This chapter re-examines the evidence for local ecclesiastical and other burial sites in pre-Viking Ireland. It compares local churches and cemetery settlements in pre-Viking Ireland with those found in England and Wales. The chapter describes the density of the pre-Viking ecclesiastical sites in Ireland, church density and social structure in Anglo-Saxon England, and the local ecclesiastical sites in Cornwall and Wales.

Tato kritická studie se zabývá dvěma současnými knihami o epistemickém relativismu, Boghossianovou Fear of Knowledge a Halesovou Relativism and the Foundations of Philosophy. První z těchto prací se přesvědčivě pokouší vyvrátit populární relativistické a konstruktivistické teze, zatímco ta druhá předkládá obhajobu specifické formy relativismu zaměřené na filosofické propozice.

Tento článek analyzuje problém normativity morálky. Argumentuji, že morálka nás normativně omezuje ve veřejném prostoru důvodů. Některá jednání jsou v dané společenské praxi poskytování a požadování morálních důvodů neobhajitelná. Morální zdůvodňování je zdůvodňováním v pojmech obecných principů s ideou férové nestrannosti k zájmům všech dotčených osob. Morální svědomí nemá nezávislý normativní význam. Normativní síla svědomí je odvozená od presumované způsobilosti morálních principů na jeho pozadí být ospravedlněné v (hypoteticky ideálním) veřejném prostoru důvodů.This paper analyses the problem of normativity of morality. (...) I argue that morality restricts us normatively in the public space of reasons. Some actions are indefensible in the social praxis of giving and asking for moral reasons. Moral reasoning is a reasoning in terms of general principles with the idea of fair impartiality to interests of all affected persons. The moral conscience has not an independent normative significance. The normative force of moral conscience is derivatedly related to the presumptive capability of the moral principles in its background to be justified in the (hypothetically ideal) public space of reasons. (shrink)

En la página 52 de su autobiografía Mi vida en la música Daniel Barenboin afirma no compartir la filosofía de Glenn Gould para quien la grabación es la única manera de producir música en el futuro. Baremboin define a su filosofía de la música un ¿naturalismo¿ para el que la música es sinónimo de vida, y lo que la singulariza es el tiempo, y el tiempo es lo que se pierde y jamás vuelve. El tiempo es lo que se pretende (...) expulsar de una sala de grabación. La música es tiempo y, por lo tanto no repetición, el metrónomo sólo repite la medida. A las notas las sigue el silencio sin el cual no existirían, y la duración del sonido es por eso intermitente, finita, mortal. Este efecto de vacío es también marcado en el mundo del lenguaje. Foucault decía que desde el punto de vista ¿arqueológico¿ los discursos son escasos, que lo que primero debe llamarnos la atención es la rareza de su existencia. Por eso mismo el sentido es también escaso, no constituye una abundancia que los hermeneutas deben interpretar. Así como hay más palabras que sentido, hay menos palabras que cosas, y en este orden de las carencias no olvidemos la primera lección de la economía política que define al ¿bien¿ por su rareza. El sonido es, entonces, una isla en un mar de silencio. Pero no fue sin duda este pequeño parágrafo en el libro de Barenboin lo que me marcó un interrogante llamado Gould. Hubo, además, una mención en la misma página referida a la muerte de Gould que le había impedido comparar las distintas versiones de sus Variaciones de Goldberg. Es posible que una cierta curiosidad por los espíritus trágicos haya detenido mi atención. (shrink)

This article seeks to present the foundations in Foucault’s thought that led him to elaborate the concept of archeology and, in addition, try to recognize its limits. To achieve this, we present his main theoretical dialogues at the beginning of his investigations and the reasons that made necessary to reframe that concept later. Among the conclusions of this study, we suggest that the allegorical conception of language, that was sustained over the period, is formally similar to the structure of metaphysical (...) thought and, as such, is abandoned by Foucault as an attempt to create an original philosophical reflection. (shrink)

