The tradition of Nyāya philosophy centers on a dispassionate quest for truth which is simultaneously connected to soteriological and epistemic aims. This article shows how Vācaspati Miśra brings together the soteriological concept of dispassion with the discourse practices of debate, as a response to Buddhist criticisms in Dharmakīrti’s Vādanyāya. He defends the Nyāyasūtra’s stated position that fallacious reasoning is a legitimate means for a debate, under certain circumstances. Dharmakīrti argues that such reasoning is rationally ineffective and indicates unvirtuous qualities. For (...) Vācaspati, fallacies are a way to prevent the spread of morally weighty falsehoods when no other method is available to a debater. After showing textual relationships between Vācaspati’s defense and Dharmakīrti’s earlier criticism, it evaluates their arguments, concluding that Vācaspati’s position involves irresolvable tensions with other Nyāya commitments. (shrink)

Śankara did not comment on the first s ū tra in his Brahmas ū trabh āṣ ya, which was a common practice in such cases; rather, he started by defining two terms: ‘superimposition’ and ‘ignorance’, in a special introductory chapter known to a wider audience as Adhy ā sabh āṣ ya. The question arises as to why he deemed it necessary to precede his commentary to the initial s ū tra with these additional elucidations. Bh ā mat ī, Vācaspati Miśra’s (...) commentary on Mah ā s ū trabh āṣ ya, seems to shed some light on the problem. According to the doctrine of advaita, the phrase ‘desire to know Brahman’ in the first s ū tra seems prima facie to have no meaning. Thus, the introductory commentary is an explanation of an idea of Brahman which is foreign to advaita. (shrink)

This paper examines Swami Hariharānanda Āraṇya’s unique interpretation of smṛti as “mindfulness” (samanaskatā) in Patañjali’s Yogasūtra I.20. Focusing on his extended commentary on Yogasūtra I.20 in his Bengali magnum opus, the Pātañjaljogdarśan (1911), I argue that his interpretation of smṛti is quasi-Buddhistic. On the one hand, Hariharānanda’s conception of smṛti as mindfulness resonates strongly with some of the views on smṛti advanced in classic Buddhist texts such as the Satipaṭṭhānasutta and Buddaghośa’s Papañcasūdanī. On the other hand, he also builds into (...) his complex account of the practice of smṛti certain fundamental doctrines of Sāṃkhyayoga—such as mindfulness of the Lord (“īśvara”) and mental identification with the Puruṣa, the transcendental “Self” that is wholly independent of nature—which are incompatible with Buddhist metaphysics. I will then bring Hariharānanda’s quasi-Buddhistic interpretation of smṛti of Yogasūtra I.20 into dialogue with some of the interpretations of smṛti advanced by traditional commentators. Whereas many traditional commentators such as Vācaspati Miśra and Vijñānabhikṣu straightforwardly identify smṛti of I.20 with “dhyāna” (“concentration”)—the seventh limb of the aṣṭāṇgayoga outlined in Yogasūtra II.28-III.7—Hariharānanda argues that smṛti is the mental precondition for the establishment of dhyāna of the aṣṭāṇgayoga. (shrink)

Based on original translations of passages from the works of three major thinkers of the classical Indian school of Advaita (Sankara, Vacaspati and Sri Harsa), but addressing issues found in Descartes, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Wittgenstein and contemporary analytic philosophers, this book argues for a philosophical position it calls 'non-realism'. This is the view that an independent, external world must be assumed if the features of cognition are to be explained, but that it cannot be proved that there is such a (...) world, independently of an appeal to cognition itself. This position is constructed against idealist denials of externality, realist arguments for an independent world and the sceptical denial of the coherence of cognition. (shrink)

Beginning from some passages by Vācaspati Miśra and Bhāskararāya Makhin discussing the relationship between a crown and the gold of which it is made, this paper investigates the complex underlying connections among difference, non-difference, coreferentiality, and qualification qua relations. Methodologically, philological care is paired with formal logical analysis on the basis of ‘Navya-Nyāya Formal Language’ premises and an axiomatic set theory-based approach. This study is intended as the first step of a broader investigation dedicated to analysing causation and transformation in (...) non-difference. (shrink)

