work stops and the rest of life begins. In a culture where work is central to our identities, good work is increasingly difficult to find. This article argues that one of the impediments to imagining a future beyond work is the productivist logic that predominates today, which determines labor and production to be key (...) activities and values. To sketch a path beyond work, the author turns to Marx, arguing that Marx provides an important critique of productivism and gestures toward a postwork future in his own writings. To do so, the author defends Marx against critiques of productivism. (shrink)

This article responds to the critique of productivist essentialism, which is the view that the human is the productive animal, made against Marx. The author argues against this view and holds that Marx introduces a dialectical account of human essence with the notion of species being in the 1844 Manuscripts, which he then develops in The German Idology. This account of essence includes a static and dynamic moment, and in capitalism, the dialectic of essence has resulted in the appearance of (...) the human as the productive animal. Finally, the author argues that Marx’s critique of production and dialectical account of human essence allow us to better think the possibilities for a post-work future. (shrink)

Much of leftist political philosophy has uncritically accepted the logic of capitalism, which is a logic of conservation that presents itself as a logic of “production.” Many leftist political philosophers subscribe to capitalism’s fundamental myth—that capitalism produces the new. This appearance of proliferation, however, masks an underlying stasis. This article interrogates this trend in the apparently disparate projects of contemporary accelerationism and Jacques Rancière. The accelerationist project of immanence allows for newness only in quantity and not in quality, while Rancière, (...) coming closer to thinking radical newness in his account of politics, forecloses the possibility of a radically emancipatory society. I suggest an open ontology, which Marx offers, provides a better framework for thinking revolutionary newness. (shrink)

The article aims to assess Hobbes’ methodological legacy. After a brief review of different interpretations of Hobbes relevant to the subject, I center the discussion on the reading advanced by Norberto Bobbio and the notion of three “different forms and levels of rationality”: First, Hobbes’ dichotomy-based reasoning that radically contended the Aristotelian tradition, as well as biblical hermeneutics used by medieval theologians. Second, individualism as a method for collective decision making, one that led to socalled “game theory” and moral individualism (...) (quite significant in contemporary political philosophy). Finally, the rationality of political power that imposes on Sovereignty binding rules for gaining and maintaining power.After the discussion of the three different forms and levels of rationality, the article concludes that Thomas Hobbes, instead of being primarilyre- ferred to as an advocate of autocratic regimes, should be considered, at the very beginning of the long history of rule of law, as one of the key authors of modern constitutionalism and democracy.Resumen:Después de un rápido recorrido sobre las múltiples interpretaciones del pensamiento hobbesiano, el ensayo retoma y desarrolla la lectura que de Hobbes propuso Norberto Bobbio. Con base en esta lectura, se busca evaluar el legado metodológico de Hobbes, el cual se despliega a través de distintos niveles de racionalidad: en primer lugar, el razonamiento basado en dicotomías, el cual desafió de manera contundente la tradición aristotélica, la labor de los historiadores antiguos y la hermenéutica bíblica de los teólogos medievales. En segundo lugar, el individualismo como método para tomar decisiones colectivas, lo que abrió la puerta a la así llamada “teoría de juegos” y al individualismo moral tan notable en la filosofía política contemporánea. Y finalmente, la racionalidad del poder político, que lógicamente impone sobre la soberanía ciertas reglas vinculantes para obtener y mantener el poder.En conjunto, con el análisis de las distintas formas y niveles de racionalidad se pretende respaldar la idea de que Hobbes —antes de ser identificado como un defensor de regímenes autocráticos— puede ser considerado como un autor clave para la democracia y el constitucionalismo moderno, colocado en el justo inicio de la larga historia del Estado de derecho. (shrink)

The paper seeks to outline the relationship between Geschlecht III and Derrida’s published texts devoted to the mark «Geschlecht» in order to detect the general strategy followed by Jacques Derrida into the construction of his archive during his lifetime. Indeed, we suppose that his archive has to be build in accordance with his deconstructive statements about the classical conception of the archive: a totalizing closure of a textual production able to trace it back to the unity of an ideal identity. (...) In particular, the paper aims to focus on a passage at the end of Jacques Derrida’s Geschlecht III, where the question of the animal in Heidegger comes in the foreground and in a way that is slightly different from what we already know through Derrida’s published Works and could impose a re-reading of its «entire» work. (shrink)

