Maximus the Confessor distinguishes three stages in the spiritual becoming of man: vita passibilis i.e. the way of life in that man is living under the reign of the bodily passions, apatheia as state of liberation from the reign of the lower passions, and vita passiva as modus vivendi in which the human makes the personal experience of the revelation and the presence of God. Thereby being man means according to Maximus suffering under the rule of someone - divine (...) or demonic - or something. The human condition is especially passive. Even contemplation (theōria) becomes in this approach a kind of passion: the passive experience of the presence of God. Although there is an old tradition in the classical Greek culture concerning the equivalency mathein-pathein (from Aeschylus to Aristotle and until Neo-Platonist thinkers like Proclus) which is received in the Christian tradition first of all by Denys the Areopagite, Maximus the Confessor is one of the first Christian theologians who tries to reconstruct the classical conception concerning the typology of the human ways of life (vita activa-vita contemplativa) as being based on passion: passion of lower impulses, passion of the demonic temptations and sins, but also passion of the overwhelming divine presence. Man can only lead a passionate life as slave of the lower passions (pathēmata) and as such of the devil or as slave of God in the Holy Spirit. (shrink)

Both Stoic and Buddhist ethics are deeply concerned with the ethical dangers of attachments. Three dangers stand out: (1) the destructive consequences of overwhelming emotionality, brought on by attachment, both for oneself and others, (2) the dangers to one's agency posed by strongly held, but ultimately unstable, attachments, and (3) the threat to virtuous emotional engagement with others caused by one's own attachment to them. The first two kinds of moral dangers have informed Stoic models of detachment (see Wong (2006). (...) In this paper I draw on Buddhist texts to present a model of detachment that responds primarily to the third moral danger of attachment, the danger of not loving well. (shrink)

With the godlike powers of modern technology, just one bad actor can unleash hell on Earth. In the face of this threat posed by technology, some have proposed moral bioenhancement as a solution. Although moral bioenhancement may at first seem like something Christian should support, it is my contention in this paper that there is at least one significant reason for Christians to be cautious in their appropriation of moral bioenhancement technology: it can at best give us a false (...) class='Hi'>apatheia, which runs the ironic risk of destroying our ability to make moral progress. (shrink)

In this article, I offer a reading of City of God 19.6 that is consonant with Augustine’s message to real judges. Often read as a suggestion that torture and execution are judicially necessary, I argue that 19.6 actually calls such necessities into question, though this is not its primary purpose; first and foremost, 19.6 is an indictment of Stoic apatheia. Situating 19.6 within Augustine’s larger polemic against the Stoics, I find that it presents the Stoic judge as a man (...) who lacks fellow feeling, and therefore, has only a parodic happiness, costly to himself and those judges. A new look at Augustine’s letters to judges confirms this reading, and shows that, for Augustine, the man of humanitas is the true model for the good judge, not the man of apatheia. (shrink)

본 논문은 공맹유학에서 도덕 감정과 평정심이 어떻게 연관돼 있는지에 대해 분석함으로써 그 윤리학적 함의를 밝힌다. 감정 혹은 정념이 마음에 혼란을 일으켜 평정심을 깨트리는 원인으로 작용할 것이라는 우려를 갖고 있는 일부 철학자들이 있다. 스토아 학파의 아파테이아(apatheia)나 도가의 무정(無情) 사상에 의하면 감정은 삶에 혼란을 몰고 오므로 통제하거나 제거 해야할 대상으로 비판받는다. 이러한 입장은 우울, 분노, 두려움 등 부정적 감정이 지나치게 강하면 심리적 안정을 저해할 수 있다는 측면에서 일리가 없는 것은 아니나 감정이 좋은 삶을 얻는데 기여한다는 사실에 대해 소홀하다는 비판을 면하기 어렵다. (...) 이들과 달리 공맹유학에서는 적절한 감정의 발현을 통해 더욱 안정적인 심신 상태를 유지할 수 있을 뿐만 아니라 인의예지 등의 덕을 증대시킬 수 있다고 보는 도덕 감정에 기초한 윤리학을 추구한다. 공자와 맹자는 효, 공손, 연민, 부끄러움, 미움, 존중심, 양보심 등이 유덕자에게 반드시 요청되는 요소라고 봄으로써 감정과 덕의 상관성에 주목하는 도덕 심리학을 전개한다. 공맹유학의 평정심을 대표하는 불혹(不惑)과 부동심(不動心)은 옳음에 대한 인지뿐만 아니라 옮음과 관련한 느낌이 적절하게 발현됨으로써 얻을 수 있다. 그러한 맥락에서 맹자는 북궁유, 맹시사, 고자 등이 채택한 용기와 부동심에 대해 의(義) 인식이 미흡하다고 비판함과 아울러 유가철학적 관점에서 도덕 감정에 기초한 평정심 이론을 그 대안으로서 제시한다. (shrink)

