This paper has two objectives: first, to rebut three misconceptions about the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze that deal with his position in ontology, aesthetics and science; and second, to probe deeper into two of these misunderstandings in order to discover their current scope. Both of these misunderstandings regard his views on ontology and on science. Here we will see how an ontology of difference and an intensive science arise. We will close our paper with some comments on the actuality of (...) this thought. (shrink)

Libro reseñado: Justicia global, derechos humanos y responsabilidad. Editores: Francisco Cortés Rodas & Miguel Giusti.

El presente texto tiene dos objetivos: una descripción y una aplicación. En primer lugar, describimos la crítica de Wittgenstein a Moore en torno a la demostración del mundo exterior a nuestras mentes. En ella rescatamos la distinción entre proposiciones marco y proposiciones epistémicas. En segundo lugar, presentamos una forma de aplicación de esta distinción para la filosofía de la ciencia. Específicamente, nos permitirá describir qué distingue a la ciencia de cualquier otro sistema de creencias. La tesis central detrás de esta (...) distinción es que la racionalidad científica, a diferencia de la tradición, pseudociencia y superstición, busca reducir el número de proposiciones marco o, idealmente, no aumentarlas. (shrink)

El presente texto tiene dos objetivos: una descripción y una aplicación. En primer lugar, describimos la crítica de Wittgenstein a Moore en torno a la demostración del mundo exterior a nuestras mentes. En ella rescatamos la distinción entre proposiciones marco y proposiciones epistémicas. En segundo lugar, presentamos una forma de aplicación de esta distinción para la filosofía de la ciencia. Específicamente, nos permitirá describir qué distingue a la ciencia de cualquier otro sistema de creencias. La tesis central detrás de esta (...) distinción es que la racionalidad científica, a diferencia de la tradición, pseudociencia y superstición, busca reducir el número de proposiciones marco o, idealmente, no aumentarlas. (shrink)

RESUMEN Los estudios actuales sobre la mentira priman su lado epistémico y desatienden los aspectos morales. Tal distinción es clara en los intentos de diferenciar la mentira de la intención de engañar, y tienen como contrapartida una concepción de la verdad realista. Por ello, las interpretaciones que cuestionan o minimizan la existencia de la Verdad tienden a ser rechazadas, y parece que tampoco podrían abordar satisfactoriamente la mentira. En este artículo cuestionaremos dicha asunción, mostrando cómo un autor del Renacimiento, Michel (...) de Montaigne, sostiene una perspectiva "negadora" de la verdad y critica la mentira, precisamente destacando su dimensión moral. ABSTRACT Current studies on lying emphasize its epistemic side and neglect the moral aspects. Such a distinction is clear in the attempts to distinguish lying from the intention to deceive and has as a counterpart a realistic conception of truth. Therefore, interpretations that question the existence of truth, or that minimize it, tend to be rejected, and it seems that they could not satisfactorily address the lie either. In this article we will question this assumption, showing how a Renaissance author, Michel de Montaigne, maintains a "denying" perspective of truth while criticizing the lie, precisely by highlighting its moral dimension. (shrink)

Resumen Ante el dilema de si la Lógica de Hegel debe entenderse como una ontología o como una continuación del proyecto kantiano de la lógica trascendental, el artículo sostiene que no es propiamente una ontología, ni un análisis de conceptos y categorías subjetivas. Su vocación metafísica se basa en el postulado según el cual la reflexión del pensamiento sobre sí mismo tiene consecuencias para la comprensión del ser de lo que no es pensamiento, de modo que resulta ser un proyecto (...) novedoso de ontología mediada por la autorreflexión del pensar.This text faces the dilemma whether Hegel’s Logic must be understood as ontology or as continuation of the Kantian project of transcendental logics. It upholds the thesis that Hegel’s Logic is not properly an Ontology -a direct and immediate description of object’s immanent way of being- nor an analysis of merely subjective concepts and categories. The metaphysical vocation of Hegel’s Logic draws rather on the claim that thought’s self-reflection has necessarily consequences for the comprehension of the being of all that is not thought. Hence, we are facing a groundbreaking project of an ontology that is mediated by thought’s self-reflection. (shrink)

