There can be little doubt, at least in the Western world, that autonomy is the ruling principle in contemporary bioethics. In spite of its ‘triumph’ however, the dominance of the utilitarian concept of autonomy is being increasingly questioned. In this paper, I explore the nature of autonomy, how it came to displace the Hippocratic tradition in medicine and how different concepts of autonomy have evolved. I argue that the reduction of autonomy to ‘the exercise of personal choice’ in medicine has (...) led to a ‘tyranny of autonomy’ which can be inimical to ethical medical practice rather than conducive to it. I take the case of Kerrie Wooltorton as an illustration of how misplaced adherence to respect for patient autonomy can lead to tragic consequences. An analysis of autonomy based on the work of Rachel Haliburton is described and applied to the role of autonomy in a recent bioethical debate — that arising from Savulescu's proposal that conscientious objection by health-care professionals should not be permit.. (shrink)

invited commentary on David Oderberg's call for conscientious objection in medicine to be permitted in the UK.

Volume 26, Issue 2, June 2020, Page 81-81.

Ediorial Content Type Journal Article Category Editorial Pages 139-140 DOI 10.1558/hrge.v17i2.139 Authors Trevor Stammers, St Mary’s University College, London Journal Human Reproduction & Genetic Ethics Online ISSN 2043-0469 Print ISSN 1028-7825 Journal Volume Volume 17 Journal Issue Volume 17, Number 2 / 2011.

Editorial for issue with articles on tranhumanism, principlism, total body transplants and inter-uterine surgery for myelomeningocele.

Volume 25, Issue 2, June 2019, Page 101-102.

Volume 25, Issue 4, December 2019, Page 293-294.

Volume 25, Issue 1, March 2019, Page 1-2.

‘There is a tide in the affairs of men.Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;’Those who edit academic journals rarely seek fortune in finan...

In 2017, The New Bioethics published its first special-themed issue on the topic of personalized medicine. It proved highly popular, especially Gyawali and Sullivan’s paper ‘Economics of Can...

Editorial on papers relating to among other infanticide and intersex.

A review of the range of articles in the summer issue of The New Bioethics.

This issue provides an end of year feast with something for everyone. Browning and Veit note how, since the presence of sentience in mammals, birds and cephalopods received official scientific reco...

In last June's themed issue on environmental bioethics, presciently planned in early 2019, we published in addition our very first paper on Covid-19 – a critique of the British Medical Association'...

Covid-19 and arguments related to abortion – these two topics between them take up the majority of the pages of this issue. That the first of these should do so, is no surprise. Over two years on f...

I suspect that most readers will, like me, be unfamiliar with the concept of chirality. Indeed I had never heard of the term before reading Dahlen’s paper proposing the completely novel concept of...

Bioethics is not a field for the faint-hearted. Life and death decisions are both at stake and everything in between. Increasingly, before-life decisions are being taken as well and this issue comm...

One of the insights gained from editing a journal is to see early trends in the research topics of submissions. The ethics of data management in healthcare is an issue on which we have published a...

Volume 26, Issue 3, September 2020, Page 195-196.

The demand for organs prompted the first use of elective ventilation in the UK in the 1990s. Recently the shortfall in supply of organs has once again prompted calls for elective ventilation to be instituted even in patients who are not brain dead. This paper proposes that the term ‘elective’ ventilation is a misnomer and the term non-therapeutic ventilation (NTV) should be used instead. It is further argued that the practice of NTV in cases of severe stroke is unethical and (...) has the potential of causing a variety of harms to the patient, their relatives, the healthcare professionals working in transplant teams and this may result in a backlash of reductions in the number of organ donations. (shrink)

This is a must-read text for anyone interested in the ethics surrounding gene editing. The author, a professor of clinical psychology at the University of Texas and director of their Developmental...

Amidst a plethora of books about human genome engineering (HGE), this one by John H Evans, a professor of sociology in the United States, stands out with its original and interesting take on how th...

Review of Arul Gawande's best seller about preparing for death.

Review of book on the nature of conscience and history of development of ideas about it.

Volume 25, Issue 1, March 2019, Page 97-100.

‘This book is the record of an exploration. I am a writer, a non-specialist in a specialist's wilderness and I find my way with a writer's tools’. Just as we should never judge a book by i...

Arising from a research project from the Faraday Institute for Science and Religion in Cambridge, UK, this primer on gene editing is written by a postdoctoral researcher in the Faculty of Divinity...

