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  1. Emotions and Memory.Fabrice Teroni - 2021 - The Emotion Researcher 2021.
    Pre-theoretically, it seems obvious that there are deep and multifarious relations between memory and emotions. On the one hand, a large chunk of our affective lives concerns the good and bad events that happened to us and that we preserve in memory. This is one amongst the many ways in which memory is relevant to the nature and causation of emotions. What does recent research teach us about these relations? § 1 surveys some key issues in this regard. On the (...)
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  2. Doubting Love.Larry A. Herzberg - forthcoming - In New Philosophical Essays on Love and Loving.
    Can one’s belief that one romantically loves another be false? If so, under what conditions may one come to reasonably doubt, or at least suspend belief, that one does so? To begin to answer these questions, I first outline an affective/volitional view of love similar to psychologist R. J. Sternberg’s “triangular theory”, which analyzes types of love in terms of the degrees to which they include states of passion, emotion, and commitment. I then outline two sources of potential bias that (...)
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  3. Fearful Object Seeing.Felipe Nogueira de Carvalho - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10:1-18.
    What is it like to perceive a feared object? According to a popular neo-Gibsonian theory in psychology, fear biases our perceptions of objects so as to encourage particular kinds of actions: when we are afraid, spiders may be perceived as physically closer than they are in order to promote fleeing. Firestone mounted severe criticisms against this view, arguing that these cases are better explained by non-perceptual biases that operate on accurate perceptions of the external environment. In this paper I will (...)
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  4. Two Irreducible Classes of Emotional Experiences: Affective Imaginings and Affective Perceptions.Jonathan Mitchell - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    A view of prominence in the philosophy of emotion is that emotional experiences are not self-standing intentional experiences. Instead, they inherit the intentional content they have from their cognitive bases. One implication is that emotions whose intentional contents differ in terms of the modal and temporal properties of the relevant particular object – because the intentional contents on which they are based differ in these respects – nonetheless need not differ qua emotion-type. This leads to the same-emotional attitude, different content (...)
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  5. Epistemic Shame in "English-Only" Latinx Americans.Lucia Munguia - forthcoming - In Cecilea Mun (ed.), Cultures of Shame.
    Shame entangles the linguistic lives of many first and second-generation Latinx Americans. On the one hand, it is easy to find videos and accounts of public acts aimed at shaming Spanish speakers in America. On the other hand, it is also common to hear first-personal accounts of the shame some members of the Latinx American community feel for living an “English-only” existence. I advance an account explaining how one’s linguistic choices can be influenced by acts intending to shame other members (...)
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  6. Emotion as Feeling Towards Value: A Theory of Emotional Experience.Jonathan Mitchell - forthcoming - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    This book proposes and defends a new theory of emotional experience. Drawing on recent developments in the philosophy of emotion, with links to contemporary philosophy of mind, it argues that emotional experiences are sui generis states, not to be modelled after other mental states – such as perceptions, judgements, or bodily feelings – but given their own analysis and place within our mental economy. More specifically, emotional experiences are claimed to be feelings-towards-values.
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  7. The Irreducibility of Emotional Phenomenology.Jonathan Mitchell - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85.
    Emotion theory includes attempts to reduce or assimilate emotions to states such as bodily feelings, beliefs-desire combinations, and evaluative judgements. Resistance to such approaches is motivated by the claim that emotions possess a sui generis phenomenology. Uriah Kriegel defends a new form of emotion reductivism which avoids positing irreducible emotional phenomenology by specifying emotions’ phenomenal character in terms of a combination of other phenomenologies. This article argues Kriegel’s approach, and similar proposals, are unsuccessful, since typical emotional experiences are constituted by (...)
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  8. Emotions and the Problem of Variability.Juan R. Loaiza - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-23.
