In den Aufsätzen dieses Bandes präsentiert Anton Friedrich Koch Hegels theoretische Philosophie als diejenige Nichtstandard-Metaphysik, in der sich die Metaphysik, nicht aber die Philosophie vollendet. Jenseits von Hegels Evolutionstheorie des Absoluten gilt es von einem Standpunkt der Endlichkeit aus neu zu philosophieren.

Den Ausgangspunkt des Aufsatzes bildet Dieter Henrichs These, daß die Negation in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik selbstreferentiell und autonomisiert vorkommt. Sie wird als exegetische These an dem daseinslogischen Sachverhalt des Anderen seiner selbst sowie am Übergang von der Seins- zur Wesenslogik bewährt und wie folgt differenziert: In der Seinslogik erscheint die Selbstbeziehung der Negation als mit Unmittelbarem kontaminiert, erst in der Wesenslogik trifft sie autonomisiert hervor. Mittel der Differenzierung ist der mengentheoretische Begriff der Unfundiertheit, der es ferner erlaubt, die These (...) von der Selbstbeziehung der Negation auch der Sache nach zu verteidigen und sie für eine Nichtstandarddiagnose der Lügnerantinomie fruchtbar zu machen. (shrink)

Auch wenn der Begriff des Kunstwerks sich nicht bündig definieren läßt, so kann man doch wesentliche Aspekte der Kunst angeben und entwickeln, indem man sie auf Voraussetzungen des Faktums bezieht, daß Menschen Wahrheitsansprüche erheben. Kant, Adorno und Heidegger haben im Ausgang von jenem Faktum einen ästhetischen bzw. einen mimetischen bzw. einen alethischen Aspekt der Kunst freigelegt. Dies ist das Thema und die zentrale These der nachfolgenden Bemerkungen. Sie sind in sechs Abschnitte gegliedert. Zunächst wird über das von Adorno so genannte (...) Nichtidentische, dann kurz über das Schöne und das Erhabene, drittens über den bildenden Schein und die Mimesis, viertens über die Wahrheit und ihre begrifflichen Momente, fünftens über Glück und Versöhnung und zuletzt über die Frage der Definierbarkeit der Kunst zu sprechen sein. (shrink)

Das sinnliche Bewusstsein, abstrakt einzeln betrachtet, bietet ein Sinnesdaten- Konglomerat in einem raumzeitlich ausgedehnten sensorischen Bewusstseinsfeld, welches affektiv in Leib und Gegenwartsbewusstsein des Menschen verankert und so auf dessen „Begehrungsvermögen“ bezogen ist, jedoch kein Bewusstsein von Subjekt und Objekt. Dieses entsteht erst durch die freie begriffliche Synthesis, die mit Fichte als intellektuelle Anschauung unseres eigenen Handelns – des Verbindens und dadurch Objektivierens sowie „Subjektivierens“/Selbstbewusstsein-Erzeugens – verstanden werden kann. In konservativer Projektion der verbindenden Verstandesbegriffe lässt sie uns erkennen, was das sinnliche (...) Bewusstsein – das Epistemische quasi vorzeichnend – zeitlich geordnet lediglich wahrnimmt. (shrink)

Irad Kimhi considers the conundrum, first addressed by Parmenides, of how negative facts can be the case and be thought, to be the puzzle that philosophy has been working to solve since Plato and Aristotle and wants to do his part by criticizing Frege's dissociation of sense and force and developing a more Aristotelian account of judgment. Michael Della Rocca considers the conundrum a hopeless aporia that we must avoid by embracing Parmenides' radical monism of being and in a recent (...) article (“Parmenides' insight and the possibility of logic”) aims to show that Kimhi is confronted with exactly the kind of insoluble difficulties that he that finds in Frege. The present article agrees with Kimhi that we can think about what is not the case, although thinking reaches all the way to what IS the case. But Della Rocca is right that Kimhi cannot explain by virtue of what we are able to do this. The counter‐proposal says: (1) Thinking reaches to being in that we have learned to read things in the intersubjective spatial field of consciousness as model tokens of singular propositions about them. (2) Negation can be thought of because thinking has its very origin in absolute, non‐well‐founded negation. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 64 Heft: 6 Seiten: 879-893.