Apresenta-se nesse texto as repercussões do Concílio Vaticano II na Igreja particular de Goiás. A fidelidade ao Concílio produziu efetiva participação de todos – presbíteros, religiosas e religiosos, leigos e leigas. Tomando como referências a vivência e experiência de pastor nessa diocese (1967-1998) e diversos estudos, Dom Tomás mostra os aspectos mais relevantes dessa história: as assembléias diocesanas, com participação de leitos (1968); as CEBs e a concretização da opção pelos pobres; as Escolas Bíblicas; a defesa da posse da (...) terra, a Comissão Pastoral da Terra - CPT e o enfrentamento da ditadura militar; a causa indígena; o ecumenismo; o exercício da colegialidade; a articulação dos bispos comprometidos com as CEBs na CNBB; o problema da Visita Apóstólica na diocese; apresenta ainda um balanço de erros e conflitos; e finalmente, relata o Sínodo diocesano (1995) e seus objetivos: 1) Avaliar a situação concreta do povo, seus sofrimentos e suas lutas, para se ter uma visão mais clara da realidade; 2) Julgar à luz da Palavra de Deus;. 3) Desenvolver com mais clareza a missão da nossa Igreja dentro dessa mesma realidade. Palavras-chave : Concílio Vaticano II. Diocese de Goiás-Brasil. Participação. Colegialidade. Abstrat This article written by Archbishop Tomás Balduíno presents the impact of Vatican II in the particular Church of Goiás, emphasizing that the loyalty to the Council produced effective participation of priests, religious and lay people. Given his experience as a pastor in this diocese (1967-1998) and several studies, Bishop Thomas shows the most relevant aspects of this story: the diocesan assemblies, with the participation of lay people (1968); the CEBs and realization of the option for the poor; the Bible Schools; the defense of land tenure, the Pastoral Land Commission - CPT and the facing of the military dictatorship; the indigenous cause; ecumenism; the exercise of collegiality; the articulation of the bishops committed to the CEBs in CNBB; the problem of apostolic visit in the diocese. The article also presents a balance of errors and conflicts, and finally reports the diocesan Synod (1995) and its objectives: 1) Evaluate the concrete situation of the people, their sufferings and their struggles to get a clear picture of reality; 2) To make the judgment of reality in light of the word of God; Develop more clearly the mission of our Church in this reality Keywords : Vatican II. Diocese of Goiás-Brazil. Participation. Collegiality. - DOI: 10.5752/P.2175-5841.2011v9n24p1341. (shrink)

