The universe appears fine-tuned for life. Bayesian confirmation theory is utilized to examine two competing explanations for this fine-tuning, namely design (theism) and the existence of many universes, in comparison with the ’null’ hypothesis that just one universe exists as a brute fact. Some authors have invoked the so-called ’inverse gambler’s fallacy’ to argue that the many-universes hypothesis does not explain the fine-tuning of ’this’ universe, but flaws in this argument are exposed. Nevertheless, the hypothesis of design, being simpler, is (...) arguably of higher prior probability and, therefore, to be preferred. The hypothesis of the single brute-fact universe is disconfirmed. (shrink)

Hume's argument concerning miracles is interpreted by making approximations to terms in Bayes's theorem. This formulation is then used to analyse the impact of multiple testimony. Individual testimonies which are ‘non-miraculous’ in Hume's sense can in principle be accumulated to yield a high probability both for the occurrence of a single miracle and for the occurrence of at least one of a set of miracles. Conditions are given under which testimony for miracles may provide support for the existence of God.

Official apologies and truth commissions are increasingly utilized as mechanisms to address human rights abuses. Both are intended to transform inter-group relations by marking an end point to a history of wrongdoing and providing the means for political and social relations to move beyond that history. However, state-dominated reconciliation mechanisms are inherently problematic for indigenous communities. In this paper, we examine the use of apologies, and truth and reconciliation commissions in four countries with significant indigenous populations: Canada, Australia, Peru, and (...) Guatemala. In each case, the reconciliation mechanism differentiated the goal of reconciliation from an indigenous self-determination agenda. The resulting state-centered strategies ultimately failed to hold states fully accountable for past wrongs and, because of this, failed to transform inter-group relations. (shrink)

The depth and diversity of scholarship on both Nāgārjuna and Kant is so staggering that any work invoking both risks losing itself in a sea of competing currents. I hope that the present offering is modest enough to stay afloat, but incisive enough to present interested readers with a thought-provoking case. Rather than a comparison between Kant and Nāgārjuna, my goal is to present an interpretation of Nāgārjuna that is lent systematic support by Kantian presumptions. Specifically, I am proposing a (...) reading of Nāgārjuna's Mūlamad-hyamakakārikā that takes advantage of a Kantian picture of the nature of judgment to account for how this text may achieve its goals.To accomplish this, we must set out with a... (shrink)

Are there wrongs for which states cannot apologise? In this chapter, I argue that the answer is 'Yes'. I begin with the simple observation that reasoning as a state official requires a conception of what officials do, and so a conception of what is - and is not - properly undertaken on behalf of the state. To act as an official, then, requires a theory of what happens in a well functioning state: it requires a 'normative theory of the state. (...) What officials believe to be necessary for a state to be a good example of its kind will affect what they recognise as outside the bounds of what a state official ought to do. This limit on what can be recognised as something prior officials ought not to have done is illustrated by Canada's official apology for imposing residential schools on indigenous peoples. Canada's official apology left out a crucial feature of the schools policy in part because of the influence of integrationist theories of the state. An integrationist view of good statehood has limited officials' ability to see the project of restructuring indigenous communities and inculcating attachment to an overarching identity as a wrong in itself, and distorted officials' diagnosis of what went wrong in previous policy. One effect has been to allow contemporary officials to offer a sincere and comprehensive apology for past officials' human rights violations in indigenous communities while themselves pursuing policies in these communities that violate human rights. The lesson of the Canadian apology is that how state officials theorise the state can undermine their capacity to recognise human rights violations for what they are and distort their judgements of what must be done in remedy. (shrink)

We consider the evidence that RA†, the vitamin A metabolite, is involved in three fundamental aspects of the development of the CNS: (1) the stimulation of axon outgrowth in particular neuronal sub‐types; (2) the migration of the neural crest; and (3) the specification of rostrocaudal position in the developing CNS (forebrain, midbrain, hindbrain, spinal cord). The evidence we discuss involves RA‐induction of neurites in cell cultures and explants of neural tissue; the teratological effects of RA on the embryo's nervous system; (...) the observation that RA can be detected endogenously in the spinal cord; and the fact that the receptors and binding proteins for RA are expressed in precise domains and neuronal cell types within the nervous system. (shrink)