그리스 철학사에서 피론은 그리스 최초의 회의주의자임과 동시에, 아이네시데모스가 창설한 피론학파의 시조였다. 그는 삶의 문제에 있어서 ‘초연함(adiaphoria)’과 ‘태연함(apatheia)’ 그리고 ‘마음의 평정(ataraxia)’을 강조하였으며, 외부 대상에 대한 ‘이해불가능성(acatalepsia)’과 ‘판단유보(epoche)’의 원리를 정립하였다.BR 서구철학사에 나타나는 피론의 모습은 다양하고, 기이하며, 이중적이고, 모순적이기까지 하다. 필자는 디오게네스 라에르티오스의 『유명한 철학자들의 생애와 사상』, 아리스토클레스의 『철학에 대하여』그리고 에우세비오스의 『복음의 준비』등에 대한 연구를 통해, 일차적으로는 그의 회의주의가 피론주의가 아니라는 테오도시오스의 시각을 불식시킴과 아울러, 궁극적으로는 그의 회의주의가 후대의 피론주의와 연속하는 철학임을 밝혔다.BR 에우세비오스의 『복음의 준비』에 나타난 아리스토클레스의 토막글들은, 피론 철학에 대한 다양한 (...) 모습과 복잡한 해석가능성들을 잘 보여준다. 특히, 아리스토클레스의 단편 C는 복잡한 논쟁을 불러일으키는 문제적 토막글이다. 이것에 대한 해석에는 주관적(인식론적) 해석과 객관적(형이상학적) 해석이 존재하는데, 전자의 입장을 대표하는 연구자로는 E. 젤러가 있고, 후자의 입장을 대표하는 학자로는 연구자로는 S. H. 스바르브손과 R. 베트 등이 있다. 그런데, 주관적 해석을 강조하게 되면 피론의 회의주의와 피론주의와의 연속성을 확보할 수 있는 장점이 있으나, 텍스트를 일부 수정해야 한다는 단점이 있다. 객관적 해석을 강조하게 되면, 텍스트를 해석하는데 있어서는 논리성을 확보할 수 있으나, 피론의 회의주의와 피론주의와의 연속성을 확보할 수 없다는 문제점이 노출된다. 이에, 필자는 객관적 해석 또는 형이상학적 해석과 일정한 거리를 두면서, 피론을 회의주의자로, 그리고 피론의 회의주의를 피론주의와 연속하는 철학임을 밝혔다. (shrink)

This article aims to analyze the following question: Can God suffer? The motivations that led us to develop this theme are based on the attempt to understand if God suffers, how that suffering is in the passion and death of his Son and how he takes part in the human suffering. Therefore, this research asks about the fact that suffering is a present reality in the lives of all and for this reason we ask what is the close relationship between (...) a God who is kindness and compassion and the human suffering. How to reconcile God and suffering? Does God also suffer or just watch our suffering? God could not have created a world without pain? Where is God in suffering? These are some questions raised in this research, in which our reflections are intrinsic. (shrink)

Anton Wilhelm Amo (c. 1700 – c. 1750) – born in West Africa, enslaved, and then gifted to the Duke of Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel – became the first African to earn a Ph.D. in philosophy at a European university. He went on to teach philosophy at the Universities of Halle and Jena. On the 16th of April, 1734, at the University of Wittenberg, he defended his dissertation, De Humanae Mentis Apatheia (On the Impassivity of the Human Mind), in which Amo investigates (...) the logical inconsistencies in René Descartes’ (1596 – 1650) res cogitans (mind) and res extensa (body) distinction and interaction by maintaining that (1) the mind does not sense material things nor does it (2) contain the faculty of sensing. (shrink)

