A major controversy in the study of the "Analects" has been over the relation between two central concepts, ren (humanity, human excellence) and li (rites, rituals of propriety). Confucius seems to have said inconsistent things about this relation. Some passages appear to suggest that ren is more fundamental than li, while others seem to imply the contrary. It is therefore not surprising that there have been different interpretations and characterizations of this relation. Using the analogy of language grammar and (...) mastery of a language, it is proposed here that we should understand li as a cultural grammar and ren as the mastery of a culture. In this account, society cultivates its members through li toward the goal of ren, and persons of ren manifest their human excellence through their practice of li. (shrink)

In Confucianism, ritual propriety 1 is commonly understood as an instrument for guiding people's actions. In this essay, however, I argue that taking ritual propriety merely as an instrument external to human beings fails to appreciate important aspects of Xunzi's conception of ritual propriety. Drawing on suggestions from Martin Heidegger's philosophy, I argue that ritual propriety in the Xunzi is analogous to language in Heidegger in important ways. For Heidegger, language is the (...) "house of Being." For Xunzi, ritual propriety could also be described as the house of the being of humanity. "House" refers to the medium in which human beings dwell. As the "house" of the morally refined person, ritual... (shrink)

Research on ethical leadership in organizations has been largely based on Western philosophical traditions and has tended to focus on Western corporate experiences. Insights gained from such studies may however not be universally applicable in other cultural contexts. This paper examines the normative grounds for an alternative Confucian virtue-based ethics of leadership in China. As with Western corporations, organizational practices in China are profoundly shaped by their own cultural history and philosophical outlook. The ethical norms guiding both the practice and (...) theory of leadership in China are underpinned by indigenous Chinese wisdoms imbued in their own traditions and China’s collective psyche. Focusing on three fundamental aspects of Confucian virtue ethics: _ren_ (仁 benevolence), _yi_ (义 righteousness) and _li_(礼 ritual propriety), this paper proposes that an ideal Confucian leader regards self-cultivation as a first priority; status and material gain, whilst important, are not the foremost concern. S/he exemplifies the virtuous role model, exudes moral charisma and influences others by shaping an organization’s ethical culture through the process of ritualization. The paper concludes by claiming that amplifying the explicit discourse around Confucian virtue ethics will help contribute to the development of better ethical leadership in China. (shrink)

This book is a study of twelve major Confucian philosophical concepts and related issues. These are dynamic harmony (he和), care-centered virtue(ren仁), ritual propriety(li禮), filial care (xiao孝), differentiated gender equilibrium (bie别), friendship (you友), longevity (shou壽), sagehood (sheng聖), equality (qi齊), freedom (ziyou自由), politics (zheng政), and education (jiao教). Each chapter presents something new: a novel interpretation from a fresh angle, an insight that has been neglected in scholarship, or a reformed idea that connects tradition with modern sensibilities. Collectively they serve as (...) a general introduction to progressive Confucian philosophy in the twenty-first century. To facilitate classroom use, each chapter concludes with a set of study questions to assist students to comprehend key points and to develop their own views. (shrink)

Edification 教化 is one of the central concepts of Confucianism. The metaphysical basis of the Confucian edification is the “philosophical theory” in the sense of rational humanism rather than the “religious doctrine” in the sense of pure faith. Confucianism did not create a system of ceremony and propriety owned by Confucians only. The system of ceremony and propriety on which Confucians depend to carry out their social edification is that of “rites and music,” the common life style of (...) ancient China. After continual metaphysical explanation and elevation, the system of ceremony and propriety and that of rites and music have undergone a sort of ever-evolving historical fluctuation, and evinced a sort of openness and forgiveness comparable to that of any other religious form. Compared with typical religious practices, whose ceremonies and rituals that have their own special fixity and exclusivity, Confucian ceremonies and rituals are fundamentally different. The edification of Confucianism can be labeled as “edification in the sense of philosophy.” As a “philosophy”, Confucianism’s vision did not focus on cognition but on completion and realization. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose an interpretation of the Confucian concept of li or Ritual Propriety, and suggest a new philosophy of action and mind on the basis of the concept. To achieve this aim, I fo...