We live in a world of states: a world in which the dominant form of “persisting structure” for the wielding of political power is characterized by territorially concentrated power exercised through political institutions that exert sovereign control in the sense of being able to exclusively command compliance. Within such a world, calls for reorganization of the way these institutions are organized so as to devolve power to groups oppressed or marginalized within existing structures are inevitable. However, for proponents of liberal (...) states, such calls for devolving power pose a problem. When substate groups call for a reorganization in which power is devolved rather than reformed, they imply that within some portions of the state’s territory, or for certain of the state’s inhabitants, state-level political institutions cannot rightfully command compliance, or at least, cannot do so exclusively. Proponents of liberal states might respond to this problem by letting go of the need for exclusive command. However, for many proponents of liberal states, the prospect of a competing source of rightful command that may assert priority over decision making that applies to the entire territory is impractical, and conceptually difficult to sustain. An alternative response, one that preserves the pre-eminent position of institutions that encompass the state’s entire territory and population, is to insist that such institutions have a vital role in ensuring that the decision making of sub-state groups meets minimal conditions of moral equality and respect for human rights. Emphasizing the role of institutions that encompass the entire territory in guaranteeing minimal conditions of moral equality and respect for human rights seems promising, but it cannot provide a satisfactory account of the desirability of empowering state officials to exercise powers of oversight, and so it cannot justify reserving such powers in the face of calls for power to be devolved. This is most obvious in relation to oppressed an marginalized groups, as state officials recognize cannot reasonably expect members of such groups to accept officials as credible guarantors of moral equality or human rights. This problem aside, there is a basic problem with the way decision making is conceived of in arguments for the importance of reserving powers of oversight as groups calling for devolution of power are not susceptible to the kind of characterization that state officials would have to engage in to effectively gauge whether to intervene to secure moral equality and human rights. (shrink)

In what follows we present group rights as portrayed in contemporary theoretical debates; compare this portrayal with some of the claims actually advanced by various indigenous groups throughout the world; and give reasons for preferring the practical to the theoretical treatments. Our findings suggest that liberal-individualist and corporatist accounts of group rights actually agree on the kind of importance that group interests have for persons and on what it is that groups who claim rights are concerned about. Both liberal-individualists and (...) corporatists locate the importance of group interests in the personal psychology of individual group members. As a result, both treat group interests (such as cultural integrity) as not only different in kind from individualized interests such as freedom of expression but as potentially in competition with them. In contrast, the real-world demands of indigenous groups place emphasis on concrete ways in which the preserving of communal life can be important to individuals’ well-being, in addition to the various spiritual and symbolic resources which such life may provide. These practical aspects of communal life make individuals’ group interests a lot like their individualized ones, and so suggest that group rights do not introduce new or distinctive theoretical questions. Instead, group rights are raise familiar questions about how individuals’ interests ought to be balanced against one another when they are in competition; what counts as an adequate institutional structure for the instantiation of a right; and who ought to be recognized as an authoritative judge of whether a right has been respected. (shrink)

It is claimed that the universe appears to be fine-tuned so as to admit the development of life. In this article Rodney Holder examines the evidence for fine-tuning and the chief rival explanation to design, namely the existence of a.

Historically, culture has been treated as an object in international documents. One consequence of this is that cultural rights in international law have been understood as rights of access and consumption. Recently, an alternative conception of culture, and of what cultural rights protect, has emerged from international documents treating indigenous peoples. Within these documents culture is treated as an activity rather than a good. This activity is ascribed to peoples as well as persons, and protecting the capacity of both peoples (...) and persons to engage in culture is taken to be as basic a component of human dignity as are freedom of movement, freedom of speech, and freedom from torture. It is not an accident that this treatment of culture has emerged from international documents treating indigenous peoples. However, the value of this treatment of culture extends beyond the human rights of indigenous peoples. Treating culture as an activity establishes an understanding of what cultural rights protect that clarifies the relationship between cultural rights and other mechanisms for protecting minorities and frames the role of cultural communities in the realization of human dignity as an important physical and political issue, not just a psychological one. For these reasons, the norms regarding cultural rights that are emerging from international documents treating indigenous peoples are a much-needed step forward for peoples' rights more generally. (shrink)

