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  1. Mitchell Aboulafia (1986). The Mediating Self: Mead, Sartre, and Self-Determination. Yale University Press.
  2. Jesús H. Aguilar & Andrei A. Buckareff (2009). Agency, Consciousness, and Executive Control. Philosophia 37 (1):21-30.
    On the Causal Theory of Action (CTA), internal proper parts of an agent such as desires and intentions are causally responsible for actions. CTA has increasingly come under attack for its alleged failure to account for agency. A recent version of this criticism due to François Schroeter proposes that CTA cannot provide an adequate account of either the executive control or the autonomous control involved in full-fledged agency. Schroeter offers as an alternative a revised understanding of the proper role of (...)
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  3. Jesús H. Aguilar, Andrei A. Buckareff & Keith Frankish (eds.) (2010). New Waves in Philosophy of Action. Palgrave Macmillan.
  4. Maria Alvarez (2010). Kinds of Reasons: An Essay in the Philosophy of Action. Oxford University Press.
    Understanding human beings and their distinctive rational and volitional capacities is one of the central tasks of philosophy. The task requires a clear account of such things as reasons, desires, emotions and motives, and of how they combine to produce and explain human behaviour. In Kinds of Reasons, Maria Alvarez offers a fresh and incisive treatment of these issues, focusing in particular on reasons as they feature in contexts of agency. Her account builds on some important recent work in the (...)
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  5. Maria Alvarez (2009). Reasons, Desires and Intentional Actions. In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave Macmillan.
  6. Chrisoula Andreou (2014). The Good, the Bad, and the Trivial. Philosophical Studies 169 (2):209-225.
    Dreadful and dreaded outcomes are sometimes brought about via the accumulation of individually trivial effects. Think about inching toward terrible health or toward an environmental disaster. In some such cases, the outcome is seen as unacceptable but is still gradually realized via an extended sequence of moves each of which is trivial in terms of its impact on the health or environment of those involved. Cases of this sort are not only practically challenging, they are theoretically challenging as well. For, (...)
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  7. G. E. M. Anscombe (1981). Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind. University of Minnesota Press.
    The intentionality of sensation -- The first person -- Substance -- The subjectivity of sensation -- Events in the mind -- Comments on Professor R.L. Gregory's paper on perception -- On sensations of position -- Intention -- Pretending -- On the grammar of "Enjoy" -- The reality of the past -- Memory, "experience," and causation -- Causality and determination -- Times, beginnings, and causes -- Soft determinism -- Causality and extensionality -- Before and after -- Subjunctive conditionals -- "Under a (...)
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  8. Kent Bach (1980). Actions Are Not Events. Mind 89 (353):114-120.
  9. Carla Bagnoli (2011). “Reason and Ethics”. In N. Vassallo & C. Amoretti (eds.), Reason and Reasons. Ontos-Verlag.
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  10. Carla Bagnoli (2011). The Exploration of Moral Life. In Iris Murdoch, philosopher. Oxford University Press.
    The most distinctive feature of Murdoch's philosophical project is her attempt to reclaim the exploration of moral life as a legitimate topic of philosophical investigation. In contrast to the predominant focus on action and decision, she argues that “what we require is a renewed sense of the difficulty and complexity of the moral life and the opacity of persons. We need more concepts in terms of which to picture the substance of our being” (AD 293).1 I shall argue that to (...)
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  11. Lynne Rudder Baker (2011). First-Personal Aspects of Agency. Metaphilosophy 42 (1-2):1-16.
    Abstract: On standard accounts, actions are caused by reasons (Davidson), and reasons are taken to be neural phenomena. Since neural phenomena are wholly understandable from a third-person perspective, standard views have no room for any ineliminable first-personal elements in an account of the causation of action. This article aims to show that first-person perspectives play essential roles in both human and nonhuman agency. Nonhuman agents have rudimentary first-person perspectives, whereas human agents—at least rational agents and moral agents—have robust first-person perspectives. (...)
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  12. Lynne Rudder Baker (1981). Why Computers Can't Act. American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (April):157-163.
    To be an agent, one must be able to formulate intentions. To be able to formulate intentions, one must have a first-person perspective. Computers lack a first-person perspective. So, computers are not agents.
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  13. John Bishop (2004). Review of Berent En, How We Act: Causes, Reasons and Intentions. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (9).