The article consists of a general introduction and two main parts, the first relating to sensory, qualitative consciousness and the second to discursive, intentional consciousness. The general thesis of the first part can be formulated like this: Humans literally overlap in their infinite spatiotemporal field of consciousness, which is one and the same for all and is only oriented differently by each individual, namely egocentrically in each case. On the basis of this common extended consciousness we can talk to each (...) other about things. In the second part, the thesis – inspired by the divergent picture theories of elementary sentences developed by the early Wittgenstein and then by Wilfrid Sellars – is argued that when we talk about things, we read them and translate them into verbal language. We read them as world-sided primordial tokens (1) of their names, (2) of phenomenal “this-such” representations of them, and (3) of various elementary sentences about them, thus treating them as objects, as Kantian intuitions and as token facts respectively. Incidentally, this result can serve to illuminate Heideg­ger’s thesis in his 1950 lecture on language that it is originally language that speaks – as the “ringing of silence” or “chiming of stillness” (“Geläut der Stille”) – and that humans have the call to speak back to language in talking to each other, i.e. to respond to the chiming of stillness. (shrink)

English summary: In this work, Anton Friedrich Koch develops a hermeneutical realism using methods of analytic philosophy, i.e. the thesis that although the real is independent from individual beliefs and perceptions, it is, however, not independent of there being beliefs and perceptions at all. We, the finite spatiotemporally embodied subjects, are therefore not a 'cosmic coincidence' but rather necessary for the existence of the material system of space-time, which, on the other hand, encompasses us and is in no (...) way a fiction or construction (subjectivity thesis). This brand of realism is hermeneutical because it treats knowing as a special case of reading and translating - of things into spoken language - (readability thesis), and in giving room to the discovery that completeness and consistency, as in mathematics, are likewise incompatible in the description of the world (antinomy thesis). German description: Anton Friedrich Koch begrundet und entwickelt in diesem Werk mit Mitteln der analytischen Philosophie einen hermeneutischen Realismus: die philosophische Lehre, dass das Reale zwar von einzelnen Meinungen und Wahrnehmungen unabhangig ist, nicht aber davon, dass es uberhaupt Meinungen und Wahrnehmungen gibt. Wir, die endlichen, raumzeitlich verkorperten Subjekte, sind also kein Zufall, sondern notwendig fur die Existenz des materiellen Raum-Zeit-Systems, das uns andererseits weitraumig umgibt und keineswegs unsere Konstruktion oder Fiktion ist (Subjektivitatsthese). Hermeneutisch ist dieser Realismus, weil er das Erkennen als einen Sonderfall des Lesens und Ubersetzens - der Dinge in Wortsprache - begreift (Lesbarkeitsthese) und weil er der Entdeckung Raum gibt, dass Vollstandigkeit und Widerspruchsfreiheit, wie in der Mathematik, so auch in der Weltbeschreibung unvertraglich sind (Antinomiethese). (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNGDer Mensch ist das Lebewesen, das Wahrheitsansprüche erhebt. Die Gliederung der Wahrheit prägt daher nicht nur Sein und Zeit, sondern auch alles Menschliche, so unser bewusstes Weltverhältnis und besonders Unglück und Glück. Die Wahrheit hat drei Aspekte: einen realistischen, einen pragmatischen und einen phänomenalen Aspekt , die Zeit drei entsprechende Modi: Vergangenheit, Zukunft und Gegenwart, unser Weltverhältnis drei Seiten: Gefühl, Wille und Wahrnehmung, das Glück drei Aspekte: Vergnügen, Gelingen und Präsenz. Gezeigt wird, wie diese Phänomene zusammenhängen und wie andererseits ihre (...) jeweiligen Aspekte auseinander treten, woraus falsches Bewusstsein und Unglück entsteht. Glück stellt sich ein im Wiederfinden der verlorenen Zeit: wenn Vergangenheit, Zukunft und Gegenwart sich in der von Proust beschriebenen Weise vereinigen.SUMMARYMan is the kind of animal that raises truth claims. The internal structure of truth, therefore, pervades not only being and time, but also everything human, such as our conscious being in the world in general and our being unhappy or happy in particular. Truth has three essential aspects: a realistic, a pragmatic and a phenomenal aspect ; time has three corresponding modes: past, future and present; conscious being in the world has three sides: feeling, willing and perceiving; happiness has three aspects: pleasure, satisfaction and presence. It is shown how these phenomena hang together and yet how their respective aspects tend to fall asunder, thus creating lack of understanding and unhappiness. Happiness will arise only when lost time is regained and when past, future and present unite in the way adumbrated by Proust. (shrink)

Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik will nicht weniger sein als die wissenschaftliche Darstellung des Systems der reinen Vernunft. In ihren drei Teilen Das Sein (1812/1832), Die Lehre vom Wesen (1813) und Die subjektive Logik oder die Lehre vom Begriff (1816) verfolgt sie den Weg, auf dem Denken sich zum begreifenden und sich selbst begreifenden Denken bestimmt. Von Anfang an steht sie damit unter dem Vorzeichen, dass die Etappen dieses Weges, das heisst die Formen des Denkens, ihre Beurteilung nicht nach Massgabe ihrer (...) Anpassung an oder Funktionalitat fur anderes, sondern durch immanente Kritik erfahren. Mit diesem Konzept einer sich selbst kritisierenden und sich selbst bestimmenden Vernunft hat die Wissenschaft der Logik es ihren Lesern nicht eben leicht gemacht und, von ihrem Erscheinen bis in die Gegenwart, tiefgreifende Kontroversen sowohl hinsichtlich ihrer Interpretation als auch hinsichtlich ihrer Einschatzung nach sich gezogen. Der vorliegende Kommentarband dient vor allem dem Ziel, Einblick in den Gedankengang der Wissenschaft der Logik zu geben. In dreizehn Originalbeitragen wird, der Gliederung des Werks folgend, die Argumentation in teils freierer, teils nah am Text orientierter Weise rekonstruiert. Daruber hinaus dokumentiert der Band unterschiedliche Perspektiven der gegenwartigen Hegel-Forschung. ". (shrink)

Kant in his critical metaphysics, as one might call his transcendental philosophy, proceeds from the syncategorematic, subject-sided forms of thinking, which are revealed by general logic qua doctrine of the inferences of reason, and assigns to them one-to-one categorematic, object-sided forms of thinking: the categories qua pure, non-empirical predicates of things. Kant then shows in his transcendental deduction that the categories are objectively, – i. e. without our invasive intervention – valid of all things in space-time. In the present essay, (...) philosophy is understood not so much as critical metaphysics in a narrow sense of “metaphysics”, but rather as the a priori hermeneutic science; and the transcendental deduction of the categories is replaced by arguments for a readability thesis and a theory of the a priori presuppositions of referencing things in space and time. The readability thesis states that things can be read as world-sided primal tokens of proper names of themselves and also as world-sided primal tokens of elementary propositions about them. The theory of the a priori presuppositions clarifies the conditions of the possibility of subjects orienting themselves in space and time and being able to refer, first, to themselves qua embodied thinkers and then as well to arbitrary individual items. (shrink)

Andrea Kern has criticized the view that the fallibility of judgements is due to their objectivity and has tried to show that objective knowledge is comprehensible only if its infallibility is not logically excluded. She argues that the notion of knowledge is more fundamental than that of error and that we must bring into play an epistemic capacity as a form of perfection to understand what knowledge is. In the present article, this position is charitably criticized and modified. It is (...) argued that infallible knowledge is even actual, but not fully objective. Infallibility characterises our knowledge of logical and of spatio–temporal form and our judgments of the kind "it seems to me that p". This knowledge is in neither case knowledge of particular objective facts, but in both cases knowledge of what Sebastian Rödl calls the object überhaupt. (shrink)

