This paper motivates institutional epistemic trust as an important ethical consideration informing the responsible development and implementation of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies (or AI-inclusivity) in healthcare. Drawing on recent literature on epistemic trust and public trust in science, we start by examining the conditions under which we can have institutional epistemic trust in AI-inclusive healthcare systems and their members as providers of medical information and advice. In particular, we discuss that institutional epistemic trust in AI-inclusive healthcare depends, in part, on (...) the reliability of AI-inclusive medical practices and programs, its knowledge and understanding among different stakeholders involved, its effect on epistemic and communicative duties and burdens on medical professionals and, finally, its interaction and alignment with the public’s ethical values and interests as well as background sociopolitical conditions against which AI-inclusive healthcare systems are embedded. To assess the applicability of these conditions, we explore a recent proposal for AI-inclusivity within the Dutch Newborn Screening Program. In doing so, we illustrate the importance, scope, and potential challenges of fostering and maintaining institutional epistemic trust in a context where generating, assessing, and providing reliable and timely screening results for genetic risk is of high priority. Finally, to motivate the general relevance of our discussion and case study, we end with suggestions for strategies, interventions, and measures for AI-inclusivity in healthcare more widely. (shrink)

What makes cases of pure risking sometimes wrong? There is a strong intuition that the wrongness of pure risking stands in an explanatory relationship with the wrongness of the non-risky act, other things being equal. Yet, we cannot simply take this for granted insofar as in cases of wrongful pure risking, the risked outcome fails to materialize. To this end, I motivate and develop an underexplored approach in the literature that I call Unificationism. According to the Unificationist account that I (...) defend, the fact that pure risking φ is pro tanto wrong is grounded by a general moral fact that φ-ing is pro tanto or all-things-considered wrong, other things being equal. This relationship holds even if and when an agent’s risky conduct fails to transpire or culminate into φ-ing ex post. I argue that this Unificationist account captures our explanatory intuition, avoids problems of extensional and explanatory inadequacy that existing alternative faces, and most importantly, renders Unificationism as a plausible view within the ethics of pure risking. (shrink)

What is wrong with imposing pure risks, that is, risks that don’t materialize into harm? According to a popular response, imposing pure risks is pro tanto wrong, when and because risk itself is harmful. Call this the Harm View. Defenders of this view make one of the following two claims. On the Constitutive Claim, pure risk imposition is pro tanto wrong when and because risk constitutes diminishing one’s well-being viz. preference-frustration or setting-back their legitimate interest in autonomy. On the Contingent (...) Claim, pure risk imposition is pro tanto wrong when and because risk has harmful consequences for the risk-bearers, such as psychological distress. This paper argues that the Harm View is plausible only on the Contingent Claim, but fails on the Constitutive Claim. In discussing the latter, I argue that both the preference and autonomy account fail to show that risk itself is constitutively harmful and thereby wrong. In discussing the former, I argue that risk itself is contingently harmful and thereby wrong but only in a narrow range of cases. I conclude that while the Harm View can sometimes explain the wrong of imposing risk when risk itself is contingently harmful, it is unsuccessful as a general, exhaustive account of what makes pure imposition wrong. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Stefansson (forthcoming) argues that by emitting and offsetting, we fail to fulfil our justice-based duty to avoid harm owed to specific individuals. In this paper, I explore a case where offsetting fails to prevent some but not all risks of harms that our emissions impose on them. By drawing on a distinction between general and specific duties not to (risk) harm, I argue that if by emitting and offsetting, we satisfy some (if not all) of our specific duties we (...) owe others, then this gives us stronger moral reasons to offset than give to charities that do good more effectively. (shrink)