ObjectivesThe aims of this research were to compare the levels of physical activity of eHealth users and non-users, to determine the effects of these technologies on motivations, and to establish the relationship that could exist between psychological constructs and physical activity behaviors.MethodsThis cross-sectional study involved 569 adults who responded to an online questionnaire during confinement in France. The questions assessed demographics, usage of eHealth for exercise and physical activity, and behavioral levels. The questionnaire also measured the constructs of Social Cognitive (...) Theory, the Theory of Planned Behavior, and automaticity facets toward eHealth for exercise and physical activity.ResultsParticipants who were users of eHealth for exercise and physical activity presented significantly higher levels of vigorous physical activity and total physical activity per week than non-users. The chi-square test showed significant interactions between psychological constructs toward eHealth and physical activity levels. Self-efficacy was significantly and negatively correlated with walking time per week. Concerning the automaticity facets, efficiency was positive and significantly correlated with vigorous physical activity levels per week. Then, regressions analyses showed that self-efficacy and automaticity efficiency explained 5% of the variance of walking minutes per week and vigorous physical activity per week, respectively.ConclusionThis study has shown that people during confinement looked for ways to stay active through eHealth. However, we must put any technological solution into perspective. The eHealth offers possibilities to stay active, however its benefits and the psychological mechanisms affected by it remains to be demonstrated: eHealth could be adapted to each person and context. (shrink)

Burnout is characterized by emotional exhaustion and caused by exposure to excessive and prolonged stress related to job conditions. Moreover, burnout is highly prevalent among health care professionals. The aim of this study is, first, to examine the mediating role of social support over the effect of burnout in health care professionals and, second, to explore potential gender differences. A convenience sample of 1,035 health professionals from Ecuador, including 608 physicians and 427 nurses, was surveyed using the Maslach Burnout Inventory, (...) Social Support Survey, and General Health Questionnaire as measures of burnout, social support, and general health, respectively. Social support was found to mediate the negative effects of burnout on health regardless of gender. Differences across the three dimensions of burnout and health are further discussed, along with their implications for designing effective burnout interventions for health care professionals in Ecuador. (shrink)

This bulletin contains a summary of the main topics of discussion in truthmaker theory, namely: the definition of truthmakers, problems with Truthmaker Necessitarianism and Truthmaker Maximalism, the ontological burden of truthmakers and the recalcitrant topic of truthmakers for negative truths.

El objetivo del escrito consiste en mostrar una interpretación del Discurso a partir de la lectura realizada por Descartes en los Principia y, más exactamente, en la “Carta-prefacio” a la traducción francesa. Esta interpretación sostiene que el texto que la tradición filosófica ha conocido como Discurso se trata de dos métodos estrechamente unidos o de un método que comprende las partes segunda y tercera. Para demostrar lo anterior, el texto se divide en tres acápites. El primero está dedicado a observar (...) la categoría de integralidad que parece exigirse de quien aspire a transitar los caminos del saber. El segundo asiste al examen de los métodos (o conjunto de preceptos) teórico y ético. El último muestra los resultados (las certezas) que se obtienen de la aplicación de cada uno de los métodos. (shrink)

In this paper I undermine the Entailment Principle according to which if an entity is a truthmaker for a certain proposition and this proposition entails another, then the entity in question is a truthmaker for the latter proposition. I argue that the two most promising versions of the principle entail the popular but false Conjunction Thesis, namely that a truthmaker for a conjunction is a truthmaker for its conjuncts. One promising version of the principle understands entailment as strict implication but (...) restricts the field of application of the principle to purely contingent truths (i.e. those that contain no necessary proposition at any level of analysis). But a conjunction of purely contingent truths strictly implies its conjuncts. So this version of the principle is committed to the Conjunction Thesis. The same is true of the version of the principle where entailment is understood in the sense of systems T, R, and E of relevant logic, since in these systems conjunctions entail their conjuncts. I argue that the Conjunction Thesis is false because a truthmaker is that in virtue of what a certain proposition is true and it is false that, for example, what the proposition that Peter is a man is true in virtue of is the conjunctive fact that Peter is man and Saturn is a planet (or the facts that Peter is a man and that Saturn is a planet taken together). I also argue against other versions of the principle. (shrink)

