While not taking St. Anselm’s ontological argument in the Proslogion to be valid, this paper shows that the dismissal of the thesis by both St. Thomas Aquinas and Kant does less than justice to St. Anselm’s text. In Chapter II of the Proslogion Anselm defines God as ‘something than which nothing greater can be thought’, claiming that this notion ‘exists in the mind’. The question is does its subject, God, exist ‘in re’. Can one proceed from the mental existence to (...) real existence given that to exist in re is greater than to exist notionally? This paper sets out several of Anselm’s premises from which he concludes that the notional existence of God defined by Anselm entails God’s actual existence, Aquinas dismissed Anselm’s arguments – possibly not having Anselm’s full text at hand. Anselm maintains that if ‘something than which nothing greater can be thought’ can be conceived, then to deny its existence in re constitutes a self-contradiction. The present paper examines in detail the elements of which Anselm’s elegant arguments are composed: q.v. Reference is made to Anselm’s Reply to Gaunilo, and to Anselm’s ontology set out in Monologion. Much, for the modern reader, turns on the topical logic of ‘perfection’ and of ‘greatness’. Again: much turns on the Kantian question ‘Is existence a predicate?’ And on the question: what kinds of things can be the subject of predicates? The comparison which Anselm is making between real and conceptual existence is not like any other comparison. This may be the flaw in his arguments. (shrink)

THE methodological principle known as Ockham’s Razor is usually formulated as “Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessarium”. However, it is well known that neither this formulation of the principle nor the idea behind it come originally from William of Ockham. This particular formula is due to Leibniz, though Ockham’s works contain equivalent formulas: “Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate”; “Si duae res sufficiunt ad eius veritatem, superfluum est ponere aliam rem”; “Frustra fit per plura, quod potest fieri per pauciora”. But (...) Duns Scotus had also used the same principle before Ockham and he refers it directly to Aristotle. If the Razor belongs to anyone then, it belongs to Aristotle, and the study of its exact meaning and value must begin with Aristotle’s views about it. It is interesting to note, in this respect, that the principle was recognized as Aristotle’s at least until the time of Galileo. Thus in his Dialogue concerning the Two chief World Systems Galileo supports his theory that “diurnal motion belongs to the earth alone rather than to the rest of the universe excepting the earth” by referring to “a very true maxim of Aristotle’s which teaches that ‘frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora’.”. (shrink)

In the _Proslogion_, St. Anselm presents a philosophical argument for the existence of God. Anselm's proof, known since the time of Kant as the ontological argument for the existence of God, has played an important role in the history of philosophy and has been incorporated in various forms into the systems of Descartes, Leibniz, Hegel, and others. Included in this edition of the_ Proslogion _are Gaunilo's "A Reply on Behalf of the Fool" and St. Anselm's "The Author's Reply to Gaunilo." (...) All three works are in the original Latin with English translation on facing pages. Professor Charlesworth's introduction provides a helpful discussion of the context of the _Proslogion_ in the theological tradition and in Anselm's own thought and writing. (shrink)

THE methodological principle known as Ockham’s Razor is usually formulated as “Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessarium”. However, it is well known that neither this formulation of the principle nor the idea behind it come originally from William of Ockham. This particular formula is due to Leibniz, though Ockham’s works contain equivalent formulas: “Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate”; “Si duae res sufficiunt ad eius veritatem, superfluum est ponere aliam rem”; “Frustra fit per plura, quod potest fieri per pauciora”. But (...) Duns Scotus had also used the same principle before Ockham and he refers it directly to Aristotle. If the Razor belongs to anyone then, it belongs to Aristotle, and the study of its exact meaning and value must begin with Aristotle’s views about it. It is interesting to note, in this respect, that the principle was recognized as Aristotle’s at least until the time of Galileo. Thus in his Dialogue concerning the Two chief World Systems Galileo supports his theory that “diurnal motion belongs to the earth alone rather than to the rest of the universe excepting the earth” by referring to “a very true maxim of Aristotle’s which teaches that ‘frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora’.”. (shrink)

IN Chapter 6 of the Poetics Aristotle defines tragedy as.

