Arts, Real-Time Video and Interactivity for Sustainability is an ongoing collaborative research project investigating how real-time video, DIY surveillance technologies and sensor data can be used as a tool for environmental awareness, activism and artistic explorations. The project consists of a series of digital contexts for aesthetic contemplation of nature and civic engagement, aiming to foster awareness and empowerment of local populations through DIY surveillance. At the core of the ARTIVIS efforts are a series of interactive installations, that make use (...) of surveillance technologies and real-time video as raw material to promote environmental awareness through the emotion generated by real-time connections with nature. Throughout the project development, the surveillance concept has been shifting from the use of surveillance technology in a centralized platform, to the idea of veillance with distributed peer-to-peer networks that can be used for science and environmental monitoring. In this paper we present the history of the ARTiVIS project, related and inspiring work, describe ongoing research work and explore the present and future challenges of appropriating surveillance technology for artistic, educational and civic engagement purposes. (shrink)

A vexing puzzle about vagueness, rationality, and evolution runs, in crude abbreviation, as follows: vague language use is demonstrably suboptimal if the goal is efficient, precise and cooperative information transmission; hence rational deliberation or evolutionary selection should, under this assumed goal, eradicate vagueness from language use. Since vagueness is pervasive and entrenched in all human languages, something has to give. In this paper, we focus on this problem in the context of signaling games. We provide an overview of a number (...) of proposed ways in which vagueness may come into the picture in formal models of rational and evolutionary signaling. Most argue that vague signal use is simply the best we can get, given certain factors. Despite the plausibility of the proposals, we argue that a deeper understanding of the benefits of vagueness needs a more ecological perspective, namely one that goes beyond the local optimization of signaling strategies in a homogeneous population. As an example of one possible way to expand upon our current models, we propose two variants of a novel multi-population dynamic of imprecise imitation where, under certain conditions, populations with vague language use dominate over populations with precise language use. (shrink)

Signalling games are popular models for studying the evolution of meaning, but typical approaches do not incorporate vagueness as a feature of successful signalling. Complementing recent like-minded models, we describe an aggregate population-level dynamic that describes a process of imitation of successful behaviour under imprecise perception and realization of similar stimuli. Applying this new dynamic to a generalization of Lewis’s signalling games, we show that stochastic imprecision leads to vague, yet by-and-large efficient signal use, and, moreover, that it unifies evolutionary (...) outcomes and helps avoid sub-optimal categorization. The upshot of this is that we see ‘as-if’-generalization at an aggregate level, without agents actually generalizing. _1_ Introduction _2_ Background _2.1_ Sim-max games and conceptual spaces _2.2_ Vagueness in sim-max games and conceptual spaces _2.3_ Vagueness, functional pressure, and transmission biases _3_ Imprecise Imitation _3.1_ Replicator dynamic in behavioural strategies _3.2_ Noise-perturbed conditional imitation _4_ Exploring Imprecise Imitation _4.1_ Setting the stage _4.2_ Simulation set-up _4.3_ Measures of interest _4.4_ Results _5_ Discussion _5.1_ Levels of vagueness _5.2_ Evolutionary benefits of imprecision _5.3_ Related work _6_ Conclusion Appendix. (shrink)

In Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, one can find a number of remarks that could be seen as antithetical to classic philosophical analysis. There are passages seemingly rejecting the ideas of concept decomposition, regression to first principles, and semantic substitution. The criticism, I argue, is aimed not at analysis in particular, but rather at some idealizations that pervade a certain picture of philosophy. This picture can be contrasted with Wittgenstein’s pragmatist view of explanations of meaning which, I believe, can inform a (...) different attitude towards philosophical method that aligns well with a vision of philosophy as conversation. If we think of philosophy as engaging in the development and exchange of explanations of meaning, we can see how various methods can coexist insofar as they are useful, and as long as the urge to sublimate them beyond our practices can be avoided. (shrink)

