OUR manuals of ethics distinguish between the ‘supreme’ and the ‘proximate’ norms of morality, the supreme norm being the ‘eternal law’ and the proximate norm ‘human reason’. They then sub-divide the proximate norm into ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’: the objective norm of morality is human reason taken as equivalent to the rational nature of man, with all the relationships which that nature essentially involves; the subjective norm is human reason understood as the particular faculty by which man apprehends his rational nature (...) and its essential relationships as a norm of moral action. (shrink)

OUR manuals of ethics distinguish between the ‘supreme’ and the ‘proximate’ norms of morality, the supreme norm being the ‘eternal law’ and the proximate norm ‘human reason’. They then sub-divide the proximate norm into ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’: the objective norm of morality is human reason taken as equivalent to the rational nature of man, with all the relationships which that nature essentially involves; the subjective norm is human reason understood as the particular faculty by which man apprehends his rational nature (...) and its essential relationships as a norm of moral action. (shrink)

In his recently published book Animals and African Ethics, Kai Horsthemke makes two important and related claims. The first is that most African metaphysical, religious, and ethical positions and perspectives on animals are anthropocentric. Second, he states that if there are one or more principles of duties regarding other animals derivable from these positions and perspectives, they are at best “indirect duties.” In this article, I critically engage with these claims in the context of the ontological beliefs and ethical standpoints (...) that flow from anthropocentrism, biocentrism, and ecocentrism. I argue that the African metaphysical worldview and African practices on animals are not anthropocentric. The nub of my argument is that a closer examination of African practices on animals and one dominant African metaphysical worldview—one that Horsthemke engages with in the book—presents us a different conclusion, one that suggests that the worldview and practices are conceivably biocentric or ecocentric rather than anthropocentric. (shrink)

Since its inception, experimental social psychology has arguably been of two minds about the nature and role of theory. Contemporary social psychology's experimental approach has been strongly informed by the “nomological-deductive” approach of Carl Hempel in tandem with the “hypothetico-deducive” approach of Karl Popper. Social psychology's commitment to this hybrid model of science has produced at least two serious obstacles to more fruitful theorizing about human experience: the problem of situational specificity, and the manifest impossibility of formulating meaningful general laws (...) of human social behavior. It is argued that a social psychology based on the search for this kind of lawfulness, under the auspices of either a strict or loose interpretation of the largely Hempelian model, is ultimately unworkable. An alternative approach to social psychology that is attentive both to the need for understanding individual situations and behaviors and to the need for generalized understanding of actual human behaviors is offered. This approach is grounded in the hermeneutic tradition. (shrink)

Much theorizing about altruism has been undertaken within a naturalistic and deterministic sociobiological framework that has sought to explain altruistic action in terms of underlying genetic selfishness. Recently, however, social constructionist thinkers have developed an alternative to such theorizing which suggests that human action arises out of fundamentally open-ended and malleable social relationships. This paper intends to show, however, that a reductive egoism is nonetheless still at work in such accounts, typically taking the form of an underlying concern for matters (...) of personal status and social recognition. As a response, this paper will briefly outline the work of the French phenomenologists Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Emmanuel Levinas as an example of non-reductive and fundamentally Other-oriented alternatives to both sociobiological and social constructionist accounts of altruistic action. (shrink)

Examines the assumption of hedonism that lies at the core of many social constructionist accounts of human interaction, and illustrates how it precludes an adequate understanding of agency, morality, and intimacy. The implications of such a hedonism are discussed, and a possible alternative to this hedonism which would allow for a more adequate account of agency, morality, and intimacy is briefly explored. It is argued that if social constructionism is going to come to grips with morality and agency it must (...) abandon explanations that invoke the necessary causation of metaphysical abstractions such as hedonism. In order to successfully accomplish this task, social constructionist accounts of human motivation and action must take into account the moral obligation to others that is intimately associated with becoming a person. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Contributors -- Series Editor's Foreword -- Preface: A 'Science' of Psychology: The Enduring Aspiration -- Introduction: Science, Scientism, and Psychology -- 1 Epistemology and the Boundaries Between Phenomena and Conventions -- 2 Hayek and Hempel on the Nature, Role, and Limitations of Science -- 3 On Scientism in Psychology: Some Observations of Historical Relevance -- 4 Why Science Needs Intuition -- 5 Scientism and Saturation: Evolutionary Psychology, Human Experience, and the (...) Phenomenology of Jean-Luc Marion -- 6 Psychotherapy and Scientism -- 7 Science and Society: Effects, Reactions, and a Call for Reformation -- 8 Beyond Scientism: Reaches in Psychology Toward a Science of Consciousness -- Index. (shrink)

