The Neglected Argument for the Reality of God is something of a Rorschach test for scholars of Peirce.1 Some see a creative presentation of his mature philosophy of inquiry, while others find evidence that Peirce was unable to free himself of his conservative religious milieu. As the editors of The Essential Peirce collection noted: “Whether this paper is an elaboration of or an offense against pragmatism is an unsettled question.”2 The primary import of the essay, I contend, is (...) not to defend God’s reality but rather to highlight continuities between religion and science. In doing so, Peirce aims to show theologians how they might better do their jobs. My aim in this paper is to take Peirce’s advice seriously and.. (shrink)

This paper is an evaluation of C. S. Peirce’s late essay “A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God”, based on the two logical values that he calls “productiveness” and “security.” After reviewing the unique logical form of “abduction” and noting that it is a formal fallacy—and so enjoys less “security” than deduction or induction—I turn to the extraordinary case of abduction that is found in “A Neglected Argument.” I argue that the productiveness of the (...) class='Hi'>Neglected Argument is found in its ability to instigate practical results. The security of the Neglected Argument, on the other hand, is rooted in an activity Peirce calls “musement,” a kind of rational intuition. Moreover, I suggest that Peirce’s notion of “musement,” which has remained something of a mystery in Peirce studies, arose from hisearly reading of Friedrich von Schiller’s aesthetics. (shrink)

C. S. Peirce develops a novel argument for belief in God in a 1908 paper he entitled “A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God.”1 That essay has received a fair amount of attention in recent years,2 but Peirce’s overall argument remains somewhat obscure. There is still more work to be done in explicating its basic structure and determining whether the argument can withstand criticism. The purpose of this essay is to reconstruct Peirce’s argument (...) in a way that reveals the most pressing objections to which it is susceptible.Peirce’s overall argument consists of three interrelated sub-arguments. First, Peirce leads us through a meditative or contemplative process through which the belief in God’s reality is.. (shrink)

Despite the attention it has received in recent years, C. S. Peirce's so-called neglected argument for God's reality remains somewhat obscure. The aim of this essay is to clarify the basic structure of Peirce's three-part argument and to show how it falls prey to several objections. I argue that his overall argument is ultimately unsuccessful in demonstrating the reality of God, even if it provides some degree of warrant for the belief in God's reality (...) to those who are uncontrollably drawn to that belief during the process of musement. (shrink)

The N.A., as Peirce somewhat affectionately called it, consists of a “nest of three arguments for the Reality of God.” The first arises from “Musement” and is perhaps best described in terms of the psychology of discovery. Yet musement “inevitably” leads to “the hypothesis of God’s Reality.” Thus this, the “Humble Argument,” then gives way to the N.A. proper, which is in part reminiscent of the traditional argument from design. Also every human heart “will be ravished by the (...) beauty and adorability of the Idea” of God’s reality, by the notion of an Ens necessarium. Indeed, “a latent tendency toward belief in God is a fundamental ingredient of the soul.”. (shrink)

This article proposes an integrative reading of Peirce's and James's philosophies, which aims to figure out the main features of a shared pragmatist metaphysics. Two methodologies are adopted to reach this goal: a historical scrutiny of sources, prevalent in the first part, and a theoretical investigation of Peirce's and James's philosophies, in the second and third parts. The first part analyzes Peirce's and James's proximity, which lies in their common understanding of pragmatism as an anti-dogmatic method in (...) philosophy, and their alleged main difference, which is represented by the issue of nominalism/anti-nominalism, and pivots around the concepts of individuals and generals. The article challenges the mainstream interpretation that sees Peirce as a champion of generality and continuity, whereas James is known for being an ardent defender of individuality. The arguments supporting such an unconventional interpretation are offered in the second part, which explores Peirce's view of individuality in logic, and the third one, dedicated to James's view of continuity in psychology. As a conclusion, Peirce and James's shared pragmatic metaphysics turns out to be centered on the dynamical bonding between individuals and generals. (shrink)

