“On Why in Philosophy Examples Matter”. The purpose of the article is to show the need of using examples in philosophy, associating to them four functions: to illustrate, explain, argue and show. Among other assertions, we attempt to justify the following: a) Examples are, as well as illustrations, evidences; such that what may be seen as an act of didactic generosity may be considered properly as the response to an always possible demand. b) The introduction of philosophical concepts requires frequently (...) a mutual cooperation between definition and example; the need of the latter in conceptual explanation is condoned by a reflection on the following of rules. c) A certain overrating of the counterexample and underrating of the example are tokens of a notion of philosophy put here into question. d) In Wittgenstein and other authors, a little heeded function of some examples is detected: of showing an alternative way of viewing the matter, of re-describing ancient philosophical themes. Towards the end, the issue of the example is assumed –this time– as an example of a more general issue: that of the relation between rhetoric and philosophy. (shrink)

El objetivo del artículo es describir rasgos estructurales de la comprensión de metáforas mediante una comparación con la comprensión de otras culturas, tal como ésta ha sido comentada por Wittgenstein y Geertz. El fenómeno de estudio es la comprensión enfática de metáforas fuertes. La comparación entre ambos tipos de comprensión sirve para plantear y dar respuesta a tres preguntas desatendidas en la profusa literatura sobre la metáfora: 1) ¿En qué sentido nos sorprenden las metáforas fuertes? 2) ¿En qué sentido pueden (...) ser profundas? 3) ¿En qué sentido hablamos de la riqueza de este fenómeno lingüístico? /// This paper sets out to describe the structural features of metaphor comprehension through a comparison with the process of understanding other cultures construed along the lines proposed by Wittgenstein and Geertz. The phenomenon under analysis is the emphatic understanding of strong metaphors. The comparison between understanding metaphors and cultures serves to raise and answer three questions that have been neglected in the vast literature on metaphors: 1) In which sense do strong metaphors surprise us? 2) In which sense can a metaphor be profound? 3) In which sense do we speak of the richness of this linguistic phenomenon? (shrink)

Desarrollo en este artículo tres planteamientos en torno a la cuestión del sentido de la vida, cada uno de ellos asociado a las nociones que figuran en su título: ambigüedad, disolución y latencia. 1) La expresión “sentido de la vida” posee al menos cuatro significados y de ello se siguen consecuencias no menores. 2) En su acepción habitual, la pregunta por el sentido puede disolverse o dejar de plantearse, cuando es sustituida por la pregunta práctica por la vida buena. 3) (...) Ello no significa que la pregunta por el sentido desaparezca del todo: ella continua latente. Pero cuando vuelve a tornarse manifiesta, ya no demanda de nosotros una respuesta. Es esa la experiencia del asombro, a la que me refiero hacia el final del texto. (shrink)

The present text follows three general objectives, which, at the same time, build its structure. Firstly, I would like to present and question Bernard Williams’ description of the virtue of accuracy. Secondly, I´ll try to complement Williams’ description by analyzing two dimensions of accuracy: care, on one side, and what I call “proximity to the problem”, on the other side. Related to that last issue, I add an excursus about writing. The third and last part of this article is an (...) attempt to relate the discussion about the so called virtues of truth —sincerity as well as accuracy— with the issue of self-deception. Specifically, I try to a) support Mele´s deflationary account of self-deception as motivationally biased belief, b) make an adjustment to this conception, and c) complement it with another aspect which has not received enough consideration in the discussion about self-deception, namely some beliefs we don´t generate or that manifest a high lack of accuracy. (shrink)

In this “Letter from Chile” I describe and comment the main features of philosophical activity in Chile. My perspective is related to my own academic experience: that of a Chilean academic, who earned his doctorate at the Free University of Berlin, worked in that same university for six years as an Assistant Professor, and has been an Associate Professor at the Department of Philosophy at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile in Santiago for the last eleven years. The first part (...) of the text offers a review of the historical development of philosophy in Chile. Afterwards, I refer to the current situation of our academic philosophy, analyzing various aspects: issues, currents, institutions, publications, research system, among others. Finally, I outline, from the above, some assessments and a general diagnosis of the present situation of philosophy in my country. (shrink)

The title and subtitle entail the main claims of this article. In the face of the present debate on the question whether Wittgenstein was a foundationalist, a coherentist, or both things, I suggest that, at least in a certain important sense, he didn’t adopt either of these positions. The point concerns the status of propositions that I characterize as “unheard-of propositions” and that constitute the most important subclass of so called “Moore-type propositions”. Unheard-of propositions (and the corresponding beliefs) are neither (...) doubted nor justified, they are not said and not even thought. We simply count on them or we take them for granted. In calling our attention on these primitive, spontaneous and instinctive certainties Wittgenstein is trying to correct an intellectualist bias in traditional conceptions of human being. This reading is confirmed through an analysis of the origin of our basic certainties: we have some of them naturally or instinctively, we acquire others by training, but in neither case there are rational processes at stake (nor irrational ones, of course). The debate between foundationalism and coherentism conceals precisely what Wittgenstein is trying to uncover: a stratum of certainties that, being objective, precede the order of knowledge and justification. (shrink)

https://revistes.uab.cat/enrahonar/article/view/v27-fermandois.

