SÍNTESE - Em consonância com o método fenomenológico- hermenêutico traçado por Martin Heidegger em Sein und Zeit, a expressão prático-auto-referencial "eu sou" [sum] deve anteceder toda predicação sobre o humano ser/estar-aí-no-mundo. A este pertence a culpa/ dívida [Schuld] enquanto sentir-se/compreender-se e confessar-se como ser-culpado/devedor [Schuldigsein]. "Sou culpado por" resulta da junção de "sou responsável por" com o "não" implícito na idéia de falta. O responder ativo-projetivo do ser-aí [Dasein] por seu ter-queser está marcado, prévia e ontologicamente, pela impossibilidade de autofundação (...) e pela possibilidade, sempre iminente, de não--ser/estaraí- no mundo; e, no plano ôntico, está permeado pela necessária restrição de possibilidades de ação e pelo inelutável retraimento a possibilidades alternativas. O texto explicita algumas potencialidades de incidência corretiva deste conceito ontológico-existencial de culpa sobre a autocompreensão do homem contemporâneo. (shrink)

We articulate a distinction between ontology, understood as involving existence questions, and metaphysics, understood as either providing for metaphysical profiles of entities or else as dealing with fundamentality and/or grounding and dependence questions. The distinction, we argue, allows a better understanding of the roles of metaontology and metametaphysics when it comes to discussing the relations between ontology and science on the one hand, and metaphysics and science on the other. We argue that while ontology, as understood in this paper, may (...) have reasonable perspectives for naturalization, given its relation to science, the same cannot be said for metaphysics, given that it is typically understood as an additional theoretical layer over science, not participating in the scientific investigation. That may result either in skepticism over metaphysics, or else on accepting that metaphysics is an autonomous branch of investigation, depending on one’s concern for metaphysics. (shrink)

Recently, in the debate about the ontology of quantum mechanics some authors have defended the view that quantum particles are individuals in a primitive sense, so that individuality should be preferred over non-individuality (the alternative option). Primitive individuality involves two main claims: (1) every item is identical with itself and (2) it is distinct from every other item. Non-relativistic quantum mechanics is said to provide positive evidence for that position, since in every situation comprising multiple particles there is a well-defined (...) number of them to begin with, and so they must be distinct from each other. We argue that the link between a well-defined number of items and the relation of identity that is being claimed to hold is not imposed by quantum mechanics, but rather by a metaphysical view. Formal evidence is advanced in favor of the thesis that counting may be performed for items without identity (non-individuals), so that quantum mechanics needs not be viewed as endorsing an ontology of individuals. (shrink)

El artículo pretende evaluar la crítica de Robert Talisse a la noción de democracia de John Dewey según la cual dicha noción sería incompatible con el pluralismo razonable de corte rawlsiano y devendría opresiva pues se funda en el ideal moral del crecimiento. Para ello, se reconstruye la “objeción pluralista” de Talisse. Posteriormente, se consideran los argumentos centrales con que Dewey sostiene su perspectiva, a saber: el argumento experimentalista y el argumento formativo. En este marco, se sostiene que la idea (...) de democracia como cooperación social y la idea de crecimiento como fin moral, comprendidas en términos deweyanos, dan lugar al pluralismo por derecho propio. (shrink)

Logical abductivism features in the recent literature as a new epistemology for logic, in connection with logical anti-exceptionalism. According to this account, (i) logical knowledge is obtained by the justified choice of a logical theory using abduction, which (ii) replaces problematic approaches in traditional logical epistemology. We argue that such claims are not properly warranted; they conflate justification and theory choice methods. Abduction requires that one starts with justified data, and justification, in such cases, needs to appeal to sources that (...) are not granted by abduction. In this sense, abduction cannot be all there is to the epistemology of logic. Some abductivists, we shall see, even appeal to methods of the traditional epistemology to obtain the data. Keeping justification and theory choice separated may contribute to avoid obscurities in discussion of the nature of data in logic and in understanding more clearly how to frame the anti-exceptional nature of logic. (shrink)

This fascinating exploration of the great discoveries of history's most important mathematicians seeks an answer to the eternal question: Does mathematics hold the key to understanding the mysteries of the physical world?