Religious-secular distinctions have been crucial to the way in which modern governments have rationalised their governance and marked out their sovereignty – as crucial as the territorial boundaries that they have drawn around nations. The authors of this volume provide a multi-dimensional picture of how the category of religion has served the ends of modern government. They draw on perspectives from history, anthropology, moral philosophy, theology and religious studies, as well as empirical analysis of India, Japan, Mexico, the United States, (...) Israel-Palestine, France and the United Kingdom. (shrink)

This paper first argues that we can bring out a tension between the following three popular doctrines: (i) the canonical reduction of metaphysical modality to essence, due to Fine, (ii) contingentism, which says that possibly something could have failed to be something, and (iii) the doctrine that metaphysical modality obeys the modal logic S5. After presenting two such arguments (one from the theorems of S4 and another from the theorems of B), I turn to exploring various conclusions we might draw (...) in light of these results, and argue that none comes cost free. In the course of laying out possible responses to my arguments, we'll have a chance to evaluate various doctrines about the interplay between contingency and essence, as well as develop some alternative reductions of metaphysical modality to essence. I don't decisively come down in favor of one response over the others, though I say some things that point towards the conclusion that essence has no role to play in reducing metaphysical modality. (shrink)

How can we apply philosophy to our everyday lives? Can philosophy affect the way we live? This book will show how philosophy can help to improve your thinking about everyday life. And how, by improving the quality of your thinking, you can improve the quality of your life. It will make you more aware of what you think and why, and how knowing this can help you can change the way you think about your life. Full of practical examples and (...) straightforward advice, and written by an expertin the field, this guide can help you become calmer and happier, and make better decisions. (shrink)

The consensus among spacetime substantivalists is to respond to Leibniz's classic shift arguments, and their contemporary incarnation in the form of the hole argument, by pruning the allegedly problematic metaphysical possibilities that generate these arguments. Some substantivalists do so by directly appealing to a modal doctrine akin to anti-haecceitism. Other substantivalists do so by appealing to an underlying hyperintensional doctrine that implies some such modal doctrine. My first aim in this paper is to pose a challenge for all extant forms (...) of this consensus position. My second aim is to show what form substantivalism must take in order to uphold the consensus while addressing this challenge. The result is a novel "plenitudinous" substantivalist view, which predicts that certain modal facts about spacetime are vague or indeterminate. I then argue against this view on independent grounds, concluding that substantivalists should reject the consensus position. The paper also discusses the way forward for substantivalists in light of this conclusion. (shrink)

Formal criteria of theoretical equivalence are mathematical mappings between specific sorts of mathematical objects, notably including those objects used in mathematical physics. Proponents of formal criteria claim that results involving these criteria have implications that extend beyond pure mathematics. For instance, they claim that formal criteria bear on the project of using our best mathematical physics as a guide to what the world is like, and also have deflationary implications for various debates in the metaphysics of physics. In this paper, (...) I investigate whether there is a defensible view according to which formal criteria have significant non-mathematical implications, of these sorts or any other, reaching a chiefly negative verdict. Along the way, I discuss various foundational issues concerning how we use mathematical objects to describe the world when doing physics, and how this practice should inform metaphysics. I diagnose the prominence of formal criteria as stemming from contentious views on these foundational issues, and endeavor to motivate some alternative views in their stead. (shrink)

The hole argument purports to show that all spacetime theories of a certain form are indeterministic, including the General Theory of Relativity. The argument has given rise to an industry of searching for a metaphysics of spacetime that delivers the right modal implications to rescue determinism. In this paper, I first argue that certain prominent extant replies to the hole argument—namely, those that appeal to an essentialist doctrine about spacetime—fail to deliver the requisite modal implications. As part of my argument, (...) I show that threats to determinism of the sort brought out by the hole argument are more general than has heretofore been recognized. I then use these results to propose a novel essentialist doctrine about spacetime that successfully rescues determinism, what I call sufficiency metric essentialism. However, I go on to argue that once we realize what an essentialist doctrine about spacetime must look like in order to address the hole argument, we should reject all such doctrines, because they can't fulfill their ambition of improving on standard modal replies to the argument. I close by suggesting some lessons for future work on spacetime and the metaphysics of physics more broadly, and also drawing some general morals for contemporary metaphysics, in particular about (i) whether essence can be used to articulate a precise structuralist doctrine, and (ii) the relationship between essence and modality. (shrink)