This paper investigates the hypothesis that Heraclitus was a formative influence on the Hippias Major. Specifically, it establishes connections between the dialogue's presentation of "the fine" (τὸ καλόν) and Heraclitus's "unity of opposites" idea. It argues that the fine is characterized by specifically Heraclitean oppositions, and it concludes that this makes a difference for the reading of certain passages in the dialogue and for philosophical conclusions regarding the fine.

Lucian's Hippias or The Bath, traditionally considered to be a straight-faced encomium of a historical architect and real-life bath-house of the Antonine period, is now often judged to be a work of satire, though what exactly is being satirized has remained elusive. This article argues that the architect ‘Hippias’ is closely modelled on Plato's caricature of the sophist Hippias of Elis in the Hippias Minor, and that his bath-house is a comic extrapolation from the sophist's home-made (...) oil-flask and strigil. Lucian's Hippias should be read as a parody of contemporary prose encomia of public buildings. (shrink)

Trata-se de tradução do Hípias Maior de Platão para o Português, com algumas notas de elucidação e justificação das opções.

Plato's Hippias Major has usually been taken to be a comic dialogue, and rightly so. Its main theme is the καλόν, but what is primarily targeted and harshly mocked throughout the dialogue is Hippias’ pretence of having σοφία, which should allow him to define what the καλόν consists in. Yet, καλόν is an ambiguous term since, besides its aesthetic meaning, it also usually means the ‘morally right’. Not being able to define what καλόν is therefore also amounts to (...) being unable to define what the right is. And indeed, the genuine σοφία, as Plato will tell us explicitly, is the σοφία that helps people, especially the youth, to become morally better. Thus, the serious conclusion Plato wants his reader to draw is, first, that the well-known sophist Hippias have no real σοφία despite their very name, and second, and most importantly, that they cannot help anyone become virtuous, and that therefore their claim of educating people in moral goodness proves to be specious. (shrink)

This paper is an attempt so to construe the arguments of the Hippias Minor as to remove the justification for regarding it as unworthy of Plato either because of its alleged fallaciousness and Sophistic mode of argument or because of its alleged immorality. It focuses, therefore, only on the arguments and their conclusions, steering clear of the dialogue's dramatic and literary aspects. Whereas I do not wish to deny the importance of these aspects to a proper understanding of the (...) dialogue – on the contrary, in a dialogue so heavily laden with irony and caricature, these aspects are necessarily more significant than they are in other dialogues – I do think there is something to be gained from concentrating on the arguments themselves. Although there can be little doubt that Socrates is up to something in the Hippias Minor, the task of determining just what he is up to can only be simplified by clarifying the arguments first.The Hippias Minor has traditionally been thought to contain two independent arguments, each having its own paradoxical conclusion. The first argument begins, it is said, when Hippias characterizes the two Homeric heroes Achilles and Odysseus as the true man and the false man respectively. Through its discovery that both the false man and the true man have δύναμις, it results in the paradox that the false man and the true are identical. The second argument, on this view, leaves the subject of ⋯ ⋯ληθ⋯ς and ⋯ ψευδ⋯ς and compares instead all sorts of agents in intentional and unintentional action. Finding that the intentional agent is in every case better than the unintentional, the argument concludes that the intentional evil-doer is also better than the unintentional. Viewing the dialogue as thus containing two distinct topics treated in two self-sufficient arguments is perhaps not the best way to understand it. (shrink)

This strange dialogue becomes intelligible when Socrates is treated as a model of the good man who appears to the Many to be bad talking with a Hippias who is a model of the bad man who appears to the Many to be good. The good and apparently good are dramatized through these models. The good is revealed to be the fitting, while the fine/beautiful (kalon) is revealed to be the apparently fitting (hence the many confusions between the two (...) concepts). Fittingness may be perceived through the senses, but this immediate aesthetic fittingness is confused by the Many with pragmatic fittingness which can actually only be perceived over time and with rational thought. Many associated themes are condensed into this short but brilliant philosophical drama. (shrink)

The first half of Plato’s Hippias Major exhibits the interfacing of the first teacher (Socrates) with the first version of a post-colonial, multi-cultural information technology system (Hippias). In this interface the purposes, results, and values of two contradictory types of operating system for educational servicing units are exhibited to, and can be discovered by, anyone who is not an information technologist.