In this paper, I propose an interpretation of the Confucian concept of li or Ritual Propriety, and suggest a new philosophy of action and mind on the basis of the concept. To achieve this aim, I fo...

A pervasive misunderstanding of Confucian philosophy’s concepts considers them to be directives that call for deference and subordination, principally associated with the concept Lǐ 禮 which is understood as rites, rituals, manners, or generally “propriety”. Imposing Lǐ 禮 is considered a path to social and personal harmony. However, an analysis of the conditions and implications of Lǐ 禮 in early Confucian thinking shows that authentic respect, not obedience, is considered the essential condition for good governance and an ordered society. (...) Significantly, authentic respect can only originate from within the self, it cannot be commanded. Based upon self-cultivation, participation in ritual and exemplary conduct establishes a commitment to respect, and the purposeful distinctions expressed through Lǐ 禮 make social order intelligible. Considering the essence of respect in depth, and comparing it to the ethics conceived by Immanuel Kant, neither Confucian nor Kantian ethics are truly deontological in the sense of a “duty that is owed to an external instance”, rather they both rest on the autonomy of the self. A synthesis of both implies that extending authentic respect to an other in an encounter within the context of Lǐ 禮 gives rise to “Existential Reciprocity”: a virtuous cycle which mutually affirms both the self and the other, while rejecting a dichotomous opposition between self-esteem and morality. This is not contingent on external factors, but accessible from a self-determined, autonomous engagement with self-affirming conduct and productive encounters. Benefits are immediate and personal, and this forms the conditions in which harmonious relationships are a natural outcome. (shrink)

본 논문은 『순자』에 나타난 ‘類’ 개념의 의미를 분석하고 그것이 순자 철학에서 가지는 함의를 밝히는 것을 목적으로 한다. 고대한어에서 ‘類’는 종족, 종류, 분류, 유사, 유례, 유추 등의 의미를 갖는다. 『순자』의 ‘類’ 역시 일차적으로는 이러한 문자적 의미를 갖지만, 그것은 순자 사상의 핵심적인 문제들과 결부되어 개념화되어 있다. 따라서 類 개념에 대한 고찰을 통해 순자사상을 보다 입체적으로 조망할 수 있을 것이다. 이 글에서는 먼저 『순자』에서 類가 禮와 法과 밀접히 결부되어 있으며 양쪽 모두의 실현에 필요한 ‘분류’와 ‘유추’와 같은 특정한 지적 능력을 의미한다는 것을 밝히고, 이러한 (...) 유개념에서 파생된 統類가 聖王, 聖人, 大儒 등 유가의 이상적 인간이 가진 능력과 관계되어 있음을 논했다. 순자의 類 개념이 그의 의례이론을 통해 가장 명시적으로 드러날 수 있음에 주목하여 본고에서는 특히 類와 禮의 관계 해명에 중점을 두었다. 喪禮에 대한 순자의 논의를 분석하여 의례의 중층적인 유적 구조를 밝히고 그 속에서 統類가 어떤 의미를 가지는지 고찰했다. 순자의 예론에 의하면 수많은 의례행위들은 일정한 원리(義)에 따라 유기적으로 구성되며, ‘統類’는 다양한 의례행위를 관통하는 ‘통일적인 원리’ 혹은 그러한 원리를 파악하는 ‘행위 및 능력’을 지칭한다. 이러한 統類는 의례적 상황에 국한되지 않고 法의 영역에도 적용되며, 더 나아가 인간 사회 전반을 질서 있게 조직하고 운용하기 위해 儒者가 갖추어야할 능력으로 이야기된다. 순자에게 있어 자연과 인간과 규범은 상호의존적이며, 인간 사회는 일관된 원리 하에 분화되고 조직되어 질서를 얻는다. 순자는 이와 같은 질서를 획득하고 유지시키는 원리를 禮義로 규정한다. 예의는 사회를 분화시키는 원리인 동시에 사회를 하나로 통합하는 원리로서 기능하는 것이다. 순자가 이상적으로 제시하는 위정자, 즉 大儒는 이러한 禮義에 기반해서 禮에 속하는 상황이건 法에 속하는 상황이건 그 근저에 있는 통일적 원리를 파악하고 적용하여 처리하는 존재로서 정의된다. 이러한 순자의 儒者像은 통일 왕조 이후 국가 관료의 기본 모델이 된다는 점에서 중국사상사 속에서 중요한 의의를 갖는다고 할 수 있다. (shrink)