For Seneca, the firmness of the Wise is shown in his ability to remain calm against attacks, as he explains in his treatise of that name. Attacks can come in the form of injustice, iniuria, and disparagement, contumelia; Seneca proves that neither of them affects the wise man. Contumelia is linked to contemptus in definition and conceptualization so that the remarks on how to deal with disparagement contain clues as to what contemptus means for Seneca. The article argues that Seneca (...) understands the term in a double sense: First, contemptus denotes a reprehensible attitude. Second, it designates a kind of indifference which is to be understood in the context of Stoic apatheia. (shrink)

This article examines Nietzsche's engagement with Stoic philosophical therapy in the free spirit trilogy. I suggest that Nietzsche first turned to Stoicism in the late 1870s in his attempt to develop a philosophical therapy that might treat the injuries human beings suffer through fate or chance without recourse to the metaphysical theodicies discredited by Enlightenment skepticism and positivism. I argue that in HH and D Nietzsche adopts a conventional form of Stoic therapy. The article then shows how Nietzsche came to (...) take a critical stance against Stoic therapy on the grounds that it entails a radical extirpation of the value judgments that underpin the emotions. For this reason, I claim that in GS he attempts to develop a rival philosophical therapy, one that aims to enable human beings to unconditionally affirm fate but without this affirmation entailing, as it does for the Stoics, the dissolution of all emotional valuations. However, despite Nietzsche's belief that he had fundamentally broken with Stoicism, I argue, first, that Nietzsche's therapy in GS is deeply indebted to a "cosmic" model of Stoicism, which consists in the loving consent to the events that happen to us, and second, that he gives us no reasonable account of how it is possible to unconditionally affirm fate without adopting some form of Stoic indifference or apatheia. (shrink)

En général, on croit que dans De civitate dei 9 et 14 Augustin critique vigoureusement l'idéal d'apatheia et le refus des passions établis par les Stoïciens. Cependant, une comparaison avec les Tusculanae Disputationes de Cicéron prouve dans quelle mesure la théorie augustinienne des passions dépend justement de la tradition qu'Augustin avait reçu de son maître Cicéron. Une telle comparaison éclaircit de plus le concept de concupiscentia chez Augustin.

THIS paper consists essentially of three parts. The first part argues the case for construing Nietzsche's remarks about Übermenschlichkeit as endorsing some specific set of character traits, of "virtues" if you like. To be an Übermensch, on this reading, is to possess or exhibit certain traits of character, traits which in the typical case are associated with notions of self-overcoming, sublimation, creativity, and self-perfection. An Übermensch, construed in this way, expresses Nietzsche's vision of the human ideal, of what human beings (...) should or might be like. In this sense Nietzsche merely continues the ancient project of articulating the human ideal, the conception of human perfectibility. Although Nietzsche's answer may appear to be shockingly different, the project of articulating a human ideal is scarcely radical. The project qua project is no different than that of Plato or Aristotle, the Stoics, Spinoza or Kant. For Plato, the philosopher-king represents the ideal of human self-perfection; for Aristotle megalopsychic man conjoined with the life of contemplation; for the Stoics apatheia and right reason; for Spinoza the intellectual amor dei was a necessary and perhaps a sufficient condition for human liberation; for Kant, the genuinely moral person qualifies as the human ideal, the person whose actions are always and only governed by the categorical imperative, although Kant would probably have called such a will a "holy" will rather than a human one. (shrink)

In the virtue ethics of Diadochus Photice, the notion of self-rule (αὐτεξούσιον) is of paramount importance for the creative progress in one’s moral perfection. With the proper use of self-rule man can escape sin and turn himself to love. In addition, Diadochus also uses the notion of apatheia (ἀπάθεια) to indicate the way for a successful cleansing (κάθαρσις) of the soul, so that with this cleansing man can grasp the logoi (λόγοι) of beings. According to Diadochus Photice, virtue ethics (...) must not be conceived in an anthropocentric way, but in a theocentric one, and so virtue does not depend only on the ethical achievements of man, but on divine grace and on the personal relation of man to God. (shrink)