During times of emergency like the pandemic itself, governments are often seen as exercising “exceptional power”. Given the state of growing urgency in responding to the pandemic, there is a worry that governments may resort to exercising their exceptional power arbitrarily—either willingly, unintentionally or perhaps even negligently. When power is exercised by states or even by non-state actors arbitrarily over a person or group, that is, at their own will in the absence of appropriate institutional checks and balances, republican theorists (...) argue that we are confronted with a threat to our freedom as non- domination. In this chapter, I explore whether, and in what ways, worries about domination could surface in the context of government’s enforcement of risk- containment measures in response to the pandemic. While imposition of these measures is deemed necessary and important for reducing risks in response to the pandemic, their imposition is prima facie problematic if it constitutes or entails wrongful exercise of arbitrary power, thereby risking domination of citizens. I motivate this claim by examining India’s initial response to the Covid-19 pandemic, particularly focussing on the public health emergency legislature (or lack thereof) authorising the implementation of emergency risk-containment measures. (shrink)

Mercier and Sperber (M&S) claim that the main function of reasoning is to generate support for conclusions derived unconsciously. An alternative account holds that reasoning has a deliberative function even though it is an internalized analogue of public discourse. We sketch this alternative and compare it with M&S's in the light of the empirical phenomena they discuss.

Review of Harris Wiseman, The Myth of the Moral Brain: The Limits of Moral Enhancement, 340 pp.

The term sustainability has become one of the most significant in the current era. It seems to be ubiquitous amongst academics, politicians, business leaders, media personnel and even the general public. It is no exaggeration to state that it is considered all over the world to be the most pressing issue to be addressed for the long-term future of the planet and its inhabitants. The topic is of course complex, and the issue of sustainability is under much debate as to (...) what it actually is and how it can be achieved, but it is completely certain that the resources of the planet are fixed in quantity and, once used, cannot be reused except through being reused in one form or another. At present, much of the discourse of sustainability has focused upon the environment and in particular upon climate change and the effects that this is having. Thus, the discourse has tended to be about mitigation. Sustainability of course requires all three pillars of the triple bottom line—economic, environmental and social—to be addressed. Indeed, it might be considered that the effects upon the social, and how we choose to live our lives, might well be the most profound effect of achieving sustainability. This book therefore focuses upon some of the many aspects of the social and how we can adapt our lives to accommodate the requirements of sustainability. it therefore takes a very different approach to addressing the issues of sustainability, while of course not ignoring the other pillars. This book therefore sets out to examine various aspects of the changes to personal, corporate and institutional behaviour which may have to come about in our search for sustainability. It is tended to address some of the issues and how they are being dealt with in various parts of the world. As always, our concept is to share best practice and thereby enrich both the discourse and our progress towards sustainability. Thus, we focus upon the current situation while also considering the extent to which the focus is changing so much that we need to think about new approaches to our understanding of behaviour and differing effects in practice. The international origins of the contributors to this book make this an original contribution taking some of the best ideas from around the world. This book therefore addresses these issues from a perspective not generally addressed by researchers, or even by politicians and the press. It therefore provides fresh perspectives upon the important issue of our common future. As always, this approach is based on the tradition of the Social Responsibility Research Network srrnet.org (a worldwide body of scholars with membership of several thousand), which in its 20-year history has sought to broaden the discourse and to treat all research as inter-related and relevant to business. This tradition has always been to explore the subject widely and to seek relevant solutions, while also sharing best practice. This book is based primarily upon some of the contributions from the network at our recent conference and shows both commonality and diversity in approaches and effects. (shrink)

Při výběru z teorií, které bychom mohli aplikovat na problém, jímž se zabýváme, je pro nás účinnost jejich použití jedním z nejdůležitějších kritérií. Jinými slovy, naše hodnocení teorií se odvíjí o jejich schopnosti řešit problémy. V tomto eseji nejprve ukáži, jaké druhy problémů jsou pro sociální vědy klíčové, a s pomocí strukturalistické kritiky funkcionalismu nabídnu ilustrace těchto problémů. Budu přitom tvrdit, že Lévi-Straussovy přísliby spojené s jeho metodou nebyly nikdy naplněny a že je strukturální antropologie neuspokojivá.

