Ontological pluralism is the view that there are different ways to exist. It is a position with deep roots in the history of philosophy, and in which there has been a recent resurgence of interest. In contemporary presentations, it is stated in terms of fundamental languages: as the view that such languages contain more than one quantifier. For example, one ranging over abstract objects, and another over concrete ones. A natural worry, however, is that the languages proposed by the pluralist (...) are mere notational variants of those proposed by the monist, in which case the debate between the two positions would not seem to be substantive. Jason Turner has given an ingenious response to this worry, in terms of a principle that he calls ‘logical realism’. This paper offers a counter-response on behalf of the ‘notationalist’. I argue that, properly applied, the principle of logical realism is no threat to the claim that the languages in question are notational variants. Indeed, there seems to be every reason to think that they are. (shrink)

This chapter challenges Cantor’s notion of the ‘power’, or ‘cardinality’, of an infinite set. According to Cantor, two infinite sets have the same cardinality if and only if there is a one-to-one correspondence between them. Cantor showed that there are infinite sets that do not have the same cardinality in this sense. Further, he took this result to show that there are infinite sets of different sizes. This has become the standard understanding of the result. The chapter challenges this, arguing (...) that we have no reason to think there are infinite sets of different sizes. It begins with an initial argument against Cantor’s claim that there are infinite sets of different sizes and then proceeds, by way of an analogy between Cantor’s mathematical result and Russell’s paradox, to a more direct argument. (shrink)

This paper argues that we should solve paradoxes for propositions (such as the Russell–Myhill paradox) in essentially the same way that we solve Russellian paradoxes for sets. That is, the standard, iterative approach to sets is extended to include properties, and then the resulting hierarchy of sets and properties is used to construct propositions. Propositions on this account are structured in the sense of mirroring the sentences that express them, and they would seem to serve the needs of philosophers of (...) language and metaphysicians who rely on such propositions. The resulting account has limitations, comparable to those faced by the iterative approach to sets, but it is argued to be in important ways preferable to others that have been proposed. (shrink)

Are there ‘self-referential’ propositions? That is, propositions that say of themselves that they have a certain property, such as that of being false. There can seem reason to doubt that there are. At the same time, there are a number of reasons why it matters. For suppose that there are indeed no such propositions. One might then hope that while paradoxes such as the Liar show that many plausible principles about sentences must be given up, no such fate will befall (...) principles about propositions. But the existence of self-referential propositions would dash such hopes. Further, the existence of such propositions would also seem to challenge the widespread claim that Liar sentences fail to express propositions. The aim of this paper is thus to settle the question–at least given an assumption. In particular, I argue that if propositions are structured, then self-referential propositions exist. (shrink)

Are there different sizes of infinity? That is, are there infinite sets of different sizes? This is one of the most natural questions that one can ask about the infinite. But it is of course generally taken to be settled by mathematical results, such as Cantor’s theorem, to the effect that there are infinite sets without bijections between them. These results settle the question, given an almost universally accepted principle relating size to the existence of functions. The principle is: for (...) any sets A and B, if A is the same size as B, then there is a bijection from A to B. The aim of the paper, however, is to argue that this question is in fact wide open: to argue that we are not in a position to know the answer, because we are not in one to know the principle. The aim, that is, is to argue that for all we know there is only one size of infinity. (shrink)

I argue that dialetheists have a problem with the concept of logical consequence. The upshot of this problem is that dialetheists must appeal to a hierarchy of concepts of logical consequence. Since this hierarchy is akin to those invoked by more orthodox resolutions of the semantic paradoxes, its emergence would appear to seriously undermine the dialetheic treatments of these paradoxes. And since these are central to the case for dialetheism, this would represent a significant blow to the position itself.

I argue that dialetheists have a problem with the concept of logical consequence. The upshot of this problem is that dialetheists must appeal to a hierarchy of concepts of logical consequence. Since this hierarchy is akin to those invoked by more orthodox resolutions of the semantic paradoxes, its emergence would appear to seriously undermine the dialetheic treatments of these paradoxes. And since these are central to the case for dialetheism, this would represent a significant blow to the position itself.