El presente estudio se inscribe en la línea de las investigaciones acerca del pensamiento de Evagrio Póntico, el monje filósofo del siglo IV d.C, que se vienen realizando en los últimos años. En este marco, nos interesa profundizar en la significación que tiene en la obra evagriana un concepto filosófica y teológicamente relevante como es el de sophía y cuál es la relación que la realidad que éste designa tiene con la vida moral. Evagrio establece una relación de connaturalidad entre (...) las virtudes y la sabiduría, de tal modo que el ejercicio ético propio de la primera etapa de desarrollo espiritual es planteado como un requisito para alcanzar la sabiduría. En este contexto se plantea el concepto de apátheia como el estado del alma capaz de alcanzar la sabiduría. No obstante, la ciencia que otorga la sabiduría es siempre en el Póntico un don divino. Por esta razón esta división en etapas no puede ni debe ser planteada de modo taxativo como si las mismas fueran compartimentos estancos. (shrink)

Epictetus (pronounced Epic-TEE-tus) was an exponent of Stoicism who flourished in the early second century C.E. about four hundred years after the Stoic school of Zeno of Citium was established in Athens. He lived and worked, first as a student in Rome, and then as a teacher with his own school in Nicopolis in Greece. Our knowledge of his philosophy and his method as a teacher comes to us via two works composed by his student Arrian, the Discourses and the (...) Handbook. Although Epictetus based his teaching on the works of the early Stoics (none of which survives) which dealt with the three branches of Stoic thought, logic, physics and ethics, the Discourses and the Handbook concentrate almost exclusively on ethics. The role of the Stoic teacher was to encourage his students to live the philosophic life, whose end was eudaimonia (‘happiness’ or ‘flourishing’), to be secured by living the life of reason, which – for Stoics – meant living virtuously and living ‘according to nature’. The eudaimonia (‘happiness’) of those who attain this ideal consists of ataraxia (imperturbability), apatheia (freedom from passion), eupatheiai (‘good feelings’), and an awareness of, and capacity to attain, what counts as living as a rational being should. The key to transforming oneself into the Stoic sophos (wise person) is to learn what is ‘in one’s power’, and this is ‘the correct use of impressions’ (phantasiai), which in outline involves not judging as good or bad anything that appears to one. For the only thing that is good is acting virtuously (that is, motivated by virtue), and the only thing that is bad is the opposite, acting viciously (that is, motivated by vice). Someone who seeks to make progress as a Stoic (a prokoptôn) understands that their power of rationality is a fragment of God whose material body – a sort of rarefied fiery air – blends with the whole of creation, intelligently forming and directing undifferentiated matter to make the world as we experience it. The task of the prokoptôn, therefore, is to ‘live according to nature’, which means (a) pursuing a course through life intelligently responding to one’s own needs and duties as a sociable human being, but also (b) wholly accepting one’s fate and the fate of the world as coming directly from the divine intelligence which makes the world the best that is possible. (shrink)

