Many international business training programs present a viewpoint of cultural relativism that encourages business people to adapt to the host country's culture. This paper presents an argument that cultural relativism is not always appropriate for business ethics; rather, a code of conduct must be adapted which presents guidelines for core ethical business conduct across cultures. Both moral and economic evidence is provided to support the argument for a universal code of ethics. Also, four steps are presented that will help ensure (...) that company ethical standards are followed internationally. (shrink)

It is argued that the preservation of truth by an inference relation is of little interest when premiss sets are contradictory. The notion of a level of coherence is introduced and the utility of modal logics in the semantic representation of sets of higher coherence levels is noted. It is shown that this representative role cannot be transferred to first order logic via frame theory since the modal formulae expressing coherence level restrictions are not first order definable. Finally, an inference (...) relation, calledyielding, is introduced which is intermediate between the coherence preservingforcing relation introduced elsewhere by the authors and the coherence destroying, inference relation of classical logic. (shrink)

This book is less about disjunction than about the English word ‘or’, and it is less for than against formal logicians—more exactly, against those who maintain that formal logic can be applied in certain ways to the evaluation of reasoning formulated in ordinary English. Nevertheless, there are many things to interest such of those persons who are willing to overlook the frequent animadversions directed against their kind in the book, and this review will concentrate on them.

The recent financial crisis has triggered an intense debate about the role of banks in society, presumably changing the criteria used in the evaluation of organizations. Against this backdrop, we investigate the changing role of banks’ organizational features in shaping different dimensions of banks’ organizational reputation. Using the media as an important evaluator, we measure the reputational dimension of visibility based on the frequency of newspaper articles and the reputational dimension of favorability based on the sentiment of newspaper articles. Drawing (...) on social judgment research for developing our hypotheses, we expect that organizational features such as financial performance and familiarity become more important determinants of organizational reputation in times of crisis. Our results support this expectation, suggesting stronger effects of these organizational features on the visibility and favorability of banks during a crisis. These findings provide novel empirical evidence on how the importance of drivers of organizational reputation changes in times of crisis and highlight areas for managerial attention. (shrink)

In this paper we investigate nonnormal modal systems in the vicinity of the Lewis system S1. It might be claimed that Lewis's modal systems are the starting point of modern modal logics. However, our interests in the Lewis systems and their relatives are not historical. They possess certain syntactical features and their frames certain structural properties that are of interest to us. Our starting point is not S1, but a weaker logic S1$^0$. We extend it to S1$^0$D, which can be (...) considered as a deontic counterpart of the alethic S1. Soundness and completeness of these systems are then demonstrated within a prenormal idiom. We conclude with some philosophical remarks on the interpretation of our deontic logic. (shrink)

This monograph revisits Uruguay’s remarkable transformation from a volatile product of ‘balkanisation’ in the River Plate area into Latin America’s first welfare-state democracy, associated with President José Batlle y Ordóñez (1903–7, 1911–15). Central to the country’s belated polity formation and nation-building was its school reform. The author investigates this, for the first time, from its start in 1868 under José Pedro Varela to the end of Batlle’s second term and argues that continuities in change prevailed over the alleged rupture of (...) 1903, including at the level of normative ideas. Moreover, by placing Uruguay into the broader context of what scholars have called the “Corridor of Ideas” from Santiago de Chile through Buenos Aires and Montevideo to Porto Alegre, this pioneering study also shows how Uruguay acted as a crossroads of intellectuals and a laboratory for the contestation, assimilation, and merger of global and autochthonous political and pedagogical philosophies. Jens R Hentschke is Professor of Latin American History and Politics at Newcastle University in the UK. (shrink)

Uruguay is a prime example of how a peripheral country creatively digested foreign experiences and became not only Latin America’s first welfare state democracy, but also a pioneer of free, compulsory, and lay education, the work of two political generations, positivist varelistas and Krausist batllistas. This article, based on new archival sources, contemporary newspapers, official publications, and monographs by protagonists argues that one of their consistent reference points, largely ignored in historiography, was Belgium, a country founded almost at the same (...) time as Uruguay and admired for its liberal constitutionalism. Uruguayan reformers’ fascination with Belgium, but also their risk awareness, increased when, from the 1860s, both countries implemented conflictual secularizing school reforms that aimed at belated cultural nation-building. (shrink)

GENERALIZED RECUBION THEORY II © North-Holland Publishing Company (1978) MONOTONE QUANTIFIERS AND ADMISSIBLE SETS Ion Barwise University of Wisconsin ...

What you believe about God actually changes your brain. Psychiatrist Tim Jennings unveils how our brains and bodies thrive when we have a healthy understanding of who God is. This expanded edition now includes a study guide to help you discover how neuroscience and Scripture come together to bring healing and transformation to our lives.