[What It’s Like, or What It’s About? The Place of Consciousness in the Material World] Summary: The book is both a survey of the contemporary debate and a defense of a distinctive position. Most philosophers nowadays assume that the focus of the philosophy of consciousness, its shared explanandum, is a certain property of experience variously called “phenomenal character,” “qualitative character,” “qualia” or “phenomenology,” understood in terms of what it is like to undergo the experience in question. Consciousness as defined in (...) terms of its phenomenal aspect is often called “phenomenal consciousness.” The major issue that occupies most thinkers is whether this phenomenal character happens to be a physical property, or whether it is rather sui generis. Those who believe the former are materialists; those who conclude the latter are dualists. As the currently dominant metaphysic is materialism – also sometimes called physicalism – the challenge appears to be to slot phenomenal properties among the physical properties that ultimately make up the world. David Chalmers argued powerfully that we can go very far in situating many mental properties in the physical world – namely, the properties that can be understood in functional terms – but that phenomenal properties resist such a treatment. Chalmers calls this “the hard problem” of consciousness. But there are also some quite powerful positive arguments for dualism. The two most influential ones are the modal argument, also offered by Chalmers, and the knowledge argument invented by Frank Jackson. Chalmers invites us to conceive of creatures that are exactly like human beings – physically, functionally, behaviorally – only bereft of phenomenal consciousness. If such creatures are conceivable, says Chalmers, they are metaphysically possible. And if they are metaphysically possible, materialism is false. Jackson, for his part, suggests we imagine Mary who has spent her entire life inside a black-and-white room and has seen the world through a black-and-white TV screen. But she also happens to know everything there is to know about the physics of color. And yet, Jackson suggests that once Mary is finally released from her room and sees a lawn outside, she learns something new: that this is what it is like to experience green color. The current work on consciousness is by and large characterized by attempts to answer these two dualistic arguments. I try to make sense of the positions within the domain of philosophy of consciousness by means of two major distinctions that mutually intersect. First, there is a distinction between dualism and materialism. An apparent third alternative currently on offer, the so-called Russellian monism, is unstable, collapsing into either dualism (panpsychism) or materialism (Russellian physicalism). Materialism comes in two main flavors: either the a posteriori physicalism, which detects an epistemic gap between phenomenal and physical truths, hence denying that the former could be derived from the latter; or the a priori physicalism, which does not acknowledge any such obstacle. The second major distinction is between phenomenism and representationalism. It’s true that Ned Block, who introduced this contrast, meant to distinguish between two kinds of materialism. But I believe that the distinction actually intersects the one between materialism and dualism. We thus arrive at a table with six slots, representing six main positions in the philosophy of consciousness: (1) dualist phenomenism (Chalmers, the early Jackson, and Tyler Burge); (2) dualist representationalism (René Descartes); (3) aposteriori materialist phenomenism (Block); (4) a posteriori materialist representationalism (Michael Tye, Fred Dretske, David Rosenthal); (5) a priori materialist phenomenism (David Lewis); and (6) a priori materialist representationalism (Daniel Dennett, Derk Pereboom). However, this scheme is in fact somewhat misleading. It is true that Dennett is usually classified as an apriori materialist (or, more precisely an apriori materialist representationalist), but I believe that needs to be corrected. In order to understand why, I first analyze varieties of materialist representationalism in detail, in particular various construals of phenomenal character in terms of representation, or intentionality, which includes a discussion of the identity of its content (the issue of externalism). By contrast, Dennett rejects the concept of phenomenal character. Consciousness has no intrinsic, publicly inaccessible properties. On that ground, Dennett builds an empirical, fully functionalist theory of consciousness, which he also tries to integrate within a general Darwinian framework. From that point of view, one can contrast Dennettian and representationalist views on the issue of animal consciousness. In addition to his rejection of phenomenal character, Dennett also abstains from the regular metaphysical departure point of regular materialism. He does not so much ask how an enigmatic property of consciousness fits an antecedently characterized world, but rather how far we can investigate all aspects of the world, including consciousness, using the scientific method. He is thus a methodological naturalist, rather than a metaphysical materialist. While this approach removes obstacles to the science of consciousness, it does not solve what might be called “the hardest problem” – of intentionality, not phenomenal consciousness. The hardest problem consists in the fact that our intentional discourse involves conflicting commitments that prevent a coherent metaphysic of representational states. However, it does not follow that we should give up on this discourse as a theoretical means of reduction as well as a practical tool of explanation. But it might be that intentional discourse is a somewhat pseudo one. (shrink)

Christian discourse for moral edification by a Catholic Bishop; written in the form of confessions of a Christian sinner.

ABOUT WEAK AND STRONG EMPIRICAL NECCESSITY. CATEGORICAL, DISPOSITIONAL PROPERTIES AND LAWS OF NATURE Pohľady na empirickú nevyhnutnosť možno rozdeliť do dvoch skupín: teórie slabej nevyhnutnosti a teórie silnej nevyhnutnosti. Do prvej teórie patria koncepcie, ktoré uvažujú svet zložený z pasívnych vlastností, akými sú kategorické vlastnosti. Za zmeny vo svete sú zodpovedné zákony prírody, ktoré sa od možného sveta k svetu líšia, a preto aj prejavy týchto vlastností sú odlišné. Druhú teóriu, teóriu silnej nevyhnutnosti, zastávajú filozofi, ktorí predpokladajú existenciu silovo aktívnych (...) vlastností, dispozícií. Práve tieto sú zodpovedné za zmeny vo svete, a vo všetkých možných svetoch sa prejavujú nevyhnutne rovnako. Autor argumentuje v prospech existencie dispozičných vlastností a tvrdí, že dispozičný výklad sveta netrpí modálnymi absurdnosťami, ktorými trpia teórie slabej nevyhnutnosti. Hoci aj dispozičné teórie majú svoje problémy a hlavne mysterióznosti, ktoré môžu viesť až do metafyziky dispozičných monád. Kľúčové slová: dispozičné vlastnosti, kategorické vlastnosti, modality, nevyhnutnosť, zákony prírody. (shrink)

[On Consciousness, Religion, and Freedom of the Will] An interview with Daniel Dennett on consciousness, religion and free will.