Logical anti‐exceptionalism is the view that logic is not special, it is continuous with science. This continuity is typically understood in terms of the use of the abductive method in logical theory choice, with logical knowledge resulting from our choice of the theory best accounting for the data. In this paper, we argue for two related claims: (i) that this understanding of the continuity between logic and science faces considerable challenges; and (ii) that such challenges may be avoided by elaborating (...) the continuity of logic with science in terms of the “logic‐as‐models” approach. More specifically, we defend that logical theories should be seen in the lights of the “models‐as‐epistemic‐tools” approach, an approach to the nature of models in empirical science more closely connected with current scientific practice. The result is a version of logical anti‐exceptionalism opening new perspectives for the philosophical understanding of logic. (shrink)

The present paper makes the following points. The summary given in Sextus Emp. Math. VII is of much greater value than usually acknowledged, since it preserves several key elements of Gorgias’ communicational strategy. A sketchy trilemma is available in the opening sentence of Philolaos as well as in a passage of Plato’s Parmenides. This is evidence in favor of the hypothesis that the very first known trilemma was devised by Gorgias and not by Sextus himself or Aenesidemus. Not unlike Zeno, (...) Gorgias enjoyed to be neither serious nor joking, but remained somewhat halfway. This point is seldom acknowledged, though it is crucial in order to understand that he pretends to claim, but his claims do not amount to any points of doctrine. That he remains halfway should not prevent us from appreciating some of his ideas, but, at the same time, we should not expect full intellectual adhesion to what he tells us. Besides, something similar occurs in most of Plato’s dialogues.. Gorgias owes a lot to Melissus. (shrink)

Esta proposta de discussão aborda o ensino da filosofia. Os objetivos da pesquisa: identificar aspectos teóricos e práticos no trabalho dos professores na disciplina de filosofia na educação básica; descrever e avaliar os temas filosóficos que são trabalhados na disciplina filosofia na educação básica; comparar a formação daqueles que têm formação em filosofia e daqueles que não a tem. Com esses objetivos pudemos verificar quais universidades brasileiras oferecem curso de filosofia. Obtivemos os dados: no Brasil temos 188 escolas públicas, 329 (...) escolas particulares perfazendo um total de 517 escolas superiores e, nessas, há um total de 83 cursos de filosofia. Faremos busca de informações sobre os professores que lecionam a disciplina de filosofia na cidade de Uberaba, MG e região circunvizinha. Queremos saber quais são e onde estão os professores de filosofia tanto nas escolas públicas quanto particulares na Educação Básica. O problema de pesquisa é “até que ponto os professores de filosofia, na Educação Básica, estão preparados teoricamente para trabalhar conteúdos e reflexões de cunho filosófico proporcionando pensamentos isentos de superficialidade própria do senso comum?”. (shrink)

We discuss the idea that superpositions in quantum mechanics may involve contradictions or contradictory properties. A state of superposition such as the one comprised in the famous Schrödinger’s cat, for instance, is sometimes said to attribute contradictory properties to the cat: being dead and alive at the same time. If that were the case, we would be facing a revolution in logic and science, since we would have one of our greatest scientific achievements showing that real contradictions exist.We analyze that (...) claim by employing the traditional square of opposition.We suggest that it is difficult to make sense of the idea of contradiction in the case of quantum superpositions. From a metaphysical point of view the suggestion also faces obstacles, and we present some of them. (shrink)

This paper analyses and compares some of the automated reasoners that have been used in recent research for compliance checking. Although the list of the considered reasoners is not exhaustive, we believe that our analysis is representative enough to take stock of the current state of the art in the topic. We are interested here in formalizations at the _first-order_ level. Past literature on normative reasoning mostly focuses on the _propositional_ level. However, the propositional level is of little usefulness for (...) concrete LegalTech applications, in which compliance checking must be enforced on (large) sets of individuals. Furthermore, we are interested in technologies that are _freely available_ and that can be further investigated and compared by the scientific community. In other words, this paper does not consider technologies only employed in industry and/or whose source code is non-accessible. This paper formalizes a selected use case in the considered reasoners and compares the implementations, also in terms of simulations with respect to shared synthetic datasets. The comparison will highlight that lot of further research still needs to be done to integrate the benefits featured by the different reasoners into a single standardized first-order framework, suitable for LegalTech applications. All source codes are freely available at https://github.com/liviorobaldo/compliancecheckers, together with instructions to locally reproduce the simulations. (shrink)