Who constitutes the public on whose behalf such an official speaks and in whose name the apology is offered? In this paper I argue that in most cases, the “public” that the official offering an apology represents and on whose behalf the apology is offered is not the general public but the public sector: those who direct, control and populate the apparatus of the state. I argue that in most cases there is not a plausible model according to which public (...) sector actors can be treated as vehicles for actions, decisions, projects and values of the general public: a public sector actor is not an avatar of the general public. This makes for a gap between public officials and the general public that must be explicitly bridged with respect to actions, decisions and attitudes named in a public apology in order for members of the general public to perceive themselves as part of either the wrongs for which apology is offered or the apology itself. Recognizing this gap does not imply that members of the general public are not or cannot be responsible for wrongs perpetrated by public sector actors. However, it does imply that the source of the responsibility will not usually be found in public officials having acted at the behest of or for the sake of the general public. (shrink)

It seems undeniable that some cultures encourage individuals to act in ways that harm others, and/or to believe that there is nothing wrong when another acts in a way that harms them. And when this is the case it also seems undeniable that it would be better if the scope for such cultures to guide individuals' decision-making were minimized or even eliminated. From these observations a number of people have inferred that groups which exhibit bad cultures ought not to be (...) permitted to hold or exercise group rights. Susan Okin's liberal feminist critique of multiculturalism is one of the most interesting and persuasive examples of this type of argument. In this paper I take a closer look at Okin's critique and ask whether it actually does give one reason to be skeptical about group rights. I conclude that it does not. For although the worries which animate Okin's critique are good ones to have, it is a mistake to think that they are about group rights. Moreover, insofar as Okin's concerns are well motivated they are not actually worries about morally problematic cultures but rather worries about groups' internal political and social structures. These worries should not be equated. Ultimately (I argue) it is not only misleading but counterproductive to focus on the viciousness of a group's culture as a potential reason for disqualifying it from holding or exercising rights. (shrink)

It is shown that, for certain classes of cosmological model which either postulate or give rise to infinitely many universes, only a measure zero subset of the set of possible universes above a given size can in fact be physically realized. It follows that claims to explain the fine tuning of our universe on the basis of such models by appeal to the existence of all possible universes fail.

The controversy that accompanied the publication and reprinting of cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammed as part of a 2005 editorial in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten has been widely interpreted as yet another illustration of an ineliminable tension between multiculturalism and liberalism. Such an interpretation would have us believe that what is at issue in defending the cartoons is our commitment to civil liberties as a mainstay of liberal democracy. But is this really what is at issue? A closer examination suggests (...) that what is actually being defended in this case is not civil liberty but civil privilege. In particular, what is at issue is the privilege to exclude and define Muslims. (shrink)

Conventional wisdom suggests that promoting self-determination for peoples and protecting the human rights of individuals are competing priorities. By this is meant that securing individuals in their human rights requires limits on the rights of their peoples, and vice versa. In contrast, the Draft UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (the Draft Declaration) treats the two as not only mutually supporting but mutually necessary. In the Draft Declaration, the right of peoples to self-determination is more than a principle (...) that constrains states in their behavior towards other states and territories “outre-mer”; it also constrains states within their domestic realm. This view of self-determination reflects the experience of many indigenous groups, for whom refusal to respect the integrity of their group and failure to respect the integrity of their persons have gone hand in hand. In this chapter, I argue that the Draft Declaration’s treatment of self-determination is right: self-determination is a human right and this human right is the same right that underpins the rights of states. Treating an interest of peoples like self-determination as a constitutive element of human dignity raises practical worries about the stability of the international system, and philosophical worries about potential conflicts between individuals and peoples. But it also casts state sovereignty itself in a different light. This new light has interesting consequences both for international law and for philosophical debates about minorities within minorities. In particular, it allows one to think about questions about internal minorities as ultimately questions about legitimacy and representation. (shrink)