    In the last decades there has been a great controversy about the scientific status of emotion categories. This controversy stems from the idea that emotions are heterogeneous phenomena, which precludes classifying them under a common kind. In this article, I analyze this claim—which I call the Variability Thesis—and argue that as it stands, it is problematically underdefined. To show this, I examine a recent formulation of the thesis as offered by Scarantino (2015). On one hand, I raise some issues regarding (...)
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  9. How to Understand Feelings of Vitality: An Approach to Their Nature, Varieties and Functions.Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran - 2021 - In Susi Ferrarello (ed.), Phenomenology of Bioethics: Technoethics and Lived Experience.
    A very basic form of experience consists in feeling energetic, vital, alive, tired, dispirited, vigorous and so on. These feelings – which I call feelings of vitality or vital feelings – constitute the main concern of this paper. My aim is to argue that these feelings exhibit a distinctive form of affectivity which cannot be explained in terms of emotions, moods, background feelings or existential feelings and to explore different paths for their conceptualization. The paper proceeds as follows. After introducing (...)
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  10. Review of Jean Moritz Müller, The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling. [REVIEW]Jonathan Mitchell - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
  11. Neglected Emotions.Andreas Elpidorou - 2020 - The Monist 103 (2):135-146.
    Given the importance of emotions in our everyday lives, it is no surprise that in recent decades the study of emotions has received tremendous attention by a number of different disciplines. Yet despite the many and great advantages that have been made in understanding the nature of emotions, there remains a class of emotional states that is understudied and that demands further elucidation. All contributions to this issue consider either emotions or aspects of emotions that deserve the label ‘neglected’. In (...)
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  12. Jealousy and the Sense of Self: Unamuno and the Contemporary Philosophy of Emotion.Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran - forthcoming - Philosophy and Literature.
    This paper explores jealousy in Unamuno’s drama El otro. Drawing on contemporary philosophy of emotion, I will argue that for the Spanish author jealousy gives the subject a sense of self. The paper begins by embedding Unamuno’s philosophical anthropology in the context of contemporary emotion theory. It then presents the drama as an investigation into the affective dimension of self-identity. The third section offers an analysis of jealousy as an emotion of self-assessment. The final section discusses how this drama can (...)
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  13. Emotion, Wahrnehmung, evaluative Erkenntnis.Jean Moritz Müller - 2011 - In Achim Stephan, Jan Slaby, Henrik Walter & Sven Walter (eds.), Affektive Intentionalität: Beiträge zur welterschließenden Funktion der menschlichen Gefühle. Paderborn, Deutschland: pp. 110-127.
    This paper explores a currently popular view in the philosophy of emotion, according to which emotions constitute a specific form of evaluative aspect-perception (cf. esp. Roberts 2003, Döring 2004, Slaby 2008). On this view, adequate or fitting emotions play an important epistemic roe vis à vis evaluative knowledge. The paper specifically asks how to conceive of the adequacy or fittingness conditions of emotion. Considering the specific, relational nature of the evaluative properties disclosed by emotions, it is argued that a suitable (...)
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  14. Pre-Emotional Awareness and the Content-Priority View.Jonathan Mitchell - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (277):771-794.
    Much contemporary philosophy of emotion has been in broad agreement about the claim that emotional experiences have evaluative content. This paper assesses a relatively neglected alternative, which I call the content-priority view, according to which emotions are responses to a form of pre-emotional value awareness, as what we are aware of in having certain non-emotional evaluative states which are temporally prior to emotion. I argue that the central motivations of the view require a personal level conscious state of pre-emotional value (...)
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  15. The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling: On Affect and Intentionality.Jean Moritz Müller - 2019 - Cham, Schweiz: Palgrave Macmillan.
    This book engages with what are widely recognized as the two core dimensions of emotion. When we are afraid, glad or disappointed, we feel a certain way; moreover, our emotion is intentional or directed at something: we are afraid of something, glad or disappointed about something. Connecting with a vital strand of recent philosophical thinking, I conceive of these two aspects of emotion as unified. Examining different possible ways of developing the view that the feeling dimension of emotion is itself (...)