Problems of logical theory choice are current being widely dis- cussed in the context of anti-exceptionalist views on logic. According to those views, logic is not a special science among others, so, in particular, the methodology for theory choice should be the same in logic as for other scientific disciplines. Richard Routley advanced one such methodology which meshes well with anti-exceptionalism, and argued that it leads one to choosing one single logic, which is a kind of ultralogic. We argue that (...) the choice for only one correct system of logic may be rejected on the basis of the methodology proposed by Routley and, furthermore, that taking anti-exceptionalism about logic seriously recommends that a pluralist view of logic should be accepted. We call this view “full-blooded anti-exceptionalism”, and the resulting view on logic, lacking a proper name, “local pluralism”. (shrink)

This paper presents a method for investigating counterfactual histories of science. A central notion to our theory of science are "advances" (ideas, data, etc.), which are units passed among scientists and which would be conserved in passing from one possible history to another. Advances are connected to each other by nets of causal influence, and we distinguish strong and weak influences. Around sixty types of advances are grouped into ten classes. As our case study, we examine the beginning of the (...) Old Quantum Theory, using a computer to store and process historical information. We describe four plausible possible histories, along with six other implausible ones. (shrink)

Opdagelsen af det ubevidste skete som bekendt inden for rammerne af Freuds tera­peutiske erfaring. Dets udforskning viste imidlertid, at følgerne af denne opdagelse var betydeligt mere omfattende end han først antog.

Following J.-Y.Béziau in his pioneer work on non-standard interpretations of the traditional square of opposition, we have applied the abstract structure of the square to study the relation of opposition between states in superposition in orthodox quantum mechanics in [1]. Our conclusion was that such states are contraries, contradicting previous analyzes that have led to different results, such as those claiming that those states represent contradictory properties. In this chapter we bring the issue once again into the center of the (...) stage, but now discussing the metaphysical presuppositions which underlie each kind of analysis and which lead to each kind of result, discussing in particular the idea that superpositions represent potential contradictions. We shall argue that the analysis according to which states in superposition are contrary rather than contradictory is still more plausible. (shrink)

In this work, we focus on a very specific case study: assuming that quantum theories deal with “particles” of some kind, what kind of entity can such particles be? One possible answer, the one we shall examine here, is that they are not the usual kind of object found in daily life: individuals. Rather, we follow a suggestion by Erwin Schrödinger, according to which quantum mechanics poses a revolutionary kind of entity: non-individuals. While physics, as a scientific field, is not (...) concerned with whether entities posited by a specific physical theory are individuals or not, answering this question is part of the quest for a better understanding of physical reality. Here lies, in large measure, the relevance of ontology. (shrink)

Systems of paraconsistent logics violate the law of explosion: from contradictory premises not every formula follows. One of the philosophical options for interpreting the contradictions allowed as premises in these cases was put forward recently by Carnielli and Rodrigues, with their epistemic approach to paraconsistent logics. In a nutshell, the plan consists in interpreting the contradictions in epistemic terms, as indicating the presence of non-conclusive evidence for both a proposition and its negation. Truth, in this approach, is consistent and is (...) dealt with by classical logic. In this paper we discuss the fate of the Liar paradox in this picture. While this is a paradox about truth, it cannot be accommodated by the classical part of the approach, due to trivialization problems. On the other hand, the paraconsistent part does not seem fit as well, due to the fact that its intended reading is in terms of non-conclusive evidence, not truth. We discuss the difficulties involved in each case and argue that none of the options seems to accommodate the paradox in a satisfactory manner. (shrink)