I present an exegesis of Henri Poincaré’s metaphysical position in three key essays within his book The Value of Science. In doing so, I argue for three theses: (a) that Poincaré’s metaphysical position in these sources is incompatible with his metaphysical position in his earlier book Science and Hypothesis; (b) that the phenomenological relationism defended by Poincaré in these sources is not a form of structural realism but rather a structuralist form of empiricism and (by design) has no greater metaphysical (...) commitments than constructive empiricism; and (c) that Poincaré holds in these sources that the existence of the external world is merely a convention. These theses serve to correct misconceptions about the consistency of Poincaré’s philosophical corpus, his positions on the realism-antirealism landscape, and the scope of his conventionalism. (shrink)

The way in which geometrical knowledge has been obtained has always attracted the attention of philosophers. The fact that there is a science that concerns things outside our thinking and that proceeds inferentially appeared striking, and gave rise to specific theories of experience and space. Nonetheless, the geometrical method has not yet been sufficiently investigated. Philosophers who investigate the theory of knowledge discuss the question of whether geometry is an empirical science, but.

The way in which geometrical knowledge has been obtained has always attracted the attention of philosophers. The fact that there is a science that concerns things outside our thinking and that proceeds inferentially appeared striking, and gave rise to specific theories of experience and space. Nonetheless, the geometrical method has not yet been sufficiently investigated. Philosophers who investigate the theory of knowledge discuss the question of whether geometry is an empirical science, but...

This chapter attempts to cover in broad outline the Buddha's views on knowledge – his “epistemology” – as they are expressed in the Pāli Nikāyas. Buddha's views on knowledge are developed for the specific purpose of understanding and eliminating the causes of suffering. Noncognitive or affective dimensions of experience, such as feelings, dispositions, and habits, play an essential role in human experience, according to the Buddha's account in the Pāli discourses. But the fact that the Buddha held such a richer (...) view of experience is not a good reason to reject calling early Buddhism a form of empiricism. The conception of highest knowledge does not require anything like omniscience, and this point indicates a clear contrast between early Buddhism and the Brahmanist quest for knowledge of an Absolute Reality. (shrink)

One of the central themes of inquiry for Karl Barth, the twentieth-century Protestant theologian, was the notion of revelation. Although he was suspicious of natural theology, recent scientific advances and the flourishing modern dialogue between science and religion offer compelling reasons to revisit Barth’s thinking on the concept. We must again ask whether and how it might be possible to hold together the notion of revelation whilst employing reason and scientific evidence in the justification of belief. In The Heavens Declare, (...) author Rodney Holder re-examines Barth’s natural theology argument and then explores how it has been critiqued and responded to by others, starting with Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Wolfhart Pannenberg. Holder then considers the contributions of two notable British participants in the science-religion dialogue, Thomas Torrance and Alister McGrath, who, despite their repudiation of natural theology in the traditional sense, also provide many positive lessons. The book concludes by defending an overall position which takes into account the ideas of the aforementioned theologians as well as others who are currently engaged positively in natural theology, such as John Polkinghorne and Richard Swinburne. Holder’s new study is sure to be of interest to theologians, philosophers of religion, and all scholars interested in the science-religion dialogue, especially those interested in natural theology as an enterprise in itself. (shrink)

The reception and interpretation of the writings of St Paul in the early modern period forms the subject of this volume. Written by experts in the field, the articles offer a critical overview of current research, and introduce the major themes in Pauline interpretation in the Reformation.