Resumen Según la tesis principal de este artículo, para articular el alcance e interés del tema wittgensteineano de los parecidos de familia se requiere ver en él, no una respuesta a la pregunta por lo que sea un concepto en general, sino una propuesta de carácter metodológico. Dos preguntas orientan la parte central del texto: (1) ¿Qué significa “conceptos de parecidos de familia”? (2) ¿Cuáles serían los conceptos en cuestión? Con respecto a (1), intento mostrar que el término no es (...) unívoco: un primer sentido dice relación con el dictum de los “parecidos que se superponen y entrecruzan” (IF 67) y se diferencia de un segundo sentido asociado al tema de los “bordes borrosos” (IF 71). Con apoyo en esta distinción ofrezco una respuesta a (2): en el primer sentido del término, no existe ningún concepto de familia, mientras que de acuerdo con el segundo todos los conceptos lo son. En la parte final propongo reinterpretar el tema en clave metodológica. Afirmar que conceptos como los de lenguaje, comprender, pensar, etc., son conceptos de familia significa que la reflexión filosófica sobre ellos no pasa fundamentalmente por buscar definiciones; que tanto o más importante es la cuidada descripción de ejemplos paradigmáticos, como “centros de variación” (EPB 190). Abstract According to the main thesis of this article, in order to articulate the scope and interest of Wittgenstein’s family resemblances topic, we should see into it not an answer to the question what concepts in general are, but a methodological proposal. Two questions guide the central part of the text: (1) What does “family-resemblances concepts” mean? (2) What concepts fall within the corresponding class? Regarding (1) I try to show that “family-resemblances concepts” is not an unequivocal term: a first sense has to do with the dictum of “similarities overlapping and criss-crossing” (IF 67) and is to be distinguished from a second sense associated with the topic of “blurred edges” (IF 71). This distinction lies behind the answer I offer to (2): in the first sense of the term, there is no family concept at all, while according to the second sense all concepts are of this kind. In the final part I propose a reinterpretation of the issue from a methodological perspective. To say that concepts like language, understanding, thinking, etc. are family concepts means that the philosophical reflection on them should not centre on the praxis of looking for definitions. As important ―maybe more important― as that it’s the careful description of paradigmatic examples, as “centers of variation” (EPB 190). (shrink)

Resumen El presente ensayo explora el alcance que poseen para la pregunta fundamental por la vida buena las reflexiones que Harry Frankfurt ha elaborado acerca de la importancia que atribuimos a ciertas cosas en general, y acerca del amor como una forma señalada en que alguien o algo puede sernos importante. Comienzo examinando las razones por las que, según el autor, resulta imposible ofrecer una respuesta no circular a dicha pregunta, razones que vuelven necesario un modo indirecto de abordarla. A (...) partir de la noción frankfurtiana de importancia propongo a continuación una crítica a la llamada teoría del deseo, el enfoque más influyente en las discusiones actuales en torno al bienestar o la vida buena. Finalmente, y luego de referirme a la necesidad, apuntada por Susan Wolf, de tomar en cuenta el valor objetivo de aquello que nos importa, presento dos consideraciones mediante las cuales intento, con y contra Frankfurt, destacar lo que me parece más valioso de sus ideas acerca del amor.This essay explores the impact of Harry Frankfurt’s reflections on the importance we attach to certain things in general, as well as on love as a marked way in which something or someone can be important to us, to the fundamental question of the good life. I begin by examining the reasons why, according to the author, it is impossible to offer a non-circular answer to this question, reasons that make necessary an indirect way of approaching it. Starting from the Frankfurtian notion of importance, I then propose a critique of the so-called theory of desire, the most influential approach in current discussions about well-being or the good life. Finally, and after referring to the need, pointed out by Susan Wolf, to take into account the objective value of what matters to us, I present two considerations through which I try, with and against Frankfurt, to highlight what seems most valuable to me of his ideas about love. (shrink)