The article takes as its venture-point the thesis that – whilst speaking of Nietzsche’s critique of objectivity – it is impossible to avoid the following fundamental problem: according to Nietzsche, objectivity and criticism are two facets of the same tendency that the “philosophy of the future” will have to overcome in the higher form of the philosophical “creation of new values”. From this perspective, it also becomes possible to explain Nietzsche’s decision to focus his critique in an attempt to intervene (...) against what he calls Rangverschiebung, the “shift in rank ordering,” of the relationship between philosophy and science. Namely, by doing so, he immediately positioned the philosophical critique on a terrain that does not allow for the critique to follow its spontaneous tendency towards the ideal of objectivity. The first part of the article addresses the epistemological aspect of Nietzsche’s critique of objectivity, i.e. it explains why Nietzsche rejected all philosophical criteria of the foundation of objective understanding. The second part, by contrast, explains how it is possible, according to Nietzsche, to intervene against the ongoing process of the “shift in rank ordering” within the relationship between philosophy and science, which ultimately leads to a harmful complete monopolisation of truth by the ideal of scientific objectivity. (shrink)

Článek seznamuje s kritikou psychologismu v logice, která je jedním z hlavních témat Husserlových Prolegomen k čisté logice. Psychologismus v logice spočíval v podstatě v tom, že logika byla chápána jako součást psychologie, příp. že psychologie se považovala za jediný a dostatečný teoretický základ logiky. Pozornost je věnována dvěma hlavním liniím kritiky psychologismu, které se v tomto Husserlově díle objevují. První z nich vychází z analýzy povahy zákonů čisté logiky (zákon sporu, sylogistické figury aj.). Analýza ukazuje, že tyto zákony se (...) nemohou zakládat na empirických psychologických pravidlech, a psychologie (jako empirická věda) tudíž nemůže být základem logiky. Druhá linie Husserlovy kritiky psychologismu v logice směřuje k prokázání vnitřní rozpornosti psychologistického stanoviska, jsou-li z něj vyvozeny jeho nejzazší důsledky. Tato rozpornost spočívá v tom, že psychologismus na jedné straně vystupuje jako vědecká teorie, na straně druhé však svou základní tezí popírá některé z nutných podmínek možnosti každé vědecké teorie vůbec, a tím sám sebe ruší jako teoreticky věrohodnou tezi. Závěrem upozorníme na jedno z pokračování boje proti psychologismu v rané fenomenologické tradici, a to na Ingardenovu kritiku psychologismu v pojetí literárního díla.The article outlines some of the main argumentation-strategies deployed by Husserl in his famous critique of the psychologistic logic in Prolegomena to pure logic. Fundamentally, the psychologism in logic consisted in considering logic to be a part of psychology, resp. in considering psychology as the exclusive and sufficient foundation of logic. The attention is given to the two main lines of argumentation against psychologism appearing in the work of Husserl. The starting point of the first one is an analysis of the laws of pure logic (principle of contradiction, the figures of syllogism etc.). It shows that these laws can not be based on mere empirical rules of psychology, and thus psychology (as an empirical discipline) can not be the foundation of logic. The second line of Husserl’s critique of psychologism aims at showing the contradictions in the psychologistic standpoint that become visible if one uncovers its ultimate implications. The main contradiction consists in that while psychology claims to be a scientific theory it contradicts at the same time by its fundamental claim some of the necessary conditions of a scientific theory as such, and thus it cancels itself as a theoretically credible set of claims. Toward the end of the paper the attention is given to one of the continuations of the fight against psychologism in the phenomenological tradition, namely to R. Ingarden’s critique of the psychologism in the conception of the literary work of art. (shrink)

In this article the conceptual connections between Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and the work of three contemporary feminist epistemologists: standpoint theorist Sandra Harding and feminist empiricists Helen Longino and Lynn Hankinson Nelson, are explored. The inquiry reveals both surprising similarities and important differences between Wittgensteinian and feminist epistemologies. Exploring these similarities and differences clarifies Wittgenstein’s epistemology and reveals the ways in which feminist epistemologists developed the themes from On Certainty.Članak istražuje pojmovne veze između Wittgensteinova spisa O izvjesnosti i rada triju suvremenih (...) feminističkih epistemologinja: teoretičarke stajališta Sandre Harding i feminističkih empirista Helen Longino i Lynn Hankinson Nelson. Ispitivanje otkriva kako iznenađujuće sličnosti, tako i važne razlike između wittgensteinovske i feminističkih epistemologija. Istraživanje tih sličnosti i razlika pojašnjava Wittgensteinovu epistemologiju i razotkriva načine na koje su feminističke epistemologinje razvile teme iz spisa O izvjesnosti. (shrink)