Anknüpfend an einen Dialog zwischen Jürgen Habermas und Joseph Ratzinger von 2004 über vorpolitische Grundlagen des demokratischen Rechtsstaates werden Eckpunkte möglicher Rechtfertigungen und ein strukturelles Defizit des Staates erörtert: selbst der demokratischste gefährdet die Freiheit seiner Bürger. Ratzinger und Habermas weisen dem religiösen Glauben differente Funktionen zu, um diesem und verwandten Defiziten abzuhelfen: Ratzinger setzt auf tiefe religiöse Überzeugung, Habermas auf Kulturchristentum. Dagegen wird hier die These vertreten, dass die vorgeschlagenen Abhilfen nicht wirkungsvoll sind. Vielmehr bedarf es einer im kritischen (...) Kantischen Sinn metaphysischen Begründung des Staates und der Moralität aus der internen Struktur der reinen praktischen Vernunft, um die Notwendigkeit einer Pluralität partikularer demokratischer Staaten und der Singularität eines universalen ethischen Gemeinwesens zu verstehen und angemessen zu bewerten. (shrink)

In ihrem Buch Existenz verteidigen Andreas Luckner und Sebastian Ostritsch die Position Saul Kripkes gegen den benachbarten Ansatz Timothy Williamsons und gegen die entferntere Tradition von Frege, Russell und Quine. Einig sind alle Parteien sich, dass Existenz als Dass-Sein zu denken ist im Unterschied zum Was- und Wie-Sein des Seienden oder, wie ich sagen werde, als formales Sein im Unterschied zum inhaltlichen Sein. Der Dissens hebt an bei der Frage, ob Existenz ein Prädikat erster Stufe oder eine Art Prädikat von (...) Prädikaten ist, wie Frege und die ihm folgen meinen, wenn sie Existenz als Quantor, d. h. unspezifische Zahlangabe zu Begriffsumfängen fassen. Kripke und Williamson dagegen erklären Existenz als eine nichtdiskriminierende Eigenschaft von Einzelnen, Kripke als eine kontingente,Williamson als eine notwendige. Luckner und Ostritsch schließen sich Kripke an und ich mich ihnen. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 491 adequacy of his ideas. Yet our view of a person's character can govern our view of what he is trying to do. More specifically, if we think Dewey never completely abandoned the idealistic standpoint with its emphasis upon the harmony of self and community realization, that he sought out easy solutions to tough moral problems, we will not regard his work as making an honest attempt (...) even to face these problems. (Coughlan is very sympathetic to Randolph Bourne's criticism of Dewey on this point.) Viewing Dewey in this way, one is tempted to come to Coughlan's conclusion that there is an ambiguity in Dewey's philosophy about how values are created and, moreover, that this conclusion "haunts any philosophy.., that does not allow itself to appeal to some transcendent source" (pp. 161-162). By the time we reach this latter conclusion we have forgotten that the aim of Dewey's moral philosophy is not to point to some transcendent source that tells us what is "right" to do. Indeed, to the extent that we appeal to such a source, we are apt to ignore the existent factors that are responsible for creating the problem. Put another way, Dewey's standpoint requires that we reject the view that one of the parties to a moral conflict is wrong because he holds the wrong moral rule and the other right because he holds to some rule that truly tells us what we "ought" to do. Instead, he maintains that the origin of the conflict is within the situation itself, and the only way out of the conflict (if there is a way out) is to take advantage of or even reconstruct the factors in the situation. Instrumentalism is the position, itself always open to revision and reconstruction on particular points, that the philosopher can offer an interpretation of moral and political problems that makes them more amenable to resolution. The philosopher, unlike the casuist, cannot tell us what to do. He attempts to provide a conception of ourselves and our social situation that will enable us to go about doing. On specific matters, Coughlan uncovers much new and interesting information. To list only a few items: he points to the possible influence of a minister named Newman Smyth on Dewey's short-lived philosophy of "dynamic intuitionalism" as developed toward the end of the important 1884 paper, "The New Psychology." He gives the most complete account so far of Dewey's unsuccessful "Thought News" experiment at Michigan and of the early development of the organic circuit theory. He tells us something of the details of Vermont life that would tend to dispel the simplistic notion that Dewey's interest in democracy was a product of his growing up there. And--most interesting of ail--a fascinating chapter on the early life of Mead and his friend Castle reveals that at one point Mead was so reduced to despair at the prospect of a cold universe governed by the laws of Newtonian physics that he simply rid himself of it by maintaining that space is simply a construction of the optic nerve: "the three dimensions simply rest upon it!" (p. 128). It was a tough time to try to become a successful philosopher. His tendency to speculate about Dewey's motives aside, Coughlan has given us the most complete and carefully worked out treatment of the early years of Dewey's life. DONALD F. KOCH Michigan State University Human Reafity and the Social World: Ortega's Philosophy of History. By Oliver W. Holmes. (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1975. Pp. xi + 175. $12.50) Professor Holmes's study in intellectual history is an inquiry into the interrelationship of Ortega's social and intellectual experiences with the formation of his ideas. In the author's own words: "This essay attempts a systematic analysis of Ortega's philosophy of human reality, the social world, and history. The unified analysis of his philosophy drew heavily upon the traditions of historicism, phenomenology, and existentialism. Such was the influence of these philosophical traditions that Ortega became, at once, critic and representative of their respective positions, problems, and solutions" (p. vii). 492 HISTORY... (shrink)

