My subject on this occasion goes uneasily with my piety. Lordship did not as such much interest my teachers William E. Lunt and Joseph R. Strayer, who were leaders in their turn of the Medieval Academy of America. In their presidential addresses of 1954 and 1968 both scholars dealt magisterially with subjects each had studied for forty years. Lunt spoke on financial relations of the papacy with England, Strayer on the place of Normandy and Languedoc in the building (...) of an administrative monarchy in France. It is easy to see that in a considerable sense both historians were working on medieval government, and it is some measure of their achievement that even today no one wishing to be informed in this grand subject can do much better than read Lunt and Strayer. I wish I could discourse on my own years of research as did those admirable scholars. If I cannot, it is not simply because I lack the accumulated erudition to reflect summarily on my work; it is also because I lack the conceptual serenity of my teachers in our common subject matter. Like Lunt and Strayer I have worked on justice, finance, and the beginnings of parliamentary life in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries; unlike those mentors I became uneasy about the paradigm in which these studies were framed. I came to wonder how Strayer could have held students, myself included, spellbound with details about the deportment of judges or sergeants while saying nothing about the adequacy of concepts like “government” or “administration” to describe such behavior. Believing there was something timeless about the action of people in power, he was gifted at evoking the ways of modern bureaucrats in those “corridors of power” he knew from his own experience in Washington. He assumed with other historians of his day and ours that all societies have governments, so that he could speak of feudalism as essentially a “method of government,” of “political organization … reduced to the simplest possible terms.”. (shrink)

This paper examines two realisations of the television talk show in North America: The Oprah Winfrey Show and Dr. Phil, looking specifically at how they function within the sub-genre of ‘therapeutic talk show’ in keeping with Livingstone and Lunt’s (1994) classification of talk shows. Talk shows are defined by Ilie (2001) as “semi-institutional discourse” having features of a given setting (TV studio), topic- and goal-oriented talk, high degree of topic control, as well as restrictions on time and turn-taking. Theorists (...) examining this sub-genre of therapeutic talk show have argued that it provides a valuable means by which stories otherwise unrecognized have a forum, or that values of truth and honesty can be conveyed (Livingstone & Lunt 1994; Masciarotte 1991; Carbaugh 1988). However, theorists such as Abt and Seesholtz (1994) view therapeutic talk shows as potentially demeaning to guests who appear on them as well as a means by which suffering can be trivialized. Through an examination and analysis of requests for information, both direct and indirect, which are the principal features of all interviews, I look at how Oprah Winfrey and Dr. Phil problematize the narratives told by their guests. Both hosts rely heavily on one type of request, B-Event assertions functioning as indirect requests for information, to provoke specific response. My findings indicate that these talk shows do not in fact provide a forum for talk that would otherwise not be considered as suggested by Livingstone and Lunt (1994). Both Oprah Winfrey and Dr. Phil appropriate the stories provided by their guests; they also participate in their own overarching meta-narrative whereby as ‘heroes’ they solve their guests’ problems within a given time frame. Guests’ narrative responses share more with the speech act of confession than with free self-expression. The speech act of confession encouraged by these therapeutic talk shows serves in turn to reinforce conservatively-held values on the part of the at-home audience for whom such confession is also entertainment. (shrink)

Atheism; faith; religion and reason; God; proof; philosophy, modern; 20th century.

In rhetoric, an orator needs both a large vocabulary and a stock of commonplaces and arguments. Erasmus put them together in his De duplici copia verborum ac rerum . In this sixth volume of the first Ordo of the Amsterdam edition of the Latin texts of Erasmus, Betty Knott has edited the Latin text and added an English introduction and commentary, providing philological and historical information which helps the reader to understand the text and identify its sources.

Ghazzālī, 1058-1111; Kīmiyā-yi saʻādat -Criticism and interpretation ; Ghazzālī, Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad, -1126; Savāniḥ -Criticism and interpretation ; Ghazzālī, Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad, -1126; Baḥr al-muḥabbat fī asrār al-muvaddat fītafsīr Sūrah-i Yūsuf -Criticism.

On essence of Mādhyamika philosophy by Lcaṅ-skya II Rol-paʼi-rdo-rje, 1717-1786 and commentaries by Dkon-mchog-ʼjigs-med-dbang-po, Khri-chen-bstan-pa-rab-rgya, and Dalai Lama XIV Bstan-ʼdzin-rgya-mtsho, 1935-.

Collected works of Rol-paʼi-rdo-rje on the doctrines of Dge-lugs-pa (Sect) and Buddhist philosophy.

On Islamic practices, doctrines and on Islamic ethics.