Der cartesische DuaUsmus besteht nicht in der Behauptung, daß die Person und ihr Körper voneinander verschieden sind, sondern in der stärkeren Behauptung, daß sie beide ohne den anderen existieren können. Können ist dabei in einem außerordentlich schwachen Sinn zu nehmen, nämlich im Sinne der analytischen Möglichkeit. Descartes' Argument für diese Behauptung in der 6. Meditation ist im Rahmen der modal-epistemischen Logik als logisch korrektes Argument präzisierbar; daneben auch sein mit dem ersteren verquicktes Argument dafür, daß es eine (...) essentielle Eigenschaft von ihm sei, eine res cogitans zu sein, aber keine, eine res extensa zu sein. Das Problem der Annehmbarkeit der Prämissen reduziert sich auf die Frage, ob es analytisch möglich ist, daß eine Person existiert, ohne mit einem Körper verbunden zu sein. Im Sinne von Descartes' Personbegriff gilt dies, im Sinne unseres Personbegriffes jedoch nicht. Welcher von den beiden Personbegriffen vorzuziehen ist, ist eine offene Frage. (shrink)

In Descartes's Meditations, one of the key texts of Western philosophy, the thinker rejects all his former beliefs in the quest for new certainties. Discovering his own existence as a thinking entity in the very exercise of doubt, he goes on to prove the existence of God, who guarantees his clear and distinct ideas as a means of access to the truth. He develops new conceptions of body and mind, capable of serving as foundations for the new science of (...) nature. Subsequent philosophy has grappled with Descartes's legacy, questioning many of its conclusions and even his basic approach, but his arguments set the agenda for many of the greatest philosophical thinkers, and their fascination endures.This new translation includes the Third and Fourth Objections and Replies in full, and a selection from the rest of Descartes's exchanges with contemporaries that helped to shape and expound his philosophy. (shrink)

Two previous attempts to discern the argument Descartes intended to establish the claim that his essence is to think have failed to meet with success. I examine those arguments and offer an interpretation of my own that follows one of Descartes' strategies in the cogito passages. The suggested interpretation involves discarding every candidate that falls victim to hyperbolic doubt. However, while my strategy may have been intended by Descartes, it does not successfully yield his conclusion.

In his Meditations Descartes concludes that he is a res cogitans, an unextended entity whose essence is to be conscious. His reasoning in support of the conclusion that he exists entirely distinct from his body has seemed unconvincing to his critics. I attempt to show that the reasoning which he offers in support of his conclusion. although mistaken, is more plausible and his mistakes more interesting than his critics have acknowledged.

Der cartesische DuaUsmus besteht nicht in der Behauptung, daß die Person und ihr Körper voneinander verschieden sind, sondern in der stärkeren Behauptung, daß sie beide ohne den anderen existieren können. Können ist dabei in einem außerordentlich schwachen Sinn zu nehmen, nämlich im Sinne der analytischen Möglichkeit. Descartes' Argument für diese Behauptung in der 6. Meditation ist im Rahmen der modal-epistemischen Logik als logisch korrektes Argument präzisierbar; daneben auch sein mit dem ersteren verquicktes Argument dafür, daß es eine (...) essentielle Eigenschaft von ihm sei, eine res cogitans zu sein, aber keine, eine res extensa zu sein. Das Problem der Annehmbarkeit der Prämissen reduziert sich auf die Frage, ob es analytisch möglich ist, daß eine Person existiert, ohne mit einem Körper verbunden zu sein. Im Sinne von Descartes' Personbegriff gilt dies, im Sinne unseres Personbegriffes jedoch nicht. Welcher von den beiden Personbegriffen vorzuziehen ist, ist eine offene Frage. (shrink)

Two previous attempts to discern the argument Descartes intended to establish the claim that his essence is to think have failed to meet with success. I examine those arguments and offer an interpretation of my own that follows one of Descartes' strategies in the cogito passages. The suggested interpretation involves discarding every candidate that falls victim to hyperbolic doubt. However, while my strategy may have been intended by Descartes, it does not successfully yield his conclusion.