  14. John Bishop (1985). Causal Deviancy and Multiple Intentions: A Reply to James Montmarquet. Analysis 45 (3):163 - 168.
  15. Michael E. Bratman (1992). Planning and the Stability of Intention. Minds and Machines 2 (1):1-16.
    I sketch my general model of the roles of intentions in the planning of agents like us-agents with substantial resource limitations and with important needs for coordination. I then focus on the stability of prior intentions: their rational resistance to reconsideration. I emphasize the importance of cases in which one's nonreconsideration of a prior intention is nondeliberative and is grounded in relevant habits of reconsideration. Concerning such cases I argue for a limited form of two-tier consequentialism, one that is restricted (...)
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  16. Fernando Broncano (2006). Consideraciones epistemológicas acerca del “sentido de agencia”. Epistemological Requirements of the Sense of Agency. Logos. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica 39:7-27.
    We discuss the conditions that the knowledge of an action must meet to reach the status of agency or complete intentional action. A first problem is to account how the subject appears in the action. We consider the model of a "sense of agency" and we oppose a theory of action control that does not take in charge the epistemological problems associated to the sense of agency model. Our claim is that epistemological requirements are intrinsic components of the agency, and (...)
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  17. Andrei Buckareff (2001). Can the Agency Theory Be Salvaged? Philosophia Christi 3 (1):217-224.
    Some of the most salient features of Randolph Clarke's causal agent-causal theory of free action are explicated and his theory critiqued. It is shown that invoking agent-causation is unnecessary and makes his theory cumbersome. For insofar as Clarke seeks to render the agency theory more intelligible by appealing to event-causation as contributing to the generation of basic actions, his theory gravitates closer to a causal indeterminist theory of free action.
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  18. Andrei A. Buckareff (2007). Mental Overpopulation and Mental Action: Protecting Intentions From Mental Birth Control. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):49-65.
    Many philosophers of action afford intentions a central role in theorizing about action and its explanation. Furthermore, current orthodoxy in the philosophy of action has it that intentions play a causal role with respect to the etiology and explanation of action. But action theory is not without its heretics. Some philosophers have challenged the orthodox view. In this paper I examine and critique one such challenge. I consider David-Hillel Ruben's case against the need for intentions to play a causal role (...)
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  19. Andrei A. Buckareff & Jing Zhu (2004). Causalisms Reconsidered. Dialogue 43 (01):147-.
    We reply to Andrew Sneddon’s recent criticism of the causal theory of action (CTA) and critically examine Sneddon’s preferred alternative, minimal causalism. We show that Sneddon’s criticism of CTA is problematic in several respects, and therefore his conclusion that “the prospects for CTA look poor” is unjustified. Moreover, we show that the minimal causalism that Sneddon advocates looks rather unpromising and its merits that Sneddon mentions are untenable.
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  20. Justin Capes (2012). Action, Responsibility and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Philosophical Studies 158 (1):1-15.
    Here it is argued that in order for something someone “does” to count as a genuine action, the person needn’t have been able to refrain from doing it. If this is right, then two recent defenses of the principle of alternative possibilities, a version of which says that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have refrained from doing it, are unsuccessful.
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  21. Randolph Clarke (2014). Agency and Incompatibilism. Res Philosophica 91 (3):519-525.
    This paper is part of a symposium discussing Helen Steward's A METAPHYSICS FOR FREEDOM. Steward argues for what she calls Agency Incompatibilism: agency itself is incompatible with determinism. This paper examines what Steward presents as her main argument for Agency Incompatibilism and finds it wanting.
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  22. Thomas Crowther (2009). Perceptual Activity and the Will. In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions. Oxford University Press. 173.
  23. Jonathan Dancy (2008). On How to Act : Disjunctively. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. 262--282.
  24. Lawrence H. Davis (1979). Theory of Action. Prentice Hall.
  25. Julian Fink (2011). Are All Actions Movements of the Agent's Body? Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):52-64.
    Davidson famously contended that all actions are movements of the agent's body. It has been objected, however, that Davidson's view is incompatible with his own definition of primitive actions. This paper argues that this objection is based on an incorrect reading of Davidson's argument. I will show that by reading 'movements', in 'all actions are bodily movements', transitively, Davidson's definition of primitive actions ceases to contradict with his thesis that all actions are bodily movements.