In [3] I argued for a particular kind of semantics for subjunctive conditionals. The arguments were based upon some linguistic considerations of the general character of what we mean when we say such and such. I urged that a semantics for subjunctive conditionals ought to provide a distinct representation of the subjunctive mood of a sentence, and should take seriously the fact that subjunctive conditionals admit distinctions of tense. The envisaged semantics took the subjunctive conditional to be about occasions, and (...) the central problem discussed was, accordingly, how to represent what must count as the same occasion in spite of whatever changes were required to make the antecedent of the conditional true. (shrink)

The author argues that polity and policies of Getúlio Vargas’s Estado Novo cannot be fully understood without exploring the legacy of Rio Grande do Sul. The southern state’s first republican governor, Júlio de Castilhos, had taken inspiration in Auguste Comte’s multifaceted political philosophy and inculcated its authoritarian traits into political institutions. Yet, he and his followers substantially adapted Comte’s positivism to the specific economic and political circumstances in their republiqueta sui generis. In contrast to Comte, the State merged temporal and (...) spiritual powers to pursue evolutionary political changes, a balanced socioeconomic modernisation, and the incorporation of the populus qua paternalistic public policies, and all this with a strong focus on education. Changing contexts resulted in further adjustments, when Vargas became governor in 1928: an ‘orderly’ inclusion of the opposition into the polity, a stronger state interventionism in the economy and labor market, and an experimentation with state corporatism. These experiences paved the way for this comtismo-turned-castilhismo-turning-varguismo to enter the national stage two years later. Despite all the compromises with other contenders for power that Vargas had to make thereafter, he and his gaúcho and other co-opted protégés remained united in the strong belief in technical solutions to social problems and a quest for rational institutions to carry out transformative policies. For them, the State was to be agent of development, tutor of corporate interest groups, and now also guarantor of national security. While highlighting the significant, and still underestimated, impact of French positivism on Vargas’s first 15 years in government, the article places emphasis on the pragmatic dimensions of its appropriation, propagation, and reinterpretation by two generations of state-builders. (shrink)

This paper is an experiment in Leibnizian analysis. The reader will recall that Leibniz considered all true sentences to be analytically so. The difference, on his account, between necessary and contingent truths is that sentences reporting the former are finitely analytic; those reporting the latter require infinite analysis of which God alone is capable. On such a view at least two competing conceptions of entailment emerge. According to one, a sentence entails another when the set of atomic requirements for the (...) first is included in the corresponding set for the other; according to the other conception, every atomic requirement of the entailed sentence is underwritten by an atomic constituent of the entailing one. The former conception is classical on the twentieth century understanding of the term; the latter is the one we explore here. Now if we restrict ourselves to the formal language of the propositional calculus, every sentence has a finite analysis into its conjunctive normal form. Semantically, then, every sentence of that language can be represented as a simple hypergraph, H, on the powerset of a universe of states. Entailment of the sort we wish to study can be represented as a known relation, subsumption between hypergraphs. Since the lattice of hypergraphs thus ordered is a DeMorgan lattice, the logic of entailment thus understood is the familiar system, FDE of first-degree entailment. We observe that, extensionalized, the relation of subsumption is itself a DeMorgan Lattice ordered by higher-order subsumption. Thus the semantic idiom that hypergraph-theory affords reveals a hierarchy of lattices capable of representing entailments of every finite degree. (shrink)

Corporate change and employee dislocation are inevitable in a free market. However, the current employment relationship in the U.S. that affords a perceived employment safety net is contrary to the natural canon of honesty. Employees cannot be guaranteed employment when a company fails or a product is no longer viable. Attempts to provide costly employment safety nets cause a firm to allocate resources to nonproductive programs that may ultimately cause a loss of competitiveness. These strategies to provide alternate employment may (...) provide only short-term solutions. But even short-term safety nets against unemployment may be sending employees unrealistic messages ... a permanent safety net against unemployment. As a result, employees may lose incentive to be innovative in creating their own personal safety nets. The resolution is candor about the risk of employment. A false employment safety net is not what employees want or need and in the long run it may be detrimental to American competitiveness. (shrink)

I am idebted to members of the Wellington Logic Seminar for useful discussions of work of which this essay forms part, in particular to M. J. Cresswell for comments in the earlier stages of the investigation and to R. I. Goldblatt who suggested the definition ofB infD supu and made numerous other suggestions.

Positivism, the predominant philosophy of Latin America’s elites at the end of the nineteenth century, found its exemplary expression in Brazil’s castilhismo and Mexico’s porfiriato. Argentina, in contrast, seemed to have deviated from the norm of ‘enlightened dictatorships’. After the end of the Rosas tyranny in 1852, authoritarianism had been discredited. Early positivism, as embodied by Teacher-President Sarmiento, could barely be distinguished from liberalism and no single political philosophy was able to exert hegemony. However, the significance of ‘scientific politics’ should (...) not be downplayed. As this article argues, the merger, in the 1880s, of Comtean positivism and teacher training revolutionised education policies that aimed at erasing frontier backwardness and inserting future generations into an export-led economy, oligarchic polity, and homogenous national organism. Normal schools, especially Sarmiento’s Escuela de Parana´, acted as laboratories for the assimilation, merger, and contestation of European, North American, and autochthonous scientific, philosophical, and pedagogical traditions. (shrink)