Peirce's "Neglected Argument" uses more or less standard logical vocabulary, such as "argument," "retroduction," "premise," "conclusion," and "hypothesis." There cannot be any doubt, however, that the musement process as he characterizes it must be regarded as a semiotic process—that is, one that relates a sign to an object by way of forming an interpretant. This assumption follows from the simple observation that, according to Peirce, all processes of thought are semiotically structured. What is more, Peirce quite (...) often uses the term 'argument' for a specific class of sign—namely, one that distinctly indicates1 or represents2 its conclusion. In addition, three years before his 1908... (shrink)

Published in 1908, C.S. Peirce’s ‘A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God’ is one of his most difficult articles. Presenting a peculiar entanglement of scientific method and theology, it sketches a ‘humble’ argument for the reality—and not the existence—of God for Musers, that is, those who pursue the activity he calls ‘Musement’. In Musement, Peirce claims, we can achieve a kind of perception of the intertwinement of the three universes of experience: of feeling, of brute fact, (...) and of reason. He also somehow relates each universe to a distinct phase of inquiry, which is described by the use of induction, deduction, and abduction or retroduction. The way that he develops his claims allows him to outline God as an abductive vague hypothesis to explain how those three universes make up a single whole. The hypothesis being vague means that the principle of contradiction does not hold for it. In this presentation, we aim at throwing some light at these points, focusing on the concept of Musement and what is understood as the vagueness of the hypothesis. (shrink)

This paper aims, above all, to invite a direct reading of the article that Charles S. Peirce published in 1908 with the title “A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God.” More than a century after its original publication, that article by Peirce has not lost its relevance: its careful reading continues to provide a lot to think about. To this end, my presentation is organized in six sections: 1) introduction; 2) presentation of “A Neglected Argument (...) for the Reality of God”; 3) the notion of reality; 4) the heart of the “Neglected Argument”; 5) contemporary discussion: a response to Oya ; and 6) conclusion. (shrink)

Charles S. Peirce sketches "a nest of three arguments for the Reality of God" in his article "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God." I provide careful analysis and explication of Peirce's argument, along with consideration of some objections. I argue that there are significant differences between Peirce's neglected argument and the traditional arguments for God's existence; Peirce's analysis of the neglected argument into three arguments is misleading; there are (...) two distinct levels of argument that Peirce does not recognize; and it is doubtful whether the argument meets all the criteria set by Peirce himself. (shrink)

Although few of Charles Sanders Peirce's writings were devoted explicitly to religious topics, Michael L. Raposa demonstrates that religious ideas played a central role in shaping Peirce's philosophy and are manifest throughout his corpus, in scientific and mathematical papers as well as in his writings on metaphysics, cosmology, and the normative sciences. Because Peirce's religious ideas are continuous with and integral to his reflections on these and other issues, they must be identified and understood if his work (...) as a whole is to be interpreted properly. An organizing perspective for Raposa's study and the subject of extended commentary is Peirce's most famous essay in the philosophy of religion, "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God." Although very few of Peirce's commentators have devoted serious attention to the religious dimension of his thought, Raposa concludes that Peirce's writings are an important resource for contemporary scholars of religion and points to those of his ideas that might be most fruitfully entertained and developed. (shrink)