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  26. Flannery (2009). The Division of Action in Thomas Aquinas. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 83 (3):421 - 440.
    Aquinas accepts that (i) some kinds of voluntary action are (qua voluntary) “basic,” not divisible into (non-fictional) further kinds; (ii) a concrete individual action may belong to more than one basic kind; (iii) the basic kinds to which it belongs are determined by the agent’s intentions qua performing the action; (iv) some intentions may stand to others as means to ends; (v) there can be concrete individual actions in which the agent’s intended means are disordered with respect to the ends; (...)
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  27. Anton Ford (2011). Action and Generality. In Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.), Essays on Anscombe's Intention. Harvard University Press.
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  28. Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.) (2011). Essays on Anscombe's Intention. Harvard University Press.
    This collection of ten essays elucidates some of the more challenging aspects of Anscombe’s work and affirms her reputation as one of our most original ...
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  29. Joshua Gert (2003). Brute Rationality. Noûs 37 (3):417–446.
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  30. Alvin I. Goldman (1970). A Theory of Human Action. Princeton University Press.
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  31. Pamela Hieronymi (2009). The Will as Reason. Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):201-220.
    I here defend an account of the will as practical reason—or, using Kant's phrase, as "reason in its practical employment"—as against a view of the will as a capacity for choice, in addition to reason, by which we execute practical judgments in action. Certain commonplaces show distance between judgment and action and thus seem to reveal the need for a capacity, in addition to reason, by which we execute judgment in action. However, another ordinary fact pushes in the other direction: (...)
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  32. Jennifer Hornsby (2004). Agency and Alienation. Ch. In _Naturalism in Question_. Eds. M. De Caro and D. Macarthur (Harvard UP):173-87.
    It is argued that the standard story of human action, as it is standardly naturalistically understood, should be rejected. Rather than seeking an agent amidst the workings of the mind (as in Velleman's "What Happens When Someone Acts"), we need to recognize an agent’s place in the world she inhabits. And in order to do so we have to resist the naturalistic assumptions of the standard causal story.
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  33. Geert Keil (2001). How Do We Ever Get Up? On the Proximate Causation of Actions and Events. Grazer Philosophische Studien 61 (1):43-62.
    Many candidates have been tried out as proximate causes of actions: belief-desire pairs, volitions, motives, intentions, and other kinds of pro-attitudes. None of these mental states or events, however, seems to be able to do the trick, that is, to get things going. Each of them may occur without an appropriate action ensuing. After reviewing several attempts at closing the alleged “causal gap”, it is argued that on a correct analysis, there is no missing link waiting to be discovered. On (...)
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  34. Douglas Lavin (2013). Must There Be Basic Action? Noûs 47 (2):273-301.
    The idea of basic action is a fixed point in the contemporary investigation of the nature of action. And while there are arguments aimed at putting the idea in place, it is meant to be closer to a gift of common sense than to a hard-won achievement of philosophical reflection. It first appears at the stage of innocuous description and before the announcement of philosophical positions. And yet, as any decent magician knows, the real work so often gets done in (...)
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  35. H. Leitgeb & A. Hieke (eds.) (2009). Reduction: Between the Mind and the Brain. Ontos.
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  36. Steven Levine (2012). Norms and Habits: Brandom on the Sociality of Action. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):n/a-n/a.
    In this paper I argue against Brandom's two-ply theory of action. For Brandom, action is the result of an agent acknowledging a practical commitment and then causally responding to that commitment by acting. Action is social because the content of the commitment upon which one acts is socially conferred in the game of giving and asking for reasons. On my proposal, instead of seeing action as the coupling of a rational capacity to acknowledge commitments and a non-rational capacity to reliably (...)
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  37. Chauncey Maher (2011). Action Individuation: A Normative Functionalist Approach. Philosophical Explorations 14 (1):99-116.
    How or in virtue of what does any one particular action differ from another? Available views on the issue of action individuation tend to emphasize the descriptive features of actions, such as where and when they occur, or what they cause or are caused by. I contend instead that actions are individuated by their normative features, such as what licenses them and what they license in turn. In this essay, deploying a suggestion from Sellars and Brandom, I argue specifically that (...)
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  38. Alfred R. Mele (2003). Philosophy of Action. In Kirk Ludwig (ed.), Donald Davidson. Cambridge University Press.
