I argue that Democritus can reasonably be regarded as a eudaimonist, though we have to be cautious, given that his work has come down to us in fragments and that some of these are rejected by some scholars. Despite these difficulties, I argue that the best interpretation of his ethical fragments overall is that he is a eudaimonist.

I argue that Democritus presents a theory of colour in which the predominance of atomic shapes and microstructural arrangements are neces- sary but not sufficient for colour vision. Focusing primarily on Democritus’ basic colours, I analyse his microstructural account, providing a new analysis of the natural and technological underpinnings of his method of explanation. I argue that the notion of predominance allows Democritus to account for both the varia- tion and the repeatable correspondence of colour perception by (...) setting limits on possible microstructures. This account, however, is complicated by the evidence for a Democritean theory of colour transformation and distorted vision, which arise from a dynamic interplay of features at the level of microstructures and at the level of perception. (shrink)

I argue that Democritus presents a theory of colour in which the predominance of atomic shapes and microstructural arrangements are necessary but not sufficient for colour vision. Focusing primarily on Democritus’ basic colours, I analyse his microstructural account, providing a new analysis of the natural and technological underpinnings of his method of explanation. I argue that the notion of predominance allows Democritus to account for both the variation and the repeatable correspondence of colour perception by setting limits (...) on possible microstructures. This account, however, is complicated by the evidence for a Democritean theory of colour transformation and distorted vision, which arise from a dynamic interplay of features at the level of microstructures and at the level of perception. (shrink)

Recent accounts of the life of Protagoras differ widely from one another in their treatment of the ancient sources, and in the conclusions which they draw from them. A re-examination of the evidence, undertaken in 1949–50 as part of a study of the Prometheus trilogy, has convinced me that a new discussion is urgently needed if we are to place the earlier stages of the sophistic movement in the right context historically; and the purpose of this paper is to lay (...) at least a part of the foundation for such a discussion. Since the evidence for the life of Protagoras includes some allusions to his relations with Democritus, and there are some obvious affinities between the careers of Protagoras and Anaxagoras, I have added a short account of the relevant points in the biography of Democritus and a more detailed study of the evidence for the life of Anaxagoras. (shrink)

The Renaissance's 'Laughing Philosopher': ourown age's 'prophet of quark' : throughout modern philosophical traditions, Democritushas been a man little known beyond his labels. Yet if the image of the cheerful ironist understates his true seriousness, that of father of modern nuclear physics - though by no means entirely unfounded - loses sight of the man in the hyperbole. Flattering as it is, it fails to do justice either to the full range of Democritus' interests or to the astonishing originality (...) of his ideas as Paul Cartledge makes clear in this enthralling book. (shrink)

The poiintt of Democritus' physiology of the eye is that vision occurs because the eye allows the image in, and its sponginess aids the transmission of the image to the reasoning faculty. Thus,, Democritus' ophthalmology plays an important, though neglected, part in his theory of vision.

Encyclopedia article on Democritus. Includes a brief overview of his philosophical views, major works, and critical reception.

Democritus is generally understood to have anticipated the seventeenthcentury distinction between primary and secondary qualities. I argue that this is not the case, and that instead for Democritus all sensible qualities are conventional.

Democritus was born at Abdera, about 460 BCE, although according to some 490. His father was from a noble family and of great wealth, and contributed largely towards the entertainment of the army of Xerxes on his return to Asia. As a reward for this service the Persian monarch gave and other Abderites presents and left among them several Magi. Democritus, according to Diogenes Laertius, was instructed by these Magi in astronomy and theology. After the death of his (...) father he traveled in search of wisdom, and devoted his inheritance to this purpose, amounting to one hundred talents. He is said to have visited Egypt, Ethiopia, Persia, and India. Whether, in the course of his travels, he visited Athens or studied under Anaxagoras is uncertain. During some part of his life he was instructed in Pythagoreanism, and was a disciple of Leucippus. After several years of traveling, Democritus returned to Abdera, with no means of subsistence. His brother Damosis, however, took him in. According to the law of Abdera, whoever wasted his patrimony would be deprived of the rites of burial. Democritus, hoping to avoid this disgrace, gave public lectures. Petronius relates that he was acquainted with the virtues of herbs, plants, and stones, and that he spent his life in making experiments upon natural bodies. He acquired fame with his knowledge of natural phenomena, and predicted changes in the weather. He used this ability to make people believe that he could predict future events. They not only viewed him as something more than mortal, but even proposed to put him in control of their public affairs. He preferred a contemplative to an active life, and therefore declined these public honors and passed the remainder of his days in solitude. (shrink)