In his "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of Goc" (1908), Charles Peirce argued for two dimensions of belief in God's reality. On the one side, he maintained that this belief would be useful for guiding the conduct of life; on the other side, he maintained that the belief could function as the first stage in a scientific inquiry. My suggestion in this paper is that we examine the last of Peirce's 1903 lectures on pragmatism at Harvard (...) to see how the possibility of this dual function arises out of his late theory of cognition in which the functional certainty of perception is brought to close quarters with the provisionality of hypotheses. The upshot is that for Peirce a healthful religious belief should internally "marry" science and religion —theory and practice — by allowing provisional and vague conceptions of God to carry on the work of guiding conduct. /// No texto "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God" (1908), Charles Peirce defende que há duas dimensões de crença na realidade de Deus. Afirma, por um lado, que esta crença poderia ser útil para orientar o comportamento (conduct of life); por outro, que ela poderia ser como que o primeiro escalão numa investigação científica. A minha sugestão neste artigo é que, examinámos as últimas conferências de Peirce de 1903 sobre o pragmatismo em Harvard para ver como a possibilidade desta dupla função surge da sua última teoria de conhecimento (cognition) em que a certeza funcional de percepção é usada para aproximar o aspecto provisório das hipóteses. A consequência disso é que para Peirce uma saudável crença religiosa deve "juntar" internamente ciência e religião - teoria e prática - permitindo as concepções provisórias e vagas de Deus para continuar a tarefa de orientar o comportamento. /// Dans ce texte "Un argument négligé pour la réalité de Dieu" (1908), Charles Peirce soutient qu'il y a deux dimensions de croyance en la réalité de Dieu. Il afflrme, d'un côté, que cette croyance pourrait être utile pour orienter le comportement (conduct of life) et, par ailleurs, qu'elle pourrait être pour ainsi dire le premier niveau dans une recherche scientifique. Ma suggestion dans le présent article est que nous examinions les dernières conférences de Peirce en 1903 sur le pragmatisme à Harvard pour voir comment Ia possibilite de cette double fonction surgit de sa dernière théorie de la connaissance dans laquelle la certitude fonctionnelle de perception est utilisée pour aborder l'aspect provisoire des hypothèses. La conséquence en est que pour Peirce une saine croyance religieuse doit "unir" intrinsèquement science et religion - théorie et pratique - en permettant les conceptions provisoires et vagues de Dieu. (shrink)

Charles S. Peirce believed that his pragmatic philosophy could reconcile religion and science and that this reconciliation involves a religious ethics creating a real community with the cosmos and God. After some rival pragmatic approaches to God and religious belief inconsistent with Peirce's philosophy are set aside, his metaphysical plan for a reconciliation of religion and science is outlined. A panentheistic God makes the best match with his desired conclusions from the Neglected Argument for the reality of (...) God, and this God is also capable of fulfilling the pragmatic role demanded by Peirce's ethical expectations for the intelligent functioning of religion. The discussion proceeds to an elaboration of the aesthetic, metaphysical, and ethical elements of Peirce's philosophical system, which indicate why Peirce's religious ethics is best categorized as akin to Stoicism, with some Christian elements. For Peirce, religious ethics proceeds from the (potentially universal) agapic community's cooperation with God's loving creativity of the universe. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to analyze Charles S. Peirce’s so-called “Neglected Argument for the Reality of God”. Peirce formulated the Neglected Argument as a “nest” of three different but sequentially developed arguments. Taken as a whole, the Neglected Argument aims to show that engaging in a religious way of life, adoring and acting in accordance with the hypothesis of God, is a subjective, non-evidentially grounded though naturally founded human reaction, and that it (...) is this (alleged) natural foundation that makes it reasonable to accept the hypothesis of God as it being actually true, thereby grounding a properly religious way of life. I argue that Peirce’s Neglected Argument lacks of any serious apologetic force since it fails to justify, on independent, non-question-begging grounds, the claim that we are all naturally (and thus inevitably) lead to formulate, and later adore and act in accordance with, the hypothesis of God. (shrink)

Charles Sanders Peirce is not known for waxing theological. Certainly, he has various writings that may be classed under the head of natural theology or the philosophy of religion, among them "Evolutionary Love", a critique of Hume on miracles, and "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God". Numerous Peirce scholars have endeavored to give expression to Peirce's philosophy of religion. Other manuscripts are suggestive of his religious practices and of how he viewed his religious beliefs (viz., (...) as heterodox if not... (shrink)