Metaphysically possible worlds have many uses. Epistemically possible worlds promise to be similarly useful, especially in connection with propositions and propositional attitudes. However, I argue that there is a serious threat to the natural accounts of epistemically possible worlds, from a version of Russell’s paradox. I contrast this threat with David Kaplan’s problem for metaphysical possible world semantics: Kaplan’s problem can be straightforwardly rebutted, the problems I raise cannot. I argue that although there may be coherent accounts of epistemically possible (...) worlds with fruitful applications, any such an account must fundamentally compromise the basic idea behind epistemic possibility. (shrink)

The notion of a proposition is central to philosophy. But it is subject to paradoxes. A natural response is a hierarchical account and, ever since Russell proposed his theory of types in 1908, this has been the strategy of choice. But in this paper I raise a problem for such accounts. While this does not seem to have been recognized before, it would seem to render existing such accounts inadequate. The main purpose of the paper, however, is to provide a (...) new hierarchical account that solves the problem. (shrink)

A necessarily true sentence is 'brute' if it does not rigidly refer to anything and if it cannot be reduced to a logical truth. The question of whether there are brute necessities is an extremely natural one. Cian Dorr has recently argued for far-reaching metaphysical claims on the basis of the principle that there are no brute necessities: he initially argued that there are no non-symmetric relations, and later that there are no abstract objects at all. I argue that there (...) are nominalistically acceptable brute necessities, and that Dorr's arguments thus fail. My argument is an application of Gödel's first incompleteness theorem. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to argue that all—or almost all—logical rules have exceptions. In particular, it is argued that this is a moral that we should draw from the semantic paradoxes. The idea that we should respond to the paradoxes by revising logic in some way is familiar. But previous proposals advocate the replacement of classical logic with some alternative logic. That is, some alternative system of rules, where it is taken for granted that these hold without exception. (...) The present proposal is quite different. According to this, there is no such alternative logic. Rather, classical logic retains the status of the ‘one true logic’, but this status must be reconceived so as to be compatible with (almost) all of its rules admitting of exceptions. This would seem to have significant repercussions for a range of widely held views about logic: e.g. that it is a priori, or that it is necessary. Indeed, if the arguments of the paper succeed, then such views must be given up. (shrink)

Kripke [1975] gives a formal theory of truth based on Kleene's strong evaluation scheme. It is probably the most important and influential that has yet been given—at least since Tarski. However, it has been argued that this theory has a problem with generalized quantifiers such as All—that is, All ϕs are ψ—or Most. Specifically, it has been argued that such quantifiers preclude the existence of just the sort of language that Kripke aims to deliver—one that contains its own truth predicate. (...) In this paper I solve the problem by showing how Kleene's strong scheme, and Kripke's theory based on it, can in a natural way be extended to accommodate the full range of generalized quantifiers. (shrink)

This is a reply to Vann McGee’s response to my paper, ‘On Infinite Size’.

Plausibly, mathematical claims are true, but the fundamental furniture of the world does not include mathematical objects. This can be made sense of by providing mathematical claims with paraphrases, which make clear how the truth of such claims does not require the fundamental existence of mathematical objects. This paper explores the consequences of this type of position for explanatory structure. There is an apparently straightforward relationship between this sort of structure, and the logical sort: i.e. logically complex claims are explained (...) by logically simpler ones. For example, disjunctions are explained by their (true) disjuncts, while generalizations are explained by their (true) instances. This would seem as plausible in the case of mathematics as elsewhere. Also, it would seem to be something that the anti-realist approaches at issue would want to preserve. It will be argued, however, that these approaches cannot do this: they lead not merely to violations of the familiar principles relating logical and explanatory structure, but even to reversals of these. That is, there are cases where generalizations explain their instances, or disjunctions their disjuncts. (shrink)

