Edited by Jordan Bohall (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign)
|Summary||Gödel's Theorems are two of the most critical results in 20th century mathematics and logic. The theorems have had profound implications for logic, philosophy of mathematics, philosophical logic, philosophy of language and more. The two theorems together are a characterization of the far limits of provability within any axiomatized theory T. This is to say that within a consistent formal theory T, there are statements constructible in the language of T that can be neither proved nor disproved (1st Theorem), and T cannot prove that it is itself consistent (2nd Theorem).|
|Key works||Gödel 1986 Franzén 2005 Raatikainen 2005|
|Introductions||Enderton 1972 Smullyan 1992 Raatikainen 2013 Smorynski 1977|
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