The ways in which languages have come to divide the visible spectrum with their color terminology, in both their variety and the apparent universal tendencies, are still largely unexplained. Building on recent work in modeling color perception and categorization, as well as the theory of signaling games, we incrementally construct a color categorization model which combines perceptual characteristics of individual agents, game-theoretic signaling interaction of these agents, and the probability of observing particular colors as an environmental constraint. We also propose (...) a method of transparent evaluation against the data gathered in the World Color Survey. The results show that the model’s predictive power is comparable to the current state of the art. Additionally, we argue that the model we suggest is superior in terms of motivation of the principles involved, and that its explanatory relevance with respect to color categorization in languages is therefore higher. Our results suggest that the universal tendencies of color categorization cannot be explained solely in terms of the shape of the color space induced by our perceptual apparatus. We believe that only by taking the heterogeneity of the phenomenon seriously can we acquire a deeper understanding of why color categorization takes the forms we observe across languages. (shrink)

Una de las características de la transmisión manuscrita de los _Tractatus _ _de Pedro Hispano es el hecho de que el tratado sobre las _Categorías _no siempre ocupa el mismo lugar al interior de la obra. En algunos manuscritos se encuentra en tercer lugar, después del tratado acerca de la _Isagoge _de Porfirio, siguiendo el orden tradicional de la _logica vetus. _Pero en algunos otros, se encuentra en quinto lugar, después del tratado sobre los _Tópicos _y antes del tratado (...) sobre la suposición. En los dos casos, el lugar de las _Categorías _de Aristóteles en la lógica es definido por la noción de “término”. El propósito de este artículo es entender por qué ocurre esta variación, ya que no es teóricamente neutral. Por tanto, para atender al problema del orden de aparición del tratado sobre las _Categorías _dentro de la lógica, se presentarán tres de los más destacados comentaristas de los _Tractatus_: Juan Buridan, Juan Versor y Pedro Tartaret. Este ejercicio proporcionará algunas conclusiones sobre la relación entre las categorías y la teoría de la suposición, y también sobre la _vexata quaestio _acerca del sujeto de las categorías. (shrink)

Science starts out with the idea of a person as billions of neurons housed in a body that is a cloud of particles. Common sense starts out with the idea of a person having capacities belonging to a single individual. The common sense person does not have parts. Our objectifying science slowly takes over the person as it tends toward physical materialism. Where will it end? What is being gradually pushed out of the world? If science had already taken over, (...) if the categories of neuroscience were complete, then it would be possible to speculate about its relation to earlier stages of thought. However, that is not the situation. The categories of science have yet to emerge. The puzzling character of new scientific objects reveals that we are on the threshold of profound conceptual change. The Humanities are at a crossroad. Do the Humanities scoff at the encroachment of science and risk the fate of those who resisted the Copernican revolution? Do they embrace the changes only to be burned at the stake like those who accepted the Copernican revolution? I suggest that the Humanities mobilize their collective power to create the categories in terms of which science will explicate the very idea of a person. Over the last fifty years, philosophers in the Kantian tradition have offered strategies for developing the new categories in humanistic terms. One approach follows “color” and “consciousness” through their passage from a common sense image of the world to a developing scientific image. It is a journey that illustrates the problems and the puzzles ahead. It indicates the perils of the next recategorization of the world. (shrink)

Integration Area C. Nature, sources, and limits of human knowledge; roles of perception, reason, testimony, and intuition in acquiring rational beliefs; e.g. science, mathematics, values, the arts, religion, social issues, and psychological states. G.E. Integration IC.

Resenha do livro de: ALVES NETO, Rodrigo Ribeiro. Alienações do mundo: uma interpretaçáo da obra de Hannah Arendt . Rio de Janeiro/Sáo Paulo: Editora PUC-Rio/Edições Loyola, 2009, 216 p.

Davidson claims that the basis for all semantic notions is the successful communication. This paper aims at exploring the consequences that this statement has for the notions of both meaning and language. And as a result, it explains why communication is not grounded on conventions or norms.