Interpretations of Peirce’s frequent references to a proof of his brand of pragmatism vary, ranging from its impossibility to its substantive completion. This paper takes seriously Peirce’s claim that a philosophical argument should be composed of multiple fibers and suggests a relatively neglected perspective that connects much of Peirce’s thought. This additional fiber is Peirce’s account of memory, often only intimated. The importance of this account arises from Peirce’s claim that the practically indubitable existence of memory is a (...) strong argument for synechism, the doctrine of continuity. Indeed, the nature of memory relates to several of Peirce’s philosophical commitments, including fallibilism and realism. As an opening to inquiry, this paper will explore the role of memory in Peirce’s account of cognition and its bearing on many of his philosophical positions. Working roughly chronologically, we will look at the implications concerning memory in Peirce’s denial of intuition in 1868, his revision of the Kantian mental faculties in 1887, his account of perception, claims about pragmatism and abduction in 1903, and some brief remarks about memory within his mature semeiotic. By covering so much material, I intend only to show the pervasive and richly suggestive theme of memory in Peirce’s thought. Accordingly, I raise more questions than I answer. Nonetheless, a probationary conclusion is that Peirce’s pragmatism, considered as the logic of abduction, concerns the self-control of memory. Alternatively, under this perspective much of Peirce’s philosophy is an attempt to account for knowledge based upon only fallible memory, rather than intuition. (shrink)

Two different versions of the ending of the first additament to C. S. Peirce's 1908 article, "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God," appear in the Collected Papers but were omitted from The Essential Peirce. In one, he linked the hypothesis of God's Reality to his entire theory of logic as semeiotic, claiming that proving the latter would also prove the former. In the other, he offered a final outline of his cosmology, in which the Reality (...) of God as Ens necessarium is indispensable to both the origin and order of our existing universe of Signs. Exploring these passages, as well as the unpublished manuscript drafts of the article, provides important insights into the key concepts of instinct and continuity within Peirce's comprehensive system of thought. (shrink)

This paper argues for a new perspective on Locke's account of toleration by looking at a set of important but neglected arguments for toleration. Standard accounts which view Lockean toleration as justified solely on considerations of conscience fail to explain Locke's preferred form of toleration, the process by which he overcame his earlier objections to toleration, and the importance of considerations regarding the practicability of religious toleration. The paper argues that attention to Locke's political arguments provides a more complete (...) account of his toleration, which integrates his views on toleration with his wider political theory. These political arguments arise from, and are intimately related to this theory of consent and his epistemological views. The political arguments allow Locke to formulate a response to the then prevailing problematique of toleration exemplified by Samuel Parker's objections. These arguments not only establish toleration as a natural right, but also a necessary condition for maintaining legitimate political society. They also explain his intolerance of atheists and Catholics on grounds other than prejudice. (shrink)

The paper interprets Kant’s neglected argument at FOUNDATIONS 401 as consisting of these two premises and conclusion: (1) It follows from consequentialism that in a natural paradise people would not be obligated to be morally good. (2) But this is absurd; one ought to be morally good no matter what. Therefore, consequentialism is false. It is shown that this argument is a powerful one, mainly by showing that independent grounds support (2) and that (1) may survive a (...) number of strong possible objections. One that it does not appear to survive, though, is that the paradise envisioned is not logically possible. (shrink)

C.S. Peirce's "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God" [NA] has always baffled its readers. Its publishing editor needed to ask, "[W]hat, then, precisely, is your neglected argument?", and EP 2's editors observe that "[t]his is one of Peirce's most enigmatic writings". First-time readers will likely concur with the underwhelmed theologian who told Michael Raposa that NA "ought to remain neglected". Early Peirce scholars did neglect the essay, regarding it as an "anomalous (...) sideshow to Peirce's more important concern with the logic and methodology of science". No longer ignored, NA continues to bewilder: "N.... (shrink)

This volume contributes to the remarkable resurgence in interest for American pragmatism and its proponents by focusing on the influence of British empiricism, ...

Anselm is commonly credited with two a priori arguments for God's existence, the non-modal argument of Proslogion 2 and a modal argument some find in Proslogion 3. But his Reply to Gaunilo contains a third. The argument as Anselm gives it has flaws, but they are not fatal, and its main premise can serve as the basis of a simpler, stronger argument.