In this article I address the Problem of Universals by answering questions about what facts a solution to the Problem of Universals should explain and how the explanation should go. I argue that a solution to the Problem of Universals explains the facts the Problem of Universals is about by giving the truthmakers (as opposed to the conceptual content and the ontological commitments) of the sentences stating those facts. I argue that the sentences stating the relevant facts are those like (...) 'a has the property F', that is, sentences stating that a particular has a certain property. Finally I show how answering these questions in this way transforms the Problem of Universals, traditionally conceived as the One over Many, that is, the problem of explaining how different particulars can have the same properties, into the Many over One, that is, the problem of explaining how the same particular can have different properties. The Problem of Universals is the problem of the Many over One. (shrink)

Peter Milne has tried to refure Truthmaker Maximalism. the thesis that every truth has a truthmaker, by producing a simple and direct counterexample to it, the sentence M: This sentence has no truthmaker. I argue that, contrary to what Milne argues, on Truthmaker Maximalism M is equivalent to the Liar, which gives the truthmaker maximalist a way to defend his position from Milne's counterexample: to argue that M expresses no proposition.

Jamin Asay’s A Theory of Truthmaking is one of the most important books on truthmaking, full of important ideas from beginning to end. One of the most interesting parts of the book is Asay's attack on the explanation-first truthmaking. Explanation-first truthmaking is the explanatory project of explaining why truths are true. This is in contrast with ontology-first truthmaking, the project defended by Asay, and which is the project of answering the fundamental ontological question “What is there?”. Asay thinks explanation-first truthmaking (...) should be abandoned because it is problematic and it offers no benefits over those of ontology-first truthmaking. In this brief paper, I argue that he has not established the problematicity of explanation-first truthmaking, and that explanation-first truthmaking offers benefits over ontology-first truthmaking. (shrink)

Esta ponencia presenta un avance parcial de la investigación sobre la democracia en los municipios colombianos desde la adopción de la elección popular de los alcaldes. A partir de una conceptualización básica y operacional de la democracia se determinan sus principales dimensiones y se presentan los resultados obtenidos para algunas variables significativas que se han procesado, aplicando técnicas de análisis multivariado. El objetivo final (aún en elaboración) es generar un índice de calidad democrática que permita comparar y explicar los avances (...) y retrocesos de la democracia en los muy diversos municipios colombianos. (shrink)

In this note we shall argue that Milne’s new effort does not refute Truthmaker Maximalism. According to Truthmaker Maximalism, every truth has a truthmaker. Milne has attempted to refute it using the following self-referential sentence M: This sentence has no truthmaker. Essential to his refutation is that M is like the Gödel sentence and unlike the Liar, and one way in which Milne supports this assimilation is through the claim that his proof is essentially object-level and not semantic. In Section (...) 2, we shall argue that Milne is still begging the question against Truthmaker Maximalism. In Section 3, we shall argue that even assimilating M to the Liar does not force the truthmaker maximalist to maintain the ‘dull option’ that M does not express a proposition. There are other options open and, though they imply revising the logic in Milne’s reasoning, this is not one of the possible revisions he considers. In Section 4, we shall suggest that Milne’s proof requires an implicit appeal to semantic principles and notions. In Section 5, we shall point out that there are two important dissimilarities between M and the Gödel sentence. Section 6 is a brief summary and conclusion. (shrink)

The object of this paper is to provide a solution to Nelson Goodman’s Imperfect Community difficulty as it arises for Resemblance Nominalism, the view that properties are classes of resembling particulars. The Imperfect Community difficulty consists in that every two members of a class resembling each other is not sufficient for it to be a class such that there is some property common to all their members, even if ‘x resembles y’ is understood as ‘x and y share some property’. (...) In the paper I explain and criticise several solutions to the difficulty. Then I develop my own solution, which is not subject to the objections I make to the other solutions, and which accords completely with the basic tenets of Resemblance Nominalism. (shrink)