A reconsideration of the Confucian concept li (ritual or ritual propriety), one that references Western philosophers as well as the Chinese context. Geir Sigurðsson offers a reconsideration of li, often translated as “ritual” or “ritual propriety,” one of the most controversial concepts in Confucian philosophy. Strong associations with the Zhou period during which Confucius lived have put this concept at odds with modernity’s emphasis on progressive rationality and liberation from the yoke of tradition. Sigurðsson (...) notes how the Confucian perspective on learning provides a more balanced understanding of li. He goes on to discuss the limitations of the critique of tradition and of rationality’s claim to authority, referencing several Western sources, notably Hans-Georg Gadamer, John Dewey, and Pierre Bourdieu. An exposition of the ancient Chinese worldview of time and continuous change further points to the inevitability of li’s adaptable and flexible nature. Sigurðsson argues that Confucius and his immediate followers did not endorse a program of returning to the Zhou tradition, but rather of reviving the spirit of Zhou culture, involving active and personalized participation in tradition’s sustention and evolution. (shrink)

This paper takes behavioural propriety as the source of ritual or the ritualistic in indigenous philosophy in the Philippines. Filipino understanding of behavioural propriety is seen in what have been identified as elements or features of indigenous philosophy in the country. These features are stored in pre-hispanic era (pre-16th century CE) maxims or proverbs and myths. In this paper, I engage conception of behavioural propriety in Filipino philosophy with that in Confucian philosophy. In Confucian philosophy, it (...) is “li” 禮 which relates to ritual. Li encompasses ritual propriety and behavioural propriety. It is originally about ritual or ceremony and, as understood in contemporary scholarship, it has the general meaning of proper conduct; it refers first and foremost to rules of proper conduct. In this paper, I address the question of what each understanding offers for the enrichment of the other. I suggest that importantly, Confucian understanding of li offers the view of behavioural propriety as having an ennobling function, and that Filipino understanding of behavioural propriety offers a perspective on the debate in Confucianism about whether it is ren 仁 or li that is more fundamental in Confucius’s thought. A point that appears to be present in the Filipino understanding is that propriety in behaviour cannot be separated from humaneness (ren). The point comes from the view in the proverbs that a person of ren is necessarily a person of li. Accordingly, the perspective which the Filipino understanding offers proposes the view that behavioural propriety is a necessary condition for humanity (ren). (shrink)

In this article, I probe the nature of Confucian virtue with special focus on ritual propriety (li). I examine two classic, mutually competing accounts of li—as moral virtue and as civic virtue—in early Confucianism by investigating the thoughts of Mencius and Xunzi. My primary aim in this article is to demonstrate how their different accounts of human nature and equally different understandings of the natural state (that is, the pre-li state) led them to the development of two distinctive (...) political theories of virtue in the Confucian tradition. More specifically, they justified the nature of the li on different terms—human/moral on the one hand and civic/political on the other. I conclude by revisiting the contemporary debate on the nature of Confucian ethics from the perspective of early Confucianism represented by Mencius and Xunzi. (shrink)

Li 禮 (translated variously as “ritual”, “etiquette”, or “propriety”) plays a central role in early Confucianism, but its complexity is not always fully understood. At first glance, it may seem as if li behaviors are merely attempts to promote conservative practices from the idealized Chinese past. However, by examining the nature and function of li, as described the Analects (Lunyu 論語) and the Xunzi 荀子 (two key texts in the early Confucian tradition), it becomes overwhelmingly apparent that li (...) is a much more complicated phenomenon. Li actually plays key roles within the interconnected fields of Confucian ethics, religion, and politics and often adds aesthetic elements to these areas of thought. As such, it is as much a source of Confucian innovation as it is a tool for promoting reverence for the past. (shrink)