According to Democritus' anthropogeny is a microcosmic consequence within the process of cosmogony. However, the case of man is a peculiarity: man, this atom complex, is well aware of himself, yet is not aware of what he must do. Man does not naturally do that which promotes the harmonious ordering of his atoms. We must create a second nature. Now it becomes possible for us to be as we must be according to our first nature. Democritus is the (...) is first thinker who explains to us what our nature is and who, from our being, derives an ought: he who wishes to do the right thing for both himself and others finds himself subject to the ought requirement to do that which brings the most calm to the atoms. This is a direct connection between being and ought, an extravagant mechanical existentialism. (shrink)

Although Bertrand Russell is probably most famous for his “logi­cal atomism,” it is his ethical thought that this article will attempt to contrast with the ethics of the founder of the ancient atomism: Democritus of Abdera. Russell has himself suggested certain affinity here. More concerned with practice than theory, both philosophers advocate a certain teleological and eudemonistic morality; furthermore, they both adopt the same approaches to various related topics. Yet, what had only been outlined by Democritus was extensively (...) developed by Russell. Hence, it is worth examining whether there is any deeper common ground between the two: can Russell’s clarity throw some light on Democritus’ fragments? (shrink)

This paper is a piece of detective work. Starting from an obvious excrescence in the transmitted text of Simplicius's treatment of the foundations of Presocratic atomism near the beginning of his "Physics" commentary, it excavates a Theophrastean correction to Aristotle's tendency to lump Leucippus and Democritus together: Theophrastus made application of the οὐ μ[unrepresentable symbol]λλον principle in the sphere of ontology an innovation by Democritus. Along the way it shows Simplicius reordering his Theophrastean source in his efforts to (...) find material which will strengthen the contrast between Leucippus's atomism and Eleatic metaphysics. And it argues that in doing so he all but obliterates Theophrastus's attempt to point up the Democritean credentials of the οὐ μ[unrepresentable symbol]λλον principle. (shrink)

The following texts and comments are a supplement to ‘Democritus on Politics and the Care of the Soul’, CQ 39 , 307–31 . The Democritean fragments there were quoted only in translation; detailed commentary on them would have taken up too much space and clogged the argument. They make their appearance here in the same order as they did there, preceded by a thumb-nail résumé of that argument and of their place in it. Text, spelling and numbering is that (...) of the standard edition: H. Diels, W. Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker . Reference will also be made to collections by P. Natorp, Die Ethika des Demokritos , S. Y. Luria, Democritea and G. Ibscher, Demócrito y sus sentencias sobre ética y education , as well as to translations by V. E. Alfieri, Gli Atomisti , K. Freeman, Ancilla to the Presocratics and J. Barnes, Early Greek Philosophy. (shrink)

This paper discusses the problem of Democritus’ allegoresis. The question whether Democritus practised allegoresis is usually answered affirmatively. Thus, for example, Jean Pépin, in his classic work on the development of allegorical interpretation, forcefully asserts that ‘Démocrite pratiqua d'abord une allégorie physique’ and that ‘il poursuivit aussi l'allégorie psychologique’. In one way or another, this view has been embraced by Luc Brisson, Ilaria Ramelli, Ilaria Ramelli and Giulio Lucchetta, Gerard Naddaf, to name just a few scholars who have (...) recently examined the issue. However, those who find allegoresis in Democritus are often somewhat perplexed at what they discover. For instance Naddaf, in his otherwise excellent study, assumes that ‘Democritus believed that Homer was indeed a visionary sage with a privileged utterance that he intentionally transmitted allegorically’, upon which he concludes that Democritus’ position is ‘inconsistent and disconcerting given his place in the pantheon of Ionian rationalism’. This shows that the claim that Democritus practised allegoresis stumbles upon the following problem: if Democritus was a rationalist, then the question arises how his rationalism can be reconciled with his alleged belief that Homer deliberately disguised his poems as allegorical prefigurations of various Democritean views. Indeed, one may legitimately ask how rational it would be on Democritus’ part to ascribe to Homer the intention of being interpreted as a precursor of atomist philosophy. The purpose of the present paper is to shed some light on this conundrum and to offer a reconsideration of certain accounts that have been suggested so far. (shrink)

This paper is a piece of detective work. Starting from an obvious excrescence in the transmitted text of Simplicius's treatment of the foundations of Presocratic atomism near the beginning of his "Physics" commentary, it excavates a Theophrastean correction to Aristotle's tendency to lump Leucippus and Democritus together: Theophrastus made application of the οὐ μ[unrepresentable symbol]λλον principle in the sphere of ontology an innovation by Democritus. Along the way it shows Simplicius reordering his Theophrastean source in his efforts to (...) find material which will strengthen the contrast between Leucippus's atomism and Eleatic metaphysics. And it argues that in doing so he all but obliterates Theophrastus's attempt to point up the Democritean credentials of the οὐ μ[unrepresentable symbol]λλον principle. (shrink)