Something surprising about Charles S. Peirce scholarship throughout the years has been the scarce attention paid to the religious dimensions of Peirce's thought. The aim of this paper is to highlight that for Peirce the belief in God is not only a natural product of abduction, of the "rational instinct" or from the educated guess of the scientist or the lay man, but also that the abduction of God is for him the “proof” of pragmatism. Not only the belief (...) in God is able to change the behavior of the believer, but according to Peirce —in "A Neglected Argument of the Reality of God" and other places— the reality of God gives meaning to the whole scientific enterprise. (shrink)

The impact of Peirce's philosophy of religion on subsequent religious thinkers was almost immediate. Within five years of the appearance of Peirce's "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God," in 1913, Josiah Royce published his brilliant Hibbert Lectures on The Problem of Christianity, delivered at Oxford earlier that year. It was the first—and in many respects remains the most impressive—attempt to adapt Peirce's ideas for the purposes of articulating a comprehensive philosophical theology. During the (...) last 100 years, only a handful of thinkers have followed Royce's lead, first Charles Hartshorne, more recently Robert Corrington, Hermann Deuser, Robert Neville and Peter Ochs. (Other scholars have set about the... (shrink)

The romance ofJoseph and Asenatk(JA), a work almost entirely neglected by classicists, was extremely popular for many centuries and translated into many languages—Slavonic, Syriac, Armenian, Roumanian, Latin (twice), Middle English, Coptic, and Ethiopian. Yet the first complete edition of the Greek text was not published until 1890, and Batiffol'seditio pritnceps(‘Le Livre de la Priére d' Aséneth’,Studia Patristicai-ii (1889–90) does not inspire confidence.Batiffol treated JA as a product of the late fourth or fifth century A.D., though he soon conceded an (...) earlier date, convinced by the arguments of various reviewers that it reflected the missionary outlook characteristic of Judaism of the late Hellenistic and early Imperial period. (shrink)

Problem: Mitterer's critique of the central argumentations of radical constructivists has been mostly neglected until today. The paper presents and evaluates his criticism and, in the second part, outlines a format of constructivism that tries to draw appropriate consequences. Solution: In his critique Mitterer explains why the radical constructivism represented above all by Maturana, Varela, von Glasersfeld or Roth still remains in a dualistic format. In his view Neurobiology is used in their writings as the indisputable basis for deriving (...) far-reaching epistemological consequences. Therefore constructivism evades self-application. To overcome this serious critique a different approach to constructivist thinking is sketched that operates without using any biological or psychological theories, tries to avoid dualism, and elaborates Mitterer's basic argument that the description of an object and the object under description are the same. Benefits: The paper shows what constructivism can learn from a serious critique and how it can be rewritten in a non-dualistic way. (shrink)

After years of neglect, alienation has again reached the agenda of critical thought. In my case, I recognize alienation as a challenge for education in contemporary societies. To obtain conceptual resources to overcome this challenge, I have revisited the comprehensive 20 th century discussion of alienation. Today, alienation is naturally discussed as an existential condition of human being, but still in the 1980s, there was a strong Marxist current that claimed alienation to be implied by capitalism, in particular by the (...) institution of private property and the social division of labor, and that alienation therefore should be criticized as part of the critique of capitalism and political economy and possibly overcome. Today, under the hegemony of neo-liberal capitalism, this critical and processual concept of alienation is more relevant than ever. Hence, in the present work I argue that the basic logic of Marx's idea of alienation still has critical potential. The argument forms a long engagement with mainly 20 th century literature, departing from the very idea of capitalism, considering the ideas of history, education and democracy, discussing how to distinguish and translate key terms, considering why alienation became an object of controversy among Marxists, offering an interpretation of Marx's critique relevant for contemporary society, thus considering alienation a consequence of working under conditions of private property, i.e. being a human being in a capitalist society, and finally presenting Marx's idea of communism as relevant to the contemporary educational agenda. (shrink)