This article focuses on two largely ignored aspects of the understanding of strong metaphors: the visual dimension and the emotional factors. Particularly, I intend to offer answers to the following questions: 1) What does it mean to understand a visual metaphor? 2) Can Wittgenstein’s ideas about the vision of aspects help to better understand this understanding? 3) In what sense does his notion of secondary sense enrich the philosophical reflection on the understanding of metaphors? 4) In what sense may emotions (...) be an important factor in the understanding of certain metaphors? The article is framed in a methodological proposal: I defend a phenomenology of the metaphor, that is, an accurate description of our experiences with metaphors, and in this case, its understanding. (shrink)

Este trabajo se centra en dos aspectos poco estudiados de la comprensión de metáforas fuertes: la dimensión visual y factores emocionales. En concreto, intento responder las siguientes preguntas: 1) ¿Qué significa comprender una metáfora visual? 2) ¿Es posible que las ideas de Wittgenstein sobre la ..

Davidson's thesis that the notion of a rule is dispensable in regard to a theoretical explanation of linguistic communication is here critically investigated. First I put Davidson's into question and thereby arrive at the conclusion that instances of communication in two languages pose no threat and that Davidson invokes a dubious concept of a rule in his treatment of so called malapropisms. Then I investigate his My thesis is that Davidson does not succeed-in taking into account appropriately the, as he (...) himself concedes, important distinction between "using words correctly" and "believing that one uses words correctly". Finally I try to formulate of the later Davidson in such a manner that they do not fall prey to his rule-criticism. (shrink)

Resumen Dada la renovada vigencia que la antigua pregunta socrática: ¿cómo se debería vivir? goza en nuestros días -en particular, en el ámbito anglosajón y alemán-, no extraña que los diferentes enfoques vengan acompañados a menudo por con sideraciones de índole metodológica. ¿Cómo abordar hoy la proverbial pregunta? ¿Con qué criterios de corrección debería cumplir una teoría de la vida buena? ¿Es siquiera posible una tal teoría? El propósito de la presente reflexión es contribuir al esclarecimiento de estas cuestiones mediante (...) lo que propongo llamar una apro ximación indirecta a la cuestión de la vida buena. En el texto se describen y justifican los rasgos centrales de dicha aproximación, la que se distancia del debate actual entre teorías de la vida buena, al no asumir una serie de pretensiones metodológicas características de dicho debate.Given the renewed interest that the old Socratic question “How should we live?” has taken in the present day -in particular, in the Anglo-Saxon and in the Germán world- it is not surprising that the different approaches are often accompanied by methodological considerations. How to deal with the old question today? What correction criteria should a theory of the good life meet? Is such a theory even possible? The aim of this essay is to contribute to the clarification of these issues through what I propose to call “an indirect approach” to the question of the good life. The paper describes and justifies the central features of this approach, which distances itself from the current debate between good life theories, by not assuming a series of methodological claims characteristic of this debate. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss the extent to which the very existence of substructural logics puts the Tarskian conception of logical systems in jeopardy. In order to do this, we highlight the importance of the presence of different levels of entailment in a given logic, looking not only at inferences between collections of formulae but also at inferences between collections of inferences—and more. We discuss appropriate refinements or modifications of the usual Tarskian identity criterion for logical systems, and propose an (...) alternative of our own. After that, we consider a number of objections to our account and evaluate a substantially different approach to the same problem. (shrink)

When discussing Logical Pluralism several critics argue that such an open-minded position is untenable. The key to this conclusion is that, given a number of widely accepted assumptions, the pluralist view collapses into Logical Monism. In this paper we show that the arguments usually employed to arrive at this conclusion do not work. The main reason for this is the existence of certain substructural logics which have the same set of valid inferences as Classical Logic—although they are, in a clear (...) sense, non-identical to it. We argue that this phenomenon can be generalized, given the existence of logics which coincide with Classical Logic regarding a number of metainferential levels—although they are, again, clearly different systems. We claim this highlights the need to arrive at a more refined version of the Collapse Argument, which we discuss at the end of the paper. (shrink)

Many authors have considered that the notions of paraconsistency and dialetheism are intrinsically connected, in many cases, to the extent of confusing both phenomena. However, paraconsistency is a formal feature of some logics that consists in invalidating the rule of explosion, whereas dialetheism is a semantical/ontological position consisting in accepting true contradictions. In this paper, we argue against this connection and show that it is perfectly possible to adopt a paraconsistent logic and reject dialetheism, and, moreover, that there are examples (...) of non-paraconsistent logics that can be interpreted in a dialetheic way. (shrink)

Eduardo Arroyo, Armelle Auris, François Boissonnet, Paul HENRY, Pierre-Jean LABARRIERE, MATIEU, Gilles AILLAUD, Gérad THALMANN, Nicole MATHIEU, Jacques VIMARD, Michel QUAREZ, Leonardo CREMONINI, L'atelier d'Eduardo Arryo: Le carré blanc du ring, Rue Descartes, No. 7, Logiques de l'éthique (Juin 1993), pp. 149-168.

