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  1. Maria Alvarez (2010). Kinds of Reasons: An Essay in the Philosophy of Action. Oxford University Press.
    Understanding human beings and their distinctive rational and volitional capacities is one of the central tasks of philosophy. The task requires a clear account of such things as reasons, desires, emotions and motives, and of how they combine to produce and explain human behaviour. In Kinds of Reasons, Maria Alvarez offers a fresh and incisive treatment of these issues, focusing in particular on reasons as they feature in contexts of agency. Her account builds on some important recent work in the (...)
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  2. Maria Alvarez (2010). Kinds of Reasons: An Essay in the Philosophy of Action. OUP Oxford.
    Understanding human beings and their distinctive rational and volitional capacities requires a clear account of such things as reasons, desires, emotions, and motives, and how they combine to produce and explain human behaviour. Maria Alvarez presents a fresh and incisive study of these concepts, centred on reasons and their role in human agency.
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  3. Maria Alvarez (2009). Reasons, Desires and Intentional Actions. In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave Macmillan
  4. C. Andreou (2005). Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action. Philosophical Review 114 (3):411-413.
  5. Gerald W. Barnes (1990). George Wilson, The Intentionality of Human Action Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 10 (5):212-216.
  6. J. Bishop (2001). McCANN, HJ-The Works of Agency. Philosophical Books 42 (3):232-232.
  7. Johannes L. Brandl, Marian David & Leopold Stubenberg (2001). Agents and Their Actions. Rodopi.
    IntroductionE.J. LOWE: Event Causation and Agent CausationRalf STOECKER: Agents in ActionGeert KEIL: How Do We Ever Get Up? On the Proximate Causation of Actions and EventsMaria ALVAREZ: Letting Happen, Omissions, and CausationFrederick STOUTLAND: Responsive Action and the Belief-Desire ModelMarco IORIO: How Are Agents Related to Their Actions? The Existentialist ResponseJens KULENKAMPFF: What Oedipus Did When He Married Jocasta or What Ancient Tragedy Tells Us About Agents, Their Actions, and the WorldRüdiger BITTNER: Agents as RulersMonika BETZLER: How Can an Agent Rationally (...)
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  8. Damir Čičić (2011). The Conflicting Aspects of Hugh McCann's Theory of Action. Filozofia 66 (9):918.
  9. Randolph Clarke (2010). Because She Wanted To. Journal of Ethics 14 (1):27--35.
    Carl Ginet has advanced an account of action explanation on which actions can be entirely uncaused and action explanations need not cite causal factors. Several objections have been raised against this view, and Ginet has recently defended the account. Here it is argued that Ginet’s defense fails to come to grips with the chief problems faced by his view.
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  10. John M. Connolly (1991). Whither Action Theory. Journal of Philosophical Research 16:85-106.
    The problem of ‘wayward causal chains’ threatens any causal analysis of the concept of intentional human action. For such chains show that the mere causation of an action by the right sort of belief and/or desire does not make the action intentional, i.e. one done in order to attain the object of desire. Now if the ‘because’ in ‘wayward’ action-explanations is straightforwardly causal, that might be argued to indicate by contrast that the different ‘because’ of reasons-explanations (which both explain and (...)
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  11. Giuseppina D'Oro & Constantine Sandis (eds.) (2013). Reasons and Causes: Causalism and Non-Causalism in the Philosophy of Action. Palgrave Macmillan.
    To mark the 50th anniversary of Donald Davidson's 'Actions, reasons and causes', eight philosophers with distinctive and contrasting views revisit and update the reasons/causes debate.Their essays are preceded by a historical introduction which traces current debates to their roots in the philosophy of history and social science, linking the rise of causalism to a metaphysical backlash against the linguistic turn. Both historically grounded and topical, this volume will be of great interest to both students and scholars in the philosophy of (...)
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  12. Stephen Davey (2013). How to Respond to the Problem of Deviant Formal Causation. Philosophia 41 (3):703-717.
    Recently, a new problem has arisen for an Anscombean conception of intentional action. The claim is that the Anscombean’s emphasis on the formally causal character of practical knowledge precludes distinguishing between an aim and a merely foreseen side effect. I propose a solution to this problem: the difference between aim and side effect should be understood in terms of the familiar Anscombean distinction between acting intentionally and the intention with which one acts. I also argue that this solution has advantages (...)