The Meditations, one of the key texts of Western philosophy, is the most widely studied of all Descartes' writings. This authoritative translation by John Cottingham, taken from the much acclaimed three-volume Cambridge edition of the Philosophical Writings of Descartes, is based upon the best available texts and presents Descartes' central metaphysical writings in clear, readable modern English. As well as the complete text of the Meditations, the reader will find a thematic abridgement of the Objections and Replies (which were originally (...) published with the Meditations) containing Descartes' replies to his critics. These extracts, specially selected for the present volume, indicate the main philosophical difficulties which occurred to Descartes' contemporaries and show how Descartes developed and clarified his arguments in response. This edition contains a new comprehensive introduction to Descartes' philosophy by John Cottingham and the classic introductory essay on the Meditations by Bernard Williams. (shrink)

Straipsnyje analitinës filosofijos poþiûriu analizuojamas Descartes’o sàmonës ir kûno skirtingumo árodymas, siekiant atskleisti jo panaðumus su ðiuolaikinëje sàmonës filosofijoje populiariu Davido Chalmerso pateiktu „zombio“ mintiniu eksperimentu ir juo grindþiamu dualizmo árodymu. Siekiama parodyti, kad ðiuolaikinis modaline semantikos analize grindþiamas árodymo variantas yra techniðkai sudë-tingesnis ir atsparesnis fizikalistinei kritikai, taèiau jis paremtas nutylëta ir nepagrásta episteminio sà-vokø skaidrumo prielaida, kuri iðskirstina kaip viena originalaus dekartiðko árodymo silpnybiø. Tai leidþia tvirtinti, kad Antoine’o Arnauld kritika, pateikta Descartes’o árodymui, lygiai taip pat sëkmingaitaikytina ir (...) Chalmerso antifizikalistiniams samprotavimams.Reikðminiai þodþiai: sàmonës filosofija, dualizmo árodymai, „zombio“ mintinis eksperimentas, fizikalizmas. (shrink)

This edition features reliable, accessible translations; useful editorial materials; and a straightforward presentation of the Objections and Replies, including the objections from Caterus, Arnauld, and Hobbes, accompanied by Descartes' replies, in their entirety. The letter serving as a reply to Gassendi--in which several of Descartes' associates present Gassendi's best arguments and Descartes' replies--conveys the highlights and important issues of their notoriously extended exchange. Roger Ariew's illuminating Introduction discusses the Meditations and the intellectual environment surrounding its reception.

'If a person can think of an F, then that person has come into causal contact with an F in the right way' is a premise in an obvious reconstruction of Putnam's argument that we are not brains in vats. 'If a person can think of an F, then that person has come into causal contact with an F or with something at least as good as an F' is the only controversial premise in Descartes' argument for the (...) existence of God. Putnam's principle entails Descartes', which suggests that we should enquire after better versions of Putnam's proof. I present three variations and conclude that Putnam's semantic theory does not have anti-sceptical consequences. In contrast, given Descartes' cognitive situation, he was perfectly justified in accepting the soundness of his argument for the existence of God. (shrink)

The Discourse on the Method for Reasoning Well and for Seeking Truth in the Sciences offers a concise presentation and defense of René Descartes' method of intellectual inquiry--a method that greatly influenced both philosophical and scientific reasoning in the early modern world. Descartes's timeless writing strikes an uncommon balance of novelty and familiarity, offering arguments concerning knowledge, science, and metaphysics (including the famous "I think, therefore I am") that are as compelling in the 21st century as they were in (...) the 17th. Ian Johnston's new translation of the original French text is modern, clear, and thoroughly annotated, ideal for readers unfamiliar with Descartes's intellectual context. An approachable introduction engages both the historical and the philosophical aspects of the text, helping the reader to understand the concepts and arguments contained therein. (shrink)

To his question whether the heated wax, Despite its changing properties, Remains the same piece of wax, Descartes simply answers that it does and that no one would judge otherwise. It is argued that the reason why this is so can be neither empirical nor can it be of a logical deductive kind. The reason is transcendental, That is, The concept of that which does not change during change is a necessary condition, I.E., It is a category. It is a (...) necessary condition for any language to be used to talk about and to describe the world of change. (shrink)

One of the notable arguments in the history of philosophy is Descartes' thesis: cogito, ergo sum. However, the question as to the logical nature of that argument has not yet been entirely clarified.

