The idea of rejection of some sentences on the basis of others comes from Aristotle, as Jan Łukasiewicz states in his studies on Aristotle's syllogistic [1939, 1951], concerning rejection of the false syllogistic form and those on certain calculus of propositions. Short historical remarks on the origin and development of the notion of a rejected sentence, introduced into logic by Jan Łukasiewicz, are contained in the Introduction of this paper. This paper is to a considerable extent a summary of papers (...) which are not easily available, even to the Polish reader: (1) J. Słupecki, Funkcja Łukasiewicza (Łukasiewicz’s function), Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Seria B, nr 3 (1959), 33-40; (2) U. Wybraniec-Skardowska, Teoria zdań odrzuconych (Theory of Rejected Sentences), (doctoral dissertation under the supervision of Jerzy Słupecki, published as a monograph), Zeszyty Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej w Opolu, Studia i Monografie, Nr 22 (1969), 5-131; (3) G. Bryll, Kilka uzupełnień teorii zdań odrzuconych (Some supplements to the theory of rejcted sentences), Zeszyty Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej w Opolu, Studia i Mnografie, Nr 22 (1969), 153-154. The paper also contains a good number of results which have not been published yet. Chapter I contains results presented in the papers (1)-(3). It provides an extension of Alfred Tarski’s theory of deductive systems presented by him in the papers [1930]: Fundamentale Begriffe der Methodologie der deduktiven Wssenschaften, I and Über einige fundamentale Begriffe der Metamathematik. The enriched theory is marked with T. The most essential new concept in T is the function Cn-1, whose definition was given by Słupecki in (1) on the basis of the so-called Tarski’s general theory of deductive systems. It has the form: y e Cn-1X iff Ex e X (x e Cn {y}), where Cn is Tarski’s consequence operation. In accordance with the definition: A sentence y is rejected on the basis of the sentences of the set X iff at least one of sentences of X is a consequence of y (is deducible from y). The intuitive meaning of the rejection function Cn-1: on the basis of false sentences we can reject false sentences only (while by means of the consequence operation Cn on the basis of true sentences we can deduce true sentences only). The function Cn-1 is a generalization of the notion of rejected sentences which was introduced into logic by Łukasiewicz. The essential property of the rejection function Cn-1 is that it satisfies the axioms of general Tarski’s consequence Cn, so it is a consequence operation, called the rejection consequence. In addition, it is an additive and normal operation. In Chapter I, there are given notions analogous to those of the theory of deductive systems, but they are written down by means of the symbol ‘Cn-1’ and not ‘Cn’. There are established the properties of introduced notions and differences and analogies taking place between them and properties of respective notions of the theory T. There are also given generalizations of the notions of ‘decidable system’ and ‘consistent system’ used by Łukasiewicz. The short Chapter II contains axioms of the system T’ which is equivalent to the system T. The only difference between sets of primitive notions of these systems consists in the appearance of the function Cn-1 in the system T’ instead of the function Cn. This chapter reproduces the results given in (2), but they are partially simplified. (shrink)

Jerzy Franczak comprehensively presents Jacques Rancière's thought by emphasizing the relations between politics and literature. The detailed analysis considers the context of modern aesthetics and political philosophy, which is why the book introduces further protagonists, such as Louis Althusser, Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu, or Jean-François Lyotard. Franczak first reconstructs Rancière's original philosophy of literature so as to then immediately apply it in readings of select world literature masterpieces by Gustav Flaubert, Max Jacob, Bertold Brecht, Vladimir Nabokov, and Philip Roth.

Прототетика Ст. Лесневского является обобщением двузначного исчисления предложений. Выступают в ней рядом с терминами этого исчисления функторы (как постоянные так и переменные) всех тех семантических категорий какие могут быть определены, когда точкой исхода является категсрия предложений.В этом труде представлены три системы прототетики. Основным термином двух из них является импликация, ссновным термином третьей системы эквивалентность. Системы с основным термином импликации разнятся гравилами вывода. В одной из них действует так наз. правило проверки, в другой прабило зкстенсиональности. Первое из этих правил является обобщением (...) следующего правила вывода исчисления предложений, обогащенного тєрминами 0 и 1:Вь'ражение ϕ является тезисом системы, когда тезисами системы являются оба выражения возникнувшие из ϕ через подстановку некоторой его переменной символов 0 и 1.На основании правила экстенсиональности тезисами системы являются правила экстенсиональности сформулированные для функторов любых семантических категсрий свойственных грототетике.В этом труде даются доказательства эквивалентности трех систем протстетики и доказательство их полноты.Значительная часть результатов из опытов Лесневского, представленных в этом труде, не была до сих пор опубликована. Обрабатывая эти результаты я пользовался записками составленными по лекциях Лесневского, его учениками. Оригинальные записки Лесневского подвєрглись уничтожению во еремя варшавского восстания. (shrink)