It is likely that the process of global climate change will continue to accelerate. There is a lack of political will to confront the problem and the consequences for humanity — including widespread suffering and institutional destabilization — will be disastrous. How should educators respond to a catastrophic future? Here, Bryan Warnick argues that two criteria should guide the educational response. The response should not (1) undermine efforts to find an “unprecedented solution” to climate change, or (2) leave students unprepared (...) to adapt to a global catastrophe. Using these criteria, he analyzes several possible ways to help students adapt to disaster, including teaching survivalism, encouraging forms of emotional resilience (like the Stoic apatheia), and helping students to appreciate the current moment. These adaptive responses seem to violate the first criterion. At the same time, an educational response focused entirely on climate activism seems to violate the second criterion. Warnick ends by exploring ways to accommodate the need for both adaptation and social engagement, finding promise in the idea of a tragic activism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Overcoming Greed:An Eastern Christian Perspective1Valerie A. KarrasAs an Eastern Orthodox Christian, I have chosen to approach the topic of "overcoming greed" from an Eastern Christian perspective, relying particularly on the writings of some of the early theologians of the Greek East. It is not coincidental either that laissez-faire capitalism arose in the Western Christian world, or that the first strongholds of communism developed in Eastern European, traditionally Orthodox, countries. (...) Both phenomena speak to an intrinsic difference in the way in which human beings are conceived as relating to the world and to each other, both personally and communally.The traditional Eastern Christian model of the human person as not simply caretaker of creation, but fundamentally as a mediator uniting all aspects of creation in humanity's own nature,2 has led historically to a general lack of interest in exploiting creation (in fact, the worst environmental problems in the Orthodox world occurred in countries after they came under totalitarian communist domination). Similarly, the Eastern Orthodox emphasis on the relational, and even communal, nature of salvation created an environment hostile to the individualist, exploitative model upon which modern Western economics has been founded (this has been rapidly changing in post-communist Eastern European countries and Russia, however).The Eastern Church identifies this phenomenon of exploitative and abusive relationships toward nature and other persons as a consequence of the fallen condition of humanity, that is, humanity as it currently exists, in a state where our natural communion with God has been ruptured. In this context, Christianity in general and Eastern Christianity in particular recognize greed as one of the passions (equivalent to what Buddhism describes as "cravings") that are part of our fallen human nature, a consequence of our separation from God. Some of the passions are primarily physical in nature, others emotional or psychic, but in fact virtually all passions are a combination of the two.Greed, a passion of both soul and body that is endemic to our current existence, is typical of this understanding. There are two aspects to the vice of greed: (1) the emotional or spiritual dimension, that is, the acquisitive lust that usually betokens either a deep-seated insecurity or, worse, a desire for power and control; and (2) the [End Page 47] external, physical manifestations of greed in the actual acquisition of things, often to the detriment or exploitation of others. Eastern Christian writings attempt to work on both dimensions of the passion of greed, especially the spiritual, while often distinguishing between greed (a moral vice) and wealth (an amoral condition).This article will focus on two early church theologians, Clement of Alexandria and John Chrysostom. In particular, it will focus on their biblical exegeses of two pertinent New Testament passages: Jesus' conversation with a young righteous scholar of the Mosaic Law and the parable of Lazarus and the rich man, respectively. Finally, I will suggest that, for Orthodox Christians, an important key to overcoming greed is disciplined asceticism, to be practiced by all persons and not simply by monks and nuns. Asceticism—the exercise of control over the passions through fasting, prayer, chastity (understood differently for married and unmarried persons), and almsgiving—is the vehicle by which to cultivate an attitude of apatheia or passionlessness, the Christian equivalent of the Buddhist ideal of detachment.Clement was a philosopher-theologian who headed the great Christian catechetical school in Alexandria in the late second century C.E. In his treatise Who IstheRich ManWhoWill Be Saved? 3 Clement mused on the spiritual and soteriological dimensions of greed by reflecting on Jesus' encounter with the wealthy young "lawyer," that is, scholar of the Mosaic Law, who questioned Jesus on how to acquire eternal life. In his response, the young man showed himself righteous in his adherence to the demands of the law, but ultimately unwilling to commit all of himself by giving away his property, even though Jesus said that it was the price to inherit eternal life.Clement pondered whether it were therefore possible for anyone wealthy to be saved, given Jesus' declaration that "it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man... (shrink)

Calm is a little-theorized but important link between Roland Barthes and Samuel Beckett. Beginning with Beckett, moving on to Barthes, and then interleaving the two, this paper proposes calm as a ‘scandalous’ category not reducible to kindred states like languor or apatheia. In dialogue with theorists of repose, such as Kant and De Quincey, calmness becomes less a sedated condition than an interactive process, entailing intense sensitivity to the fluctuations of what Barthes calls ‘the affective minimal’. Artistically generative, this (...) ‘emotive lucidity’ encourages inquisitiveness towards the natural world, and enables in both writers specific writing practices — from lists to notation to haiku. (shrink)

This article attempts to provide an overview and discussion of Plutarch’s views in his Moralia about emotions and their relation to moral virtue and reason. By tracking different clusters of imagery – artisanal, zoological and botanic – that Plutarch uses in his essays to articulate the relationship between emotions and reason, it explores three philosophical perspectives on emotions: emotions of a virtuous person are likened to a well-shaped piece of material; to animals that need to be guided or reined in (...) by their master; and to wholesome plants in a garden. Each of these imageries is used to support a different account of moral virtue: virtue as the emotional disposition to feel moderately; virtue as the obedience of emotions to the commands of reason; and virtue as the absence of bad emotions and flourishing of the good ones. This analysis enables us to weigh the influences of major philosophers on Plutarch’s account, and to elucidate his commitment on both metriopatheia and apatheia. (shrink)