DESCARTES'S MAIN ARGUMENTS FOR DUALISM--FROM HIS INABILITY\nTO CONCEIVE MIND "APART FROM" BODY AND FROM PSYCHIC\nSIMPLICITY--ARE ESSENTIALLY ALIKE. BUT BOTH ARE AMBIGUOUS:\nDESCARTES VACILLATES BETWEEN USING GOD TO "VALIDATE" AN\nALREADY GIVEN DUALIST CONCLUSION AND USING THE GUARANTEE TO\nINFER DUALISM FROM THE EPISTEMIC POSSIBILITY OF A\nDISEMBODIED MIND. HIS THEORY OF REPRESENTATION LEAD HIM TO\nCONFUSE THESE STRATEGIES AND TO OVERLOOK THE PROBLEMS OF\nEACH. NONETHELESS, DESCARTES ANTICIPATES KANT'S INSIGHTS\nINTO THE FAILURES OF TRADITIONAL PHILOSOPHY OF MIND.

Descartes’s proof of the existence of God in the third ’Meditation’ can be interpreted as a version of the argument from design. He cannot point to the marvels of nature, since all he has after the second ’Meditation’ is his ideas, but his idea of God serves as the brilliantly designed entity that he claims he cannot have authored on his own. Several passages in his replies to commentators support this interpretation, and when one considers what Descartes believed he (...) had deduced from this idea, it is understandable that he could consider it a wonderful idea. (shrink)

Descartes' First Meditation is widely supposed to contain an intuitive and compelling argument in support of skepticism with respect to the existence of a natural world. The leading question of this essay is whether that is indeed the case. To this end, I undertake a detailed rereading of Descartes' text on its own terms, abstracting from what has been made of it during subsequent centuries. I conclude that the argument in fact to be found in the First Meditation (...) rests upon a series of problematic and disputable commitments - a classical formalist paradigm in epistemology, according to which, explicitly or implicitly, mathematical knowledge is treated as a model for knowledge in general; a broad notion of "reasons for doubt" which subsumes mere possibilities; and, most contentiously of all, the presumed ontological independence of mind and body. (shrink)

The central theme of this study is that Descartes is a teacher who develops his arguments for the different philosophical orientations of his students. Indeed, according to Cunning, so respectful is Descartes of their orientations that he actually misrepresents his own view in the Meditations on central doctrinal matters like the basis for dualism. The exegetical argument for this is the central argument of the book, though many other aspects of the Meditations are discussed in novel and interesting (...) ways. Descartes describes himself as establishing the duality of mental and physical substances in two stages in the Meditations. It is in Meditation II, he says in the Fourth Replies, where he shows that a .. (shrink)

This article shows that Descartes’ ontological argument in Meditation V is needed to ground essential distinctions, particularly the mind/body distinction. It does this by tracing out Descartes’ di...

the meditations on first philosophy presents us with an alleged proof for the existence of God that proceeds from the existence of an idea of an infinite being in the human mind—an idea of God—to the existence of God himself. Insofar as we have an idea of an infinite being, an idea with “infinite objective reality,” we can legitimately ask whence it came to us. The only possible cause of this idea, claims Descartes, is an infinite being, namely, God. The (...) occurrence of just this idea in the proof is essential. In fact, Descartes maintains that any such causal proof for God’s existence crucially relies on this idea: “it seems to me that all these proofs based on his effects are reducible to a single one; and also .. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe most prominent early modern argument against materialism is to be found in Descartes. Previously I had argued that this argument relies crucially on a robust conception of substance, according to which it has a single principal attribute of which all its other intrinsic qualities are modes. In the present paper I return to this claim. In Section 2, I address a question that is often raised about that conception of substance: its commitment to the idea that a (...) substance has a single such principal attribute. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra and Daniel Garber have argued that this claim relies on Descartes's identification of substance with attribute. But I argue that it relies on his view that a substance has a single, unitary nature. In Section 3, I examine the role of this conception of substance in arguments found in Malebranche and Leibniz and compare these arguments with Descartes's. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Descartes' Cogito Augustine's “Si fallor, sum” Argument (If I Am Mistaken, I Exist).