In the philosophy of Confucius, the concept _li_ is both central and elusive. While it is often translated 'ritual' or 'the rites,' I argue that there are numerous significant ways in which _li_ is as much an internal property of individuals as it is an external set of rules or norms. I discuss _li_ as deference, as developed dispositions, as embodied intelligence, and as personalized exemplary conduct. Finally, reflecting on the work of Fingarette, and Hall and Ames, as well (...) as Wilson's analysis of their work, I argue that the external _aspect_ of _li_, although reasonably understood under the rubric of 'traditional norms,' may nonetheless legitimately evolve, and that this coheres well with the notion that an internal sense-of-ritual is integral to the meaning of _li_. (shrink)

This article explains how li 禮 or ‘ritual propriety’ is the ‘body language’ of ren 仁 or the authentic expression of our humanity. Li and ren are interdependent aspects of a larger creative human way (rendao 仁道) that can be conceptually distinguished as follows: li refers to the ritualized social form of appropriate conduct and ren to the more general, authentically human spirit this expresses. Li is the social instrument for self-cultivation and the vehicle of harmonious human interaction. (...) More, li must mean something that is effectively communicated to others for an authentic, human (ren) interaction to occur. Li is the body language of ren in being the ritual vehicle for its’ expression; however, li is underdetermined by ren and so must be distinguished from it in on further grounds: authentic human activity must not just be equivocated with social convention because conclusively establishing whether a particular action is li (or is a truly ren action) is impossible. As a result, li is often confused with social power and privilege that is easier to empirically identify than ren conduct is, but this is a mistake since li has to express ren or it is not li at all. The inescapable ambiguity of li – an ambiguity that attaches to any language – can be critiqued by the Western view that sees something ‘essential’ to the ‘self,’ and that makes one a ‘self’ in and of oneself and not in a way that depends on others. I show that such Western individualism – while resting on a fundamentally different way of thinking of being a person and living a good life – does not reduce Confucian ritual to being an instrument for social discrimination and subordination. My argument is indebted to twentieth-century philosophy of language in the West that offered the idea that some words are actions. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to show, first, that ritual in general and the Confucian li in particular can serve an important pedagogical function, and, secondly, that the sophisticated treatment of li by Confucius and his immediate followers demonstrates that they were consciously aware of this particular potential of li. The discussion takes off by considering formal, ritualized performances from an educational point of view by making use of some seminal, largely Western, research on ritual, though always (...) with an eye on li. It then turns more specifically to li as exemplifying informal interpersonal conduct, whereby pre-Qin Confucian writings will be consulted to construct an interpretation of li as creative and personalized edifying embodiments of a cultural legacy. It will be argued that both aspects of ritual, formal and informal, are potentially of value as a pedagogical tool for instilling a communal sense in the practitioners as well as enabling them to contribute creatively to the ongoing evolution of their cultural habitat. (shrink)

This essay argues that Confucian ritual propriety (li 禮) and Aristotelian habit (hexis, ἔξις) play analogous roles within their respective ethical systems and that we can come to appreciate important dimensions of each category by juxtaposing it with the other. Despite numerous and deep dissimilarities, both li and hexis work to organize and publicize emotions and dispositions, ground true moral quality in phenomenally-present activity, and (leveraging insights from Marcel Mauss) contribute to shaping and actualizing an agent’s body and (...) behavior. The essay unpacks several semantic subtleties of li and hexis, and attempts to respond to alleged disanalogies. Finally, the success of a such a li-hexis analogy reveals the ways in which Aristotle’s virtues are more socially contingent and Confucian morality is less particularistic than is often allowed; which in turn, I argue, lessens some of the distance between virtue-based and role-based ethical frameworks. (shrink)