Reviews the book, The mismeasure of desire: The science, theory, and ethics of sexual orientation by Edward Stein . It would hardly be overstating the matter to say that perhaps the single most hotly debated issue in both psychology and contemporary American culture is the nature and origins of human sexual desires. In opposition to the currently more widely accepted thesis that sexual orientation is determined at birth, philosopher and educator Edward Stein argues in this new book that much of (...) what we think we know about the origins of sexual desire is probably misguided and incomplete. Carefully examining a broad range of research on sexual orientation, Stein suggests that many of the most frequently cited findings are deeply flawed—not only methodologically but also in light of certain unquestioned philosophical assumptions and cultural stereotypes. Although the arguments in Stein’s book are more than a little likely to create controversy, and, indeed, some may well be found to be specious, his book is nonetheless a very welcome infusion of thoughtful philosophical and psychological thinking into the all-too-often muddled arena of contemporary academic and political debate. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

La metodología e-learning apuesta por un cambio a los modelos tradicionales, implementados en las instituciones de educación. Con el fin de poner a prueba y analizar los resultados de este nuevo modelo, se decidió implementar prácticas de laboratorio virtuales para el curso de conversión electromagnética del pregrado en ingeniería electrónica, una de estas prácticas tiene como título “circuito equivalente de un transformador”, con ella y junto a la consulta de los niveles de satisfacción de los estudiantes en sus resultados de (...) aprendizaje, construiremos las métricas necesarias para evaluar este método. (shrink)

The term “aesthetics” is misleading when applied in the classical Indian philosophical context. Before the modern period, there is substantially no body of speculation on the pleasurable responses to created objects, as such, or on their formal capacities to induce such responses. What we do have, on the other hand, are: (1) several partly distinct traditions having to do with the elements out of which are constructed such objects – including literary “objects” – according to prevailing canons of symbology and (...) use that have a ritual or religious basis; and (2) an intensely developed set of speculations on the narrower question of the observed power (often judged in emotive terms) of the dramatic work to transform us, its spectators. This second problematic, in time, comes to be seen as paradigmatic for all “art,” including poetry, music, and the plastic arts. The first set of traditions focuses on what we might call the semantics of the work, contrasting it, in the case of the written work, with “ordinary” symbolical and ritual uses of language “how does it mean what it means?”; the second set deals with the restorative or transformative capacity of dramatic and other “fictive” works, vis‐à‐vis those that immediately and practically provide, or presume to provide, a transcendent solution on human problems – most importantly, of course, the essentially religious problem of human suffering caused by the bondage of cyclic existence “how does the work of art also accomplish human ends?”. (shrink)

In this preamble, we highlight some of the more recent work on gender and sexuality in African philosophy. We do this as a way of introducing the special issue on “African Philosophy, Women, and Feminism”. In particular, we outline and highlight the trajectory and intellectual landscape of several discussions on women and feminism in African philosophy in the issue, and in this way, build on some previous work on gender, women, sexuality and African philosophy.