Studie se zabývá tím, jak se v českých zemích obráželo bouřlivé období vývoje biologického myšlení od přelomu 19. a 20. století do první světové války, kdy vedle sebe existovaly velmi různé názory na evoluci. Mnohovrstevnatost teoretickou přitom doplňuje i kulturní a vědecká mnohovrstevnatost českých zemí, kde se jednak mísí vlivy německé a české biologie na svých autonomních institucích, a jednak lze spatřovat rozdíly i mezi lokálními centry Prahou a Brnem se svými badatelskými tradicemi a nezávislými vazbami na další centra ve (...) Vídni a evropských univerzitách. Centrem zájmu jsou teoreticky uvažující biologové, kteří buď sami dlouhodobě profilovali české biologické myšlení, anebo na něj měli díky zdejšímu působení přímý vliv. V letech ca 1900–1915 došlo k prvnímu otevřenému a diskutovanému vrcholu v české recepci evolucionismu a před jednoznačnými pozicemi a „velkými teoriemi“ má navrch spíše prostředkování diferencované zahraniční diskuse, podněty vlastní experimentální práce a opatrné očekávání od nového studia variability a dědičnosti. (shrink)

[On the Ethics of Euthanasia Again: A Reply to Critics] The article is a reply to three critics of a previous piece on the ethics of euthanasia in which I defended physician-assisted suicide. According to Ingrid Strobachová it is necessary to give a greater attention to the significance of pain, which, she claims, may benefit from a phenomenological description. According to Marta Vlasáková my argument is not valid because two principles on which it is founded – i.e. the conception of (...) life as of fundamental value and the autonomy of the patient – are not in mutual harmony. Jakub Jirsa criticises the very concept of assisted suicide and the moral legitimacy and need for the legalisation of assisted suicide. To Dr Strobachová I reply that phenomenological description is as acceptable a method as any other – as long, that is, as it is not only a verbal game, but constitutes a real source of knowledge. To Dr. Vlasáková I argue that a more charitable reading of my argument is possible. The arguments of Dr. Jirsa against assisted suicide are beset with various inconsistencies, including the fact that he himself allows that doctors should tolerate suicide by the refusal of food and drink. Such an act does not, however, differ in any relevant way from doctor-assisted suicide. (shrink)

Libertad o utopía? -- Unamuno en el infierno -- El año de los poetas -- El hombre superior -- Concursos y premios literarios -- Por fortuna aún contamos con la poesía -- Desahogo lírico -- Xenofobia -- Variaciones sobre un tema de Omar Khayyam -- Simón Bolívar y la lectura -- El tierno encanto de las pequeñas ciudades.

Straipsnis skirtas palyginti Arvydo Šliogerio ir Martino Heideggerio hominizuotos Būties sampratoms jų meno filosofijose. Šio tikslo siekiama pasitelkiant jų pasirinktų tapybos kūrinių interpretacijas – Šliogerio atveju pasirinktas Paulio Cézanne’o paveikslas Didžioji pušis, o Heideggerio atveju pasirinktas Vincento van Gogho paveikslas Batų pora. Straipsnio autorius pateikia argumentus, kaip pasirinktas Šliogerio meno kūrinys koreliuoja su jo aristoteliška substancinio individo koncepcija. Sykiu parodoma, kaip nuosekliai evoliucionavo Šliogerio hominizuotos Būties kritika nuo knygos Daiktas ir menas iki veikalo Transcendencijos tyla. Straipsnio pabaigoje išryškintas Šliogerio prieštaravimas (...) sau dėl dviejų nesuderinamų menininko samp­ratų: pirmas apie Menininką-žmogų, įliejantį „daugiau Būties“ į daiktą meno kūrinyje, negu kad tos Būties yra tame daikte gamtoje; antras apie tikrąjį Menininką-gamtą, kuris duoda daiktui „daugiau Būties“, negu jos randame žmogaus rankdarbyje. (shrink)