Li (禮) and yi (義) are two central moral concepts in the Analects. Li has a broad semantic range, referring to formal ceremonial rituals on the one hand, and basic rules of personal decorum on the other. What is similar across the range of referents is that the li comprise strictures of correct behavior. The li are a distinguishing characteristic of Confucian approaches to ethics and socio-political thought, a set of rules and protocols that were thought to constitute the wise (...) practices of ancient moral exemplars filtered down through dynasties of the past. However, even while the li were extensive and meant to be followed diligently, they were also understood as incapable of exhausting the whole range of activity that constitutes human life. There were bound to be situations in life where there would be no obvious recourse to the li for guidance. As part of their reflections on the good life, the Confucians maintained another moral concept that seemed to cover morally upright exemplary behavior in these types of situations. This concept is that of yi or rightness. In this chapter, I begin with a brief historical sketch to provide some context, and will then turn to li and yi in turn. In the end, I will suggest how li and yi were both meant to facilitate the supreme value of social harmony that pervades much of the Analects and serves as its ultimate orientation. (shrink)

This work is a thought experiment in re-interpreting the virtue of li or ritual/propriety for the contemporary, multi-cultural, world. Using Zhuangzi, the Lunyu, and Zhongyong as my primary points of departure, I re-interpret the Confucian ideas of hierarchy in terms of the Daoist conception of harmony. Many scholars today argue that Confucianism has a relational ontology, yet at the same time, we find that Confucian values can and do lead to rigid and harmful traditions that have historically oppressed (...) marginalized groups like women. As such, I re-imagine what li might look like if we take relational ontology seriously, Drawing from Zhuangzi, I argue that Confucian harmony and order do not necessarily arise out of hierarchy, and that harmony, the most primary goal of li and of the Confucian project, can be best attained through propriety that is influenced by Daoism and feminist values such as equality. (shrink)

This paper specifically deals with the relation between respect and li禮in the Confucian context. Li has both negative and positive sources. On the positive level, ritual propriety enables one to ex...

Confucian state doctrines have shaped Asian cultures for millennia as prescriptive codes of conduct with an emphasis on hierarchy and obligation. Yet a premise at the core of lǐ —understood as propriety, ritual, or generally a cultural grammar—is authenticity, and authentic respect cannot be commanded. What if the lǐ were to be elegant instead? Hans-Georg Gadamer analyzed play as a fusion of horizons that are absorbed into the same event, co-constituting subject and object in an aesthetic experience, and (...) dissolving their dichotomy. We consider examples from Japanese aesthetics in this framework to give depth to key Confucian concepts: the values that enable a relationality that is not in conflict with autonomy; the points of reference for self-improvement through culture; a social organization that enacts reciprocity; and the essential posture this requires. The radical simplicity of the philosophy of tea, chanoyu, and the aesthetic refinement of the Katsura Rikyū palace illuminate the principle of emotional resonance in encounters, which underlies the fusion of cognitive, ethical, and aesthetic horizons. This view reveals how the relational premise of the Confucian philosophical system entails an ontological commitment to mutuality. This is indeed ethics, but neither particularism nor generalism; in its aesthetic dimension it is the mode of perception of a self fulfilled in play. (shrink)

Confucius associates the good and the beautiful. Li (translated variously as “ritual propriety,” “ritual,” “etiquette,” or “propriety”) embodies the entire spectrum of interaction with humans, nature, and even material objects. I argue that Confucius attempts to introduce an ethical ontology, not of “what,” but of “the way.” The “way” of reality becomes known with the deliberate participation to the Dao. In other words, through interaction. The way people co-exist demonstrates the rationality of the associations of living (...) and functioning together. Li, as an aesthetic-moral principle, embodies the entire spectrum of one’s interaction with humans, nature, and even material objects. Li is a constitutive element of Confucian ethics and politics, highlighting the importance of beauty, and not only goodness, in human action. The worthiness of human action is judged both aesthetically and morally. Moreover, I hold that Confucius’ ethical ontology is not an ontology of “whatness” but of “howness,” according to the Dao, since Confucius primary concern was not to define the Dao, but to restore the Dao of the ancient sage-kings. The morality of the action is dependent on the way it is performed, according to the mandates of the Dao. (shrink)