Arthur Schopenhauer , filozof postkantovske tradicije, u svojim se djelima Svijet kao volja i predodžba i O temelju morala u velikoj mjeri bavio i etičkim pitanjima. Pri tome je bilo nemoguće zaobići Kantovo etičko naučavanje, koje je Schopenhauer podvrgnuo detaljnoj kritici. Schopenhauer je Kantu spočitavao rigorizam u etici, koji je za njega neprihvatljiv s obzirom da predstavlja čisti formalizam, a ne govori ništa o zbiljskim motivima koji pokreću ljudsko ponašanje. Za te Kantove odredbe Schopenhauer je pronašao mjesto unutar uređenja pravne (...) države, jer se pravne države ne tiču motivi koji nekoga navode na određeno ponašanje, već isključivo formalno zadovoljenje načela pravednosti.Arthur Schopenhauer , the philosopher of postKantian tradition, in his writings The World as Will and Representation and On the Basis of Morality, has been dealing a lot with ethical questions. In that way, it was impossible to skirt from Kant’s ethical teaching, which Schopenhauer submitted to detailed criticism. Schopenhauer reproached him his ethical rigorism, which was unacceptable for Schopenhauer, knowing the fact that it represents pure formalism, but it does not tell anything on real motives that are driving force of a human behaviour. These Kant’s instructions were placed by Schopenhauer in the frame of establishing legal state, because the system in itself is not considered of human motives as being a reason for certain behaviour, while the system is exclusively considered of a formal fulfillment of a principle of justice. (shrink)

Okosnica ovog doprinosa jest odgovor na neke opaske i predrasude Darka Polšeka iz Zagreba, iznesene u kritičkom osvrtu na moju kritičku procjenu njegova viđenja eugeničkog nasljeđa u biotehnološkom dobu. Za tu je svrhu doprinos podijeljen u devet paragrafa, koji donose filozofsku kritiku nekih Polšekovih prigovora. U doprinosu se rasvjetljavaju još neki novi problematični aspekti glavne Polšekove teze o takozvanoj ‘novoj eugenici’. Autor u ovom doprinosu iznosi argumente koji pokazuju i epistemološke i etičke slabosti takozvane nove eugenike, ali ne na način (...) isticanja ničim dokazanih pretpostavki i predrasuda, nego na način filozofske analize i prosudbe. Stoga iznesena argumentacija u ovom kritičkom odgovoru ostaje u okvirima diskutirane teme i pokušava čuvati dostojanstvo argumentirane rasprave. Jer, niti uz najbolju volju argument snage ne može zamijeniti snagu argumenta. Sve se ostalo prepušta kritičkoj prosudbi čitatelja.The framework of this contribution is an answer to some of the comments and prejudices madeby Darko Polšek from Zagreb, published in a critical analysis of the author’s critical judgementof his view of eugenic heredity in the biotechnological era. To this end, the article prints nineparagraphs philosophically criticizing some of Polšek’s objections. It also sheds light on a num­ber of other new problematic aspects of Polšek’s main thesis on the so-called »new eugenics«.The author of this contribution presents arguments that illustrate both the epistemological andethical weaknesses of the so-called new eugenics – not in the manner of accentuating unprovedpresuppositions and prejudices, but in the manner of philosophical analyses and judgements.Accordingly, the arguments set out in this critical reply remain within the framework of thetopic discussed and attempt to preserve the dignity of the argued discourse. For, the argumentof power can never replace the power of argument. All else is left to the critical judgement of the readers. (shrink)