The first half of Plato’s Hippias Major exhibits the interfacing of the first teacher (Socrates) with the first version of a post-colonial, multi-cultural information technology system (Hippias). In this interface the purposes, results, and values of two contradictory types of operating system for educational servicing units are exhibited to, and can be discovered by, anyone who is not an information technologist.

This paper seeks to address the extent to which ancient historical actors might be seen to have exhibited what might be described as rational motives. In particular, it examines a number of strategic interactions employed by the Athenian tyrant Hippias in his interactions of Aristogeiton, the protagonist of an unsuccessful coup d’etat. A secondary objective of this paper is to explore Hippias’ reactionary policies following his brother’s assassination, namely, whether Hippias’ choice of external allies, in the face (...) of possible exile, were irrational as suggested by some ancient authors. (shrink)

In the 'Hippias Major' Socrates uses a counter-example to oppose Hippias‘s view that parts and wholes always have a "continuous" nature. Socrates argues, for example, that even-numbered groups might be made of parts with the opposite character, i.e. odd. As Gadamer has shown, Socrates often uses such examples as a model for understanding language and definitions: numbers and definitions both draw disparate elements into a sum-whole differing from the parts. In this paper I follow Gadamer‘s suggestion that we (...) should focus on the parallel between numbers and definitions in Platonic thought. However, I offer a different interpretation of the lesson implicit in Socrates‘s opposition to Hippias. I argue that, according to Socrates, parts and sum-wholes may share in essential attributes; yet this unity or continuity is neither necessary, as Hippias suggests, nor is it impossible, as Gadamer implies. In closing, I suggest that this seemingly minor difference in logical interpretation has important implications for how we should understand the structure of human communities in a Platonic context. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 63, Issue 3, pp 223 - 228 The paper argues that Plato, in the _Hippias Major_ gives due consideration to the question whether, for some qualities F, such as beauty, it is possible to give an account of what F is by pointing to an example-and-exemplar. He takes seriously, and gives cogent reasons in defense of, an affirmative answer to this question in a manner comparable to Geach—although he argues that these reasons lead to inconsistency, if combined (...) with the view that it is possible to make comparisons in regard to F among significantly different examples-and-exemplars of a thing that is F. (shrink)

Published with the assistance of a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities.

This paper is an attempt so to construe the arguments of the Hippias Minor as to remove the justification for regarding it as unworthy of Plato either because of its alleged fallaciousness and Sophistic mode of argument or because of its alleged immorality. It focuses, therefore, only on the arguments and their conclusions, steering clear of the dialogue's dramatic and literary aspects. Whereas I do not wish to deny the importance of these aspects to a proper understanding of the (...) dialogue – on the contrary, in a dialogue so heavily laden with irony and caricature, these aspects are necessarily more significant than they are in other dialogues – I do think there is something to be gained from concentrating on the arguments themselves. Although there can be little doubt that Socrates is up to something in the Hippias Minor, the task of determining just what he is up to can only be simplified by clarifying the arguments first. The Hippias Minor has traditionally been thought to contain two independent arguments, each having its own paradoxical conclusion. The first argument begins, it is said, when Hippias characterizes the two Homeric heroes Achilles and Odysseus as the true man and the false man respectively. Through its discovery that both the false man and the true man have δύναμις, it results in the paradox that the false man and the true are identical. The second argument, on this view, leaves the subject of ληθς and ψευδς and compares instead all sorts of agents in intentional and unintentional action. Finding that the intentional agent is in every case better than the unintentional, the argument concludes that the intentional evil-doer is also better than the unintentional. Viewing the dialogue as thus containing two distinct topics treated in two self-sufficient arguments is perhaps not the best way to understand it. (shrink)

This book examines Plato's most puzzling dialogue, Hippias Minor, in detail, treating Socrates' engagement with both Homer and the sophist Hippias over human excellence as at once playful and deadly serious.