Modern mainstream ethical theories with its overemphasis on autonomy and non-interference have failed to adequately respond to contemporary social problems. A new ethical perspective is very much needed. Thanks to Carol Gilligan's 1982 groundbreaking work, 'In a Different Voice' , we now not only have virtue and communitarian ethicists, but also a group of feminist philosophers, charting a new direction for ethics that tempers modern ethics' obsession with autonomy, contractual rights, and abstract rules. Nel Noddings, in her 'Caring: A Feminine (...) Approach to Ethics and Moral Education', further contributed to this important discussion. In this work, Noddings proposes a new kind of moral ideal. She calls it "caring." Noddings defines "caring," as a direct, felt concern and action from the one-caring toward the well-being of the cared-for. In other words, care is a state of mental engrossment and motivational displacement that impels caring actions for the happiness of the cared-for and it transcends any rule-bound moral judgment. A caring attitude is best manifest in the spontaneous emotive bond of love between a mother and a child. This human relation of unscrutinized maternal love and care should be the model of ethics. Noddings's theory evokes a vigorous debate concerning whether or not the model can withstand rigorous philosophical scrutiny as a stand-alone ethical theory. This paper first discusses the strengths and weaknesses of a pure care ethics. Secondly, it demonstrates why both the Kantian and the Aristotelian attempts are unsatisfactory, and it offers a Confucian solution to the problems of care ethics. It argues that notwithstanding gender-oppressive practices that are at times associated with Confucianism, Confucian ethics of 'ren' (humaneness) is both more compatible with care ethics and is better equipped with conceptual resources than Kantian liberalism or Aristotelian virtue ethics to handle the moral predicament of the postmodern world. The paper demonstrates that care is an inherent element of Confucian 'ren' but that 'ren' is more than Noddings's care. It examines three essential principles that can be extracted from philosophical classical Confucianism: (1) an affectionate and particularistic approach to persons, (2) the mutual conditioning of the two prominent Confucian virtues -- humaneness (ren) and ritual propriety (li), and (3) the inseparability of the familial and the political self. The last section of the paper applies Confucian care ethics to concrete cases such as the geriatric care crisis and the problem of poverty. (shrink)

Confucian philosopher Xunzi’s moral thought is considered in light of the modern focus on self-realization. Self-Realization through Confucian Learning reconstructs Confucian thinker Xunzi’s moral philosophy in response to the modern focus on self-realization. Xunzi (born around 310 BCE) claims that human xing (“nature” or “native conditions”) is without an ethical framework and has a tendency to dominate, leading to bad judgments and bad behavior. Confucian ritual propriety (li) is needed to transform these human native conditions. Through li, people (...) become self-directing: in control of feelings and desires and in command of their own lives. Siufu Tang explicates Xunzi’s understanding of the hierarchical structure of human agency to articulate why and how li is essential to self-realization. Ritual propriety also structures relationships to make a harmonious communal life possible. Tang’s focus on self-realization highlights how Confucianism can address the individual as well as the communal and serve as a philosophy for contemporary times. (shrink)