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  13. L. H. Davis (1991). On Action by Carl Ginet. [REVIEW] Mind 100:390-394.
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  14. Philip E. Davis (1962). Action" and "Cause of Action. Mind 71 (281):93-95.
  15. R. E. Dowling (1969). ROWN, D. G.: Action. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47:404.
  16. Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.) (2011). Essays on Anscombe's Intention. Harvard University Press.
    This collection of ten essays elucidates some of the more challenging aspects of Anscombe’s work and affirms her reputation as one of our most original ...
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  17. Carl Ginet (1995). Reason's Explanation of Action. In Timothy O'Connor (ed.), Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will. Oxford University Press
  18. Don Gustafson (2007). Neurosciences of Action and Noncausal Theories. Philosophical Psychology 20 (3):367–374.
    Recent neuroscience and psychology of behavior have suggested that conscious decisions may have no causal role in the etiology of intentional action. Such results pose a threat to traditional philosophical analyses of action. On such views beliefs, desires and conscious willing are part of the causal structure of intentional action. But if the suggestions from neuroscience/psychology are correct, analyses of this kind are wrong. Conscious antecedents of action are epiphenomenal. This essay explores this consequence. It also notes that the traditional (...)
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  19. Ghita Holmström-Hintikka & Raimo Tuomela (1997). Contemporary Action Theory.
  20. Jennifer Hornsby (2011). Actions in Their Circumstances. In Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.), Essays on Anscombe's Intention. Harvard University Press
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  21. J. Lenman (2007). Review: Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action. [REVIEW] Mind 116 (463):776-778.
  22. E. J. Lowe (1996). Subjects of Experience. Cambridge University Press.
    In this innovative study of the relationship between persons and their bodies, E. J. Lowe demonstrates the inadequacy of physicalism, even in its mildest, non-reductionist guises, as a basis for a scientifically and philosophically acceptable account of human beings as subjects of experience, thought and action. He defends a substantival theory of the self as an enduring and irreducible entity - a theory which is unashamedly committed to a distinctly non-Cartesian dualism of self and body. Taking up the physicalist challenge (...)
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  23. Eric Marcus (2012). Rational Causation. Harvard University Press.
    Introduction -- Rational explanation of belief -- Rational explanation of action -- (Non-human) animals and their reasons -- Rational explanation and rational causation -- Events and states -- Physicalism.
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  24. Alfred Mele (1992). On Action, by Carl Ginet. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):488-491.
  25. Alfred R. Mele (1992). Recent Work on Intentional Action. American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (3):199 - 217.
  26. Bede Rundle (1997). Mind in Action. Oxford University Press.
    Mind in Action challenges the dominant view in contemporary philosophy that human action is driven by thoughts and desires much as a machine is made to function by the operation of physical causes. Bede Rundle rejects the materialist view of mind and the causal theory of action; his alternative approach elucidates such key concepts as thought, belief, desire, intention, and freedom to give a fresh view of human behavior.
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  27. Constantine Sandis (2004). Book Review: Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action. [REVIEW] Journal of Moral Philosophy 1 (2):223-225.
  28. Constantine Sandis & Timothy O'Connor (eds.) (2010). A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Blackwell.
  29. Frederick Stoutland (2011). Introduction : Anscombe's Intention in Context. In Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.), Essays on Anscombe's Intention. Harvard University Press
  30. Frederick Stoutland (2011). Summary of Anscombe's Intention. In Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.), Essays on Anscombe's Intention. Harvard University Press
  31. Frederick Stoutland (1968). Basic Actions and Causality. Journal of Philosophy 65 (16):467-475.
  32. Markos Valaris, Agency and Control.
  33. Niels van Miltenburg (2012). Practical Knowledge and Foreseen Side Effects. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    On Anscombe's view, intentional actions are characterized by a specific type of knowledge (practical knowledge) possessed by the agents that perform them. Recently, interest in Anscombean action theory has been renewed. Sarah Paul argues that Anscombean action theory faces a serious problem: It fails to discriminate between an action’s intended aim or purpose and its foreseen side effects. Since Anscombeans conceive practical knowledge as the formal cause of intentional actions, Paul dubs this a problem of “deviant formal causation.” In this (...)
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  34. George M. Wilson (1989). The Intentionality of Human Action. Stanford University Press.
    CHAPTER ONE Introduction Twenty-five years ago it was pretty widely held among Anglo- American philosophers that it was sheer confusion to suppose that an ...
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