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  1. Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge (2012). The Story About Propositions. Noûs 46 (4):635-674.
    It is our contention that an ontological commitment to propositions faces a number of problems; so many, in fact, that an attitude of realism towards propositions—understood the usual “platonistic” way, as a kind of mind- and language-independent abstract entity—is ultimately untenable. The particular worries about propositions that marshal parallel problems that Paul Benacerraf has raised for mathematical platonists. At the same time, the utility of “proposition-talk”—indeed, the apparent linguistic commitment evident in our use of 'that'-clauses (in offering explanations and making (...)
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  2. Otávio Bueno, Christopher Menzel & Edward N. Zalta (2013). Worlds and Propositions Set Free. Erkenntnis:1-24.
    The authors provide an object-theoretic analysis of two paradoxes in the theory of possible worlds and propositions stemming from Russell and Kaplan. After laying out the paradoxes, the authors provide a brief overview of object theory and point out how syntactic restrictions that prevent object-theoretic versions of the classical paradoxes are justified philosophically. The authors then trace the origins of the Russell paradox to a problematic application of set theory in the definition of worlds. Next the authors show that an (...)
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  3. Tadeusz Ciecierski (2011). A Problem with Structured Propositions. In Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), Philosophical and Formal Approaches to Linguistic Analysis. Ontos-Verlag. 81.
    The paper shows that the paradox of the totality of propositions rest on assumptions characteristic of some theories of structured contents (like Jeffrey King's "new account of structured propositions").
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  4. Sean Crawford (2006). Propositions. In Keith Brown (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Language and Linguistics, 2nd ed.
  5. John Hawthorne & Ofra Magidor (2009). Assertion, Context, and Epistemic Accessibility. Mind 118 (470):377 - 397.
    In his seminal paper 'Assertion', Robert Stalnaker distinguishes between the semantic content of a sentence on an occasion of use and the content asserted by an utterance of that sentence on that occasion. While in general the assertoric content of an utterance is simply its semantic content, the mechanisms of conversation sometimes force the two apart. Of special interest in this connection is one of the principles governing assertoric content in the framework, one according to which the asserted content ought (...)
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  6. Mark Jago (forthcoming). Hyperintensional Propositions. Synthese:1-17.
    Propositions play a central role in contemporary semantics. On the Russellian account, propositions are structured entities containing particulars, properties and relations. This contrasts sharply with the sets-of-possible-worlds view of propositions. I’ll discuss how to extend the sets-of-worlds view to accommodate fine-grained hyperintensional contents. When this is done in a satisfactory way, I’ll argue, it makes heavy use of entities very much like Russellian tuples. The two notions of proposition become inter-definable and inter-substitutable: they are not genuinely distinct accounts of how (...)
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  7. Mark Jago (2014). The Impossible: An Essay on Hyperintensionality. Oxford University Press.
    Mark Jago presents an original philosophical account of meaningful thought: in particular, how it is meaningful to think about things that are impossible. We think about impossible things all the time. We can think about alchemists trying to turn base metal to gold, and about unfortunate mathematicians trying to square the circle. We may ponder whether God exists; and philosophers frequently debate whether properties, numbers, sets, moral and aesthetic qualities, and qualia exist. In many philosophical or mathematical debates, when one (...)
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  8. Mark Jago (2006). Imagine the Possibilities: Information Without Overload. Logique Et Analyse 49 (196):345–371.
    Information is often modelled as a set of relevant possibilities, treated as logically possible worlds. However, this has the unintuitive consequence that the logical consequences of an agent's information cannot be informative for that agent. There are many scenarios in which such consequences are clearly informative for the agent in question. Attempts to weaken the logic underlying each possible world are misguided. Instead, I provide a genuinely psychological notion of epistemic possibility and show how it can be captured in a (...)
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  9. Shen-yi Liao (2014). Collective De Se Thoughts and Centered Worlds. Ratio 27 (1):17-31.
    Two lines of investigation into the nature of mental content have proceeded in parallel until now. The first looks at thoughts that are attributable to collectives, such as bands' beliefs and teams' desires. So far, philosophers who have written on collective belief, collective intentionality, etc. have primarily focused on third-personal attributions of thoughts to collectives. The second looks at de se, or self-locating, thoughts, such as beliefs and desires that are essentially about oneself. So far, philosophers who have written on (...)