Reciprocity is ubiquitous in our lives, both as a way of rewarding and punishing others. Consequently, the social sciences have devoted many studies to this phenomenon. However, the concept of 'reciprocity' is quite polyvalent, and is used in many different ways across different disciplines - a situation potentially prone to equivocation, which hinders fruitful interdisciplinary work. At the same time, although philosophers often invoke 'reciprocity' in their work, there is a lack of conceptual clarification about what reciprocity actually means - (...) an eminently philosophical task. This thesis fills such a gap, by offering a general framework that allows us to understand how 'reciprocity' is used across different sciences. Such a framework consists in a grammar of several uses/meanings of reciprocity. Moreover, the thesis fills a second gap, regarding the correct interpretation of the psychological role of the reciprocity-motive in economic experiments. There has been a long-standing tradition in economics which overemphasizes the role of inequality aversion and downplays the role of reciprocity. Contrary to this deeply ingrained trend, I argue that reciprocity is the main motive of punishment of free-riders in the public goods game. My argument includes the first systematic critique of an experiment which is currently quite popular in behavioural economics. I show that the latter does not deserve the credit which it has received so far, and thus many economists need to revise their endorsement of inequality aversion. By offering a renewed interpretation of the motives in economic experiments, the thesis highlights reciprocity as a distinctive motivation. The thesis also offers tools to rethink key aspects of economic methodology, and proposes a distinction between prediction, explanation and rationalization of behaviour, in order to achieve psychologically realistic explanations of behaviour. The disciplinary home of the thesis is in philosophy of social science, economics and moral psychology. (shrink)

The purpose of the present study is to examine the attitudes of Portuguese chartered accountants with respect to questions of ethical nature that can arise in their professional activity. Respondents were asked to respond to the Ethics Position Questionnaire developed by Forsyth (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 39(1), 175–184, 1980), in order to determine their idealism and relativism levels. Subsequently, they answered questions about five scenarios related to accounting practices, with the objective of measuring their ethical judgments. Based on (...) the idealism and relativism levels of our respondents, they were classified into one of four groups, representing different ethical ideologies (absolutism, exceptionism, subjectivism, and situationism). The results indicated that age was the major determinant of relativism. Contrary to previous research, older respondents revealed themselves significantly more relativistic than younger ones. Gender seems to be the most important determinant of ethical judgments; against expectations, men evidenced significantly stricter judgments than women in two of the five scenarios. Findings also indicated that respondents’ ethical judgments did not differ significantly based on their ethical ideology, supporting the idea that ethical ideology is not an important determinant of ethical judgments. (shrink)

I introduce a proof system for the logic of relative fundamentality, as well as a natural semantics with respect to which the system is both sound and complete. I then “modalise” the logic, and finally I discuss the properties of grounding given a suggested account of this notion in terms of necessity and relative fundamentality.

Brian Cutter objected to the consequence argument due to its dependence on the principle that miracle workers are metaphysically impossible. A miracle worker is someone who has the ability to act in a way such that the laws of nature would be violated. While there is something to the thought that agents like us do not have this ability, Cutter claims that there is no compelling reason to regard miracle workers as metaphysically impossible. However, the paper contends that miracle workers (...) are indeed impossible according to well-known theories concerning the laws of nature. This result highlights the reliance of the consequence argument on a plausible premise, which is widely accepted by proponents of non-Humean views of laws. The paper also provides a way to explain away the intuition that miracle workers are possible, but this has the upshot that a recent, two-dimensional formulation of the consequence argument is unsound. (shrink)

Público el centro de la participación política de los ciudadanos. Sin embargo, las diferencias materiales que existen entre los individuos pueden influir de una forma decisiva en el desarrollo del proceso deliberativo.En este artículo examino la forma en que desde esta teoría de la democracia se ha hecho frente a este problema. Aunque encontramos notables diferencias entre los autores, todos ellos defienden la necesidad de garantizar una igual influencia de los ciudadanos en el proceso político.

Temporaryism—the view that not always everything always exists—comes in two main versions: presentism and expansionism (aka the growing block theory of time). Both versions of the view are commonly formulated using the notion of being present, which we, among others, find problematic. Expansionism is also sometimes accused of requiring extraordinary conceptual tools for its formulation. In this paper, we put forward systematic characterizations of presentism and expansionism which involve neither the notion of being present nor unfamiliar conceptual tools. These characterizations (...) are full-blown logics, each logic comprising an axiomatic proof system and an intuitive semantics with respect to which the system is both sound and complete. (shrink)