The word for Professor Else’s book is “monumental”. It is monumental in size, monumental in its scope, in its scholarship and erudition, and in its general mastery of the most difficult of all Aristotle’s texts, the Poetics. And, in case this should give the impression that the book is over–solemn and pedantic, it may be remarked that Professor Else carries this monumental air lightly and easily; he writes with verve and shows a nice commonsense as he moves among the complexities (...) of Aristotle’s text and the complexities worse complicated of the commentators on the Poetics. In short, we now have a definitive commentary in English on Aristotle’s Poetics to take the place of the very unsatisfactory interpretations of Butcher and Bywater. (shrink)

The word for Professor Else’s book is “monumental”. It is monumental in size, monumental in its scope, in its scholarship and erudition, and in its general mastery of the most difficult of all Aristotle’s texts, the Poetics. And, in case this should give the impression that the book is over–solemn and pedantic, it may be remarked that Professor Else carries this monumental air lightly and easily; he writes with verve and shows a nice commonsense as he moves among the complexities (...) of Aristotle’s text and the complexities worse complicated of the commentators on the Poetics. In short, we now have a definitive commentary in English on Aristotle’s Poetics to take the place of the very unsatisfactory interpretations of Butcher and Bywater. (shrink)

Professor Körner’s essay on what he calls conceptual thinking is much more extensive in scope than its title suggests. Körner begins with a “logical”—as opposed to epistemological or psychological—discussion of the different kinds of concepts, “ostensive” and “non-ostensive”, and defines a concept as a sign used in accordance with rules. These rules, he emphasises, are not purely conventional, derived either from artificial formal languages or from “ordinary language” as the Linguistic Analysts claim. Thus he says that the claim of the (...) Analysts that a proposition is meaningless unless it has a role in ordinary language,” presupposes a criterion to decide whether, if a proposition cannot be expressed in some language, it is the proposition which is defective and not merely the language”. Körner’s position, therefore, differs in this respect from that of the Analysts, although his method is similar to theirs in that he claims that his enquiry is a purely neutral “logical” one involving no metaphysical or epistemological presuppositions or commitments and, in a sense, having no direct metaphysical or epistemological repercussions one way or the other. So, for example, when he says that an ostensive concept must have a “basis”,—that is, something to which it is applied—he does not mean that a concept, to be meaningful, must designate some ostensible “instance”. Thus, he admits, an Idealist might deny that there is any “instance” corresponding to the concept “physical object” while, nevertheless, acknowledging that his fountain pen is a “basis” of the concept “physical object”. In other words, Körner’s definition of the concept does not either directly sanction or rule out the Idealist epistemological position. (shrink)

Professor Körner’s essay on what he calls conceptual thinking is much more extensive in scope than its title suggests. Körner begins with a “logical”—as opposed to epistemological or psychological—discussion of the different kinds of concepts, “ostensive” and “non-ostensive”, and defines a concept as a sign used in accordance with rules. These rules, he emphasises, are not purely conventional, derived either from artificial formal languages or from “ordinary language” as the Linguistic Analysts claim. Thus he says that the claim of the (...) Analysts that a proposition is meaningless unless it has a role in ordinary language,” presupposes a criterion to decide whether, if a proposition cannot be expressed in some language, it is the proposition which is defective and not merely the language”. Körner’s position, therefore, differs in this respect from that of the Analysts, although his method is similar to theirs in that he claims that his enquiry is a purely neutral “logical” one involving no metaphysical or epistemological presuppositions or commitments and, in a sense, having no direct metaphysical or epistemological repercussions one way or the other. So, for example, when he says that an ostensive concept must have a “basis”,—that is, something to which it is applied—he does not mean that a concept, to be meaningful, must designate some ostensible “instance”. Thus, he admits, an Idealist might deny that there is any “instance” corresponding to the concept “physical object” while, nevertheless, acknowledging that his fountain pen is a “basis” of the concept “physical object”. In other words, Körner’s definition of the concept does not either directly sanction or rule out the Idealist epistemological position. (shrink)

Liturgy and ritual -- Structure -- Curriculum.

Current bioethical debate is bizarre because it concentrates on exceptional cases while it does not pay attention to underlying value perspectives that determine the agenda of the debate.