Bertrand Russell argued that any attempt to get rid of universals in favor of resemblances fails. He argued that no resemblance theory could avoid postulating a universal of resemblance without falling prey to a vicious infinite regress. He added that admitting such a universal of resemblance made it pointless to avoid other universals. In this paper I defend resemblance nominalism from both of Russell's points by arguing that (a) resemblance nominalism can avoid the postulation of a universal of resemblance without (...) falling into a vicious infinite regress, and (b) even if resemblance nominalism had to admit a universal of resemblance, this would not make it pointless to avoid postulating other universals. (shrink)

Peter van Inwagen has given an answer to the question ‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’. His answer is: Because there being nothing is as improbable as anything can be: it has probability 0. Here I shall examine his argument for this answer and I shall argue that it does not work because no good reasons have been given for two of the argument’s premises and that the conclusion of the argument does not constitute an answer to the question (...) van Inwagen wanted to answer. (shrink)

Today the definition of Spain as a national, historical and sovereign entity is in crisis. This situation has been reached because the Spanish left has assumed as its own many of the ideas about the concept of the Spanish nation of peripheral nationalisms. In this article we try to discover the causes of this identification through the study of the propaganda texts that the opposition to the Franco regime had on the national concept, rescued in the rulings of the Public (...) Order Court. In them we will observe how the opposition to Francoism in the Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia and the Canary Islands mixed Marxist and nationalist ideologies in their messages, but with great fundamental differences in each of these regions. Furthermore, we certify that the "Burgos Process" was the turning point that cemented the identification of the Spanish left throughout the country with the nationalist movements. (shrink)

What I call the argument from almost indiscernibles is an argument, put forward by Robert Adams in 1979, for the possibility of indiscernibles based on the possibility of almost indiscernibles. The argument is that if almost indiscernibles are possible, indiscernibles are possible, but since almost indiscernible are possible, indiscernibles are possible. The argument seems to be an improvement over the mere appeal to intuitions, like that suggested by Max Black, that situations in which there are indiscernibles are possible, for the (...) argument purports to give us a reason that indiscernibles are possible. In this paper I shall assess the argument by examining whether there is support for the conditional premise that if almost indiscernibles are possible, indiscernibles are possible. I shall argue that there are reasons to think that either the premise lacks support or almost indiscernibles are dispensable. If the premise lacks support, the argument does not establish the possibility of almost indiscernibles; if almost indiscernibles are dispensable, the argument is not needed to establish the possibility of indiscernibles. (shrink)

In my book *Resemblance Nominalism* I argued that the truthmakers of ´a and b resemble each other´ are just a and b. In his "Resemblance Nominalism and counterparts" Alexander Bird objects to my claim that the truthmakers of ´a and b resemble each other´ are just a and b. In this paper I respond to Bird´s objections.

In this paper I argue, contra Fraser MacBride, that conceptual analysis, and in particular the distinction between numerical and qualitative identity, can solve the Problem of Universals, whether understood as the One over Many or the as the Many over One. In this paper I show why the solutions needed to solve either version of the problem must be in terms of truthmakers, and that the distinction between numerical and qualitative identity is not sufficient to solve them.

Stephen Mumford's new book is a comprehensive study and discussion of a perennial philosophical topic: nothing, or what does not exist, or non-being. The variet.

Are the categorical laws of ontology metaphysically contingent? I do not intend to give a full answer to this question in this paper. But I shall give a partial answer to it. In particular, Gideon Rosen, in his article “The Limits of Contingency”, has distinguished a certain conception of metaphysical necessity, which he calls the Non-Standard conception, which, together with the assumption that all natures or essences are Kantian, is supposed to entail that many laws of ontology are metaphysically contingent. (...) Now, the argument Rosen gives supports the conclusion that all categorical laws of ontology are contingent. I shall argue that the Non-Standard conception and the thesis that all natures are Kantian are incompatible with each other and that, if the Non-Standard conception is true, there must be at least one metaphysically necessary categorical law of ontology, and I shall identify such a law. Thus my contribution to the question of the title of the paper will be that not all categorical ontological laws can be contingent if the Non-Standard conception is true. (shrink)

In pages 3005, 3006 and 3019, there is a sentence that begins: “If the premise lacks support, the argument does not establish the possibility of almost indiscernibles…”.