Although contemporary Confucianists tend to view Western liberalism as pitting the individual against society, recent liberal scholarship has vigorously claimed that liberal polity is indeed grounded in the self-transformation that produces “liberal virtues.” To meet this challenge, this essay presents a sophisticated Confucian critique of liberalism by arguing that there is an appreciable contrast between liberal and Confucian self-transformation and between liberal and Confucian virtues. By contrasting Locke and Confucius, key representatives of each tradition, this essay shows that both liberalism (...) and Confucianism aim to reconstruct a society freed from antisocial passions entailing a vicious politics of resentment, and yet come to differing ethical and political resolutions. My key claim is that what makes Confucian self-cultivation so distinctive is the incorporation of ritual propriety ( li ) within it, whereas liberal self-transformation that relies heavily on a method of self-control comes back to the problem that it originally set out to overcome. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the relation between shame and a Confucian notion of yi (righteousness, rightness), especially through discussions from Confucius and Mencius. Section one clarifies Mencius’s position that righteousness is both external and internal. Although this idea includes rules, it is primarily something intended by our innate moral feelings. Section two illustrates the point that if one’s action is not right (yi), the feeling of shame spontaneously arises and motivates a self-correction. This section also clarifies the difference between the idea (...) of shame in Max Scheler and in Confucian thought. Section three compares absolute yi with general li (ritual propriety) as well as the roles that shame and duty play in relation to ren (primarily humane love). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:5. Grange plays the blame game on the free market system for example on pp. xviii, T^ 29, 67, 74, 85, 91, 94, 109, III; in connection with remarks on environmental mat- ~ ters it is a consistent subtext of his entire work. Two of his previous works are Nature: J^ An Environmental Cosmology, 1997, and The City: An Urban Cosmology, 1999 (both Albany: tfl SUNY Press). ^ 6. (...) The transliteration of ren as "authoritative person" is an egregious tour deforce, ^ leading to a somewhat inelegant result in English, as in the following examples: "Authoritative persons are content in being authoritative; wise persons flourish in it"; and "The Master said: "I have yet to meet people who are truly fond of authoritative conduct (ren)... And those who abhor behavior contrary to it, in becoming authoritative themselves, will not allow such conduct to attach itself to them" (cited from Grange, p. 29). Li (ritual propriety) is co-opted as a match for the Deweyan concept of experimental inquiry. Yi (sense of justice, outer righteousness, often combined with ren, which in combination constitute the two cardinal virtues of Confucian moral theory), and zhi (knowledge, wisdom) are similarly adopted to work in tandem with a model of an "aesthetic" populism. Grange renders yi as "what is fitting and appropriate," akin to "beauty," or "the fair and the fitting," that is, acting consistently in a manner of openness to what is happening that is "the very opposite of the narcissism that infects so much of Western culture" (p. 52)). 7. The demiurgic role of the "master" here reminds one of the fundamental rift between Whitehead and Dewey that is glossed over in this construction. Dewey, who remained committed to a naturalistic doctrine of emergent evolution, chided Whitehead for his doctrine of the ingression of eternal objects. In reply, Whitehead refused to change this key part of his cosmology. The doctrinal clash between the two thinkers appears to be reflected in the debate over the value of the Confucian concept of Heaven (tian), as indicated in note 4. Edited by Anne Waters American Indian Thought. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004. 306 pages. $29.95 paper. This volume is a group of twenty-two essays about the various facets of Native American thought and philosophy. Eighteen Native American scholars of American Indian thought are the contributors. In many ways this volume is a first in that these Native peoples are trying to create an inteUectual space where ideas, philosophies, spiritualities and esthetics can be examined in a meaningful way. As a long time student of Native American political thought, I applaud this volume because it represents a departure from the attitudes that I encountered in the academy as a young Native American scholar a generation ago. I can remember as a young Associate Ptofessor being in the elevator of Bunche HaU at UCLA when a history colleague of mine turned to me and quizzed me about my interests in Native American history. When I stated that I was interested in Native American thought and particularly Native American political theory, the coUeague replied that they did not know that American Indians had any thoughts or inteUectual traditions. Needless to say, we have 863 ^ corne a long way since that conversation over twenty five years ago. I have ^ always taught undergraduate courses and graduate courses on the History of KH Native American Thought and I adopted this book for a graduate course of ^ mine when it first came out last year. I can say that it was well received by my ^ graduate students and it provided an excellent array of essays on the various areas of Native American philosophy. The work also demonstrates that Native American ideas can be examined within the context of the discipline of philosophy. This collection of essays by American Indian thinkers blends contemporary philosophies with traditional ideas and philosophical issues. Thus, philosophical questions relating to time, place, history, national communities, religion, law, science, the arts and ethics are all addressed. Moreover, the reader can compare Native American viewpoints on phenomenology, metaphysics, ethics, esthetics, epistemology, logic and science with the perspectives of Western philosophy on these topics. In a very real sense, this volume opens new ways... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:5. Grange plays the blame game on the free market system for example on pp. xviii, T^ 29, 67, 74, 85, 91, 94, 109, III; in connection with remarks on environmental mat- ~ ters it is a consistent subtext of his entire work. Two of his previous works are Nature: J^ An Environmental Cosmology, 1997, and The City: An Urban Cosmology, 1999 (both Albany: tfl SUNY Press). ^ 6. (...) The transliteration of ren as "authoritative person" is an egregious tour deforce, ^ leading to a somewhat inelegant result in English, as in the following examples: "Authoritative persons are content in being authoritative; wise persons flourish in it"; and "The Master said: "I have yet to meet people who are truly fond of authoritative conduct (ren)... And those who abhor behavior contrary to it, in becoming authoritative themselves, will not allow such conduct to attach itself to them" (cited from Grange, p. 29). Li (ritual propriety) is co-opted as a match for the Deweyan concept of experimental inquiry. Yi (sense of justice, outer righteousness, often combined with ren, which in combination constitute the two cardinal virtues of Confucian moral theory), and zhi (knowledge, wisdom) are similarly adopted to work in tandem with a model of an "aesthetic" populism. Grange renders yi as "what is fitting and appropriate," akin to "beauty," or "the fair and the fitting," that is, acting consistently in a manner of openness to what is happening that is "the very opposite of the narcissism that infects so much of Western culture" (p. 52)). 7. The demiurgic role of the "master" here reminds one of the fundamental rift between Whitehead and Dewey that is glossed over in this construction. Dewey, who remained committed to a naturalistic doctrine of emergent evolution, chided Whitehead for his doctrine of the ingression of eternal objects. In reply, Whitehead refused to change this key part of his cosmology. The doctrinal clash between the two thinkers appears to be reflected in the debate over the value of the Confucian concept of Heaven (tian), as indicated in note 4. Edited by Anne Waters American Indian Thought. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004. 306 pages. $29.95 paper. This volume is a group of twenty-two essays about the various facets of Native American thought and philosophy. Eighteen Native American scholars of American Indian thought are the contributors. In many ways this volume is a first in that these Native peoples are trying to create an inteUectual space where ideas, philosophies, spiritualities and esthetics can be examined in a meaningful way. As a long time student of Native American political thought, I applaud this volume because it represents a departure from the attitudes that I encountered in the academy as a young Native American scholar a generation ago. I can remember as a young Associate Ptofessor being in the elevator of Bunche HaU at UCLA when a history colleague of mine turned to me and quizzed me about my interests in Native American history. When I stated that I was interested in Native American thought and particularly Native American political theory, the coUeague replied that they did not know that American Indians had any thoughts or inteUectual traditions. Needless to say, we have 863 ^ corne a long way since that conversation over twenty five years ago. I have ^ always taught undergraduate courses and graduate courses on the History of KH Native American Thought and I adopted this book for a graduate course of ^ mine when it first came out last year. I can say that it was well received by my ^ graduate students and it provided an excellent array of essays on the various areas of Native American philosophy. The work also demonstrates that Native American ideas can be examined within the context of the discipline of philosophy. This collection of essays by American Indian thinkers blends contemporary philosophies with traditional ideas and philosophical issues. Thus, philosophical questions relating to time, place, history, national communities, religion, law, science, the arts and ethics are all addressed. Moreover, the reader can compare Native American viewpoints on phenomenology, metaphysics, ethics, esthetics, epistemology, logic and science with the perspectives of Western philosophy on these topics. In a very real sense, this volume opens new ways... (shrink)

There is a remarkable and surprising connection to be found between an argument of Søren Kierkegaard’s and one of Zhuangzi’s—what I call the ‘social misfit’ critique. I will argue that this connection highlights a hitherto unacknowledged parallel between the moral thought of their respective targets: Hegel in the case of Kierkegaard and Confucius in the case of Zhuangzi. Specifically, it reveals a significant parallel between Hegel’s movement from Moralitat to Sittlichkeit and Confucius’ position on the central and irreducible role of (...) li (ritual or propriety) in morality. I will begin by briefly tracing the ‘social misfit’ critique as it is found in Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling and in the Zhuangzi. In Section 2, I will sketch Hegel’s argument for the indispensability and irreducibility of social norms (Sittlichkeit) for morality, and reflect on the implications of this move for the possibility of social criticism. Finally, I will argue that Confucius can be understood as articulating a vision of morality and of social criticism very close to Hegel’s. (shrink)