In an individualistic society and in the increasingly competitive business environment people do not seem inclined to forgive others their trespasses. One is more likely to choose to ignore the virtue of forgiveness as a way of handling personnel situations involving intense conflict or mild disagreements, favoring instead the negative feelings of resentment, anger, revenge or retaliation. Business people seem less concerned with growth in virtue and character; interestingly they allow their character and ultimately their work relationships to deteriorate because (...) they hold onto feelings of anger and resentment. Is there a place for forgiveness in our interpersonal relationships in general and in corporate life in particular? I believe there is. A study of the virtue of forgiveness shows that it is a misunderstood virtue, but one that deserves attention. In this article I will examine the virtue of forgiveness, defining what forgiveness is and is not, and will illustrate how it might be situated as an essential human resource management strategy. (shrink)

Mr. M. P. Charlesworth seems to have been too sceptical when he remarked that ‘the names of the Indian princelets given in the Periplus are unidentifiable, or rather too easily identifiable with any one, to be of any use’. Actually, the ruler mentioned in ch. 41 is identifiable beyond reasonable doubt, and his date is practically certain.

Mr. M. P. Charlesworth seems to have been too sceptical when he remarked that ‘the names of the Indian princelets given in the Periplus are unidentifiable, or rather too easily identifiable with any one, to be of any use’. Actually, the ruler mentioned in ch. 41 is identifiable beyond reasonable doubt, and his date is practically certain.

Global bioethics and the environment -- Biodiversity -- Health -- Disease -- Drugs -- Food -- Water -- Global bioethics in practice.

This long-awaited book replaces Hughes and Cresswell's two classic studies of modal logic: _An Introduction to Modal Logic_ and _A Companion to Modal Logic_. _A New Introduction to Modal Logic_ is an entirely new work, completely re-written by the authors. They have incorporated all the new developments that have taken place since 1968 in both modal propositional logic and modal predicate logic, without sacrificing tha clarity of exposition and approachability that were essential features of their earlier works. The book takes (...) readers from the most basic systems of modal propositional logic right up to systems of modal predicate with identity. It covers both technical developments such as completeness and incompleteness, and finite and infinite models, and their philosophical applications, especially in the area of modal predicate logic. (shrink)

This book critically analyses experiences with bioethics education in various countries across the world and identifies common challenges and interests. It presents ethics teaching experiences in nine different countries and the basic question of the goals of bioethics education. It addresses bioethics education in resource-poor countries, as the conditions and facilities are widely different, and set limits and provide challenges to bioethics educators. Further, the question of how bioethics education can be improved is explored by the contributors. Despite the volume (...) of journal publications agreement on bioethics education is rather limited. There are only few examples of core curricula, demonstrating consensus on the contents, goals, methods and assessment of teaching programs. We need ask: How can agreement on the best modalities of bioethics education be promoted? (shrink)

Expressions in a language, whether words, phrases, or sentences, have meanings. So it seems reasonable to suppose that there are meanings that expressions have. Of course, it is fashionable in some philosophical circles to deny this.

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This is a fine book on a heroic and noble figure of Russian political and intellectual history. Alexander Radishchev, descendant of Tartar princes, was a page at the court of Catherine the Great who sent him to Leipzig to complete his education. Imbued by the ideas of the 18th century in Germany and of the French enlightenment, Radishchev went back to his native Russia but could not reconcile himself to the horrible state of the Russian serfs. Thus he wrote a (...) vitriolic denunciation of the feudal regime in A Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow after which the Empress Catherine exiled him to Siberia. Eventually he managed to get back to the capital but he was unable to win back his former position. In despair of ever realizing his ideas he committed suicide. His tormented life and his rich, eclectic philosophic and political views are treated in this well-written, interesting study.--M. J. V. (shrink)

Susini, who is Professor of German at the Sorbonne, seems to have devoted his life to the study of German mysticism. After his monumental work on Baader he now offers a new edition of the famous spiritual poems of Angelus Silesius along with a French translation. While the Introduction to the first volume is quite short and devoid of any attempt at offering a new authoritative interpretation of the Silesian Mystic's work and thought, the second volume consists entirely of notes (...) displaying the author's vast and admirable erudition. These notes place Angelus Silesius in the general context of the history of Western mysticism, especially in regard to philosophical and speculative matters. They also allow us to retrace a certain influence he had on philosophers as different as Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Baader. As far as the French text of the poems is concerned, even though the great beauty of the original is not matched, the translation is correct and poetical.—M. J. V. (shrink)

