This is a new edition of the manual published in 1974 and 1984. Compared with those earlier editions it is revised, enlarged and more precise in its argumentation. In its beginnings the manual aimed at meeting the didactic needs to present students of the Faculty of Christian Philosophy at the ATK a complete handling of Christian ethics. The author, who wrote his manual in difficult times of communist ideology, decided to include in one work, besides a positive exposition of Christian (...) ethics, a critical discussion with other ethical systems as well as his own explicit theory on Augustinian and Thomistic ethics, which he endeavoured to develop. Thus the work interlocked the didactic objectives and the process of growth and justification of the Author's views, Krakow 2001, p. 308). (shrink)

The paper presents a brief outline of Michał Heller’s programme of theology of science, with specific attention to its collocation and critical role with respect to both theology and science. The former consideration is based on a third domain of truths (Hans Urs von Balthasar), while the latter is inspired by Józef Tischner’s presentation of religious thinking. Theology of science as such will be described with reference to Larry Laudan’s approach, considered here as a very useful and pragmatic tool for (...) the description of basic concepts of this theology. (shrink)

Argues that the key distinction between human and nonhuman social cognition consists in our complex, diverse and flexible capacities to shape each other's minds in ways that make them easier to interpret.

Argues that the key distinction between human and nonhuman social cognition consists in our complex, diverse and flexible capacities to shape each other's minds in ways that make them easier to interpret.

I argue for two claims. First I argue against the consensus view that accurate behavioral prediction based on accurate representation of cognitive states, i.e. mind reading , is the sustaining function of propositional attitude ascription. This practice cannot have been selected in evolution and cannot persist, in virtue of its predictive utility, because there are principled reasons why it is inadequate as a tool for behavioral prediction. Second I give reasons that favor an alternative account of the sustaining function of (...) propositional attitude ascription. I argue that it serves a mind-shaping function. Roughly, propositional attitude ascription enables human beings to set up regulative ideals that function to mold behavior so as to make it easier to coordinate with. (shrink)

I review recent evidence that very young, pre-verbal infants attribute belief-like states when anticipating the behavior of others. This evidence is drawn from infant performance on non-verbal false belief tasks. I argue that, contrary to typical interpretations, such evidence does not show that infants attribute belief-like states. Rather, it shows that infants apply an enhanced version of what Gergely ( 2011 ) calls the “teleological stance” to brief bouts of behavior. This requires them to parse behavioral sequences into goals and (...) rationally/informationally-constrained means of achieving them; however, it does not require the attribution of unobservable mental states, like beliefs, that are causally responsible for behavior. (shrink)

Hilary Putnam (1926–2016) was prone to change his mind on variety of philosophical issues and almost constantly to modify his views. The last period of the development of his philosophy is known as the phase of commonsense or natural realism, eloquently presented in his 1994 Dewey Lectures. This paper is focused on three facets of his position and tries to identify three difficulties it encounters. Firstly, Putnam claims that in the contemporary realism debate we have, on the one hand, proponents (...) of extravagant metaphysical realism, and, on the other hand, advocates of various versions of irresponsible antirealism. Unfortunately, the delineation of the debate is too coarse-grained, since there are many forms of metaphysical realism, and lumping together various antirealisms is confusing and unhelpful. Secondly, Putnam’s naïve direct realism in the philosophy of perception seems incompatible with his transactional account of perception. Thirdly, for some time Putnam was under a spell of Wittgensteinian quietism that distorted the true character of his philosophical ideas. (shrink)

I argue that proponents of embodied social cognition (ESC) can usefully supplement their views if they enlist the help of an unlikely ally: Daniel Dennett. On Dennett’s view, human social cognition involves adopting the intentional stance (IS), i.e., assuming that an interpretive target’s behavior is an optimally rational attempt to fulfill some desire relative to her beliefs. Characterized this way, proponents of ESC would reject any alliance with Dennett. However, for Dennett, to attribute mental states from the intentional stance is (...) not to attribute concrete, unobservable mental causes of behavior. Once this is appreciated, the kinship between IS—understood as a model of our quotidian interpretive practices—and ESC is apparent: both assume that quotidian interpretation involves tracking abstract, observable, behavioral patterns, not attributing unobservable, concrete, mental causes, i.e., both assume social cognition is possible without metapsychology. I argue that this affinity constitutes an opportunity: proponents of ESC can use IS as a characterization of the subpersonal basis for social cognition. In the process, I make my interpretation of IS more precise and relate it to current empirical literature in developmental psychology. (shrink)