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  16. Justification et rationalité des émotions.Anne Meylan - 2018 - Philosophiques 45 (2):477-487.
    A la manière des expériences perceptuelles qui nous présentent des formes, des couleurs, des sons, des textures, etc. les émotions nous présentent des propriétés évaluatives. Ainsi, les émotions constituent un type d’expérience perceptuelle spécifique, un type qui nous donne accès à des valeurs (plutôt qu’à des propriétés non axiologiques). Cette théorie d’origine meinongienne doit beaucoup Christine Tappolet qui y consacre un second livre Emotions, Values and Agency que tous les amoureux des choses vraiment bien faites ne pourront qu’apprécier. Cet article (...)
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  17. Sensory Versus Core Affect.Murat Aydede - manuscript
    This is the text of an invited talk exploring the connections between two apparently distinct notions of affect, sensory versus core affect. It is basically a progress report. It is exploratory and tentative. It starts from a mild puzzle about the apparent mismatch between the notion of affect that affective neuroscientists generally deploy and the notion of affect that emotion psychologists deploy. The notion favored by psychologists is the notion of core affect. The phenomenon studied by affective neuroscientists is usually (...)
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  18. Is Love and Emotion?Arina Pismenny & Jesse Prinz - 2017 - In Christopher Grau & Aaron Smuts (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Love. New York, NY, USA:
    What kind of mental phenomenon is romantic love? Many philosophers, psychologists, and ordinary folk treat it as an emotion. This chapter argues the category of emotion is inadequate to account for romantic love. It examines major emotion theories in philosophy and psychology and shows that they fail to illustrate that romantic love is an emotion. It considers the categories of basic emotions and emotion complexes, and demonstrates they too come short in accounting for romantic love. It assesses the roles of (...)
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  19. The Rationality of Emotion.William Lyons - 1990 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (3):631-633.
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  20. VII. Emotions, Rationality, and Mind/Body1: Patricia Greenspan.Patricia Greenspan - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 52:113-125.
    There are now quite a number of popular or semi-popular works urging rejection of the old opposition between rationality and emotion. They present evidence or theoretical arguments that favour a reconception of emotions as providing an indispensable basis for practical rationality. Perhaps the most influential is neuroanatomist Antonio Damasio's Descartes' Error, which argues from cases of brain lesion and other neurological causes of emotional deficit that some sort of emotional ‘marking,’ of memories of the outcomes of our choices with anxiety, (...)
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  21. VIII. The Significance of Recalcitrant Emotion : Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson.Justin D'arms - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 52:127-145.
    Sentimentalist theories in ethics treat evaluative judgments as somehow dependent on human emotional capacities. While the precise nature of this dependence varies, the general idea is that evaluative concepts are to be understood by way of more basic emotional reactions. Part of the task of distinguishing between the concepts that sentimentalism proposes to explicate, then, is to identify a suitably wide range of associated emotions. In this paper, we attempt to deal with an important obstacle to such views, which arises (...)
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  22. Emotional Truth. By Ronald de Sousa. (Oxford UP, 2011. Pp. Xviii + 391. Price £38.00.).Adam Morton - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):220-222.
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  23. Replay to de Sousa and Davis.Charles Taylor - 1988 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18 (3):449-458.
    The papers by Ronald de Sousa and Steve Davis raise very interesting issues. I think that they have the issue almost right between us, but I want to make some small amendments, which will make a big difference.First, de Sousa: with all the talk about the ‘significance feature,’ I’m not trying to make an in principle argument against the reduction of purpose/action to physical movement/change. Perhaps such an argument is possible, perhaps not. For the moment, all we have is the (...)
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  24. On the Rationality of Emotions: Or, When Are Emotions Rational?Klaus R. Scherer - 2011 - Social Science Information 50 (3-4):330-350.