There are two different approaches to the Hippias Major. The first emphasises its conformity to a pattern, with the aim of uncovering a single argumentative structure common to several ‘Socratic’ dialogues. The second approach emphasises elements specific to the Hippias Major, including dramatic features such as character, with the aim of finding the best reading of the dialogue taken individually. I make use of the second approach to show that a careful reading of the dialogue by itself does (...) not support the widely held view that Socrates’ interlocutor, the sophist Hippias, misunderstands the central question. I propose a new basis for the Socrates-Hippias exchange which gives an important role to the notion of explanation, and I show that this reading enables us to detect and analyse an argument presented against the position advocated by Hippias. I make a connection between the interpretation defended here and some broader issues about our understanding of the development of Plato’s philosophy. (shrink)

This paper offers a detailed analysis of the first part of Hippias's speech in Plato's Protagoras (337 С 5-E 2). The aim of this analysis is to show the very richness of political notions and implications of Hippias's purpose, which one can be almost considered a sort of 5th century ВС philosophical hetairies's manifesto. Our analysis clarifies the meaning of Hippias's nomos/physis antithesis and it focuses on the philosophical value of these two terms. We try to reconstruct (...) Hippias's conception of positive law and to specify the concept of wise men's relationships and affinity. That, however, does not support the idea of a cosmo-politanism grounded on mankind's universal relationship. Hippias's position – which has to be grasped on the basis of Hippias's ontology explained by an important passage of Plato's Hippias Major – rather sustains the idea of a sort of "aristocratic cosmopolitanism" connected to the philosophical hetairies: that implies the recognition of verified and enhanced differences. (shrink)

Plato’s Hippias Minor proposes a thesis that I call the Superiority of the Voluntary Wrongdoer, which states that the person doing something wrong voluntarily is better than the person doing it wrong involuntarily. This claim has long unsettled scholars, who have tried to determine whether Socrates is serious about SVW or disavows it. The primary strategy among interpreters is to appeal to Socrates’ prior commitment to the “Socratic paradox” that no one does injustice voluntarily; with the Socratic paradox in (...) the background, it is argued, we can better understand how Socrates treats SVW. In this paper, I aim to show that the Hippias Minor points us towards a different understanding of SVW and the Socratic paradox, with implications for their role both in the dialogue and in Plato’s philosophy as a whole. My first step towards this understanding is to consider the distinctive methodology of the Hippias Minor. Socrates’ attitude towards his and Hippias’ arguments is characterized by πλάνη, or wavering; I argue that this wavering shows that Socrates wants to determine how he might accommodate what is compelling about both his and Hippias’ positions, rather than choosing one over the other. To that end, I look more closely at what each interlocutor proposes in the dialogue, concluding that many of their primary commitments are shared by both interlocutors and do not contradict. We do not, then, need to throw out SVW, and we can grasp the true role of the Socratic paradox: it is not axiomatic but a conditional conclusion of the dialogue, and Socrates’ attempt to reconcile SVW with Hippias’ arguments provides reasons and motivation for accepting it. Accordingly, we cannot assume that the Socratic paradox will be in place, and we should look for some indication in the Hippias Minor as to why it could hold. I argue that the dialogue provides a framework for doing so, by taking steps towards a new understanding of knowledge that can support the Socratic paradox. These moves put the Hippias Minor in the position of beginning to examine and develop key ideas in Plato’s ethics and epistemology. (shrink)

Plato’s discourse on beauty in the Hippias Major and the Symposium is distinctly apophatic in nature. Plato describes beauty in terms of what it is not (an approach sometimes referred to apophasis, or the via negativa). In this paper, I argue that Platonic apophatic practise in the Hippias Major and the Symposium depicts beauty as an ally to certain aspirations of philosophical discourse. In the first section, I offer some brief prefatory remarks on the nature of apophasis and (...) its presence in Plato’s thinking. In the second section, I provide some background to the dialogue of the Hippias Major and highlight the apophatic nature of the descriptions of beauty offered therein. In the third and final section, I discuss the Symposium, a dialogue within which, in addition to representing beauty apophatically, Plato illustrates how we may become able to achieve some positive, or cataphatic, insights into the nature of beauty. I conclude that the purpose of the Platonic apophatic portrayal of beauty in the Hippias Major and the Symposium is to show that, while beauty cannot be reduced to a series of assertive truth statements, it can nevertheless function as an accessory to other dimensions of philosophical thinking. (shrink)