Jerzy Perzanowski s ideas were based on an original blend of logic and ontology in what he called onto/logic, where the slash is meant to suggest a quotient of ontology by logic. Perzanowski began as a logician, his early works being on modal logic, then gradually shifted his interest to logical philosophy, meaning not so much philosophy of logic as philosophy informed by logic. Perzanowski was a rare breed of analytical philosopher who thought that a philosophical theory of everything (...) was worthwhile. In this systematic spirit, he began with method. He presented his method of total analysis and synthesis quite simply: reduce the object of research to its simplest possible constituents, and then combine them in some way. Better still, combine them in every possible way, thereby producing a space of possibilities analogous to (and in certain cases identical with) the logical space. Thus, analysis and synthesis differ from a trivial disassembly and reassembly.". (shrink)

Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution by means of natural selection finds application far outside biology, for which it was originally invented. Its consequences for science proved far-going, influencing practically every field from thermodynamics to the humanities. While acting on biological systems, the Darwinian mechanism is a source of progress and the local-scale abandonment of the universe’s general tendency towards chaos. However, observations of changes taking place in selection-exposed organisms show that evolutionary success requires some essential limitations. The application of this (...) reasoning to social evolution may appear thought-provoking: stable evolution requires not only intense selection but also a conservative approach to ideas. (shrink)

The problem of legal normativity is one the most controversial issues in the philosophy of law. It was already a subject of heated debate in the 19th century and, over the last 100 years, the study of normativity has taken many shapes and forms, from Kelsen's dualism, through the reductionism proposed by legal realists, to some nihilistic stances. In recent years, there has been a renewed interest in the problems surrounding the concept of law's normativity, and this collection is seen (...) as a contribution to that debate. The book will be of interest to lawyers and philosophers, both at the graduate and professional levels. (shrink)

Chciałem Go pożegnać. Kilkakrotnie próbowałem napisać choć parę słów. O Nim samym. Okazało się, że nie potrafię. Udało mi się tylko przedstawić Jego poglądy na reizm Tadeusza Kotarbińskiego, ale uczyniłem to gdzie indziej. Muszę tu poprzestać na ofiarowaniu Mu tego, co napisałem na Jego dziewięćdziesiąte urodziny, w osiemdziesięciolecie naszej przyjaźni.

The aim of this paper is to make presentism a dynamic view of reality by basing it on a notion of dynamic existence, that is, on a notion of existence which has a dynamic character. The paper shows that both of the notions of existence which are used in metaphysical theories of time have a static character and, while such a notion is useful for eternalists, it is useless for presentists if they want to make their view able to remain (...) in agreement with our everyday experience and self-consistent. It is demonstrated that both empirical and theoretical arguments indicate that the presentist should replace the notion of this static existence with the notion of a dynamic existence and that this maneuver allows the presentist to treat his/her existential thesis as equivalent to the thesis that time flows. Not only does this strategy allow us to express presentism in a simple, homogenous way which remains in agreement with our experience, but also permits us to solve some of the difficult problems which presentism faces, such as, for example, the objection of triviality and the question about the rate of time passage. Moreover, such an approach to presentism allows us to solve fundamental metaphysical problems concerning time such as the problem of the openness of the future and the fixity of the past, direction of causation, and relations between presentism and persistence through time by endurance. (shrink)

There are three kinds of nature singled out according to the physical contact with the man: “nature immune from man”, “nature touched by man”, and “nature transformed by man”. The latter type is of highest relevance for the man’s present dilemmas. The extrapolation of present tendencies of the man-nature relations is summarized in the two basic dilemma: ecological dilemma/either the development of the modern technologies or the destruction of human ecological environment/, and peace dilemma /either to continue the nuclear arms (...) race or the total nuclear disarmament/. There are four types of situations facing the man when avoiding the negative results of trends in the transformation of nature, which are linked with legal phllosophy. The man-nature relations are axiologically ambivalent because the transformed nature is the challenge, but calls for looking at nature as apart of our life, and to exist with it in in it. (shrink)

There are five basic types of ontology of law identified in relation with the singling out simpIe ontological objects in a strong or weak sense, dualist ontological objects, and complex ontalogical objects in a strong or weak sense. The conceptians of law far mulated in the theories/philosophies/ of law are ascribed to these five types.

The old-fashioned concept of state is shown to be inadequate and misleading. Replacing it by a concept of information and taking advantage of the invariance of the mechanical description under time reversal puts the problems of the interpretation of quantum mechanics in a new light. A more realistic interpretation appears to be possible. Moreover, a new explanation of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox is presented, too.