Si bien la influencia de Clemente de Alejandría sobre Evagrio Póntico ha sido señalada por autores como Antoine Guillaumont y Paul Géhin, este trabajo se orienta a considerar su presencia en el círculo de los discípulos de Evagrio y, paralelamente, reconsiderar las temáticas en las que, efectivamente, existió tal influencia. Utilizaré como texto de base para el análisis los Chapitres des disciples d’Évagre, un largo texto que reúne una serie de breves capítulos o kephalaia con enseñanzas de Evagrio que fueron (...) recogidas por sus discípulos, en los que puede observarse la influencia clementina. Me detendré particularmente en dos conceptos importantes para ambos autores: la apatheia y la amistad espiritual, lo cual permitirá, a mi entender, relativizar la autoridad de Clemente en Evagrio y los círculos cultos de los Padres del Desierto. (shrink)

Resumen La figura del Abba, central en el monacato cristiano primitivo, recibe en el pensamiento de Evagrio Póntico, primer sistematizador de la espiritualidad monástica, la significativa denominación de “Gnóstico” pues se trata del monje que ha alcanzado un cierto grado de ciencia espiritual -natural primero, sobrenatural después- luego de haber atravesado la Praktiké. Esta última constituye, en la comprensión evagriana del itinerario cristiano, la primera etapa del progreso espiritual caracterizada principalmente por el cumplimiento de los mandamientos con el fin de (...) obtener la virtud. Al cabo de la Praktiké, se alcanza la apátheia que constituye una condición propicia del alma para recibir la ciencia presente en las cosas y en los seres racionales. Evagrio llama “gnóstico” a quien ha recibido por lo menos las primicias de esta ciencia o gnosis. Sitúa así aquel “ministerio de la palabra” que el monacato asigna al Abba, en el marco de su esquema de la vida cristiana, atribuyéndole una función medicinal que encuentra en la figura - cara al cristianismo tardo antiguo- del Cristo médico su arquetipo, su especificidad y su raíz. Nos interesa examinar en esta ocasión el modo en que aparece esta figura del Cristo en la obra de Evagrio Póntico y cómo ella constituiría el modelo y la raíz del ministerio terapeútico que, en el pensamiento evagriano, puede ejercer el gnóstico.The Abba figure, central to early Christian monasticism, receives in the thought of Evagrius Ponticus the significant denomination of "Gnostic" because it is the monk who has attained a certain degree of spiritual science after having crossed the Praktiké. The latter constitutes, in the evagriana understanding of the Christian itinerary, the first stage of the spiritual progress characterized mainly by the fulfillment of the commandments in order to obtain the virtue. At the end of the Praktiké, the apátheia is reached, which constitutes a propitious condition of the soul to receive the science present in things and rational beings. Evagrius calls "gnostic" who has received at least the first fruits of this science or gnosis. The "ministry of the word" that monasticism assigns to the Abba, is, for Evagrius, within this framework of Christian life. Our Author attributes the gnostic a medicinal function which finds in the figure - very important for the Late Antique Christianity- of the “Christ Physician”, its archetype, its specificity and its root. We are interested in examining on this occasion how this figure of Christ appears in the work of Evagrius Ponticus and how it would constitute the model and root of the therapeutic ministry that, in Evagrian thought, can be exercised by the Gnostic. (shrink)

The Two Faces of Stoicism: Rousseau and Freud AMI~LIE OKSENBERG RORTY Nor do the Stoics mean that the soul of their wisest man resists the first visions and sudden fantasies that surprise [him]: but [he] rather consents that, as it were to a natural subjection, he yields .... So likewise in other passions, always provided his opinions remain safe and whole, and.., his reason admit no tainting or alteration, and he in no whit consents to his fright and sufferance. Montaigne, (...) Essays, I. 1 THE STOICS ARE A WEIGHTY EMBARRASSMENT to their friends who, like myself, want to defend them from the charges that their views are at best vague or ludicrous, perhaps offensive or inconsistent. There is no doubt that some of their pronouncements seem material for Aristophanic comedy, others callous and yet others incoherent. And there is also no doubt that they openly defy common sense and deliberately change the terminology they inherit, introduc- ing neologisms ad hoc. And yet, and yet -- it is no accident that they continue, rightly continue, to have a powerful hold on ordinary belief and acute philo- sophical reflection. Here -- in what is itself a parody -- are some of the commonplaces famil- iarly attributed to the Stoics.' First, the notorious matter of Stoic apatheia. Diogenes Laertius reports that I believe, but cannot here argue, that despite the signficant differences between early, middle and late Stoics, the classical Stoics shared a common agenda. It is.. (shrink)