This note argues that research in Analytical Philosophy broadly conceived should be published exclusively in English. Reasons are given for this and the thesis is defended from eleven objections.

Resumen: Este ensayo analizará el libro Rompan Filas de Bruno Vidal desde tres líneas de sentido, la alegoría, la heteroglosia y el giro subjetivo para definir el vaivén entre lo testimonial y lo poético, la contradicción. Este aspecto central de este trabajo se desprenderá desde la alegoría del horror como elemento problematizador de lo narrable de las experiencias traumáticas; la refracción de voces conduce a una heteroglosia que lleva consigo una responsabilidad como ética del texto; por último, el filtro prerrogativo (...) intentará sostener el intersticio entre recordar y olvidar, entre lo documental y lo ficcional.: This test will analyze the book Rompan Filas of Bruno Vidal from three lines of sense, the allegory, the heteroglossia and the subjective draft to define the sway between the nominal thing and the poetical thing, the contradiction. This central aspect of this work will part from the allegory of horror as a problematizing element of the narrativity of traumatic experiences; the refraction of voices leads to heteroglossia, which carries a responsibility as ethics of the text; finally, the prerogative filter will try to support the interstice between remembering and forgetting, between documentary and ficcional aspects. (shrink)

El presente trabajo analiza el libro Guión de Héctor Hernández Montecinos desde las perspectivas de flujo y de profanación para dar a conocer un tipo de producción poética que tensiona un problema del lenguaje: si el lenguaje es o no una representación de un sujeto que se asume en la escritura. Para este caso se postula que el sujeto que habla no se representa en el lenguaje. Lo que hay en esta lectura son solo residuos o devenires ficcionales de un (...) posible sujeto que se profana en el lenguaje. Por lo anterior, este lenguaje poético está expuesto como delirios mentales para hablar sobre poesía, historia y modos de entender la realidad. This paper analyzes Guión from the perspectives of flow and defilement to provide a kind of poetic production that stresses a problem of language: if the language is or is not a representation of a subject that is assumed in writing. For this case, it is postulated that the speaking subject is not represented in the language. What is in this reading are only residuals, or fictional becomings of a possible subject that is profaned in language. Therefore, this poetic language is exposed as mental delusions to speak about poetry, history and ways of understanding reality. (shrink)

The Gamer's Dilemma challenges us to find a distinction between virtual murder and virtual pedophilia. Without such a distinction, we are forced to conclude that either both are morally acceptable or that both should be morally illicit. This paper argues that the best way to solve the dilemma is, in one sense, to dissolve it. The Gamer's Dilemma rests on a misunderstanding in the sense that it does not distinguish between the form of a simulation and its surface content. A (...) greater appreciation of the way structural features of a simulation affect subject experience will help us see why only simulations of murder and pedophilia generating virtually real experiences are likely to be seen as wrong. I argue that a simulation’s structural elements powerfully affect how subjects experience simulated content and hence is an important, and previously neglected, variable necessary to dissolve the Gamer's Dilemma. Properly understood, virtually real simulations of murder and pedophilia are both likely to be treated by players as morally wrong. Similarly, virtually unreal murder and pedophilia will be less likely to be judged as wrong. Subject judgments are thus consistent once a simulation’s structural variables are accounted for. The Gamer's Dilemma dissolves as a dilemma once we acknowledge these structural features of simulations and how they affect experience and moral judgment. (shrink)

I argue that psychopathy undermines three common assumptions typically invoked in favor of moderate reasons responsive theories of moral responsibility. First, I propose a theory of psychopathic agency and claim that psychopathic agency suggests that the systems underlying receptivity to reason bifurcate into at least two sub-systems of receptivity. Next, I claim that the bifurcation of systems for receptivity suggests that reactivity is not “all of a piece” but that it too decomposes into at least two subsystems. Lastly, I argue (...) that prior attempts by Fischer and Ravizza to address these concerns contain an appeal to internalism. Since Fischer and Ravizza want their theory to remain agnostic about the nature of reasons for action, this appeal to internalism is problematic for their view. I close by suggesting that if we are to make sense of when and why psychopaths are responsible then a mechanism-based theory of responsibility must be able to explain how different systems of receptivity and reactivity come together to constitute a single mechanism that grounds responsibility ascriptions for action and they must do so without tacitly appealing to implausible forms of internalism about reasons for action. (shrink)