Anti-exceptionalism about logic states that logical theories have no special epistemological status. Such theories are continuous with scientific theories. Contemporary anti-exceptionalists include the semantic paradoxes as a part of the elements to accept a logical theory. Exploring the Buenos Aires Plan, the recent development of the metainferential hierarchy of ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document}-logics shows that there are multiple options to deal with such paradoxes. There is a whole ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} (...) \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document}-based hierarchy, of which LP\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {LP}}$$\end{document} and ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document} themselves are only the first steps. This means that the logics in this hierarchy are also options to analyze the inferential patterns allowed in a language that contains its own truth predicate. This paper explores these responses analyzing some reasons to go beyond the first steps. We show that LP\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {LP}}$$\end{document}, ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document} and the logics of the ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document}-hierarchy offer different diagnoses for the same evidence: the inferences and metainferences the agents endorse in the presence of the truth-predicate. But even if the data are not enough to adopt one of these logics, there are other elements to evaluate the revision of classical logic. Which is the best explanation for the logical principles to deal with semantic paradoxes? How close should we be to classical logic? And mainly, how could a logic obey the validities it contains? From an anti-exceptionalist perspective, we argue that ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document}-metainferential logics in general—and STTω\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {STT}}_{\omega }$$\end{document} in particular—are the best available options to explain the inferential principles involved with the notion of truth. (shrink)

In this article, we will present a number of technical results concerning Classical Logic, ST and related systems. Our main contribution consists in offering a novel identity criterion for logics in general and, therefore, for Classical Logic. In particular, we will firstly generalize the ST phenomenon, thereby obtaining a recursively defined hierarchy of strict-tolerant systems. Secondly, we will prove that the logics in this hierarchy are progressively more classical, although not entirely classical. We will claim that a logic is to (...) be identified with an infinite sequence of consequence relations holding between increasingly complex relata: formulae, inferences, metainferences, and so on. As a result, the present proposal allows not only to differentiate Classical Logic from ST, but also from other systems sharing with it their valid metainferences. Finally, we show how these results have interesting consequences for some topics in the philosophical logic literature, among them for the debate around Logical Pluralism. The reason being that the discussion concerning this topic is usually carried out employing a rivalry criterion for logics that will need to be modified in light of the present investigation, according to which two logics can be non-identical even if they share the same valid inferences. (shrink)

Transhumanism proposes human enhancement while regarding the human body as unfit for the future. This fulfills age-old aspirations for a perfect and durable body. We use “alienation” as a concept to analyze this mismatch between human aspirations and our current condition. For Hannah Arendt alienation may be accounted for in terms of earth- and world-alienation, as well as alienation from human nature, and especially from the given (“resentment of the given”). In transhumanism, the biological body is an impediment to human (...) accomplishment. At most, this movement accepts “clean” bodies, not bodies with excretions. We argue that real human bodies are valued in the event of giving birth, so a modified concept that Arendt proposed, natality, seems a suitable way to explore the dialectic alienation-reconciliation involving the body (Arendt’s “A child has been born unto us”), when re-read by some feminist scholars. (shrink)

Adding a transparent truth predicate to a language completely governed by classical logic is not possible. The trouble, as is well-known, comes from paradoxes such as the Liar and Curry. Recently, Cobreros, Egré, Ripley and van Rooij have put forward an approach based on a non-transitive notion of consequence which is suitable to deal with semantic paradoxes while having a transparent truth predicate together with classical logic. Nevertheless, there are some interesting issues concerning the set of metainferences validated by this (...) logic. In this paper, we show that this logic, once it is adequately understood, is weaker than classical logic. Moreover, the logic is in a way similar to the paraconsistent logic LP. (shrink)

In some recent articles, Cobreros, Egré, Ripley, & van Rooij have defended the idea that abandoning transitivity may lead to a solution to the trouble caused by semantic paradoxes. For that purpose, they develop the Strict-Tolerant approach, which leads them to entertain a nontransitive theory of truth, where the structural rule of Cut is not generally valid. However, that Cut fails in general in the target theory of truth does not mean that there are not certain safe instances of Cut (...) involving semantic notions. In this article we intend to meet the challenge of answering how to regain all the safe instances of Cut, in the language of the theory, making essential use of a unary recovery operator. To fulfill this goal, we will work within the so-called Goodship Project, which suggests that in order to have nontrivial naïve theories it is sufficient to formulate the corresponding self-referential sentences with suitable biconditionals. Nevertheless, a secondary aim of this article is to propose a novel way to carry this project out, showing that the biconditionals in question can be totally classical. In the context of this article, these biconditionals will be essentially used in expressing the self-referential sentences and, thus, as a collateral result of our work we will prove that none of the recoveries expected of the target theory can be nontrivially achieved if self-reference is expressed through identities. (shrink)