ABSTRACT There are forms of discriminations that are not defensible, and unjustified discriminations manifest in different forms. One such manifestation is racism, which involves the use of morally arbitrary natural and moral constituents (characteristics, abilities, qualities) to demarcate racial or ethnic groups and consequently designate some groups as superior and others as inferior. In this article, I discuss one form of racism (intellectual racism), namely, racism in relation to color, as a way of highlighting how the notion of superiority and (...) inferiority of racial or ethnic groups (Caucasian and Africans) play out in the intellectual landscape and discourse. Ultimately, my motivations are threefold: one, to signify and engage with some views of racial coloring and color eliminativism; two, to make and extend the position that color eliminativism is not defensible; and three, to highlight and emphasize the claim that given the notion of a “one-colored humanity,” racial groups ought not to be classified as superior or inferior. (shrink)

The claim that is examined in this chapter is that, as is bivalent logic, trivalent logic occupies a place in the field of logic. A trivalent logic is a three-value logical system, and a bivalent logic is a two-value logical system. As part of advancing this claim, the chapter uses the examples of trivalent logic in Charles Sanders Peirce’s thought, the trivalent logic of Janus, the Aymará trivalent logical system, and African trivalent logic. Using the example of ancestorhood, where characteristically (...) an ancestor, as a living dead, is both a spiritual and physical entity or is considered neither a spiritual nor physical being, the overarching view or thesis that is defended and advanced is that African trivalent logic mirrors a trivalent African metaphysics or ontology. (shrink)

This article discusses some of the core values among the Igbos. This is done partly as a way of showing the way in which these values play out both in gender relations in and highlighting the way women are viewed. In this sense, our attempt here should be understood as an investigation. The values that we examine are those of truthfulness or truth, respect or respectfulness and industry or industriousness or hard work. The aim is to help make the case (...) that in Igboland women are neither marginalised nor treated as inferior to men. In presenting these ideas, we draw on some proverbs (to show the values of truth and respect) and some characters and actors in Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall Apart (to demonstrate the values of respect and industry) for both men and women. (shrink)

As an international instrument on climate change, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change embraces a general obligation to protect the climate system, from which some specific obligations for developed countries fall off from. In this paper, I discuss three of such obligations. Firstly, the obligation to address the causes of climate change and to mitigate its adverse effects, next, the obligation to assist developing countries that are vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting the costs (...) of adaptation to those adverse effects and finally, the obligation to support other developing countries by providing them with appropriate resources in order for them to mitigate and adapt to the adverse effects of climate change. I show that these obligations are framed in the treaty as obligations of beneficence and suggest that the first two can be expressed as obligations of justice. I argue for the soundness of expressing the obligations this way and that doing so may have the added virtue of addressing both the egoistic and performance problems since it introduces some incentive for taking the obligations seriously and the possibility for their realization. (shrink)

René Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy is his most celebrated philosophical work. The book remains one of the most significant and influential works in epistemology, metaphysics and philosophy of mind in the history of Western philosophy. In this paper I examine the relationship between the various hyperbolic doubts, the dreaming, imperfect creator, and evil demon hypotheses in Meditation I. The paper shows that the "painting analogy" occupies a central position in the First Meditation not only because it effectively links together (...) the hyperbolic doubts, but also because it lays the groundwork for the claim that although it may be impossible for us to know things outside us as our thoughts represent them to be, we can know at least the feature of our thoughts themselves. By raising the necessary doubt about our sensible experience and the corporeal world, the "painting analogy" makes the case for the primacy of the intellectual world. (shrink)

The conventioral understanding takes God to pray a pivotal philosophical role in Descartes's epistemological project. Michael Della Rocca disagrees with this interpretation. In a recent article, " Descartes, the Cartesian Circle, and epistemology without God," he forcefully argues for the view that takes God to be peripheral and at the fringe of Descartes's account of knowledge. He argues that Descartes renders God less important in his epistemology simply in virtue of having normative certainty of clear and distinct ideas or perceptions (...) prior to his theological argument. This paper generally argues that although it could be said that Descartes has normative certainty of some claims before his arguments for God's existence, it is misleading to claim that God plays no pivotal philosophical role in Descartes's epistemological project. In particular, it argues that since the relevant conditions for scientia for Descartes include normative certainty of clear and distinct perceptions and understanding of the metaphysical foundations of cognition it is mistaken to suppose that God takes on a less than central role in Descartes's epistemology. (shrink)