The author presents the problem of humanizing the demon and giving to the human being the demonic features. The analysis focuses on modern Polish prose, especially on such works: Cz. Miłosz, A. Szczypiorski, J. Broszkiewicz, A. Gołubiew, T. Konwicki, G. Herling- Grudziński. He is mostly interested in the devil figure as an evil spirit.

Cet article aborde le rôle du personnage du diable dans le roman de Jerzy Krzysztoń Obłęd. Jusqu'à présent ce rôle n'est pas suffisamment apprécié, malgré qu’il soit de très grande importance. La raison d’être du diable dans ce roman e’est la personnification des états psychiques du heros et du narrateur en commun. Dans Obłęd le diable a été présenté, avant tout, du point de vue médical et il a enrichi la description de la maladie du héros principal. Comme la figure (...) du mal, le personnage du diable facilite à contempler la réalité du mal et de la souffrance. (shrink)

Le roman épistolaire de Kazimierz Brandys, intitulé Les Variations postales (1972), est une sorte d’imitation du recueil des lettres de la familie Zabierski de 1770 à 1970. En décrivant les faits auquels les membres de cette famille ont participé, soit dont ils ont entendu parler, les narrateurs des lettres successives exercent la «microhistoire» - c’est-à-dire ils construisent «la vérité individuelle» comme une opposition par rapport aux généralisations historiques. Donc le point de vue individuel est opposé au processus historique. Cet article (...) analyse le roman de Brandys en tenant compte de la technique du fragment. Il s’agit du caractère fragmentaire, nommé naturel, qui résulte de la situation existentielle des narrateurs particuliers et qui sert à mettre en lumière «la vérité individuelle». (shrink)

I defend an alternative to the two traditional accounts of the relationship between metacognition and social cognition: metacognition as primary versus social cognition as primary. These accounts have complementary explanatory vices and virtues. They also share a natural assumption: that interpretation in terms of mental states is “spectatorial”, aiming exclusively for an objective description of the mental facts about self and others. I argue that if one rejects this assumption in favor of the view that interpretation in terms of mental (...) states also plays important regulative roles with respect to minds and behavior, a new and superior conception of the relationship between metacognition and social cognition comes into view. On this conception, person-level metacognitive concepts are socio-cognitive tools that shape us into better cognitive agents and more predictable cognitive objects, thereby enhancing our abilities at social coordination. Mastery of these metacognitive concepts relies on subpersonal, non-conceptual, procedural metacognition. This reconceptualization of the relationship between metacognition and social cognition combines the complementary explanatory virtues of the two traditional conceptions, while avoiding their complementary explanatory vices. (shrink)

The article presents two concepts of indexicality. The first, more standard and narrow, identifies indexicality with systematic (meaning controlled) context-sensitivity. The second, broader (derived from the work of Jerzy Pelc), conceives indexicality in terms of the potential variability of the general semiotic characteristics expressions (with respect to the context of use). The text introduces the concept of a pragmatic matrix that serves for a schematic representation of contextual variation. I also recapitulate briefly the views of Jerzy Pelc on the meaning (...) (manner of use) and use of expressions, and briefly indicate its relationship approaches with contemporary debates around contextualism and status of non-sentential speech acts. Finally, the relationship between the broader notion of indexicality and the directival theory of meaning is analyzed. (shrink)