    The connections between emotion and rationality are reexamined. Historically, Plato’s doctrine of the tripartite soul has established the preconception of a strict separation of emotion/passion from cognition/rationality, encouraging the biased perception that emotions are inherently irrational. To examine whether emotions can be rational, one must first examine the various meanings of rationality as developed in philosophy, psychology and the social and economic sciences. In this article, three forms of rationality are distinguished, and it is suggested that they can act as (...)
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  25. Rationality and the Emotions; a Picoeconomic Approach.George Ainslie - 1985 - Social Science Information 24 (2):355-374.
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  26. Sadder but Wiser? Rationality and the Emotions.Jon Elster - 1985 - Social Science Information 24 (2):375-406.
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  27. Emotions Can Be Rational.Klaus Scherer - 1985 - Social Science Information 24 (2):331-335.
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  28. Rationality and the Emotions: Report on a Colloquium.Klaus Scherer - 1985 - Social Science Information 24 (2):323-324.
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  29. Are Appeals to the Emotions Necessarily Fallacious?Lawrence Hinman - 1995 - Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 15 (1):53-62.
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  30. Rationality and Emotions.Olga Korpalo - 1999 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 14 (1):109-127.
    This article is an extension of the author’s previous work on this subject. Primarily it outlines the main directions of this mode of analysis and possible fields to which it could be applied. The first chapter demonstrates a specific method of understanding emotions. The second chapter examines the concept of emotions as a source of the specific modes of “internal” rationality of an agent. The third chapter isdevoted to a comparison between various emotions and the two basic intentional states - (...)
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  31. The Rationality of Emotion.Robert M. Gordon - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (2):284.
    How should we understand the emotional rationality? This first part will explore two models of cognition and analogy strategies, test their intuition about the emotional desire. I distinguish between subjective and objective desire, then presents with a feeling from the "paradigm of drama" export semantics, here our emotional repertoire is acquired all the learned, and our emotions in the form of an object is fixed. It is pretty well in line with the general principles of rationality, especially the lowest reasonable (...)
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  32. Emotion and Object.Irving Thalberg - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (2):278.
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  33. Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions.Robert C. Solomon & Jon Elster - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (1):104.
    This is perhaps the richest book on emotions I have read. It is also a very frustrating book. It appears to be—and Elster more or less suggests this—a series of quite different kinds of essays, connected by somewhat confusing cross references and a general concern for the nature of emotions and their transformations. The first chapter is a position paper on explanation in the social sciences, a plea for “mechanisms” as opposed to law-like principles and straightforward causal accounts. The second (...)
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  34. The Rationalities of Emotion.Cecilea Mun - 2016 - Phenomenology and Mind 2016 (11):48-57.
    I argue that emotions are not only rational in-themselves, strictly speaking, but they are also instrumentally rational, epistemically rational, and evaluatively rational. I begin with a discussion of what it means for emotions to be rational or irrational in-themselves, which includes the derivation of a criterion for the ontological rationality of emotions (CORe): For emotion or an emotion there exists some normative standard that is given by what emotion or an emotion is against which our emotional responses can be judged (...)
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  35. I—Ronald de Sousa.Ronald De Sousa - 2002 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1):247-263.
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  36. How the Intentionality of Emotion Can Be Traced to the Intensionality of Emotion: Intensionality in Emotive Predicates.Prakash Mondal - 2013 - Pragmatics and Cognition 21 (1):35-54.
    In this paper a connection between intentionality, intensionality, language and emotion will be drawn up through a demonstration of an intimate relationship between the intentionality of emotion and intensionality in language. What will be shown is that the intentionality of emotion can ultimately be traced to the intensionality of emotional contexts. For this purpose, emotive predicates will be categorized in terms of their intensional behavior and regularities. They will then be brought forward for an explication of why and how far (...)
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  37. Emotion, Evolution and Rationality.Dylan Evans & Pierre Cruse (eds.) - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
    Do our emotions stop us being rational? For thousands of years, emotions have been thought of as obstacles to intelligent thought. This view has been challenged in recent years by both philosophers and scientists. In this groundbreaking book, the first of its kind, leading thinkers from philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience challenge this commonly held view of emotion in a series of fascinating and challenging essays.
