Deliberative democracy has assumed a central role in the debate about deepening democratic practices in complex contemporary societies. By acknowledging the citizens as the main actors in the political process, political deliberation entails a strong ideal of participation that has not, however, been properly clarified. The main purpose of this article is to discuss, through Jürgen Habermas’ analysis of modernity, reason and democracy, whether and to what extent deliberative democracy and participatory democracy are compatible and how they can, either separately (...) or together, enhance democratic practices. Further exploration of this relationship will permit a better understanding of the possibilities and limits of institutionalizing both discourses, as well as of developing democracy in a more substantive dimension. (shrink)
Vitale plantea un razonamiento en torno a la existencia y naturaleza de los llamados «derechos colectivos». Tomando al antiguo filósofo Carnéades como pretexto y simple inspiración, el autor explora los argumentos tanto a favor como en contra de la existencia de comunidades homogéneas y de los derechos atribuibles a colectivos. Según Vitale, en ninguno de los dos casos la existencia o inexistencia de derechos colectivos obtie-ne un fundamento sólido. En el fondo, el multiculturalismo no logra evitar la contradic-ción (...) que consiste en el hecho de que los derechos particulares reivindicados por cada una de las comunidades terminan por ser totalmente incompatibles con aquellos igualmente particulares reivindicados por las otras comunidades. (shrink)
The paper aims to present a reading of the question of Testimony rising in Derrida's later works (from Faith and Knowledge to Poetics and Politics of Witnessing): the experience of Testimony as the irreducible condition of the relation to the Other, of every possible link among living human singularities and, thus, of the thinking of a community to come. This thinking is able to divert the community from the economy grounding and structuring it within our political tradition governed by the (...) metaphysics of presence, which demands the sacrifice of the Other in its multiple theoretical and practical forms. We intend to read this proposal and to point out its rich perspectives by bringing it into the articulation of an ethical-political archi-writing. So we suggest going back to Derrida's early analyses of phenomenology and to De la grammatologie in order to present a reading of archi-writing as the irreducible condition of the relation to otherness and, thus, of the experience through which a living human singularity constitutes itself, a singularity different from the one our tradition compels us to think of within the pattern of the absolute presence to the self, free from the relation to the other. (shrink)
The discussion about the Raven Paradox is ever-renewing: after nearly 70 years, many authors propose from time to time new solutions, and many authors state that these solutions are unsatisfactory. It is worthy to be carefully noted that though most arguments in favor or against the paradox are based on the notion of “probability” and on the application of Bayes’ law, not one of them makes use of the Kolmogorov axiomatic theory of probability and on the subsequent notion of “random (...) variable”. This seems to be due to a preference for the purely logical interpretation of the notion of “probability” which makes it possible to assign a probability value to propositions expressing natural (universal) laws. This paper aims at presenting an attempt to contribute a solution to the paradox by the proposal of a different way to express universal natural laws and by the use of a language which does not allow one to apply probability to universal statements. (shrink)
This contribution starts by comparing two of Ferrajoli's essays:Cittadinanza e diritti fondamentali (1993) and the articleof the review's present issue, Fundamental Rights. Theauthor shows that the methodological perspective of the twoworks is different: in the first one, while remaining in theframework of present constitutionalism, Ferrajoli argues chieflyfor an overcoming of citizenship; in the second one, the attemptis to give birth to a new law paradigm. The doubts and questionsVitale mentions concern exactly this possibility.
Este trabajo está dedicado al análisis de dos legados fundamentales de Thomas Hobbes al pensamiento político moderno, en la lectura que de ello ha ofrecido Norberto Bobbio. El primero es un legado de carácter metodológico, que consiste en dar prioridad a la demostratio por encima de cualquier forma de interpretatio. El segundo es el individualismo, cuyas diferentes declinaciones son decisivas para fundar, medir y valorar las diversas fórmulas políticas que el Leviatán, en cuanto esencia del Estado moderno, puede albergar. El (...) trabajo se cierra con un tercer nivel de comparación sobre la fortuna de Hobbes y de Bobbio entre sus contemporáneos y en nuestros días. (shrink)
In this essay, I focus on Norberto Bobbio’s reflections on human rights. Firstly, I seek to establish his underlying conception of philosophy: although it is impossible to spell out the philosophical foundations of human rights, this does not imply that philosophical thought, in the sense of critical reason, cannot make a useful contribution and provide valuable arguments in support of human rights. Secondly, I examine the related issue of the justification of human rights and assess his theory on the basis (...) of its own conception of a possible foundation. The way we answer the question of coherence also clarifies (a) what model of civil association is compatible with such a foundation, i.e. with such a worldview; (b) what model is absolutely incompatible with it; and finally (c) what intermediate solutions are there, if there are any. I argue that the communitarian variants of the conception of rights are distortions: collective or cultural rights, i.e. rights of a community towards which all of its members have duties, appearing alongside individual rights, trump individual rights, i.e. the rights linked to personhood that once constituted the most effective legal and political means for emancipating the individual from the power of the community. I therefore consider the “Copernican Revolution” of individualism and its consequences in Bobbio’s thought. As the example of personal freedom shows, where rights are ascribed principally to groups or communities rather than to individuals, we have good reason to fear that rights will turn out to be merely the privilege of the few. Once we follow this line of though in Bobbio, the ecumenical openness to alternative approaches and the argument from “the consensus of the people” yield to a clearly universalistic perspective that derives from the Enlightenment and can be interpreted as the product of the specifically modern version of natural law theory. (shrink)
Introduction -- Part I: The lie that we are not good enough as we are -- Where the lie came from and why we bought it -- Trying to meet the criteria for good enough -- Perpetuating the striving and the lack -- Part II: Dead ends and what they teach us -- Money/stuff -- Appearance -- Religion -- Food -- Drugs/alcohol -- Sex/romantic love -- Accomplishment/education/notoriety -- Busyness -- Part III: The truth : we are innately good -- Evil (...) is an alternative, not our nature -- Lighting our darkness to let go of fear, false beliefs, and all negative -- Emotion -- Looking at our essence, which is love, or everything good -- Being who we are ... it means overcoming our separateness -- Invoking love -- Aligning with love -- Being love innately more than we ever dreamed of being. (shrink)