Author: Wojewódzki Tadeusz Title: REMARKS BASED AN A WAY OF THINKING (Uwagi na kanwie sposobu myślenia) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.12, number: 2011/1, pages: 213-237 Keywords: JERZY KMITA, THEORY OF CULTURE, WAY OF THINKING, KNOWLEDGE Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:In the interpretation of the actions of communities, teams or organizations – it is crucial, according to the author of this publication, to consider their way of thinking. Referring to (...) Professor Jerzy Kmita’s theory of culture, the way of thinking adopted in the publication is identified based on values and knowledge that are shaped within the frame of the intellectual partnership, as well as being respected and applied in practice. The way of thinking – reproduced on the basis of the actual actions – can significantly deviate from that which is stated, accepted, or articulated as desired. Mental barriers determine this. Their identification is based – in the proposed concept – on an analysis of syndromes. The more significant the share of mental barrier syndromes is for the organization’s way of thinking, the greater the difference between the actual and desired state of affairs. The competences achieved through academic humanistic education are necessary in the blocking of mental barrier syndromes. From the perspective of the needs of modern organizations, skills in information processes appear to be very useful. The author attributes a special role to the quantification of knowledge. Reflections on the mental barrier syndromes are included by the author in The Theory of a thinking organization analogously to The Theory of a learning organization or The Theory of constraints. At the same time he highlights its interdisciplinary character and intellectual pedigree, pointing at the methodological school of Poznań, especially the thoughts of Professor Jerzy Kmita. (shrink)

L’autodeterminazione è una categoria fondamentale nella visione personalistica di K. Wojtyła. Essa è una relazione entro la volontà. Una relazione di cui si potrebbe dire: la volontà si rivela come proprietà della persona e la persona come realtà che, riguardo al suo dinamismo, è constituita propriamente dalla volontà. L’autodeterminazione non è un atto chiuso entro se stesso, preché essenziale è il momento della verità e nella verità.

The paper attempts to pose a problem for theories claiming that intentional attributions are essentially normative. Firstly, I argue that the claim is ambiguous. Secondly, that three possible interpretations of the claim can be distinguished: one that appeals to normative impositions put on agents of intentional states, another that exploits the fact that one can normatively assess the states in question and a further one that locates normativity in the domain of special intentional explanations. Thirdly, it is argued that each (...) interpretation faces serious difficulties: they either fail to provide a justification for the claim they intend to make or they contradict certain justified observations about intentional attributions. (shrink)

It has become banal to say that the object of the art of theatre, its artifact, is particularly fragile, that a theatrical performance— necessarily limited in time and not reproducible—is an ephemeral phenomenon. And yet it is a fact that the evanescence of the theatre arts explains better than any other circumstance the universality and the importance of iconography in this area. What could be more natural than the forever manifested desire to prolong the length of the theatrical phenomenon, to (...) immortalize it in a certain sense. (shrink)

Maximilian de Gaynesford has argued against the standard view that the reference of the first-person pronoun ‘I’ is determined by a rule linking the referent to some feature of the context of use. In this paper, we argue that de Gaynesford's arguments are inconclusive. Our main aim, however, is to formulate a novel version of the reference rule for ‘I’. We argue that this version can deal with several problematic cases. Our strategy involves analysing the so-called agent of the context (...) as the person responsible for a particular speech act. From this analysis, we exclude a particular class of uses of ‘I’, uses that we believe are best understood as demonstrative. (shrink)

It is a truism that the relationships between literature and visual entertainment are multiple, complex and variable, especially if we consider literature in the broad sense and keep in mind the enormous variety in the forms of spectacle. Actually, several dangers lie in wait for the one who, on the comparative level, deals with the problem of the relationships between a literary work and a work intended to be viewed as visual entertainment.

We prove that all finitely axiomatizable tense logics with temporal operators for ‘always in the future’ and ‘always in the past’ and determined by linear fows time are coNP-complete. It follows, for example, that all tense logics containing a density axiom of the form ■n+1F p → nF p, for some n ≥ 0, are coNP-complete. Additionally, we prove coNP-completeness of all ∩-irreducible tense logics. As these classes of tense logics contain many Kripke incomplete bimodal logics, we obtain many natural (...) examples of Kripke incomplete normal bimodal logics which are nevertheless coNP-complete. (shrink)

The paper shows that the paradox of the totality of propositions rest on assumptions characteristic of some theories of structured contents (like Jeffrey King's "new account of structured propositions").

Artykuł omawia postać Jerzego Grobickiego, który służył jako oficer armii cesarsko-królewskiej i został pułkownikiem Wojska Polskiego w II RP. Brał udział w I i II wojnie światowej, a po wojnie wyemigrował do Kanady.