[Filip Tvrdý on Naturalizing Philosophy] The paper distinguishes several versions of contemporary naturalism: revisionary, constructive, and non-representational. Revisionary naturalism pleads substituting the traditional philosophical inquiry into the nature of things by a genetic inquiry into the origin of our – often faulty – beliefs about the nature of things. Constructive naturalism accepts the program of traditional philosophy, yet hoping that its questions could be answered by broadly scientific methods. Non-representational naturalism is an extension of metaethical expressivism, claiming that philosophical claims (...) should not be understood as descriptive in nature. These distinctions can help us classify the most self-consciously naturalistic project in the recent Czech philosophy, Filip Tvrdý’s TROUBLES OF INTROSPECTION (2015). Tvrdý is officially pursuing a genetic, revisionary project, which does not coincide with nonrepresentational naturalism. However, there are also traces of constructive naturalism in Tvrdý’s book. (shrink)

ABOUT WEAK AND STRONG EMPIRICAL NECCESSITY. CATEGORICAL, DISPOSITIONAL PROPERTIES AND LAWS OF NATURE Pohľady na empirickú nevyhnutnosť možno rozdeliť do dvoch skupín: teórie slabej nevyhnutnosti a teórie silnej nevyhnutnosti. Do prvej teórie patria koncepcie, ktoré uvažujú svet zložený z pasívnych vlastností, akými sú kategorické vlastnosti. Za zmeny vo svete sú zodpovedné zákony prírody, ktoré sa od možného sveta k svetu líšia, a preto aj prejavy týchto vlastností sú odlišné. Druhú teóriu, teóriu silnej nevyhnutnosti, zastávajú filozofi, ktorí predpokladajú existenciu silovo aktívnych (...) vlastností, dispozícií. Práve tieto sú zodpovedné za zmeny vo svete, a vo všetkých možných svetoch sa prejavujú nevyhnutne rovnako. Autor argumentuje v prospech existencie dispozičných vlastností a tvrdí, že dispozičný výklad sveta netrpí modálnymi absurdnosťami, ktorými trpia teórie slabej nevyhnutnosti. Hoci aj dispozičné teórie majú svoje problémy a hlavne mysterióznosti, ktoré môžu viesť až do metafyziky dispozičných monád. Kľúčové slová: dispozičné vlastnosti, kategorické vlastnosti, modality, nevyhnutnosť, zákony prírody. (shrink)

In German pre-critical aesthetics, the term Betrachtung (contemplation) was coined to describe the reception of beauty and art. It was also used by Immanuel Kant in his Critique of Judgment (1790), and by Bernard Bolzano in his treatise On the Concept of Beauty (1843). Both Bolzano and Kant tied the judgment of taste (beauty) to the mere contemplation of the initial object. However, each of them meant something different by this act, and each accorded it a different importance. The study (...) describes Kant’s and Bolzano’s conceptions of mere contemplation, compares them and shows that Bolzano’s concept should be understood as a content modification of Kant’s innovative procedure. (shrink)

Ludwig Wittgenstein Poznámky o barvách. (Překlad a úvodní studie Ondřej Beran). 1. vyd. Praha: Filosofia, 2010, ISBN 978-80-7007-323-0, 139 stran.

Abstrakt/Abstract: Ve dvacátém století se nejrůznější společenské vědy musely obecně vyrovnávat s relativizací těch nejzákladnějších konceptů, jako je komunikace, text, význam, bytí nebo realita. Současně se pak začalo nevyhnutelně otřásat i heuristické, intuitivní pojetí autora jako „toho, kdo píše“. Naše pojednání představuje stručný exkurz do moderního teoretického myšlení, které se z tohoto hlediska otázkou autora zabývalo. Zmiňujeme se o Nové kritice, která odmítala pátrání po autorově záměru a usilovala o interpretaci literárního díla jako soběstačné entity. Dále pojednáváme o Rolandu Barthesovi, (...) který prosazoval pojetí díla jakožto součásti textového pole, přičemž otázka autora je pro něho zcela irelevantní. Posléze věnujeme pozornost způsobu, jímž se k autorovi staví Michel Foucault. Ten rozebírá jeho diskurzivní fixaci a táže se, jakou funkci plní koncept, s nímž člověk ve skutečnosti pracuje, když o autorovi hovoří. Závěrem se zaměřujeme na určité prvky kultu osobnosti, které lze na konci dvacátého století i v současnosti v pojetí autora vysledovat. Referenčním rámcem celého pojednání je vztah konceptu autora k představě esenciálního významu literárního textu. The twentieth century saw a whole range of disciplines within the field of social sciences struggle to come to terms with a relativisation of some of the fundamental concepts of traditional thinking, such as communication, text, meaning, existence, and reality. Inevitably, the heuristic, intuitive notion of the author as "the one who writes" also started to fray around the edges. Our article presents a short overview of some modern theoretical thinking that has tackled the que+stion of the author in this new context. We mention the New Critics, who refused to seek the author's intention and endeavoured to interpret literary works as autonomous entities. We then discuss Roland Barthes and his conception of literary work as part of an indefinite textual field; in this conception Barthes considers the question of an author as entirely irrelevant. Then we focus our attention on how the problem of the author is addressed by Michel Foucault. He treats the author as a concept, explores its discursive implications, and examines the modalities of its functioning. In the final part of the article we focus on certain marks of cult of personality that can be observed in authors at the end of the twentieth century as well as today. As a referential framework for our analysis, we employ the relation between the concept of the author and the essentialist notion of a determinate meaning of a literary text. (shrink)