There has been a most deserving movement in the last years to unite in one volume the most important scholarly articles written on the same topic yet published in different learned journals. The present volume is devoted to the problems of medieval German and Dutch mysticism from its beginnings to The Imitation of Christ. The selection is interesting and varied yet a certain technical narrowness pervades the whole volume. Instead of sharing the pages somewhat equally between philological and philosophico-theological articles, (...) there is a heavy preponderance of the purely philological and of the strictly historical. Moreover, the papers of a more philosophical character talk less to the philosophically interested reader than to the specialist in the history of medieval philosophy. Of course, there are welcome exceptions like the fine study of Joseph Koch on Eckhart's doctrine of analogy or A. Ampe's article on the "essential return of the soul to God according to Jan Van Ruysbroeck"--but the general tone of the volume is such that the non-specialist would have difficulty to be interested in many of its chapters.--M. J. V. (shrink)

This is an interesting theologically oriented study of Saint Bernard's teachings on man. The author tackles the central issue of Bernardian studies: was this holy monk a theologian or a philosopher, or both? Bernard's entire œuvre is penetrated by the questioning of the boundaries of natural and revealed knowledge, i.e., of philosophy and theology. The doctrine of man, that microcosmos in whom God was made flesh, is the best and the most likely ground on which to discuss the interconnection between (...) faith and reason, which was the most intricate issue of medieval culture. To do this, we need, among other things, a chart of the human intellectual faculties—and the author gives us exactly this. This is the core of the book but there is more. He presents an analysis of the properly philosophical aspects and patterns of Bernard's way of thinking, and also a good chapter on his metaphysics of the relationship between body and soul. The author is well-versed in the enormous secondary literature on Saint Bernard to which his study is a valuable addition.—M. J. V. (shrink)

One of the most significant theories of the late Brentano is that only the real can be represented, while of the so-called non-real we can formulate no authentic concepts but only fictions of language. This doctrine has not been fully comprehended by some of the best students of Brentano's thought, although others have called it "the Copernican turning-point" of his philosophy. The present selection of texts is intended to clarify and expound the controversial theory. Ninety-one letters exchanged between Brentano, Marty, (...) and O. Kraus make up the bulk of the volume and they are followed by fourteen short essays, all but one unpublished up to now. These are difficult and condensed texts but they allow us to follow closely the intense struggle of this great philosopher to articulate and to explain a theory which he had considered immensely important. They continuously refer to Aristotle whom Brentano venerated. There is a fair amount of comment on Kant, Husserl, and Meinong. A long and interesting introduction by Mayer-Hillebrand with concise yet comprehensive notes completes the volume.--M. J. V. (shrink)

This interesting commentary on the Book of Job, following upon the author's earlier and shorter English-language studies in different U.S. periodicals, renews the now almost forgotten tradition of philosophical commentaries on Biblical books. Biblical scholarship is missing from this study. Instead we have the German text of Job printed along with a profusion of notes. Sometimes these are only a few words to explain a sentence, sometimes they amount to a longer philosophical digression. Most contemporary scholars consider such commentaries amateurish (...) and outmoded; yet a non-theological reflection on a text of universal, almost supra-Biblical, content such as the book of Job is certainly justified.—M. J. V. (shrink)

One of the most interesting and difficult tasks of contemporary theological reflection is the elaboration of a verifiable theology. The subject is as old as theology itself, and the contemporaries of Schleiermacher, like Hegel and Schelling, devoted immense industry and ingenuity to a speculative study of the history of religions. Yet the idealist's philosophical approach could not satisfy Schleiermacher whose very point of departure is the autonomous category of the religious. His peculiar approach to the different positive religions, their necessity (...) as well as their facticity, is the central theme of Welker's book. In a way, we are given a restatement of Schleiermacher's fundamental views on religion and religions. The treatment of the history of religion is only a corollary of these more general issues. The book is concluded with a rich and interesting chapter comparing Schleiermacher with Rudolph Otto.--M. J. V. (shrink)

Eckhart is usually treated from the viewpoints of philosophy or speculative mysticism. Weiss is a theologian and his well-documented, heavily-footnoted study on salvation history in Meister Eckhart is a departure from this tradition. Without any claim to revolutionize our Eckhart-image he explores the themes of original sin, Incarnation, Passion and the glorification of Christ, the Church and the sacraments. All these themes of positive theology unfold in the context of the respective patristic and scholastic doctrines. The very meagerness of Eckhart's (...) teaching on the traditional positive and historical aspects of Christian thought reveals how strong and fundamental were this great Dominican's leanings toward neo-Platonic essentialism.—M. J. V. (shrink)