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Hannah Tierney
University of California, Davis
  1.  69
    Quality of Reasons and Degrees of Responsibility.Hannah Tierney - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):661-672.
    Traditionally, theories of moral responsibility feature only the minimally sufficient conditions for moral responsibility. While these theories are well-suited to account for the threshold of responsibility, it’s less clear how they can address questions about the degree to which agents are responsible. One feature that intuitively affects the degree to which agents are morally responsible is how difficult performing a given action is for them. Recently, philosophers have begun to develop accounts of scalar moral responsibility that make use of this (...)
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  2. Desperately Seeking Sourcehood.Hannah Tierney & David Glick - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):953-970.
    In a recent essay, Deery and Nahmias :1255–1276, 2017) utilize interventionism about causation to develop an account of causal sourcehood in order to defend compatibilism about free will and moral responsibility from manipulation arguments. In this paper, we criticize Deery and Nahmias’s analysis of sourcehood by drawing a distinction between two forms of causal invariance that can come into conflict on their account. We conclude that any attempt to resolve this conflict will either result in counterintuitive attributions of moral responsibility (...)
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  3.  95
    Keith Lehrer on the Basing Relation.Hannah Tierney & Nicholas D. Smith - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (1):27-36.
    In this paper, we review Keith Lehrer’s account of the basing relation, with particular attention to the two cases he offered in support of his theory, Raco (Lehrer, Theory of knowledge, 1990; Theory of knowledge, (2nd ed.), 2000) and the earlier case of the superstitious lawyer (Lehrer, The Journal of Philosophy, 68, 311–313, 1971). We show that Lehrer’s examples succeed in making his case that beliefs need not be based on the evidence, in order to be justified. These cases show (...)
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  4.  78
    A Maneuver Around the Modified Manipulation Argument.Hannah Tierney - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):753-763.
    In the recent article “A new approach to manipulation arguments,” Patrick Todd seeks to reframe a common incompatibilist form of argument often leveraged against compatibilist theories of moral responsibility. Known as manipulation arguments, these objections rely on cases in which agents, though they have met standard compatibilist conditions for responsibility, have been manipulated in such a way that they fail to be blameworthy for their behavior. Traditionally, in order to get a manipulation argument off the ground, an incompatibilist must illustrate (...)
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  5. How Many of Us Are There?Hannah Tierney, Chris Howard, Victor Kumar, Trevor Kvaran & Shaun Nichols - 2014 - In Justin Sytsma (ed.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Mind. Continuum Press.
  6.  94
    Nonconciliation in Peer Disagreement: Its Phenomenology and Its Rationality.David Henderson, Terry Horgan, Matjaz Potrc & Hannah Tierney - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (1-2):194-225.
    The authors argue in favor of the “nonconciliation” (or “steadfast”) position concerning the problem of peer disagreement. Throughout the paper they place heavy emphasis on matters of phenomenology—on how things seem epistemically with respect to the net import of one’s available evidence vis-à-vis the disputed claim p, and on how such phenomenology is affected by the awareness that an interlocutor whom one initially regards as an epistemic peer disagrees with oneself about p. Central to the argument is a nested goal/sub-goal (...)
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  7.  33
    Tackling It Head On: How Best to Handle the Modified Manipulation Argument.Hannah Tierney - 2014 - Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (4):663-675.
    IntroductionPatrick Todd’s article, “A New Approach to Manipulation Arguments,” has spurred considerable discussion in the literature.Patrick Todd, “A New Approach to Manipulation Arguments,” Philosophical Studies, Vol. 153, No. 1, , pp. 127–133. In his essay, Todd attempts to reframe how manipulation arguments function dialectically. These arguments, often presented by incompatibilists, typically rely on cases in which agents, though they have met a number of compatibilist sufficient conditions for responsibility, have been manipulated such that they intuitively fail to be blameworthy for (...)
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  8.  2
    Defusing Existential and Universal Threats to Compatibilism: A Strawsonian Dilemma for Manipulation Arguments.Andrew James Latham & Hannah Tierney - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.
    Many manipulation arguments against compatibilism rely on the claim that manipulation is relevantly similar to determinism. But we argue that manipulation is nothing like determinism in one relevant respect. Determinism is a “universal” phenomenon: its scope includes every feature of the universe. But manipulation arguments feature cases where an agent is the only manipulated individual in her universe. Call manipulation whose scope includes at least one but not all agents “existential manipulation.” Our responsibility practices are impacted in different ways by (...)
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  9.  51
    The Comparative Nonarbitrariness Norm of Blame.Daniel Telech & Hannah Tierney - 2019 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 16 (1).
    Much has been written about the fittingness, epistemic, and standing norms that govern blame. In this paper, we argue that there exists a norm of blame that has yet to receive philosophical discussion and without which an account of the ethics of blame will be incomplete: a norm proscribing comparatively arbitrary blame. By reflecting on the objectionableness of comparatively arbitrary blame, we stand to elucidate a substantive, and thus far overlooked, norm governing our attributions of responsibility. Accordingly, our aim in (...)
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  10.  48
    A Pilgrimage Through John Martin Fischer’s Deep Control: Essays on Free Will and Value.Hannah Tierney - 2016 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 10 (1):179-196.
    John Martin Fischer’s most recent collection of essays, Deep Control: Essays on Free Will and Value, is both incredibly wide-ranging and impressively detailed. Fischer manages to cover a staggering amount of ground in the free will debate, while also providing insightful and articulate analyses of many of the positions defended in the field. In this collection, Fischer focuses on the relationship between free will and moral responsibility. In the first section of his book, Fischer defends Frankfurt cases as an important (...)
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  11.  2
    Expanding Moral Understanding.Hannah Tierney - 2019 - Australasian Philosophical Review 3 (3):318-323.
    ABSTRACT In ‘Forgiveness: An Ordered Pluralism,’ Fricker argues that the function of forgiveness is to liberate the forgiver from redundant blame-feeling. Blame is rendered redundant when it no longer serves its purpose, so to understand the function of forgiveness, we must understand the function of blame. For Fricker, the paradigmatic function of Communicative Blame is to align the moral understandings of wrongdoers and their victims, which is accomplished by wrongdoers coming to feel remorse. In this paper, I argue that Fricker (...)
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  12.  91
    Hypercrisy and Standing to Self-Blame.Hannah Tierney - forthcoming - Analysis.
    Lippert-Rasmussen (2020) argues that the moral equality account of the hypocrite’s lack of standing to blame fails. To object to this account, Lippert-Rasmussen considers the contrary of hypocrisy: hypercrisy. In this article, I show that if hypercrisy is a problem for the moral equality account, it is also a problem for Lippert-Rasmussen’s own account of why hypocrites lack standing to blame. I then reflect on the hypocrite’s and hypercrite’s standing to self-blame, which reveals that the challenge hypercrisy poses for accounts (...)
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  13.  29
    Ways to Be Blameworthy: Rightness, Wrongness, and Responsibility: Mason, Elinor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019, Pp. Viii + 237, £50 (Hardback).Hannah Tierney - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (3):628-628.
    In her rich and engaging new book, Elinor Mason argues that blameworthiness has three varieties—ordinary, detached, and extended—each of which corresponds to a distinct way of acting wrongly. In ex...
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