What is the status and nature of the “it” and the ontological progression from an “it” to an “it” in Ifeanyi Menkiti’s normative conception of a person? In this article, I attempt to preliminarily give some nuance content to the “it” of childhood and the “it” of the nameless dead. My motivation is straightforwardly simple: to defend Menkiti’s claim that both “its” have some depersonalised moral standing or existence. However, in doing so, I argue that a better account of the (...) ontological progression of personhood is from an “it” to an “it-it”5 rather than from an “it” to an “it.” On this modified version of the double hyphenated “its”, which isunderpinned by the idea of moral force, the prior moral worth of the nameless dead is taken into account as valuable members of our collective immortality, notwithstanding the fact that their names have been forgotten. (shrink)

One of the practical ethical areas that Thaddeus Metz applied his Relational Moral Theory (RMT) to is business ethics. In this important area of applied ethics, Metz examines the question of how business owners, and related agents ought to deal with others, especially workers and consumers. He argues that the relational account of obligations recommends a stakeholder model of business and provides a plausible alternative (if not better to) familiar kinds of utilitarianism and Kantianism. In this article, I discuss and (...) engage with this claim by raising a number of issues for RMT. For although I believe that Metz’s moral account could, in general and under certain description, be positioned as a viable competitor to utilitarianism and Kantianism, it is not clear that in certain theoretical aspects of the stakeholder account of business, it fares better than, for example, utilitarianism. Furthermore, I argue, on the one hand, that RMT should be understood as a _heterochthonous account_ of African ethics and, on the other hand, that an _autochthonous account_ of African ethics captures better or comes closer to the moral sensibilities of indigenous Africans. An _autochthonous account_ of African ethics has a different take on the issue of the stakeholder model of business and does conceptualize the business relationship in terms of needs and welfare whereby a “distant” individual may be owed more duties than a “local” individual. (shrink)

In this chapter, I begin the first attempt at mapping out what I consider to be the one concept of African ethics and some of its many accounts. I take the one concept of African ethics to be the general idea or notion of African morality and the many accounts to be narrations or versions that try to flesh out this concept. Regarding the one concept of African ethics, I suggest that constitutive of it or characteristic of it is communal (...) flourishing. Taking Ubuntu, Ujamaa, and Ukama as representatives of the many accounts of African ethics, I highlight the sense in which they constitute developments or narrations of the general notion of communal flourishing. (shrink)

I want to do a couple of things in this essay. First, I want to articulate the central direction that postmodern thinking or philosophy takes. Second, I want to present a brief sketch of African philosophy, focusing mostly on some aspects of African ethics. Third, I want togesture towards the view that while postmodern thinking seems to suggest that African philosophy is a legitimate narrative or “language game” it could beargued that given its central ideas and doctrines African philosophy may (...) be open to some of the worries facing modern thinking. (shrink)

Aristotle is credited with the first full-fledged robust philosophical discussion and presentation of substance. His account of substance presents different notions of substance, which were elaborated on and modified in the medieval and modern periods. Among those that elaborated on the conception of substance in the modern period are Rene Descartes, John Locke, Baruch or Benedict de Spinoza, George Berkeley, Gottfried Leibniz, David Hume, and Immanuel Kant. What is the nature of substance and how is it understood by these philosophers? (...) In this paper I examine the notions of substance in the philosophical systems of Locke, Spinoza, and Kant. I go beyond this comparative and exploratory exercise to show why Kant takes on a more expansive notion of substance. In particular, for Kant the conceptions of substance we find in Locke and Spinoza do not allow the idea of substance to do the work that substance as a pure concept of the understanding should do. (shrink)

In this paper I examine five essential themes in Brand Blanshard's coherence theory of truth. Blanshard defines truth in terms of the rational or the interdependence of concepts, where concepts determine objects of experience rather than merely conform to them. On this view, truth is contextual and is the approximation of thought to reality or the systemization of the two ends - the immanent and transcendent. I raise some worries for this account of truth, foremost of which is the worry (...) that it commits us to a deep-seated skepticism, both theoretical and practical. In order to be able to tell when the immanent end is achieved and if it is making progress towards the transcendent end (i.e., when the ultimate systematization is realized), we require an omniscient standpoint of cosmic order or overarching system of beliefs. While this seems possible in principle it is not so in practice. (shrink)