In Hippias Minor, Plato does not merely condemn Homer as a reference in ethical matters. He opposes two uses of poetry when it comes to referring to and giving meaning to it: poetry as a source of knowledge admitted and frozen by tradition, ethically normative, and poetry as a source of philosophical questions, conducive to ethical reflection. The debate shows that Socrates’ view of Homer, as well as his Homeric point of view, allow us to ask good and often (...) paradoxical questions about the link between truth, falsity, knowledge and calculation, which are essential for those who want to build solid ethics. The dialogue then shows how the philosopher enriches the meaning of the Homeric text. (shrink)

In Plato's "Hippias Major" 292e6-7, we can find a self-predication sentence; "The fine is always fine." (We have similar expressions in "Protagoras" 330c4-6, 330d8-el, "Lysis" 220b6-7.) How should we interpret this sentence? We cannot give it any metaphysical meaning drawn from Plato's own theory of Form, which is explicit in his middle dialogues. "The fine" here should be the logical cause, not the one of the metaphysical essentials (cf. Paul Woodruff's "Plateo Hippias Major", p. 150). So taking a (...) sentence like "parthenos kale kalon" (287e4), we can safely paraphrase it in Woodruff's manner: "a fine girl is a fine thing." This can avoid reading the metaphysical meaning into the text. And I would like to make a new proposal for reading of 292e6-7: "the fine thing is what is to be called fine." This is to emphasize the unique character of the self-predication sentences in the early dialogues. In the Socratic way of discourse, Socrates and his partner get involved into "trial and error" during their pursuit of the knowledge. What they can do then is to give their opinions which seem to them true (so-called alethes doxa", cf. "Meno" 85c), and to get close examinations of them. And in this way they are getting closer to the knowledge. My interpretation well describes these activities. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article looks to Attic comedy to explain Socrates’ first argument in Plato's Hippias Major: his refutation of Hippias’ claim that the Beautiful is a beautiful girl. As part of his argument, Socrates introduces three examples of beautiful things—a mare, a lyre and a pot —all of which are used in comedy as metaphorical obscenities for sexualized women. The author contends that an erotic reading of the text accomplishes what no other interpretation can: a unified account of the (...) passage that allows for Socrates’ successful refutation of a proposal in keeping with Hippias’ character. In addition, it explains Socrates’ choice of examples—in particular, the rarely cited χύτρα—and Hippias’ otherwise inexplicable reaction to the χύτρα, as well as the analogous relationship of monkeys and men to pots and girls. (shrink)

Resumen El siguiente artículo propone una interpretación del Hipias Mayor de Platón. A partir del análisis del contexto dramático, de los interlocutores y de la ejecución del diálogo, se destaca el problema de lo bello en sus implicancias ontológicas y éticas. El repetido esfuerzo por determinar lo bello no sólo responde a un problema filosófico fundamental, sino a una intención terapéutica por parte de Sócrates. El desdoblamiento de Sócrates resultará en el fondo ser un recurso por el cual sea posible (...) superar el olvido de la ignorancia que el interlocutor de Sócrates padece.The following paper proposes an interpretation of Plato’s Hippias Major. From the analysis of the dramatic context, the interlocutors and the execution of the dialogue, it highlights the problem of beauty in its ontological and ethical implications. The repeated effort to determine the beautiful not only responds to a fundamental philosophical problem, but to a therapeutic intention by Socrates. The debated splitting of Socrates will be ultimately a resource by which it is possible to overcome the oblivion of the ignorance that the interlocutor of Socrates suffers. (shrink)

The question of ontological commitment in Plato’s Hippias Major has been important in disputes over the dialogue’s place in the corpus, its meaning, and its authenticity. But this question seems to have been settled—the Hippias Major is not committed to the ‘forms.’ Such an ontological conclusion has been vigorously defended, but its defenses rest on a problematic meta-ontological framework. This paper suggests a more adequate framework and brings more evidence to the evaluation of the question of ontological commitment (...) in the Hippias Major. It concludes that the dialogue is indeed committed to some kind of form. (shrink)