Here are two plausible ideas about belief. First: beliefs are our means of storing information. Second: if we believe something, then we are willing to use it in reasoning. But in this paper I introduce a puzzle that seems to show that these cannot both be right. The solution, I argue, is a new picture, on which there is a kind of belief for each idea. An account of these two kinds of belief is offered in terms of two components: (...) a relatively stable one, which represents our information; and a more variable one, which represents what we are taking seriously. I also consider the possibility of solving the puzzle by less radical means; and an alternative argument for the proposed account of belief in terms of considerations from desire. (shrink)

Unfortunately, there is a mistake in line 10 of Section 1.2. The correct reference should read: As Kripke pointed out, we can produce one simply by baptizing the string ‘Jack is short’: Jack.

This paper addresses the question: given some theory T that we accept, is there some natural, generally applicable way of extending T to a theory S that can prove a range of things about what it itself (i.e. S) can prove, including a range of things about what it cannot prove, such as claims to the effect that it cannot prove certain particular sentences (e.g. 0 = 1), or the claim that it is consistent? Typical characterizations of Gödel’s second incompleteness (...) theorem, and its significance, would lead us to believe that the answer is ‘no’. But the present paper explores a positive answer. The general approach is to follow the lead of recent (and not so recent) approaches to truth and the Liar paradox. (shrink)

Approaches to truth and the Liar paradox seem invariably to face a dilemma: either appeal to some sort of hierarchy, or declare apparently perfectly coherent concepts incoherent. But since both options lead to severe expressive restrictions, neither seems satisfactory. The aim of this paper is a new approach, which avoids the dilemma and the resulting expressive restrictions. Previous approaches tend to appeal to some new sort of semantic value for the truth predicate to take. I argue that such approaches inevitably (...) lead to the dilemma in question. In contrast, the present proposal sticks with classical semantic values, but allows the compositional rules associated with these to admit of exceptions. I show how such an approach can be developed systematically. (shrink)

The emergence of modern sciences in the seventeenth century profoundly renewed our understanding of Nature. For the last three centuries new ideas of Nature have been continuously developed by theology, politics, economics, and science, especially the sciences of the material world. The situation is even more unstable today, now that we have entered an ecological mutation of unprecedented scale. Some call it the Anthropocene, but it is best described as a new climatic regime. And a new regime it certainly is, (...) since the many unexpected connections between human activity and the natural world oblige every one of us to reopen the earlier notions of Nature and redistribute what had been packed inside. So the question now arises: what will replace the old ways of looking at Nature? This book explores a potential candidate proposed by James Lovelock when he chose the name "Gaia" for the fragile, complex system through which living phenomena modify the Earth. The fact that he was immediately misunderstood proves simply that his readers have tried to fit this new notion into an older frame, transforming Gaia into a single organism, a kind of giant thermostat, some sort of New Age goddess, or even divine Providence. In this series of lectures on "natural religion", Bruno Latour argues that the complex and ambiguous figure of Gaia offers, on the contrary, an ideal way to disentangle the ethical, political, theological, and scientific aspects of the now obsolete notion of Nature. He lays the groundwork for a future collaboration among scientists, theologians, activists, and artists as they, and we, begin to adjust to the new climatic regime. (shrink)

This book presents a posthumous collection of previously uncollected works of political theory written by Whittle Johnston. Johnston believed that both the liberal tradition of political thought and the realist tradition of international thought had contributed much to humanity's store of political wisdom, but that each had limitations that could most easily be recognized by its encounter with the other. His method of accomplishing this task was to examine the liberal conception of political life in general and international political (...) life in particular and then to explore the realist critique of the liberal view, particularly as it was expressed by three great twentieth-century realist thinkers, all of whom were, in their various ways, skeptical of liberal assumptions: Reinhold Niebuhr, Hans Morgenthau, and E. H. Carr. In doing so, Johnston reveals the power of the realist outlook, but also the areas in which it remains insufficient, and insufficient particularly where it underestimates the complexity and prudence that liberalism is capable of displaying. There have been studies of both liberalism and realism, but no other work has put them into conversation with each other in the way that this book does. (shrink)