One effect of modern journal publishing is that you may already have read all the papers published in this issue because they have all been available on the JME web-site for some time; and some of them have already generated discussion both on the web-site and in the public media. But just in case you do not visit the web-site every day the Concise Argument will continue to guide you to some interesting items in the print journal. Wilful neglect (...) in English law If you live in the UK you have probably already heard Professor Margot Brazier discuss the paper by Alghrani et al on the radio . The paper points to a glaring inconsistency in English law. If a healthcare professional kills a patient by neglect the healthcare professional can be convicted of the serious criminal offence of gross negligence manslaughter and a conviction does not depend …. (shrink)

Since the World Health Organization first declared the novel coronavirus a pandemic, diverse strategies have emerged to address it. This paper focuses on two leading strategies, elimination and mitigation, and examines their ethical basis. Elimination or ‘Zero-COVID’ dominates policies in Pacific Rim societies. It sets as a goal zero deaths and seeks to contain transmission using stringent short-term lockdowns, followed by strict find, test, trace and isolate methods. Mitigation, which dominates in the US and most European nations, sets targets for (...) community transmission and lifts restrictions once targets are met. This approach takes calculated risks and regards a certain amount of disease and death as ethically justified. Section I examines different societal responses to risk that underlie these different policy approaches. Section II focuses on ethical arguments favouring Zero-COVID and raises health equity objections. Section III proposes a long-term strategy that balances the twin goals of promoting population health and health equity. There are no data available for this work. (shrink)

Wilkinson and Weaver have given a readable English translation of this highly influential work in which Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca point out historical and systematic inadequacies in much of contemporary logic and methodology. Since Descartes, philosophy has presupposed that all reason is self-evident and all proof is apodictic. The central thesis this work develops is that those areas outside the calculations of formal logic need not be dismissed as nonrational or meaningless. The "new rhetoric," by challenging the self-evidence of reason and (...) by opening the mind to induction through speech, extends the concept of reason beyond the limits of a system of formal deductive logic. While retaining much respect for modern logic, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca find the foundation for their theory in ancient philosophy, particularly in Aristotle. The proof which the authors call "the new rhetoric" Aristotle calls "dialectical proof," or the proof based on reasoning from generally accepted opinions. The "new rhetoric," however, both expands and neglects aspects of the ancient dialectic. "New rhetoric" will not be limited simply to spoken words. This work is primarily a systemization of rhetoric through the analysis of methods of proofs in the humanities, law, and philosophy. The social character of language plays a central part in the authors' idea of rhetoric and argumentation. The starting point of the investigation is not definitive truth, but the opinions of men expressed in language. Apodictic argumentation in contemporary methodologies has as the condition for its possibility normal linguistic expressions.--D. S. S. (shrink)

At its January 2017 meeting, the Executive Committee of the Peirce Society decided to plan a panel on "Charles S. Peirce and the Study of Religion" for the American Academy of Religion Annual Meeting in November, 2017, in Boston. The AAR accepted our proposal as a special meeting and I had the privilege of organizing and chairing it. We are pleased that the panel of papers will be published as a group in The Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society.Michael (...) L. Raposa's paper, "On Reading God's Great Poem: A Delayed Response to Christopher Hookway," picks up a long debate about the extent to which Peirce's late "Neglected Argument for the Reality of God" is continuous or discontinuous with his early work.Brandon... (shrink)

This paper discusses an argument for scientific realism put forward by Anthony Quinton in The Nature of Things. The argument – here called the controlled continuity argument – seems to have received no attention in the literature, apparently because it may easily be mistaken for a better-known argument, Grover Maxwell’s “argument from the continuum”. It is argued here that, in point of fact, the two are quite distinct and that Quinton’s argument has several advantages (...) over Maxwell’s. The controlled continuity argument is also compared to Ian Hacking’s “argument from coincidence”. It is pointed out that both arguments are to a large extent independent from considerations about high-level scientific theories, and that both are abductive arguments at the core. But these similarities do not dilute an important difference related to the fact that Quinton’s argument cleverly seeks to anchor belief in unobservable entities in realism about ordinary objects, which is a position shared by most contemporary scientific anti-realists. (shrink)