At the start of Early Modernity, the notion of raison d’état (reason of state) became a central issue in European politics. By means of that notion politicians and intellectuals reflected upon the legitimacy of violent and unethical means in the service of higher ends. Due, among others, to the nature of modern warfare, the role of the state acquired new significance in human affairs. Therefore, many philosophers and politicians argued that politics might be fundamentally different from other human activities and (...) might require a special rationality and morality. Also, thus my hypothesis, the discourse and history of the raison d’état is throughout history characterized by some recurring themes, such as the consolidation of governmental power. In this study, I want to explore how the raison d’état, in various strengths, has been instrumentalised in the political doctrine of Richelieu and Louis XIII as well in the political ideas of Putin and his ideological right-hand Dugin. It will be discussed how in both political systems; sovereignty is considered to be an undifferentiated body of legitimate power with a firm basis in Christian-Stoic natural law. The stoic ideal of indifference (apatheia) is an important reference in the reason of state rhetoric since the individual is supposed to be prepared to sacrifice his life for the preservation of the State. The common good should be the objective of each person in the society. I will analyse to what extent Putin and Dugin, in defending their war politics, use similar arguments as cardinal Richelieu. By reflecting on the intellectual discourse about the nature and purposes of the State itself, and the element of justice and higher values in the public discourse, it can be analysed how the raison d’état operates in a political doctrine. (shrink)

This paper shows how turns in theology in early Modernity and in the last century framed the context of distinct philosophical understandings of the self. Focusing on the concept of “pure nature,” the foreshadowing of philosophical themes in theology is shown. It is further argued that while the modern self emerging from certain early Modern theological discourses from Suárez, through Descartes to Kant was deeply implicated in Stoic apatheia, the self which arises from a phenomenological rethinking of the place (...) of love and beauty in the worldliness of being and appearance is one which is fundamentally passionate. At play here is a shift in the notion of will from that of sovereign indifference to desire. (shrink)

This paper uses the exchanges between the lovers Dido and Aeneas in Aeneid IV to undercut the pretensions of Stoic philosophers to lead a dispassionate, imperturbable life under the sole guidance of “reason.” It takes Aeneas as an example of Stoicism’s lawyer-like, falsified rationality—“I will say just a few words in regard to this matter [pro re]” (IV 336)—and Dido as an example of someone who, though under the sway of furor, nevertheless makes honest, reasoned arguments that are continuous with (...) the feelings she is experiencing. The point is not that one is more at fault than the other but the rather more radical thesis that with his Aeneas character Virgil is showing that Stoicism’s ataraxia and apatheia are inevitably dissimulation, inevitably fake. (shrink)