Normative theories of argumentation tend to assume that logical and dialectical rules suffice to ensure the rationality of argumentative discourse. Yet, in everyday debates people use arguments that seem valid in light of such rules but nonetheless biased and tendentious. This article seeks to show that the rationality of argumentation can only be fully promoted if we take into account its ethical dimension. To substantiate this claim, I review some of the empirical evidence indicating that people’s inferential reasoning is systematically (...) affected by a variety of biases and heuristics. Insofar as these cognitive illusions are typically unintentional, it appears that arguers may be biased despite their well-intended efforts to follow the rules of critical argumentation. Nevertheless, I argue that people remain responsible for the rationality of their arguments, given that there are a number of measures that they can (and ought to) take to avoid such distortions. I highlight the importance of argumentational virtues and critical thinking to rational debates, and describe a set of indirect strategies of “argumentative self-control”. (shrink)

Journal Name: Semiotica Issue: Ahead of print.

This article concerns a phenomenon of elementary quantum mechanics that is quite counter-intuitive, very non-classical, and apparently not widely known: a quantum particle can get reflected at a potential step downwards. In contrast, classical particles get reflected only at upward steps. As a consequence, a quantum particle can be trapped for a long time (though not forever) in a region surrounded by downward potential steps, that is, on a plateau. Said succinctly, a quantum particle tends not to fall off a (...) table. The conditions for this effect are that the wave length is much greater than the width of the potential step and the kinetic energy of the particle is much smaller than the depth of the potential step. We point out how the topic is accessible with elementary methods, but also with mathematical rigor and numerically. (shrink)

The main purpose of this work is to provide a semiotic ontology for redescription of active cognitive externalism, recently developed by the paradigm 4E (embodied, embedded, enactive, extended cognition). In our approach, distributed cognitive systems (DCSs) are described as semiosis, signs in action. We explored the relationship between semiosis and cognition, as conceived by C. S. Peirce, in association with the notion of distributed cognitive system (DCS). We introduce Peircean externalist approach with an emphasis on the notion of temporal distribution (...) of semiosis, and describe DCSs, and their elements, as “sign in action”. To develop this argument, we describe an example of DCS -- verbal-musical improvisation of repente, repentismo, or viola singing. It is a phenomenon of verbal-musical improvisation that takes the form of a challenge in versified oral poetry. We describe the phenomenon as the embodiment of the formal structure of a cognitive task and an inferential process. This embodiment corresponds to a semiotization of the repente performances as DCSs. The temporally distributed tendency of repentismo organizes the DCS as a system that performs metasemiotic experiments on the action of signs. (shrink)

El hecho de que este año 2004 se cumpla el tercer centenario de la muerte de J. Locke ya de por sí es una ocasión para repasar su pensamiento como uno de los más influyentes en la tradición filosófica, especialmente en la anglosajona. Más oportuno aún es repensarlo a la luz de las consecuencias de sus planteamientos no sustancialistas. En el terreno gnoseo lógico, si de la sustancia no tenemos una idea clara y distinta entonces se alza con toda crudeza (...) el problema del correlato de nuestras ideas: su significado y su referencia. De la consideración de las ideas como signos surge una visión de las posiciones de Locke, inicialmente catalogadas de representacionistas, que las sitúa en el ámbito de la expresión. (shrink)

En este articulo relaciono dos asuntos que no se relacionan comunmente en la literatura sobre Frege: el argumento de Frege sobre la interpretacion de las oraciones de identidad y su problema de referirse a las funciones. Primero expongo el argumento y concluyo que es plausible. Luego caracterizo las relaciones semanticas que el argumento le permite introducir. A continuacion trato el problema antes mencionado y muestro corno afecta a la semantica de Frege: esas relaciones semanticas se vuelven innominables y, por tanto, (...) su seolantica resulta ser inexpresable. Finalmente considero una solucion posible a este probierna.In this paper, I relate two items not commonly related in the literature on Frege: Frege’s argument on the interpretation of identity statements and his problem of referring to functions. First, I expound the argument and conclude that it is sound. Second, I characterize the semantical relations which the argument allows him to introduce. In what follows, I deal with the above mentioned problem and show how it affects Frege’s semantics: those semantical relations become unnameable and, therefore, his semantics turns out to be unexpressible. I consider a possible solution of this problem. (shrink)