    The basic subject matter of the philosophy of action is a pair of questions: (1) What are actions? (2) How are actions to be explained? The questions call, respectively, for a theory of the nature of action and a theory of the explanation of actions. Donald Davidson has articulated and defended influential answers to both questions. Those answers are the primary focus of this chapter.
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  39. Alfred R. Mele (2002). Review of Searle's Rationality in Action. [REVIEW] Mind 111 (444):905-909.
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  40. Alfred R. Mele (1992). Recent Work on Intentional Action. American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (3):199 - 217.
  41. Alfred R. Mele (1984). Aristotle on the Proximate Efficient Cause of Action. Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Vol. X:133-155.
  42. Elijah Millgram (2006). Review of Reasonably Vicious, by Candace Vogler. [REVIEW] European Journal of Philosophy 14 (3):430–434.
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  43. Elijah Millgram (ed.) (2001). Varieties of Practical Reasoning. MIT Press.
    This book covers a broad spectrum of positions on practical reasoning—from the nihilist view that there are no legitimate forms of practical inference, and ...
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  44. Marc Moffett, Two Conceptions of Mind and Action: Knowing How and the Philosophical Theory of Intelligence.
    Perhaps it is a pity that the Theory of Knowledge and the Theory of Conduct have fallen into separate compartments. (It certainly was not so in Socrates’ time, as his interest in the relation between eidos and technê bears witness.) If we studied them together, perhaps we might have a better understanding of both. H.H. Price, Thinking and Representation..
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  45. María G. Navarro (2012). Review of 'New Waves in Philosophy of Action' Edited by Jesús H. Aguilar, Andrei A. Buckareff and Keith Frankish. [REVIEW] Metapsychology Online Reviews 16 (51).
    New Waves in Philosophy, a book collection that stands out for giving a snapshot of research in all areas of philosophy is a successful editorial project addressed by Vincent F. Hendricks and Duncan Pritchard. New Waves in Philosophy of Action is one of its last titles, edited by Jesús H. Aguilar, Andrei A. Buckareff and Keith Frankish. -/- The book is aimed at the researchers of all fields and readers in general interested in this sub-discipline of philosophy very difficult to (...)
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  46. Matthew B. O'Brien & Robert C. Koons (2012). Objects of Intention: A Hylomorphic Critique of the New Natural Law Theory. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 86 (4):655-703.
    The “New Natural Law” Theory (NNL) of Germain Grisez, John Finnis, Joseph Boyle, and their collaborators offers a distinctive account of intentional action, which underlies a moral theory that aims to justify many aspects of traditional morality and Catholic doctrine. -/- In fact, we show that the NNL is committed to premises that entail the permissibility of many actions that are irreconcilable with traditional morality and Catholic doctrine, such as elective abortions. These consequences follow principally from two aspects of the (...)
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  47. Gilbert Plumer (1984). Time as Success. International Studies in Philosophy 16 (1):35-55.
    Partly following suggestions from Dewey, I show how we may acquire the concepts of Now and time without our being able to sense time. I rationally reconstruct these concepts by ‘deriving’ them from the concepts of ‘required for’ and ‘sensed’ (taken tenselessly). Among other reasons, because activity is explicitly required for succeeding or failing, and because these ubiquitous conditions are sensed, our concept of time is rooted squarely in our experience of these conditions.
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  48. Beth Preston (2012). A Philosophy of Material Culture: Action, Function, and Mind. routledge.
    This book focuses on material culture as a subject of philosophical inquiry and promotes the philosophical study of material culture by articulating some of the central and difficult issues raised by this topic and providing innovative solutions to ...
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  49. Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco (2009). From Shared Agency to the Normativity of Law: Shapiro's and Coleman's Defence of Hart's Practice Theory of Rules Reconsidered. Law and Philosophy 28 (1):59 - 100.
    Colemanand Shapiro have recently advanced a second at- tempt to reconcile Hart’s practice theory of rules and the idea of the normativity of law; i.e., the idea that legal rules qua social rules give reasons for actions and, in some circumstances create and impose duties and obligations. Their argumentative strategy is to resort to elements in Bratman’s work on shared agency and planning, though they introduce important and substantive modifications to Bratman’s own explanation. Bratman describes his own theory as a (...)
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  50. David-Hillel Ruben (1991). Review of Natural Agency. [REVIEW] Mind (2):287-290.
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