Charting a genealogy of the modern idea of the self, Felix Ó Murchadha explores the accounts of self-identity expounded by key Early Modern philosophers, Montaigne, Descartes, Pascal, Spinoza, Hume and Kant. The question of the self as we would discuss it today only came to the forefront of philosophical concern with Modernity, beginning with an appeal to the inherited models of the self found in Stoicism, Scepticism, Augustinianism and Pelagianism, before continuing to develop as a subject of philosophical debate. Exploring (...) this trajectory, The Formation of the Modern Self pursues a number of themes central to the Early Modern development of selfhood, including, amongst others, grace and passion. It examines on the one hand the deep-rooted dependence on the divine and the longing for salvation and, on the other hand, the distancing from the Stoic ideal of apatheia, as philosophers from Descartes to Spinoza recognised the passions as essential to human agency. Fundamental to the new question of the self was the relation of faith and reason. Uncovering commonalities and differences amongst Early Modern philosophers, Ó Murchadha traces how the voluntarism of Modernity led to the sceptical approach to the self in Montaigne and Hume and how, by way of Hamann and Jacobi's reception of Hume, this sceptical strand, in turn, culminated in Kant's rational faith. More than a history of the self in philosophy, The Formation of the Modern Self inspires a fresh look at self-identity, uncovering not only how our modern idea of selfhood developed but just how embedded the concept of self is in external considerations: from ethics, to reason, to religion. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:A New Stoicism by Lawrence C. BeckerEric BrownLawrence C. Becker. A New Stoicism. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998. Pp. vii + 216. Cloth, $ 29.95.As the title suggests, A New Stoicism is not primarily a work in the history of philosophy but an appropriation for current purposes. Becker boldly identifies himself as a stoic (sic) and seeks to “outline a contemporary version of stoic ethics” (6). While disdaining (...) much of the ancients’ provocative rhetoric, Becker defends some of the most controversial Stoic positions, including apatheia and what he calls “the Axiom of Futility.” Indeed, he apostasizes significantly only by surrendering teleology.Historical inquiry is limited to commentaries that are appended to each chapter in order to show “in detail how this work can justify calling itself stoic” (7). Here Becker offers summaries of and references for central interpretive disputes, generally appends his own views, and occasionally argues for them. These commentaries typically shed more light on Becker’s project than on the ancients, but they do suffice to justify calling the project Stoic. And historically minded readers will still find much of value in this book, especially by reflecting on Becker’s appropriations and appreciations.As a contribution to contemporary ethics, Becker’s program—“neither a comprehensive ethical theory nor a practical handbook” (7)—aims to follow the facts, especially of moral psychology. To Becker “every norm (as a fact about the world) is internal to some, agent’s project” (77).1 To show how humans have not just a hodge-podge of [End Page 162] personal norms both nasty and nice but a set of recognizably moral norms, Becker counts on certain “schematic and probabilistic” (12) facts about human nature and natural psychological development, including the attribution of a “built-in motivational pressure for reducing cognitive dissonance—for achieving logical consistency and connectedness (integration) among the objects of thought” (87). On Becker’s account, a human being naturally reflects on the norms generated by her various endeavors, and her reflection leads her eventually to the conclusion that “I am required, as a necessary condition of exercising my agency, to take solely the perfection of (the exercise of) my agency based on practical reasoning all-things-considered as my most comprehensive and controlling endeavor” (116–117). The naturally perfect agent recognizes the norms generated by this most controlling endeavor as axiomatically superordinate to all her other norms (42) and achieves maximal integration (and maximal versatility!) of her possible endeavors, but Becker takes pains to insist that she will still experience conflict, passion, and her own idiosyncratic pleasures and pains.Becker’s achievement is considerable. He puts to rest the caricature of the impassively passive stoic and challenges modern moral philosophy to take fuller account of real and diverse moral psychology, and in doing so he provides clear evidence for thinking that philosophy benefits by a close engagement with its Stoic past.But Becker’s project faces some difficult questions. Those unsympathetic to the immediate move from facts about endeavors to norms, for example, will press “the normative question.” I wish he had said more about how social virtue enters. Consider Harry, a remarkably well-integrated agent who has not integrated any norms to help people outside of his limited community (see esp. 97). Can Becker say that Harry is wrong, as the ancient Stoics would? Some of the ancients seem to give an account of social development that naturally culminates in positive concern for all human beings, but Becker pulls up well short of this in his brief remarks about social development (74–76, 96–97, 156). Other ancients seem to argue that naturally perfected agency agrees with the divine order of the cosmos, which recognizes no relevant distinctions between various communities, but Becker has jettisoned this sort of argument. Perhaps Becker will say that Harry can have healthy integration but cannot have the versatility required of ideal agency (103–107) since ideal agency requires “the optimization of the agent’s practically possible endeavors” (107) and engagement with outsiders is a practical possibility. But Becker’s notions of an endeavor and of practical possibility themselves raise difficult questions surrounding intention.Stylistically, Becker’s initially charming use... (shrink)

Os escritos de Evágrio Pôntico, monge do século IV, embora não constituindo um sistema filosófico, são de capital importância para compreendermos o desenvolvimento da cultura ocidental. No presente trabalho, todavia, operamos um corte epistemológico diferente. Buscamos na sua obra Tratado Prático, primeira parte de uma trilogia de teologia espiritual, elementos de uma doutrina psicológica que, é o que pretendemos demonstrar, se constitui em verdadeira terapêutica. Assim, exploramos alguns conceitos fundamentais dessa obra, tais como os de impassibilidade, de pensamentos passionais, e (...) o de paixões, e também doutrinas importantes, como a da divisão tripartite da alma e a demonologia evagriana. (shrink)