The contemporary problem of disagreement has two prominent solutions. The Conciliationists think that after discovering a case of disagreement one should be less certain of one’s original position. Those who favor Conciliatory views tend to think that disagreement is epistemically significant because it causes problems for one’s rationality. The Steadfasters, on the other hand, think that one should maintain one’s belief in the face of a disagreement; thus, disagreement appears a less epistemically significant problem to them. But neither of these (...) solutions address the actual problem of disagreements: that the very same faculties which cause me to trust myself provide you a differing opinion. Therefore, we need a solution for disagreement that responds to the issues it presents to one’s self-trust rather than secondary factors, like the likelihood of peerhood or the truth of the Uniqueness Thesis. Such an account ought to be regulative in nature. That is, it should offer insight to epistemic agents. The best of the regulative accounts can be found in virtue epistemology, because its practical nature is grounded in a holistic appraisal of epistemic agents. In cases of disagreement, to be epistemically virtuous, an agent needs to balance her intellectual fortitude with her intellectual humility and open-mindedness. But in order to balance these virtues when they appear to be in conflict, we need another resource that is able to govern them. For this purpose, I introduce intellectual phronesis. Like its moral counterpart, intellectual phronesis can help one to discern the particularity of situations in order to determine the appropriate response. Accordingly, intellectual phronesis is the ideal tool to adjudicate which intellectual virtue is appropriate for a particular disagreement. (shrink)
Language’s intentional nature has been highlighted as a crucial feature distinguishing it from other communication systems. Specifically, language is often thought to depend on highly structured intentional action and mutual mindreading by a communicator and recipient. Whilst similar abilities in animals can shed light on the evolution of intentionality, they remain challenging to detect unambiguously. We revisit animal intentional communication and suggest that progress in identifying analogous capacities has been complicated by (i) the assumption that intentional (that is, voluntary) production (...) of communicative acts requires mental-state attribution, and (ii) variation in approaches investigating communication across sensory modalities. To move forward, we argue that a framework fusing research across modalities and species is required. We structure intentional communication into a series of requirements, each of which can be operationalised, investigated empirically, and must be met for purposive, intentionally communicative acts to be demonstrated. Our unified approach helps elucidate the distribution of animal intentional communication and subsequently serves to clarify what is meant by attributions of intentional communication in animals and humans. (shrink)
On average, women make up half of introductory-level philosophy courses, but only one-third of upper-division courses. We contribute to the growing literature on this problem by reporting the striking results of our study at the University of Oklahoma. We found that two attitudes are especially strong predictors of whether women are likely to continue in philosophy: feeling similar to the kinds of people who become philosophers, and enjoying philosophical puzzles and issues. In a regression analysis, they account for 63% of (...) variance. Importantly, women are significantly less likely to hold these attitudes than men. Thus, instructors who care about improving the retention of women undergraduates should find ways to improve these attitudes – for instance, by demonstrating the ways in which professional philosophers are like them. We will discuss some tentative but intuitively plausible suggestions for interventions, though further research is required to establish the effectiveness of those interventions. (shrink)
Redish et al. provide a significant advance in our understanding of addiction by showing that the various addictive processes are in fact all decision-making processes and each may undergird addiction. We propose means for identifying more central addiction processes. This recognition of the complexity of addiction followed by identification of more central processes would help guide the development of prevention and treatment.
25 medical historians born between 1800 and 1900 have been selected, mainly by citation frequency, for a study in comparative biography. They originated in Germany, U.S.A., U.K. France, Switzerland, Italy, and Austria. A number of them were active in two countries due to emigration from fascist Europe in the 1930s. All were MDs except for one historian. Most of them showed an interest in the history of medicine early in life, some only between age 40â50. Their motivations were quite varied. (...) Most of them made their living with clinical practice, at least initially. Those ten who attained a chair in the history of medicine did so usually between age 41 and 56. Our selection of medical historians active between 1825 and 1975 is very heterogeneous, much more so than in the final decades of the 20th century. (shrink)
A fundamental question in causal inference is whether it is possible to reliably infer the manipulation eﬀects from observational data. There are a variety of senses of asymptotic reliability in the statistical literature, among which the most commonly discussed frequentist notions are pointwise consistency and uniform consistency (see, e.g. Bickel, Doksum ). Uniform consistency is in general preferred to pointwise consistency because the former allows us to control the worst case error bounds with a ﬁnite sample size. In the (...) sense of pointwise consistency, several reliable causal inference algorithms have been established under the Markov and Faithfulness assumptions [Pearl 2000, Spirtes et al. 2001]. In the sense of uniform consistency, however, reliable causal inference is impossible under the two assumptions when time order is unknown and/or latent confounders are present [Robins et al. 2000]. In this paper we present two natural generalizations of the Faithfulness assumption in the context of structural equation models, under which we show that the typical algorithms in the literature are uniformly consistent with or without modiﬁcations even when the time order is unknown. We also discuss the situation where latent confounders may be present and the sense in which the Faithfulness assumption is a limiting case of the stronger assumptions. (shrink)
: Drawing on several feminist and anti-racist theorists, I use the trope of the vampire to unravel how whiteness, maleness, and heterosexuality feed on the same set of disavowals—of the body, of the Other, of fluidity, of dependency itself. I then turn to Jewelle Gomez's The Gilda Stories (1991) for a counternarrative that, along with Donna Haraway's reading of vampires (1997), retools concepts of kinship and self that undergird racism, sexism, and heterosexism in contemporary U.S. culture.
O maior problema do controle de constitucionalidade – um dos institutos básicos do Estado de direito –, com relação à sua justificação democrática, é a chamada dificuldade contra-majoritária [countermajoritarian difficulty], já apontada por Bickel. O texto apresenta o tratamento dessa questão em Habermas, Rawls e Dworkin, a partir da bioética, especialmente o caso do aborto, da eutanásia e da eugenia. Argumenta-se que a justificação moral de boa parte do controle de constitucionalidade encontra sua base em fundamentos morais impostos ao (...) legislador, a partir de uma perspectiva liberal. Tais fundamentos são reconstruídos, tendo em vista a posição tolerante de Locke concernente à problemática religiosa. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Bioética. Constitucionalidade. Liberalismo. Liberadade religiosa. ABSTRACT The major problem of the control over constitutionality – one of the basic institutes of the rule of law –, with regard to its democratic justification, is the so-called countermajoritarian difficulty, already highlighted by Bickel. The article shows how this issue is tackled by Habermas, Rawls, and Dworkin, from the standpoint of bioethics, especially in matters of abortion, euthanasia, and eugenics. It argues that the moral justification of a great deal of the control over constitutionality finds its basis on moral grounds imposed to the legislator from a liberal perspective. Such grounds are reconstructed with a view to recasting Locke’s tolerant position concerning religious affairs. KEY WORDS – Bioethics. Constitutionality. Liberalism. Religious freedom. (shrink)
Drawing on several feminist and anti-racist theorists, I use the trope of the vampire to unravel how whiteness, maleness, and heterosexuality feed on the same set of disavowals-of the body, of the Other, of fluidity, of dependency itself. I then turn to Jewelle Gomez's The Gilda Stories for a counternarrative that, along with Donna Haraway's reading of vampires, retools concepts of kinship and self that undergird racism, sexism, and heterosexism in contemporary U.S. culture.