El presente trabajo propone determinadas aproximaciones iusfilosóficas al discurso jurídico, a partir de los estudios realizados por Walter Benjamin sobre Franz Kafka. La investigación se realiza con las herramientas metodológicas que aportan las “teorías críticas del derecho” y los marcos teóricos que indagan la relación “derecho-literatura”. Los textos, discusiones y apuntes realizados por el pensador alemán permiten movilizar un análisis de determinados tópicos y categorías pertenecientes al espacio jurídico. Las investigaciones que realiza en torno a la figura de Kafka ofrecen (...) insumos para indagar la formación, despliegue y conservación del derecho. Desde la obra kafkiana, Benjamin visibiliza y desarticula los conceptos nodales de justicia, ley, poder y violencia, lo que permite dar cuenta de los mecanismos y dispositivos que hacen posible el sustento mitológico del derecho. (shrink)

This essay aims to show that the nations of Central America must create access to safe and legal abortion as well as promote a political dialogue on the subject that is based on reason and science, rather than religion. Not only does prohibiting abortion constitute a violation of women's human rights, but, based on international human rights law as well as the minimum duties of civil ethics, failing in to provide such access or dialogue would mean failing to meet the (...) standards of a legitimate democratic state. (shrink)

This text has already been published in Time & Society, 2016, Vol. 25, pp. 613-633. We thank Gonzalo Iparraguirre for the permission to republish it here.: This article presents the introduction and the update of an ethnographic research on temporality among indigenous groups, published in 2011 in its full version as a book in Spanish. It seeks to prove the usefulness of the conceptual distinction between time, defined as the phenomenon of becoming in itself, and - Anthropologie – Nouvel (...) article. (shrink)

There is a long-standing discussion concerning the nature of moral discourse. Multiple views range from realism—according to which moral discourse is closer to scientific discourse than to fictional discourse—to anti-realism—according to which moral discourse is rather closer to fictional discourse. In this paper, I want to motivate a novel anti-realist account. On this view, there are no moral properties or truths, neither mind-independent nor mind-dependent ones (i.e., anti-realism). However, moral cognition results from the use of higher order cognitive abilities with (...) enough resources to grant moral discourse with all the features of a realist talk (i.e., cognitive quasi-realism). I defend this view based on empirical evidence on human moral development and by showing that the resulting account can meet the demands of robust moral realism. The paper concludes by placing the proposed view within the metaethical landscape by comparing it against other forms of anti-realism, most significantly against expressivism. (shrink)

It is often said in physics that if two models of a theory are related by a symmetry, then the two models provide (or could provide) two different representations of the very same situation, alike the case of two maps of different color for the very same city. It is also said that the situations represented by two models of a theory are indiscernible in some ways when the models in question are related by a symmetry of the theory, just (...) like the situation in the interior of the cabin of a train when the train is at rest in the station is empirically indiscernible from the situation in the interior when the train is moving uniformly (in classical mechanics, these two situations are represented by two models related by a boost). In recent years, philosophers of physics have focused a lot of attention in developing various principles that aim to elucidate these and similar remarks on symmetries, models, physical equivalence, and representation that are widespread in physics practice. The goal of the current article is to provide a critical review of these principles, and suggest a new framework for thinking about these kinds of questions. One important upshot of the paper is that questions of indiscernibility, and questions of the representational capacity of models, must be distinguished from one another. (shrink)

Imagine that we are on a train playing with some mechanical systems. Why can’t we detect any differences in their behavior when the train is parked versus when it is moving uniformly? The standard answer is that boosts are symmetries of Newtonian systems. In this paper, I use the case of a spring to argue that this answer is problematic because symmetries are neither sufficient nor necessary for preserving its behavior. I also develop a new answer according to which boosts (...) preserve the relational properties on which the behavior of a system depends, even when they are not symmetries. (shrink)