I critically examine the view that Descartes’s independence conception (IC) of substance plays a crucial role in his “separability argument” for substance dualism. I argue that IC is a poisoned chalice. I do so by considering how an IC-based separability argument fares on two different ways of thinking about principal attributes. On the one hand, if we take principal attributes to be universals, then a separability argument that deploys IC establishes a version of dualism that is unacceptably (...) strong. On the other hand, if we take principal attributes to be tropes, then IC introduces challenges which undermine the argument. This is partly because the assumption of tropes makes it possible to distinguish several versions of substance dualism, versions which differ with respect to their degree of generality. I argue that taking principal attributes to be tropes makes it challenging to establish any of these versions by way of an IC-based separability argument. I conclude the paper by suggesting a way forward for the proponent of the separability argument. (shrink)

This paper explores the idea that Descartes’ cogito is a kind of diagonal argument. Using tools from modal logic, it reviews some historical antecedents of this idea from Slezak and Boos and culminates in an orginal result classifying the exact structure of belief frames capable of supporting diagonal arguments and our reconstruction of the cogito.

A recent discussion of descartes' cosmological argument has misconstrued its nature. Since the argument is seldom discussed, Is not flawed in the particular ways suggested, But is flawed in other ways, An analysis seems justifiable. Descartes' argument is, I contend, That the content of the idea of God required God as its cause. Finite experience cannot produce it, And prior awareness of it is a condition for recognizing finiteness. The argument does not depend on platonism, However (...) platonistic may be its context in descartes' thought. The defect, Noted by early objectors, Is that we have no unexplainable idea of god. The ideas of God we do have can be derived from ordinary experience, So this paper contends. (shrink)

Descartes famously espouses modal voluntarism, the doctrine that God freely creates the eternal truths. God has chosen to make it true that two plus two equals four, for instance, but he could have chosen otherwise. Why, though, does Descartes endorse modal voluntarism? Many commentators have noted that he regularly appeals to divine omnipotence to justify his doctrine. This strategy is usually thought to be unsuccessful, however, because it seems to presuppose—question-beggingly—that the eternal truths are in the scope of God’s power. (...) This paper argues that Descartes’s appeal to divine omnipotence has more going for it than meets the eye. Like many other medieval and early modern philosophers, Descartes assumes that God has the power to control everything that remains unfixed by his own essence. At the same time, though, he denies that the eternal truths are fixed by, or grounded in, the divine essence. The combination of these two commitments leads to modal voluntarism. The paper also argues that the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) may play an important role in the reasoning that leads Descartes to endorse modal voluntarism. This is surprising, given that the PSR appears to be deeply at odds with modal voluntarism. (shrink)

It is still commonly supposed that Descartes based his argument for the mind-body distinction on the law of the indiscernibility of identicals. I argue that this interpretation is very unlikely to be correct. I explain three contemporary versions of this interpreta- tion and say why I reject it. Basically, use of this law for Descartes’s conclusion would require reference to human bodies or else the supposition, for the purpose of the argument, of reference to human bodies. But at (...) the time Descartes formulated his argument, he would not have allowed either. Instead, I amend a different interpretation which others have found, and briefly defend it against one famous objection. (shrink)

Two major interpretations have been advanced for the sum res cogitans passage in Descartes’s Second Meditation. According to the first interpretation, he argues in this passage that only thinking belongs to his essence. According to the second interpretation, due to Anthony Kenny, Harry Frankfurt and others, no such claim is defended by Descartes. Rather, it is his aim to argue that only thinking can be ascribed to him with certainty. In this essay, it will be shown that the “naive”, essentialist (...) reading of the sum res cogitans reasoning is closer to the text than the perhaps more sophisticated, purely epistemic reading. Although the interpretation defended here is not new, it will be arrived at by way of new arguments. (shrink)

Of late there has been a resurgence of interest in the proofs of God’s existence. Both the ontological argument and Thomistic forms of the cosmological argument have been analyzed repeatedly and well. Very little attention, however, has been given to the rather unique cosmological argument presented by Descartes in his Third Meditation. An additional reason for airing this argument is that a recent presentation of D’s cosmological argument has misconstrued its basic structure.