This collection of ten essays elucidates some of the more challenging aspects of Anscombe’s work and affirms her reputation as one of our most original ...

A philosopher argues that state-sponsored cyberattacks against central military or civilian targets are always acts of war. What is this philosopher doing? According to conceptual analysts, the philosopher is making a claim about our concept of war. According to philosophical realists, the philosopher is making a claim about war per se. In a quickly developing literature, a third option is being explored: the philosopher is engineering the concept of war. On this view, the philosopher is making a proposal about which (...) concept we should have – even if it deviates from the extant concept, and even if it does not capture ‘what war really is’. The activity or method of proposing such revisionary definitions, as well as the metaphilosophical reflection on it, has become known as conceptual engineering. (shrink)

Conceptual engineers aim to revise rather than describe our concepts. But what are concepts? And how does one engineer them? Answering these questions is of central importance for implementing and theorizing about conceptual engineering. This paper discusses and criticizes two influential views of this issue: semanticism, according to which conceptual engineers aim to change linguistic meanings, and psychologism, according to which conceptual engineers aim to change psychological structures. I argue that neither of these accounts can give us the full story. (...) Instead, I propose and defend the Dual Content View of Conceptual Engineering. On this view, conceptual engineering targets concepts, where concepts are understood as having two kinds of contents: referential content and cognitive content. I show that this view is independently plausible and that it gives us a comprehensive account of conceptual engineering that helps to make progress on some of the most difficult problems surrounding conceptual engineering. (shrink)

This paper introduces and discusses three models of future: a determinist model, a stochastic model, and the model of True Prophetic Knowledge. All three models coexist in natural languages and are represented both in their grammatical systems and in the text-building discourse strategies speakers and authors apply to.

Musical flutes constructed from bird bone and mammoth ivory begin to appear in the archaeological record from around 40,000 years ago. Due to the different physical demands of acquiring and working with these source materials in order to produce a flute, researchers have speculated about the significance—aesthetic or otherwise—of the use of mammoth ivory as a raw material for flutes. I argue that biological signaling theory provides a theoretical basis for the proposition that mammoth ivory flute production is a signal (...) of increasing social differentiation in Upper Palaeolithic human life. (shrink)

Explorations in Archaeology and Philosophy grew out of an interdisciplinary conference on the Upper Palaeolithic, “Digging Deeper: Archaeological and Philosophical Perspectives”, held on Miami Beach, Florida, in December 2017. The previous decade had seen increasing numbers of publications on topics of interest to both philosophers and archaeologists, so the time was ripe for a conference which served to generate constructive dialogue between researchers from both disciplines. Themes discussed included art, music, the mind, symbols, mortuary practices, and archaeological methodology. This volume (...) draws from several contributors to that conference as well as other leading researchers at the forefront of the intersection of archaeology and philosophy. Its scope is expanded from the Upper Palaeolithic to archaeological research in general—adopting a broad conception inviting many perspectives from philosophy and interdisciplinary evolutionary studies to the table—and is organized by topics into four sections: Theory and Inference; Interdisciplinary Connections; Cognition, Language and Normativity; Ethical Issues. (shrink)