Este ensayo se propone afrontar dos niveles de reflexión y cuestionamiento sobre la democracia procedimental y sobre los regímenes políticos en los que históricamente se han manifestado las “democracias avanzadas” occidentales. En un primer nivel se consideran las críticas sobre la mutación de la democracia procedimental y su transformación en una forma de oligarquía electiva, un régimen en el que acaba faltando la competición real entre elites distintas y distintas propuestas políticas. En un segundo nivel se pone en duda que (...) una restauración de la democracia procedimental, a partir de las propuestas de los grandes teóricos del siglo XX —Kelsen, Schumpeter, Popper, Bobbio, Ferrajoli— esté orientada y sea estructuralmente adecuada para afrontar con seriedad las “amenazas presentes”, pero en el fondo conocidas ya desde hace medio siglo (riesgo de una catástrofe ecológica, crecientes desigualdades planetarias, bulimia del mercado, terrorismo, etcétera). Amenazas que se agravan cada vez más tras la caída del muro de Berlín, y a las que todos estamos, aunque en distinta medida, expuestos. La respuesta de las democracias avanzadas a estas cuestiones ha estado marcada por el “desarrollo”, centrado en el modelo económico-político y científico-tecnológico occidental, que habría tenido que difundirse globalmente, con resultados contrarios a las expectativas, como quedó ya en evidencia en el informe Meadows, comisionado por el Club de Roma, y como siguen mostrando los estudios de autores como Jonas, Rist, Latouche. No sabiendo, o no pudiendo, mantener la promesa “ilustrada” de formar ciudadanos responsables y rindiéndose ante su infantilización por medio de las técnicas de marketing, como ha mostrado Barber, los regímenes democráticos que tenían su matriz teórica en la Ilustración parecen incapaces de generar en su interior ese “movimiento contrario” que podría despertar una conciencia, cuando menos difusa, de las amenazas globales que nos aguardan en el próximo futuro. (shrink)

Trust is a hot topic of academic research. Across disciplines – from philosophy to psychology to sociology – there is a growing body of scholarship on trust.1 This scholarship addresses, among othe...

In Biodeconstruction (2018) I argued that Derrida, in the Life Death seminar (1975–76), would have anticipated the most recent developments in epigenetics, a field in which the dogma of genetic determinism is radically challenged by noting the influence of the environment in the production of mutations in the genetic program, particularly when a genetic population is faced with a radical change in its environmental conditions, which I propose to call an ‘ecological event’. I explore a comparison between the Derridean deconstruction (...) of genetic determinism and the theoretical elaborations of epigenesis, referring to the work of Eva Jablonka and Marion J. Lamb, Evolution in Four Dimensions (2005). Jablonka and Lamb propose a theory of genetic variation in which mutations would be the result of the interpretation of unpredictable environmental events by the individual whose survival would be in danger. Through this comparison, I show that the study of ‘interpretive Mutations’ as reactions to unpredictable environmental events can be helpful in understanding the Derridean theme of the ‘event’, rearticulating it in relation to the radical environmental changes that humanity will sooner or later face. (shrink)

The article seeks to outline the relationship between Geschlecht III and Jacques Derrida’s published texts devoted to the mark “Geschlecht,” in order to detect the general strategy followed by Derrida in the construction of his archive during his lifetime. Indeed, we suppose that his archive has to be built in accordance with his deconstructive statements about the classical conception of the archive: a totalizing closure of a textual production able to trace it back to the unity of an ideal identity. (...) In particular, the article aims to focus on a passage at the end of Jacques Derrida’s Geschlecht III, where the question of the animal in Heidegger comes into the foreground and in a way that is slightly different from what we already know through Derrida’s published works and that could require a re-reading of his “entire” work. (shrink)

Deliberative democracy has assumed a central role in the debate about deepening democratic practices in complex contemporary societies. By acknowledging the citizens as the main actors in the political process, political deliberation entails a strong ideal of participation that has not, however, been properly clarified. The main purpose of this article is to discuss, through Jürgen Habermas’ analysis of modernity, reason and democracy, whether and to what extent deliberative democracy and participatory democracy are compatible and how they can, either separately (...) or together, enhance democratic practices. Further exploration of this relationship will permit a better understanding of the possibilities and limits of institutionalizing both discourses, as well as of developing democracy in a more substantive dimension. (shrink)

I develop a theodicy that begins with the recognition that we owe our existence to great and varied evils. I develop two versions of this theodicy, with the result that some version is available to the theist regardless of her assumptions about the existence and nature of free will. My defense of Non-Identity Theodicy is aided by an analogy between divine creation and human procreation. I argue that if one affirms the morality of voluntary human procreation, one should affirm the (...) morality of divine creation; conversely, denying the morality of divine creation commits one to denying the morality of human procreation. (shrink)

I develop a theodicy (Non-Identity Theodicy) that begins with the recognition that we owe our existence to great and varied evils. I develop two versions of this theodicy, with the result that some version is available to the theist regardless of her assumptions about the existence and nature of free will. My defense of Non-Identity Theodicy is aided by an analogy between divine creation and human procreation. I argue that if one af rms the morality of vol- untary human procreation, (...) one should af rm the morality of divine creation; conversely, deny- ing the morality of divine creation commits one to denying the morality of human procreation. (shrink)