If we really believed that God knowing was enough--and left it there--our questions, worries, and angst over life's struggles would find more than temporary relief. Many of us wake up every day with looming anxieties over our future and a weariness we can't shake. We have more questions than answers and live with difficult daily realities and secrets we feel we cannot share. The question remains for most believers: How can I fix it, make sense of it, or solve it? (...) Enter God Knows: a guidebook to lead the modern believer to a place of release, relief, and reliance upon the omniscience of God. Inspired by the seldom-studied book of Nahum, God Knows details the behind-the-scenes picture we are missing, what His great knowing entails, and how his omniscience provides daily perspective to bring the healing and peace we are all desperate to find. (shrink)

I distinguish between two opposing intuitions about the nature of the singular causal relation. The first stresses the nomological character of causation, while the second emphasises is seemingly local character. My question is this: is it possible to formulate an account of causation which incorporates both intuitions? Anscombe gives us reason to think that these intuitions could not be jointly met in an account of causation. Foster and Tooley's acount seems to provide a counter-instance to her claim, but this proves (...) to be a false start. I put forward an alternative suggestion which, by utilising tropes, manages to reconcile both the local and nomological character of causation. (shrink)

L'origine dell'anima umana secondo Dante.--La dottrina d'Alberto Magno sull'Inchoatio formae.--Alberto Magno e san Tommaso.--La posizione di Alberto Magno di fronte all'averroismo.--L'anima umana secondo Sigieri.--Anima e corpo nel pensiero di san Tommaso.--L'aristotelismo della scolastica e i francescani.--Individualità e immortalità nell'averroismo e nel tomismo.

In Intuition et idéalités: Phénoménologie des objets mathématiques (2020), Dominique Pradelle questioned the nature of mathematical knowledge–the status of math.

... Le figure del terzo legislatore e del terzo giudice costituiscono la garanzia che la tutela dei deboli non renda debole né il dovere né il diritto, ma ne fortifichi la consapevolezza responsabile in ognuno di noi, mostrando il significato giuridico del ‘dono di senso’, nucleo, nella mia interpretazione dell’intenso magistero di Bruno Romano. (Dalla Presentazione di L. Avitabile).

Which entities should be accepted as part of the furniture of the world, and which not? What are pseudo-objects, if they are not properly objects? This collection explores the answers given to these questions by some key philosophers throughout the 20th century. It brings together essays by leading scholars on a subject of central importance to both metaphysics and the history of philosophy.".

When reading contemporary theories of distributive justice, one could easily get the impression that questions of fiscal design are normatively speaking merely instrumental for realizing the distributive ideal. Once the overall conception of justice is settled upon, questions of how the state should arrange its institutions and policies are settled if they effectively and efficiently promote the preferred distribution. I argue that such pure instrumentalism is mistaken in the context of fiscal policy. As a result, there is nothing problematic or (...) morally arbitrary about accepting domain-specific principles of fiscal justice. (shrink)

Bruno Latour’s long term project is to compare the felicity and infelicity conditions of the different values dearest to the heart of those who have ‘never been modern’. According to him, this is the only way to develop an anthropology of the Moderns. After his work on science, on technology and, more recently, on law, this book explores the truth conditions of religious speech acts.Even though there is no question that religion is one of the values that has been (...) intensely cherished in the course of history, it’s also clear that it has become immensely difficult to tune in to its highly specific mode of enunciation. Every effort to speak in the right key sounds awkward, reactionary, pious or simply empty. Hence the necessity of devising a way of writing that brings to the fore this elusive form of speech to render it audible again. In this highly original book, the author offers a completely different tack on the endless ‘science and religion’ conflict by protecting them both from the confusion with the notion of information. Like The Making of Law, this book is one more attempt at developing this ‘inquiry on modes of existence’ that provides an alternative definition of society. (Publisher's abstract). (shrink)