This paper investigates Vācaspati Miśra’s remarkably complex argumentative architecture in support of non-difference by means of a microsimulation model, the classical gold-crown case. A full range of positions, including instantaneism, transformative continuum, indeterminate common basis reference, difference and non-difference coordination, etc., is put under the scrutiny of the Vācaspati Miśra’s dialectic effort. The possibility of coexistence of multiple properties with a single referent is then formally explored. The analysis is carried out in compliance with the ‘Navya-Nyāya Formal Language’ extensional set-based (...) approach and its non-predicative, and variables free, relational syntax. Repeatable modules and structures of reasoning are identified and designed in the form of hypothesis frameworks, axioms and theorems to allow more accurate inferences, in particular regarding transformation and permanence, together with possible or impossible plexuses of properties. Identity and difference qua mutual absence are thoroughly defined with the aid of these formal tools, which conjointly might cast new light on the heuristic and expressive power of Navya-Nyāya logic, as well as on the theoretical potentialities of the non-dualistic account. (shrink)

The work of three present-day Sankritist-philosophers, _God and the World's Arrangement_ allows readers to engage directly with writings of the classical Indian philosophers Śaṅkara and Vācaspati, as well as some of their most acute critics, on the question of whether the existence of a creator God can be known by reason alone. Carefully selected and annotated with the needs of students foremost in mind, these new translations will be of interest to anyone wishing to see up close a newly set (...) gem of our philosophical inheritance from global antiquity. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:God and the World's Arrangement: Readings from Vedānta and Nyāya Philosophy of Religion by Nirmalya Guha, Matthew Dasti, and Stephen PhillipsSwami Narasimhananda (bio)God and the World's Arrangement: Readings from Vedānta and Nyāya Philosophy of Religion. Translated, with Introduction and Explanatory Notes, by Nirmalya Guha, Matthew Dasti, and Stephen Phillips. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2021. Pp. xx + 91. Paperback $19.00, isbn 978-1-62466-957-6.The scarcity of accessible English translations of Sanskrit texts (...) that retain the philosophical rigor of the original has been a great challenge in Indian philosophy. God and the World's Arrangement, a translation with introduction and explanatory notes by Nirmalya Guha, Matthew Dasti, and Stephen Phillips, is an example of how this scarcity could be addressed without straying away from present-day idioms and context. This book discusses the perspectives on God and the arrangement of the world according to Nyāya, Vedānta, Mīmāṃsā, and Buddhist philosophies. This book is divided into two parts, followed by two appendices, and a bibliography. Each part has study questions at the end and there is an impressive reading list. The first part is a translation and analysis of Śaṅkara's theistic argument in his commentary on the Brahma-sūtra 2.2.1–10. The translators also include the subcommentary by Vācaspati Miśra. The second part contains the translation and analysis of Vācaspati Miśra's theistic argument in his commentary on the Nyāya-sūtra 4.1.19–21. All translations are followed by explanations that elaborate the contexts of the arguments. The translations in this book are elegant and use modern English idioms.The seeds of this book were sown by a guest lecture by Nirmalya Guha to a philosophy course at the University of Texas at Austin. The other two authors joined hands with Guha and worked on texts from Sāṃkhya, Nyāya, Vedānta, and Buddhist schools of thought. Scholars around the world are now interested in having a pan-global view of philosophy. However, such an understanding requires an informed engagement with the various contexts and mores of thought. This deceptively slim volume addresses this problem by succinctly providing the required background context and clarifying many commonly held misconceptions about Indian philosophy, particularly Advaita Vedānta. For a long time, there have not been many serious readings of Advaita Vedānta texts. This book comes as a relief and explains the basic concepts of Advaita Vedānta with readings from relevant portions of texts like the Brahma-sūtra. This book is a step to fill the gap [End Page 1] of texts that properly voice the perspectives of scholars from within the traditions following Advaita Vedānta.It is heartening to read a contemporary text that acknowledges the unbiased masterly exegetical work of Vācaspati Miśra that earned him the epithet sarva-tantra-svatantra, "one who is equally proficient in all the disciplines of knowledge." The translators and editors of this book have a noble goal of "coupling Vācaspati's works on Vedānta and on Nyāya" to make "it possible for a wide swath of his work to be pondered, little of which is currently accessible despite Vācaspati's importance for the whole of classical Indian philosophical thought" (p. xi). The editors lose no time in clarifying the approach of the texts explained in the book from Vedānta and Nyāya philosophies. They explain in some detail one of the means of knowledge, pramāṇa s, used by the Indian philosophies that adhere to the Vedās, the means of anumāṇa or inference. An interesting aspect of this book is the contemporary examples that the translators give, like those of a politician and automobile manufacturers. For instance, the translators explain different ways in which arguments given through an example can fail. The translators explain the error of an example not having the property to be proved in this manner:Yet another type of failure occurs when the property to be proved is not actually present in the example. Should one argue that "People who purchase Japanese vehicles... (shrink)

Translation of a section of the Nyāyasūtra (and early commentaries) on the reducibility of arthāpatti (postulation) to anumāna (inferential reasoning). This includes NS 2.2.1-6, with the commentaries of Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, and Vācaspati Miśra.