Arnauld raised the concern that Descartes’s real distinction argument proved too much, because it seemed to lead us back to the Platonic view according to which the mind uses the body as its vehicle. Descartes responds by pointing out that he argued against this account of mind-body union in the Sixth Meditation. Descartes believes he did not prove too much, because he offers an argument against this view whose premises and conclusion are consistent with the real distinction (...) class='Hi'>argument. In this paper, the union argument is reconstructed and evaluated in order to see if, through his rejection of the Platonic view, Descartes adequately addresses Arnauld’s concern. In the end, Descartes adequately addresses this concern only if God’s veracity provides a secure foundation for a crucial inference. Finally, these considerations show a way for those committed to the real distinction of mind and body to avoid the problem of their interaction. (shrink)

The third Meditation is typically understood to contain two a posteriori arguments for the existence of God. The author focuses on the second argument, where Descartes proves the existence of God partly in virtue of proving that Descartes cannot be the cause of himself. To establish this, Descartes argues that if he were the cause of himself, then he would endow himself with any conceivable perfection. The justification for this claim is that bringing about a substance is more difficult (...) than creating an attribute, so anything that can do the former can do the latter. While current explanations of this justification are either implausible or inadequate, the author argues that this principle derives support from a scholastic distinction between being-as-such and determinate being. With this distinction in view, we can make sense of Descartes's argument without appealing to ambiguous or inadequate notions. (shrink)

I critically examine the view that Descartes’s independence conception of substance plays a crucial role in his “separability argument” for substance dualism. I argue that IC is a poisoned chalice. I do so by considering how an IC-based separability argument fares on two different ways of thinking about principal attributes. On the one hand, if we take principal attributes to be universals, then a separability argument that deploys IC establishes a version of dualism that is unacceptably strong. (...) On the other hand, if we take principal attributes to be tropes, then IC introduces challenges that undermine the argument. This is partly because the assumption of tropes makes it possible to distinguish several versions of substance dualism, versions that differ with respect to their degree of generality. I argue that taking principal attributes to be tropes makes it challenging to establish any of these versions by way of an IC-based separability argument. I conclude the paper by suggesting a way forward for the proponent of the separability argument. (shrink)

In Meditation I, Descartes dismisses the possibility that he might be insane as a ground for doubting that the senses are a source of knowledge of the external world. In this paper, I argue that Descartes was justified in so doing, and draw some general epistemological conclusions from this result.

THIS PAPER ATTEMPTS TO PINPOINT EXPLICITLY THE VICIOUS\nCIRCULARITY IN PROPOSITION I OF DESCARTES' "GEOMETRICAL\nDEMONSTRATIONS" OF GOD'S EXISTENCE. THE ARGUMENT IS TREATED\nBOTH DISCURSIVELY AND SYMBOLICALLY. SINCE THE PHRASE\n"NATURE OR CONCEPT" OCCURS CRUCIALLY, THE TERM "CONCEPT" IS\nEXAMINED RELEVANT TO THE FOLLOWING DISTINCTIONS: (I)\nPROPERTY CONCEPTS--GENERAL AND INDIVIDUAL (ENUMERATIVE AND\nDESCRIPTIVELY UNIQUE) (II) PSYCHOLOGICAL\nCONCEPTS--DEPENDING ON HOW ONE INTERPRETS "CONCEPT," THE\nARGUMENT DIFFERS IN FORM AND CONCLUSION. WHEN "CONCEPT" IS\nTAKEN IN THE SENSE OF: GENERAL PROPERTY CONCEPTS AND\nDESCRIPTIVELY UNIQUE, INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY CONCEPTS--ONLY A\nHYPOTHETICAL CONCLUSION IS DERIVABLE.

Among the rational arguments for God’s existence there is the ontological argument, originally put forth – in its classical form – by the scholastic theologian and philosopher Anselm of Canterbury and subsequently reiterated, in slightly altered versions, by some of the modern thinkers. The present paper aims to outline a comparative presentation of the ontological argument as formulated by Anselm and Descartes, respectively, and to investigate the ways in which the two Christian philosophers perceived the relationship between faith (...) and reason, between unconditional acceptance of divine Revelation and its expression in the terms of discursive thinking. (shrink)