Quantum mechanics raises deep questions about our conceptionof reality. In this essay we discuss a possible solution proposed by ShimonMalin in his book Nature Loves to Hide to some of these diculties. Firstlywe discuss Malin's exposition about how the quantum theory entails a deeprevision of our conception of reality, overthrowing some kinds of realism.Here, the main focus is quantum mechanics' violation of Bell's inequalities.After that, we briey present the author's proposal of a new conception ofreality grounded in some relations he (...) claims to hold between some featuresof quantum mechanics, mainly the collapse of the wave function, with thephilosophies of Plotino and A. N. Whitehead. We end our discussion pointingto some diculties in the author's approach.A mec^anica qu^antica levanta profundas quest~oes acerca de nossaconcepc~ao de realidade. Neste ensaio discutiremos uma possvel soluc~ao paraalgumas destas diculdades proposta por Shimon Malin em seu livro NatureLoves to Hide. Primeiramente discutiremos a exposic~ao de Malin sobre omodo como a teoria qu^antica acarreta uma profunda revis~ao de nossa concepc~ao da realidade, derrogando certas formas de realismo. Aqui, o principalponto centra-se no fato de a teoria violar das desigualdades de Bell. Depois,apresentaremos de modo mais breve a proposta do autor de uma novaconcepc~ao da realidade baseada em certas relac~oes que arma existir entrealgumas caractersticas da mec^anica qu^antica, principalmente o colapso dafunc~ao de onda, com as losoas de Plotino e A. N. Whitehead. Finalizamos apontando algumas diculdades na abordagem do autor. (shrink)

Scientific realism is typically associated with metaphysics. One current incarnation of such an association concerns the requirement of a metaphysical characterization of the entities one is being a realist about. This is sometimes called “Chakravartty’s Challenge”, and codifies the claim that without a metaphysical characterization, one does not have a clear picture of the realistic commitments one is engaged with. The required connection between metaphysics and science naturally raises the question of whether such a demand is appropriately fulfilled, and how (...) metaphysics engages with science in order to produce what is called “scientific metaphysics”. Here, we map some of the options available in the literature, generating a conceptual spectrum according to how each view approximates science and metaphysics. This is done with the purpose of enlightening the current debate on the possibility of epistemic warrant that science could grant to such a metaphysics, and how different positions differently address the thorny issue concerning such a warrant. (shrink)

In this paper we deal with the problem of stating what an analogy relation is, according it is usually used on teaching natural sciences. According our proposal, two situations are said to be analogous if their representations includes isomorphical subsets. We analyze the elements that can be inv..

Non-reflexive logics are systems of logic in which the reflexive law of identity is restricted or violated. The most well-known of such systems are Schrödinger logics and quasi-set theory; both are related with the metaphysics of quantum mechanics, aiming at formalizing the idea that quantum entities are non-individuals. We argue in this paper that non-reflexive logics may be seen as attempting to characterize two metaphysically incompatible notions of non-individuals: (i) non-individuals as violating self-identity and (ii) non-individuals as indiscernible entities. The (...) problem is that any choice between these options brings difficult questions, making the understanding of non-individuals through the apparatus of non-reflexive logics rather implausible. (shrink)

This book discusses the philosophical work of Décio Krause. Non-individuality, as a new metaphysical category, was thought to be strongly supported by quantum mechanics. No one did more to promote this idea than the Brazilian philosopher Décio Krause, whose works on the metaphysics and logic of non-individuality are now widely regarded as part of the consolidated literature on the subject. This volume brings together chapters elaborating on the ideas put forward and defended by Krause, developing them in many different directions, (...) commenting on aspects not completely developed so far, and, more importantly, critically addressing their current formulations and defenses by Krause himself. Given that Krause’s ideas do connect directly and indirectly with a wide array of subjects, such as the philosophy of quantum mechanics, more broadly understood, the philosophy of logic and logical philosophy, non-classical logics, metaphysics, and ontology, this volume contains important material for the research on logic and foundations of science, broadly understood. All the invited contributors have already worked with the ideas developed by Décio (some of them still work with them), being also distinct authors and extremely relevant in their areas of expertise. The volume is aimed at philosophers, including those of physics and quantum mechanics. (shrink)

Quasi-truth is a formal approach to a pragmatically-oriented view of truth. The basic plan motivating the framework consists in providing for a more realistic account of truth, accommodating situations where there is incomplete information, as typically happens in the practice of science. The historical sciences are a case in hand, where incomplete information is the rule. It would seem, then, that the quasi-truth approach would be the most appropriate one to deal with historical sciences, then. In this paper, we explore (...) this possibility and use the historical sciences as a test case for the approach of quasi-truth. Our claim is that, on what concerns historical sciences, the quasi-truth approach fails in two basic senses; first, by misrepresenting some cases concerning incomplete information, and second, by falling short of accounting for many features of incomplete information peculiar to historical sciences. We conclude that, despite its stated goals, quasi-truth must be either amended or substituted if the goal of a more faithful representation of scientific practice is to be achieved. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the relation between logical theory and evidence in the context of an anti-exceptionalist approach to logic. I hold not only that current versions of anti-exceptionalism failed to appreciate the fact that logical evidence is theory laden, but also that benefits for the view are expected when we engage with the appropriate philosophy of science. I make the discussion more vivid by considering the cases of both the Liar and Russell paradoxes, and disputes between the classical (...) and dialetheist approaches to them. Disputes between these parties involve different understandings of the logical terminology involved in the evidence (the paradoxes), and they illustrate how the data gets contaminated with theory. As a result of the discussion, I conclude that pragmatical considerations are better guides to evaluate disputes in such cases, with scientific fertility being the criterion of legitimacy for a logical system. (shrink)