Biblical Exegesis and Mystical Theology in the Venerable Bede brings together seventeen essays by Arthur Holder exploring the theology and spirituality found in Bede's biblical commentaries and homilies. The volume shows that Bede was both a masterful student of received tradition and a creative thinker concerned to address the needs and concerns of his audience of Christian pastors and teachers in the eighth-century Northumbrian church. Although Bede is best known as the author of The Ecclesiastical History of the English People, (...) the last half-century of scholarship has demonstrated the sophistication and vast influence of his work in the fields of grammar, biblical interpretation, hagiography, poetry, computus, natural science, and theology. The chapters in this volume show how Bede's exegesis was integrally connected with his work in all those genres and with the monumental artistic productions of his monastery such as the illuminated bible manuscript known as the Codex Amiatinus. The five parts of the book deal with Bede as teacher and biblical scholar, his interpretations of the tabernacle and the temple, his commentary on the Song of Songs, his attitudes toward philosophy and heresy, and his mystical theology. This book will be of interest to students of Christian theology, mysticism, the development of biblical interpretation, and the history of early medieval England. (shrink)

Most political philosophers are reluctant to treat cultural rights as basic. Instead, the predominant view is that cultural interests are only important derivatively, in virtue of their contribution to some other interest. In this chapter I argue that political philosophers ought to follow international human rights norms regarding the importance of culture. Not only do international human rights courts and committees come to the right conclusion about the significance of culture, but, as importantly, they come to this conclusion because they (...) think about what cultural rights protect inthe right way. Contemporary political philosophers prefer to treat cultural rights as derivative in part because they tend to treat culture as a “resource” or a “good,” but this is a mistake. Cultural rights are better understood as protecting and promoting an activity. Respecting and promoting cultural participation is a constitutive element of showing respect for human dignity because, like free expression, political participation, and freedom of conscience, cultural participation is something persons do as part of making a life for themselves. (shrink)

The Current Legal Problems lecture series and annual volume was established over fifty five years ago at the Faculty of Laws, University College London and has long been recognised as a major reference point for legal scholarship. The continuing strength of Current Legal Problems is its representation of a broad range of legal scholarship opinion, theory, methodology, and subject matter, with an emphasis upon contemporary developments of law. Contributions to the 59th volume in the series include a major re-evaluation of (...) the Human Rights Act from Trevor Allan; a survey of recent trends in British crime and control from Robert Reiner; an analysis of the EU's impact on cultural diversity from Bruno de Witte; an examination of tax avoidance from Judith Freedman and a critique of EU constitutionalism from Neil Walker. (shrink)

Robert Card argues that although Susan Okin’s analysis in Justice, Gender and the Family leads to the conclusion that justice within the family requires elimination of gendered roles within marriage, this conclusion is not compatible with a conception of justice in which neutrality between reasonable conceptions of the good, and protection of individuals’ contractual capabilities are taken to be fundamental values. Although Card is right that there is tension in Okin’s work between where the analysis of injustice within the gender-structured (...) family leads and where, as a reformer, Okin is willing to go, and he is right to locate the source of that tension in Okin’s attempt to remain within Rawlsian liberalism, Okin’s view has more resources to respond to this critique than Card acknowledges. In the end, these additional resources may not be sufficient to address the problems that Card notes, but they do suggest a more complex relationship between Okin’s view and the liberal tradition than Card allows.. (shrink)

Multicultural Odysseys by Will Kymlicka is a textbook example of how to effectively integrate empirical research and philosophical analysis. In it Kymlicka offers a measured and scrupulously honest assessment of what he takes to be both the potential and the limits of liberal multiculturalism as a model for democratization, seeking not to defend his views on multiculturalism in so much as try to understand them. In particular, he seeks to understand how his views on multiculturalism can be correct in the (...) context of Western democracies (as he does not doubt they are) and yet be limited in their potential for export. In approaching his project in this way, Kymlicka raises a number of questions about multiculturalism, about theorizing across borders, and about the nature of Western democracy that he does not directly address, but toward which the reader is inevitably spurred. In this commentary I focus on one especially important question: What does the analysis of this book imply about the future prospects for ideal theorizing? I argue that, without the author intending or necessarily foreseeing it, Multicultural Odysseys has made the world of political philosophy a much less hospitable place for ideal theorizing, at least as it has traditionally been understood. In the wake of Kymlicka’s treatment of the limits on liberal multiculturalism’s exportability it is difficult to imagine that ideal theorizing can occupy the same central place in normative analyses of multiculturalism, minority rights, liberalism, democracy, and global justice. (shrink)