The idea of the university is habitually discussed in relation to German or English language classics. Instead, I will focus on the Spanish language periphery arguing that the discussions there merit attention for distinguishing between three central Old World models of the university, namely, apart from the English and the German, also a French one. Moreover, the marginal perspective stresses the social and political importance of the university. In this perspective, José Ortega y Gasset deserves attention for arguing for a (...) university in the service of a modern republican state. Ortega stresses the importance of a cultural formation that includes the sciences to make enlightened decisions, the distinction between teaching a discipline and doing research within it, and that between a scientist doing research and a highly educated professional practitioner. Unfortunately, the role of knowledge and truth is neglected. The argument from the periphery is therefore necessary albeit not sufficient. (shrink)

The authors of Habits of the Heart charge that America is losing the institutions that help “to create the kind of person who could sustain a connection to a wider political community and thus ultimately support the maintenance of free institutions.” Bellah fears that “individualism may have grown cancerous – that it may be destroying those social integuments that Tocqueville saw as moderating its more destructive potentials, that it may be threatening the survival of freedom itself.” Proponents of the liberal (...) free market order should, I will argue, take seriously the concerns that motivate Bellah and company: citizens of a liberal regime cannot live by exchanges alone. Liberal constitutionalism depends upon a certain level and quality of citizen virtue. But while the need for virtue is often neglected by liberal theorists, it is far from clear that the actual workings of liberal institutions have drastically undermined virtue in the way Bellah's dire account suggests. That analysis serves, moreover, as the springboard for a radically transformist argument that seeks, not so much to elevate and shape, but to transcend and deny, the self-interestedness that the free market exercises. Having argued against Bellah's analysis and prescriptions, I shall attempt to show how the phenomena he describes are open to an interpretation that is happier from the point of view of a concern with virtue. I shall end by using Tocqueville to suggest that combining liberal capitalism with intermediate associations like voluntary groups and state and local government helps elevate and shape self-interest, promoting a citizenry capable of and insistent upon liberal self-government. (shrink)

The growing number of universities today makes it relevant to consider again the idea of the university. Consulting the classics of the discussion, I argue that we must retain the idealist notions of knowledge, science and truth professed by Newman in his argument for liberal education, although he neglects the possible corruption of the university faculty. The problem of corruption is recognized by Jaspers, criticizing all idealist notions and leaving science and scholarship to rely only on existential commitment. The (...) problem for both classics, however, is that they conceive of academic freedom in an all-too individualist way. Instead, I argue that the idea of the academic republic should be taken seriously, i.e., that a contemporary idea of the university must include suggestions for university government comprising institutional checks and balances. Only such a constitutional notion of academic freedom may counter neo-liberal reification of higher education, science, and scholarship. (shrink)

This paper tests the following hypothesis: that the prime matter of classical Aristotelian-Scholastic metaphysics is numerically identical to energy. Is P=E? After outlining the classical Aristotelian concept of prime matter, I provide the master argument for it based on the phenomenon of substantial change. I then outline what we know about energy as a scientific concept, including its role and application in some key fields. Next, I consider the arguments in favour of prime matter being identical to energy, followed (...) by the arguments against. The method used is that of ontological profile comparison: does the profile of prime matter match, in key features, that of energy? An affirmative answer, that P=E, would be a momentous discovery: it would show that one of the most neglected and derided ideas of pre-modern metaphysics – a contributor to its downfall in the wake of the Scientific Revolution – was right all along. From a negative answer we would still learn much about the interaction of science and metaphysics. It turns out, however, given what we currently know, that the answer is not quite as simple as one might hope. (shrink)

In this article, I discuss the role of friendship in ethical development by focusing on the virtue of humility in Matteo Ricci’s (1552–1610) first work written in Chinese, On Friendship (Jiaoyou Lun 交友論). My overarching argument is that, since humility is a disposition or virtue that leads a person to being open to seeking or receiving help and guidance from others, it can facilitate ethical development by taking into account both the equal and unequal ethical status between friends. Moreover, (...) since in non-Chinese scholarship this work has been neglected or misinterpreted if discussed at all, I also attempt to show why On Friendship should be more widely studied and its importance more widely recognized. (shrink)