En el presente artículo se problematiza un aspecto de la crónica modernista: su compilación y publicación en ediciones críticas. Se revisa el caso de tres libros de autores centroamericanos que aparecieron, originalmente, en publicaciones periódicas: La vida de Rubén Darío Escrita por él mismo (1915), de Rubén Darío; Sensaciones de París y de Madrid (1900), de Enrique Gómez Carrillo; y El libro del trópico (1907), de Arturo Ambrogi. Las tres obras ofrecen particularidades que las convierten en modelos diferentes de un (...) mismo problema filológico, por lo que evidencian lo provechoso que sería para el proceso de lectura de un receptor de hoy, acceder a un texto anotado y editado críticamente. (shrink)

Nonrelativistic quantum mechanics (QM) works perfectly well for all practical purposes. Once one admits, however, that a successful scientific theory is supposed not only to make predictions but also to tell us a story about the world in which we live, a philosophical problem emerges: in the specific case of QM, it is not possible to associate with the theory a unique scientific image of the world; there are several images. The fact that the theory may be compatible with distinct (...) ontologies, and that those ontologies may themselves be associated with a plurality of metaphysical approaches, gives rise to the problem of metaphysical underdetermination. This paper concludes that the available metametaphysical criteria fail to deliver objectivity in theory choice, and it puts forward its own criterion based on a tension between two methods of metaphysical inquiry: one that is closely related to science and another that is not. (shrink)

In this paper we deal with two applications of the square of opposition to controversial issues in the philosophy of quantum mechanics. The first one concerns the kind of opposition represented by states in superposition. A superposition of “spin up” and “spin down” for a given spatial direction, for instance, is sometimes said to originate particular kinds of opposition such as contradictoriness. The second application concerns the problem of identical particles. Identity and indiscernibility are entangled in discussions of this problem (...) in such a way that a proper conceptual treatment of those issues through the square seems profitable. (shrink)

We discuss the ‘Consciousness Causes Collapse Hypothesis’ (CCCH), the interpretation of quantum mechanics according to which consciousness solves the measurement problem. At first, it seems that the very hypothesis that consciousness causally acts over matter counts as a reductio of CCCH. However, CCCH won’t go so easily. In this paper we attempt to bring new light to the discussion. We distinguish the ontology of the interpretation (the positing of a causally efficacious consciousness as part of the furniture of reality) from (...) metaphysics (the metaphysical character of that consciousness). That distinction allows us to map the philosophical theories of consciousness compatible with quantum mechanics under the tenets of CCCH. Also, it indicates that the problem will have to be discussed at a metaphysical level rather than at the physical level. Our analysis corroborates recent arguments to the effect that this interpretation is not ruled out so easily. (shrink)

The Received View on quantum non-individuality is, roughly speaking, the view according to which quantum objects are not individuals. It seems clear that the RV finds its standard expression nowadays through the use of the formal apparatuses of non-reflexive logics, mainly quasi-set theory. In such logics, the relation of identity is restricted, so that it does not apply for terms denoting quantum particles; this “lack of identity” formally characterizes their non-individuality. We face then a dilemma: on the one hand, identity (...) seems too important to be given up, on the other hand the RV seems to require that identity be given up. In this paper we shall discuss how the specific characterization of the RV through non-reflexive logics came to be framed. We examine some of the main objections to this version of the RV and argue that they are misguided under this specific “non-reflexive” understanding of the RV. Finally, we shall also argue that this non-reflexive view is not the only option for a metaphysical articulation of the RV: less radical approaches to identity and logic are open. In particular, some of these alternative approaches to the RV we present may be immune to most of the criticisms presented against the non-reflexive approach. (shrink)