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  10. Shen-yi Liao (2012). What Are Centered Worlds? Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):294-316.
    David Lewis argues that centered worlds give us a way to capture de se, or self-locating, contents in philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. In recent years, centered worlds have also gained other uses in areas ranging widely from metaphysics to ethics. In this paper, I raise a problem for centered worlds and discuss the costs and benefits of different solutions. My investigation into the nature of centered worlds brings out potentially problematic implicit commitments of the theories that employ (...)
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  11. Michael McGlone, Lewis on What Puzzling Pierre Does Not Believe.
    In “What Puzzling Pierre Does not Believe”, Lewis ([4], 412‐4) argues that the sentences (1) Pierre believes that London is pretty and (2) Pierre believes that London is not pretty both truly describe Kripke’s well‐known situation involving puzzling Pierre ([3]). Lewis also argues that this situation is not one according to which Pierre believes either the proposition (actually) expressed by (3) London is pretty or the proposition (actually) expressed by (4) London is not pretty. These claims, Lewis suggests, provide a (...)
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  12. María G. Navarro (2009). Book Review of 'Teorías Del Juicio' by Gaetano Chiurazzi. [REVIEW] Arbor. Ciencia, Pensamiento y Cultura 740:1353-1361.
    La tesis que plantea Gaetano Chiurazzi en Teorías del juicio llamará la atención del lector interesado tanto en las cuestiones filosóficas esenciales como en su dilucidación y exposición en el curso de la historia. El profesor de hermenéutica filosófica en la Universidad de Turín plantea el análisis del discurso apofántico que, desde la filosofía aristotélica, se distingue por estar formado por proposiciones en las que, por medio de la función atributiva, se expresa la relación predicativa «S es P». Reparar en (...)
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  13. Daniel Rothschild (2012). Expressing Credences. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (1pt1):99-114.
    After presenting a simple expressivist account of reports of probabilistic judgements, I explore a classic problem for it, namely the Frege-Geach problem. I argue that it is a problem not just for expressivism but for any reasonable account of ascriptions of graded judgements. I suggest that the problem can be resolved by appropriately modelling imprecise credences.
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  14. Wolfgang Schwarz (2013). Variations on a Montagovian Theme. Synthese 190 (16):3377-3395.
    What are the objects of knowledge, belief, probability, apriority or analyticity? For at least some of these properties, it seems plausible that the objects are sentences, or sentence-like entities. However, results from mathematical logic indicate that sentential properties are subject to severe formal limitations. After surveying these results, I argue that they are more problematic than often assumed, that they can be avoided by taking the objects of the relevant property to be coarse-grained (“sets of worlds”) propositions, and that all (...)
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  15. Jason Stanley (2010). &Quot;assertion" and Intentionality. Philosophical Studies 151 (1):87 - 113.
    Robert Stalnaker argues that his causal-pragmatic account of the problem of intentionality commits him to a coarse-grained conception of the contents of mental states, where propositions are represented as sets of possible worlds. Stalnaker also accepts the "direct reference" theory of names, according to which co-referring names have the same content. Stalnaker's view of content is thus threatened by Frege's Puzzle. Stalnaker's classic paper "Assertion" is intended to provide a response to this threat. In this paper, I evaluate Stalnaker's claim (...)
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  16. Jonathan Y. Tsou (2012). Distinguishing Non-Conceptual Content From Non-Syntactic Propositions: Comment on Fuller. Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (2):53-57.
  17. James A. Woodbridge (2006). Propositions as Semantic Pretense. Language and Communication 26 (3-4):343-355.
    Our linguistic and inferential practices are said to implicate a kind of abstract object playing various roles traditionally attributed to propositions, and our predictive and explanatory success with this ‘‘proposition-talk’’ is held to underwrite a realistic interpretation of it. However, these very same practices pull us in different directions regarding the nature of propositions, frustrating the development of an adequate unified theory of them. I explain how one could retain proposition-talk, and the advantages of interpreting it as being purportedly about (...)
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