Through a close reading of Plutarch’s Against Colotes 3-9, the paper reconstructs and interprets the original Epicurean criticism against Democritean epistemology and ontology, and in particular against Democritus’ theory of sensible qualities, and Plutarch’s twofold criticism of Epicurean epistemology, on similar grounds, and of the questionable exegetical and argumentative manoeuvres used by the Epicurean Colotes. In the process of interpreting Plutarch’s text, the paper reflects on the nature, motivation and plausibility of Plutarch’s own exegetical and argumentative strategies. Finally, the (...) paper suggests that a careful reading of Against Colotes will help us to put into focus the important question of whether, independently of their apparently opposite claims about the “reality” of secondary qualities, Democritus and Epicurus shared either a form of radical relativism or a form of commonsense “intersubjectivism” in their evaluations of ascriptions of such qualities to macroscopic objects. (shrink)

Democritus’ atomism aims to respond to threats of Parmenidean monism. In so doing, it deploys a familiar epistemological distinction between what is known by the senses and what is known by the mind. This turns out to be a risky strategy, however, leading to inadvertent skepticism with only diffuse and contrary ethical implications. Vasubandhu’s more explicitly metaphysical atomism, by contrast, relies on a different principle to get to its results, and aims to address different concerns. It leaves us with (...) a view that positively implies a concrete mode of practical engagement, and resources for a critical stance. Even if certain atoms end up proven incoherent, there is no danger of slipping into the morally fatal indifference of inadvertent skepticism. For the ethical implications, it matters how one arrives at one’s atomism. (shrink)

A number of Democritean fragments may loosely be called ‘political’, concerned as they are with questions to do with the πλις – with government, with the duties and dangers of public office, with justice, law and order. The majority of them have been preserved in chapters of Stobaeus’ anthology entitled ‘On the State’ , ‘On Laws and Customs’ , ‘On Government’.

This paper investigates the Democritean account of human nature and sociability. After briefly discussing what the claim that human beings are social animals means, the paper analyzes two culture stories, preserved in Diodorus of Sicily and John Tzetzes, that are typically taken to be Democritean, arguing that there are prima facie significant differences between the two accounts. The paper then concludes that human beings are not social animals by nature on the Democritean view, but rather that the Democritean account belongs (...) to a different, that is, non-Aristotelian and non-Stoic, tradition of social thought. (shrink)

First published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

I develop a positive interpretation of Democritus' theory of agency and responsibility, building on previous studies that have already gone far in demonstrating his innovativeness and importance to the history and philosophy of these concepts. The interpretation will be defended by a synthesis of several familiar ethical fragments and maxims presented in the framework of an ancient problem that, unlike the problem of free will and determinism, Democritus almost certainly did confront: the problem of the causes of human (...) goodness and success. I will argue that Democritus' account of the virtues and success is naturally interpreted as an intellectualist one. His focus on our intellectual powers as the source of our own agency and cause of our success led him to remarkable breakthroughs in moral psychology, including the development of a kind of cognitive-behavioral therapy for stress and anxiety, and the proposal of an autonomous source of moral sanction. (shrink)

Journal Name: Apeiron Issue: Ahead of print.

De Anima A 2, 404a 27=Diels, Vorsokratikev 5th edition 68a 101: ⋯κεῖνοςμ⋯γ⋯ρ ⋯πλ⋯ς ψυχ⋯ν ταὐτ⋯7nu κα⋯ νο⋯ν. τ⋯ γ⋯ρ ⋯ληθ⋯ς εἶναι τ⋯ φαι7nu;⋯7mu;ενον; and a 30–31: οὐ δ⋯ χρ⋯ται τῷς δυν⋯7mu;ει τ7iota;7nu;⋯ τ⋯ν ảλ⋯θειαν, ảλλ⋯ ταὐτ⋯ λγ;ει φυχ⋯ν κα⋯ νο⋯ν.2. Metaph. Г 5, 1009b 12=D.v. 5th ed. 68A 112: ὂλως δ⋯δι⋯ τ⋯ ὐπολαμβ⋯νειν φρ⋯νησιν μ⋯7nu; τ⋯ν αἲσθησιν, τα⋯την δ εἷναι ảλλο⋯ωσιν, τ⋯ φαι7nu;⋯μεν7nu; κατ⋯ τ⋯ν αἷσθησι7nu; ⋯ξ ⋯7nu;⋯γκης ⋯ληθ⋯ς εἶναἰ φασιν.