Faz uma digressão acerca de alguns aspectos do 'Tratado de direito natural', sem esgotar suas possibilidades analíticas. Pretende, ao inserir a obra em seu contexto de produção, discutir a relação entre o direito natural tal como foi expresso por Tomás Antonio Gonzaga e as possibilidades de interpretação abertas pelo direito português de então.

Autor připomíná 300. výročí narození Davida Huma tím, že české odborné i studentské veřejnosti předkládá text Humova Dopisu lékaři, opatřený poznámkami zpřístupňujícími jeho obsah. Tento dopis představuje významné svědectví o počátcích Humovy filosofie a je místem, kde můžeme identifikovat "bod obratu" na cestu směřující k Traktátu. Zároveň je nepostradatelným dokumentem pro výklad Huma z pozice "kontextualistického přístupu" k ranně-novověké filosofii, jak jej uplatňují zejména Alexander Stewart a John P. Wright.

Článek se zabývá pojmem panteismus v období renesance. Ačkoli termín panteismus se objevil až na konci 17. století a později v kontextu tzv. “Pantheismusstreit”, za předchůdce moderního panteistického myšlení byl označen renesanční filosof Giordano Bruno. Následně i Mikuláš Kusánský, a to jakožto pokračovatel myšlení Mistra Eckharta, začal být považován za panteistu. Jak Kusánský, tak Bruno v určitém smyslu obhajovali imanenci božského ve světě, avšak zároveň oba zdůrazňovali rozdíl mezi Bohem a přírodou a připisovali Bohu transcendenci nebo přinejmenším transcendentální aspekty. Toto (...) není v souladu s definicí panteismu v tzv. silném slova smyslu, kdy se tvrdí striktní identita Boha a světa. Zdá se, že pojem renesanční panteismus je konstruktem, který byl vytvořen skrze násilnou aplikaci terminologie osvícenské filosofie na renesanční období. (shrink)

[Against Method: Karel Kosik on Architecture and Urbanism] A critical analysis of the views of a prominent Czech philosopher who transitioned from humanist Marxism to Heideggerian conservatism. This philosophical development is also reflected in his occasional reflections on the built environment.

Erste Monografie über Franz Fickers Ästhetik. Die Ästhetik des institutionell wichtigsten Universitätsästhetikers der österreichischen Monarchie des Vormärz wird institutionell als Bestandteil der österreichischen Universitätspolitik und ideell als Bestandteil der Geschichte der mitteleuropäischen Ästhetik untersucht.