Une envie de transmettre, d'expliquer. De s'expliquer aussi. Sur la cohérence d'une pensée que l'apparente dispersion et variété des sujets qu'il a abordés avait, en partie, masquée. Bruno Latour s'est livré à cette série d'entretiens avec une simplicité, une jubilation et une puissance qui n'adviennent que dans les moments où l'on sait que la vie, et notamment celle de l'esprit, se condense. Un apaisement lié au sentiment d'urgence, une immanence indissociable de l'imminence et de la nécessité à tout concentrer, (...) résumer, déployer. Un souci de clarté, un plaisir de la conversation, un art de la performance. Comme si tout s'éclaircissait alors que la fin approchait"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Walter Benjamin est le penseur de la reproductibilité technique au XXe siècle, et il nous a donné de nombreuses pistes de lecture pour comprendre ce que la technique fait et défait dans nos sociétés industrielles fondées sur l'exploitation de l'autre. Déclin de l'aura, disparition de l'original, exposition généralisée, vulgarisation, performance, émergence de la star et du dictateur, choc, contrôle des masses et émancipation, il nous laisse un précieux viatique de fragments, célèbres ou méconnus, qui nous permettent de poser cette question (...) : Comment appréhender le monde digital qui est en train de révolutionner notre siècle? Dans cet essai, nous faisons l'hypothèse, soufflée par Benjamin lui-même, que nombre de ses intuitions fulgurantes, suscitées par l'essor de la photographie et l'irruption du cinéma, puis de la radio, sont restées en sommeil à son époque, et se réveillent maintenant à la faveur de l'irruption du monde digital. La logique de l'accessibilité mondiale prend racine dans le monde de la reproductibilité mécanique et en révèle le sens. De la même façon que le philosophe a pris au sérieux la technique de la radiodiffusion, au point de devenir lui-même réalisateur d'émissions à la fin des années 20, nous proposons de relire ses textes à l'aune d'une observation matérialiste du monde numérique, où chaque lecteur est en train de devenir auteur et producteur, témoin de sa propre existence en voie de dédoublement."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Today's physics has led to incredible advances in the technology we use in daily life - from cell phones and GPS systems to PET scans and more. Current theories in physics have been amazingly effective in practical terms. Yet all is far from well: the two foundational concepts in physics - Quantum Theory and General Relativity - are incompatible with each other, and observations of the universe show that our theories are incomplete - at best. While physicists have tried to (...) paper over this impasse by inventing dark matter and dark energy, they remain unobserved mysteries. Adding fuel to the fire of current crises, artificial intelligence threatens to replace our most cherished theories and procedures with arcane algorithms. Worse yet perhaps, the public understands physics poorly, either taking it for granted or fearing and rejecting it completely. Physicists dream of a new universal theory that will completely change how we see our world, much as Einstein did with relativity and Newton with gravity. Likewise, society loves the romantic notion of a single genius heroically creating a massive paradigm shift. Still, is this scenario likely today? Perhaps the next steps in physics will be incremental rather than gigantic. In Physics in Crisis, Bruno Mansoulié uses simple language, insightful examples, and his personal experience as a working physicist to address these fundamental questions and reflect on how today's crises in physics might be solved. (shrink)

Face à l'ampleur des crises écologique et énergétique, de la montée des inégalités sociales, la sobriété est désormais inévitable. L'idée, pourtant, n'est pas neuve: de l'éthique personnelle promue par les philosophes antiques à la tempérance comme vertu théologale chrétienne, l'histoire de la sobriété plonge loin ses racines dans les sociétés de subsistance. Mais qu'en est-il dans nos sociétés d'abondance récente désormais sous contrainte écologique? Pour Bruno Villalba, il manque encore à la sobriété de devenir politique. Loin de consister simplement (...) en l'élargissement d'une éthique personnelle, les politiques de sobriété impliquent de réviser en profondeur les conditions de bien-être de notre société matérialiste et hédoniste. Faire le choix de la sobriété, c'est aussi assumer ses conséquences. Mais sommes-nous réellement prêts à renoncer à un imaginaire de l'abondance, de la consommation généralisée, de l'extension du pouvoir d'achat, et à adapter notre liberté aux limites planétaires?"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)