This chapter looks at ‘any’ as a quantifier. If noun phrases with ‘any’ are to be construed quantificationally, they must sometimes be represented by a universal quantifier, and sometimes by an existential. Earlier philosophers, notably Quine and Geach, hoped that the existentially representable cases might, when considerations of scope are taken into account, prove to be universal after all. Nevertheless, there are ineluctably ‘existential’ uses. In addition, if there are cases that must be represented existentially, then it is useless to (...) insist that all those cases that can be represented universally must be, even those for which a short-scope existential representation is available. However, the larger conclusion is that we should question the view that ‘any’ is essentially a quantifier in anything like the first-order logical understanding of that notion. (shrink)

The first chapter discusses the association of the English word ‘or’ in reasoning. “Or” is descended from the Anglo-Saxon word meaning second, a form which survives in such expressions as “every other day.” If logical theory had not introduced the vocabulary of disjunction, we could not formulate the question. The truth-functional character of ‘or’ and ‘and’, if they have such a character in their natural language habitat, is a character that is derived as a consequence of their playing a certain (...) role in discourse, one best described as punctuation, or in a specialized sense of the word adverbial. In many cases, the transformation of a sentence embedding an or-list to an equivalent or joined pair of sentences cannot plausibly be called disjunctive distribution. ‘Or’-words derive from additive rather than from subtractive ancestors. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the conceptual orbitings of individuals corresponding to lists of noun phrases formed with ‘or’. We should resist the precept that a set-theoretic union must be contrived for every occurrence of ‘or’ in favour of some discourse-theoretical account that codifies the work that ‘or’ does in the punctuation of speech. A succession of sentences composed with ‘or’ is replaced by a succession of forms containing non-assertive occurrences of those sentences either composed with ‘and’ or as separate acts of (...) speech. The discussion of the behaviour of ‘or’ may be taken up in intensional environments where Quine left the subject of the opacity of certain verbs. The degree of particularity of the intentions is reflected in the particularity with which the dative pronoun will permit existential generalization. (shrink)

This chapter examimes relevance to misunderstandings about the meaning of aut and possible meanings of ‘or’. In spite of what has been said about the notion of form, there is no harm in applying the word ‘formal’ to the Stoics' work. By some standards, it is not informal, and by those standards, we may therefore call it formal where it is the contrast intended. Since the substitution account of validity would not rule out such disjunctions and a descriptive account would, (...) the descriptive account seems on that score to be the more likely candidate for the Stoic conception of validity. Boole also took exclusivity, even the same arity-free idea of exclusivity, to be centrally important to his representation, but the exclusivity was constructed out of a non-exclusive disjunctive use of ‘or’. (shrink)

This chapter talks about how philosophers define and use the word ‘or’ and how the word ‘or’ has undergone changes in modification. The notion of logical form does not apply straightforwardly to sentences of natural language. A sentence has no logical form independently of a specification of a formal language of representation. There is a sense in which the whole meaning of the inclusive “or” is only part of the meaning of the exclusive “or”. According to Boole's Rule, and-lists of (...) general terms represent unions in the subject place; or-lists of general terms represent unions in the predicate place. A unified semantic account of or, and a uniform semantics of natural language connectives more generally must depend upon an abandonment of both assumptions. (shrink)

This chapter examines puzzle about the word ‘or’ and some proposed solutions. The theorems of propositional logic are interpreted in such a way as to be provided with an analogous account. The contrast lies in the absence of any such compositional account of ‘or’ and the vocabulary of preference. The distributive puzzle has merely been displaced. We should have to justify the assumption that every list formed with ‘or’ is a disjunctive list. A grammaticological account of distribution over or-lists depends (...) upon our being able to understand the list-containing sentence as a sentence-embedding sentence. Readers have to add a parallel observation about ‘or’. Disjunctive occurrences of ‘or’ as a sentential connective are, if not quite rare, at least not among the commonest uses of ‘or’ in spoken or written English. (shrink)

This chapter describes the second myth. The second myth can be described as cheerful handmaiden to the first, and, perhaps because of its classical hearkening, has an undeniable charm. Some languages, though English is not one of them, have two different words for two different senses of “or.” The second myth—Latin not only possessed truth-functional vocabulary but also possessed a clearer meaning. The ultimate source of the myth remains a mystery. As with the English ‘or’ the puzzle is not to (...) understand how the conjunctive uses of aut are to be explained in the face of its disjunctive meaning, but how its disjunctive use arises out of a more primitive meaning that is adverbially conjunctive and more or less adversative. Latin, awaits its dissolution, and as we shall see, provides a useful clue. (shrink)

This chapter explains the final account of the origins of disjunction. In Russell's account, “or” corresponds to a state of hesitation. ‘In order to express a hesitation in words, we need “or” or some equivalent word’. His suggestion that ‘or’ represents a state of hesitation takes up in altered form a theme of earlier writers having to do with the character of disjunction in individual as contrasted with general propositions. Grice's genetic speculations about ‘or’ are, like Russell's, part of an (...) attempt to say more generally what the logical particles do in language and thus why they came into it. The final account of the origins of disjunction is, a realization of Wittgenstein's aim, and since it will show how the logical uses of ‘or’ have been sponsored by specific non-logical requirements of linguistic practice. (shrink)