[Précis of What It’s Like, or What It’s About? The Place of Consciousness in the Material World] The paper provides a summary of my recent Czech-language book, WHAT IT'S LIKE, OR WHAT IT'S ABOUT? THE PLACE OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE MATERIAL WORLD (2017). As suggested by the subtitle, the topic of the book is philosophy of consciousness. In the contemporary literature, most participants have in mind the so-called phenomenal characters, and the main issue debated between dualists and materialists is whether (...) these characters are material properties. Even the Russellian monists, who otherwise present themselves as an alternative to both dualism and materialism, accept the concept of phenomenal character. I express doubts about this concept in chapter six of my book; accordingly, I allot most space in the paper to the material from this chapter. Despite the majority opinion, I believe that no agreement has in fact been reached concerning the content of this concept. Similarly to Daniel Dennett, I recommend trying to develop a philosophy of consciousness without the concept of phenomenal character. As is well known, Dennett – to some extent similarly to the aforementioned materialists – proposes a reduction of consciousness in terms of representation. However, I wound up rather more skeptical than Dennett, since following up on my previous book, THE METAPHYSICS OF ANTI-INDIVIDUALISMU (2008), I claim that a naturalistic theory of representation is incoherent. (shrink)

In July 1647 Valeriano Magni published in Warsaw a description of his experiment proving the existence of vacuum. His treatise called “Demonstratio ocularis, loci sine locato, corporis successive moti in vacuo, luminis nulli corpori inhaerentis” provoked a huge polemic, not only with the opponents of the void but also concerning the authorship of the experiment. The article deals with the circumstances of Magni’s experiment and the polemics with both scholars attacking Magni from the point of Aristotelianism and French scientists who (...) admitted the existence of the void but accused Magni of plagiarism, for experiments with vacuums had been performed by Torricelli and Pascal first. The attention is paid to the philosophical background of Magni’s experiments. (shrink)

El siguiente artículo se propone recuperar la cobertura del juicio de Bergen-Belsen por el semanario Argentinisches Wochenblatt, una de las principales publicaciones dirigida a la comunidad germanohablante en la Argentina y editada en la Ciudad de Buenos Aires. El proceso judicial de Belsen tuvo lugar entre septiembre y noviembre de 1945 y fue dirigida por una corte británica en la ciudad de Lünenburg. En el mismo se enjuiciaron a cuarenta y cinco agentes de las SS y sus colaboradores por crímenes (...) de guerra cometidos durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial en los campos de concentración de Auschwitz y Bergen-Belsen. En particular, se pretende exponer cómo fueron recuperados los testimonios de los sobrevivientes como de los victimarios por el semanario con el objetivo de aportar al conocimiento de la recepción de los procesos judiciales contra los nazis durante la posguerra en la prensa argentina en general y la editada en idioma alemán en particular. (shrink)

El presente artículo propone un modelo de análisis para orientar el discernimiento y posicionamiento en torno al uso de la IA en educación superior. Analizaremos los cuatro posibles usos de la IA que más incidencia tendrán en esta si se considera el actual desarrollo de esta tecnología. Ellos son: la co-construcción de conocimiento, el uso de IA para tutoría o mentoreo, el auge de las plataformas adaptativas y la capacidad predictiva. Propondremos un ejercicio de análisis para cada uso apelando a (...) algunas de las dimensiones del modelo propuesto para orientar sobre su utilización. El resultado es fecundo, en tanto advierte sobre el riesgo de parcializar el análisis perdiendo de vista las implicancias y los compromisos más profundos que exige el discernimiento sobre el uso de la IA. (shrink)

Studie komentuje a kriticky rozvádí Ginzburgovu koncepci indexického paradigmatu ve vědách o člověku. Zasazuje metodu čtení vedlejších detailů coby indikátorů nějaké přímo nepřístupné skutečnosti do historického, kulturního a zejm. technického kontextu na příkladech proměn lékařské diagnostiky či znalectví umění. Sleduje souvislosti mezi vývojem gramotnosti, písmových forem a grafologických postupů v 19. století a nástup technických forem zápisu, který vnesl do řady oborů nové postupy interpretace a analýzy a zproblematizoval tradiční hranice mezi přírodními, sociálními a humanitními vědami.

Este ensayo plantea el estudio de la libertad desde una perspectiva metafísica; más en concreto, a la luz del acto personal de ser. Se subraya la elección concreta del Fin Último como momento constitutivo de la libertad humana y, desde semejante punto de vista, como su fundamento. La libertad no es estática, sino un poder susceptible de desarrollarse constantemente hasta desembocar en la plena adhesión, fácil y gozosa, a lo que es bueno y en la proporción en que lo es; (...) en este sentido, la plenitud de la libertad humana puede considerarse como necesidad conquistada o necesidad por exceso. (shrink)