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  38. Emotion and Object.John R. S. Wilson - 1972 - Cambridge University Press.
    A study in the philosophy of mind, centred on the problem of 'intentionality' the sense in which emotions can be said to have objects, their relation to these objects, and the implications of this relation for our understanding of human action and behaviour. Dr Wilson sets his enquiry against a broad historical background on what distinguishes man from inanimate objects by describing both Cartesian view of man is matter plus mind and the neo-Wittgensteinian view that there is a dynamic behavioural (...)
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  39. The Role of Emotion in Rationality: Limiting the Search for Evidence.John Stewart McKay - unknown
    In this thesis I consider a key problem in the theory of rationality, namely that as limited knowers we must set limits on the scope of our considerations. In Chapter I, I outline the problem: the need to draw certain kinds of cognitive limits in order to be rational and the special role that emotions play in that process. In Chapter II, I outline a theory of rationality. I do this by considering a number of views on rationality and epistemology (...)
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  40. Emotions and Reasons.Robert Pinto - unknown
    This paper pictures emotions as able to provide reasons for action in so far as the beliefs and desires which make up reasons for action are constitutive elements of emotions themselves. It claims that the states of the world which prompt emotional attitudes “justify” them in so far as they render the beliefs constitutive of those attitudes true. Finally, it addresses the question what can make the desires or valuings ingredient to emotions appropriate to their objects.
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  41. Reasons and Emotions.Christine Tappolet - forthcoming - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity.
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  42. Discourses of Emotionality and Rationality in the Financial Services Industry.Dina V. Nekrassova - unknown
    This dissertation explores the practices of emotion work in the financial services industry as they are constructed in interviews with people employed in different financial organizations. The issues of emotion work in organizations are generally investigated in terms of emotion management, impression formation and negotiation or accomplishment. The previous research has also uncovered that emotions and market moods influence how people make financial decisions under conditions of fundamental uncertainty. In this study, I adopt a critical-interpretive approach and seek to develop (...)
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  43. The Person and Primary Emotions.Peter Anthony Bertocci - 1988
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  44. A. Kenny's "Action, Emotion and Will". [REVIEW]Raziel Abelson - 1964 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 24 (3):442.
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  45. Emotionally Relevant Feelings.Mary Irene Bockover - 1990 - Dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara
    In this thesis I argue that emotion can not be adequately defined in terms of sensation, normative belief , nor a combination of the two. Emotion does entail "feeling" however, and explaining the sense of feeling which is relevant to defining emotion is the central aim of this thesis. In brief, I will show that the "emotionally relevant" sense of feeling is intentional in itself--but it is not to be identified with bodily sensation as feelings "traditionally" have been treated, nor (...)
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  46. The Causes and Objects of Emotions.Joseph Ramsey Martin - 1967 - Dissertation, University of Virginia
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  47. Emotion, Object and Justification.Bonnelle Lewis Strickling - 1984 - Dissertation, The University of British Columbia (Canada)
    The subject of this thesis is the emotion-object relationship and the problem of the justification of emotions as it bears on the emotion-object relationship. We will consider three possible constituents of the concept of emotion: feelings, behavior, and belief. ;Feeling cannot be the only constituent of emotion because there are not enough distinct feelings to account for the number of emotions we seem to have. However, the Schachter-Singer study indicates that, though feelings are not the means by which we identify (...)
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  48. Patricia S. Greenspan, Emotions and Reasons. [REVIEW]Jenefer Robinson - 1991 - Philosophy in Review 11 (2):101-104.
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  49. Ronald de Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion. [REVIEW]Jenefer Robinson - 1989 - Philosophy in Review 9:224-228.
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  50. Wallas: Reason and Emotion in Social Change.D. Waldo - 1941 - Journal of Social Philosophy and Jurisprudence 7:142.
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