Reidentification scepticism is the view that we cannot knowledgeably reidentify previously perceived objects. Amongst classical Indian philosophers, the Buddhists argued for reidentification scepticism. In this essay, I will discuss two responses to this Buddhist argument. The first response, defended by Vācaspati Miśra (9th century CE), is that our outer senses allow us to knowledgeably reidentify objects. I will claim that this proposal is problematic. The second response, due to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (9th century CE), is that the manas or the inner (...) sense, functioning as a capacity of attention, helps us knowledgeably reidentify objects. I will explain how this second response answers the Buddhists’ challenge. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Studies in Advaita Vedanta: Towards an Advaita Theory of ConsciousnessChakravarthi Ram-PrasadStudies in Advaita Vedanta: Towards an Advaita Theory of Consciousness. By Sukharanjan Saha. Kolkata: Jadavpur University, 2004. Pp. 231.Studies in Advaita Vedanta: Towards an Advaita Theory of Consciousness, by Sukhar-anjan Saha, is a collection of papers each of which has something to say about consciousness in Advaita, although some of the papers have a rather tenuous connection to (...) this theme. Saha brings to bear a lifetime of study of Advaita and its philosophical contexts in these essays. The one notable lacuna in his approach is the tendency to ignore virtually all contemporary literature on Advaita, and to concentrate almost entirely on the original Sanskrit texts themselves—although he is clearly at home in a variety of modern philosophical techniques. His views are, in themselves, interesting and carefully spelled out.In "The Many Faces of the 'I,' " Saha draws on well-known uses of aham in Śaṅkara, Vācaspati, and Padmapāda to draw the larger conclusion that Advaita is willing to allow for multiple, context-variant senses of 'I,' in contrast to both a Naiyāyika like Gadhādhara and Western thinkers like Husserl."Advaita Analysis of Suffering" is an elegant and surprising essay. Much of it appears to be a fairly general survey of the manner in which different Hindu and Buddhist thinkers identify a positive cognitive error in understanding reality—avidyā—as the cause of suffering. But Saha notes that the classical consensus on suffering is not an empirical statement; there are ordinary success stories, after all. He then ingeniously uses this fact to show that suffering is something structural to existence. Śaṅkara's example of someone who feels "I am fair-complexioned" is a smug indication of the suffering brought to bear on others who are not, in a society that favors fair complexion. Suffering, Saha argues, is socially relative; it relates to value structures more than mere physical discomfort. If all were of the highest or lowest varna, there would be neither pride nor striving, neither bragging nor lamenting. The metaphysical discussion on suffering, it turns out, is really a commentary on Hindu society.Saha heroically—in the light of modern, especially Western scholarship, which sees Śaṅkara as an arch-conservative proponent of brahminical values—tends to see the Advaitin as a social reformer. In the essay above, he sees ś an.kara as teaching precisely the social lesson against discrimination when he talks of suffering. Saha returns to this theme in "Śaṅkara and Varna Distinctions in Hinduism." He puts forward the argument that since Śaṅkara held that all social distinctions were not ultimate (pāramārthika), and since class/varna distinctions are social ones while liberating knowledge is ultimate, varna is irrelevant to liberation. How those traditionally excluded from brahminical philosophy will respond to this generosity is another matter. [End Page 107]In "Inner Sense and Higher Order Consciousness," Saha usefully explains how Nyāya takes an awareness of awareness to be a matter of inner sense, while Advaita denies this. It is sometimes hard to follow him through the essay, as it is not always clear what is being argued. But the contours of the standard Nyāya and Advaita positions on putative higher-order consciousness are laid out competently. The Nyāya position is clear enough, in that the higher-order awareness is an inner perception, with the mind playing the role of an 'inner' organ for the self. So the self becomes conscious of an object through the mind, and that act of consciousness itself becomes an object of the mind; in the latter instance, the mind functions to generate a higher-order consciousness, taking the first mental state as its object. This is relatively clear, but puts a great burden on Nyāya to give a cogent theory of mind, such that the idea of the mind as an inner sense organ becomes persuasive. But this challenge lies beyond the scope of Saha's essay.Gradually, Saha's argument emerges. Advaita takes the mind to be separate from consciousness, which is the untouched ātman. So, there may well be mental... (shrink)

As is the case with most pre‐modern philosophers of India, very little historical information is available about Bhartṛ‐hari. There are many interesting legends, some turned into extensive plays and poems, current about him. However, it is impossible to determine on their basis even whether there was only one philosopher called Bhartṛ‐hari. The appellation “philosopher” could unquestionably be applied to the author or authors of at least two Sanskrit works that are commonly ascribed to Bhartṛ‐hari.