It is widely accepted that a theory of truth for arithmetic should be consistent, but -consistency is a highly desirable feature for such theories. The point has already been made for first-order languages, though the evidence is not entirely conclusive. We show that in the second-order case the consequence of adopting -inconsistent theories of truth are considered: the revision theory of nearly stable truth T # and the classical theory of symmetric truth FS. Briefly, we present some conceptual problems with (...) ω-inconsistent theories, and demonstrate some technical results that support our criticisms of such theories. (shrink)

Transhumanist thought on overpopulation usually invokes the welfare of present human beings and the control over future generation, thus minimizing the need and meaning of new births. Here we devise a framework for a more thorough screening of the relevant literature, to have a better appreciation of the issue of natality. We follow the lead of Hannah Arendt and Brent Waters in this respect. With three overlapping categories of words, headed by “natality,” “birth,” and “intergenerations,” a large sample of books (...) on transhumanism is scrutinized, showing the lack of sustained reflection on the issue. After this preliminary scrutiny, a possible defense of natality in face of modern and transhumanist thought is marshaled, evoking a number of desirable human traits. One specific issue, the impact of modern values on natality, is further explored, reiterating that concerns about overpopulation and enhanced humans should keep in sight the natural cycle of birth and death. (shrink)

Resumen: La tolerancia es un privilegio de los poderosos. Una persona puede tolerar sólo si tiene el poder para interferir con aquello que objeta. En este artículo analizaré las circunstancias en las que alguien tiene el poder para tolerar. Argumentaré que la respuesta debe incorporar consideraciones tanto prácticas como metafísicas. Específicamente, defenderé que alguien tiene el poder para tolerar cuando sus propiedades fundan tal poder en la situación práctica en que ella se encuentra, según es caracterizada por sus intereses prácticos. (...) Al hacerlo criticaré el análisis del mencionado poder realizado por Glen Newey. (shrink)

El artículo busca dilucidar algunas características del epistolario en tanto que fuente historiográfica y encontrar claves de comparación con la autobiografía. Con importantes aspectos en común, sus propósitos, sus sesgos y la posición subjetiva de sus autores evidencian importantes diferencias. A partir de esta problemática, se analizará la correspondencia sostenida por Max Weber desde el servicio militar durante la Gran Guerra. En un período en el que no tiene intervención pública alguna, el análisis se centra en la evolución de su (...) perspectiva sobre el papel de Alemania y sobre su actividad específica en los lazaretos. Cada uno de estos aspectos se relaciona respectivamente con dos piedras angulares de la obra weberiana: el problema nacional y el proceso de burocratización. (shrink)

In this paper, we present a non-trivial and expressively complete paraconsistent naïve theory of truth, as a step in the route towards semantic closure. We achieve this goal by expressing self-reference with a weak procedure, that uses equivalences between expressions of the language, as opposed to a strong procedure, that uses identities. Finally, we make some remarks regarding the sense in which the theory of truth discussed has a property closely related to functional completeness, and we present a sound and (...) complete three-sided sequent calculus for this expressively rich theory. (shrink)

Rejecting the Cut rule has been proposed as a strategy to avoid both the usual semantic paradoxes and the so-called v-Curry paradox. In this paper we consider if a Cut-free theory is capable of accurately representing its own notion of validity. We claim that the standard rules governing the validity predicate are too weak for this purpose and we show that although it is possible to strengthen these rules, the most obvious way of doing so brings with it a serious (...) problem: an internalized version of Cut can be proved for a Curry-like sentence. We also evaluate a number of possible ways of escaping this difficulty. (shrink)

The logics of formal inconsistency are logics tolerant to some amount of contradiction, but in which some versions of explosion still hold. The main result of this paper is a reconstruction of two such logics in the dialogical framework. By doing so, we achieve two things. On the one hand, we provide a formal approach to argumentative situations where some contradictions may occur while keeping the idea that there may still be situations in which some propositions are ‘safe’ in the (...) sense of immunity to the contradictions. On the other hand, we open a new line of study on these logics, in the context of the game-theoretical approach to semantics born in the 1960s, with various interesting perspectives, some of which are discussed at the end of this article. (shrink)