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  1. Ralf M. Bader (2012). The Non-Transitivity of the Contingent and Occasional Identity Relations. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):141-152.
    This paper establishes that the occasional identity relation and the contingent identity relation are both non-transitive and as such are not properly classified as identity relations. This is achieved by appealing to cases where multiple fissions and fusions occur simultaneously. These cases show that the contingent and occasional identity relations do not even satisfy the time-indexed and world-indexed versions of the transitivity requirement and hence are non-transitive relations.
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  2. Tom Baldwin (1984). Lowe on Modalities de Re. Mind 93 (370):252-255.
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  3. David Barnett (2000). Is Water Necessarily Identical to H2O? Philosophical Studies 98 (1):99-112.
    The “scientific essentialist” doctrine asserts that the following are examples of a posteriori necessary identities: water is H2O; gold is the element with atomic number 79; and heat is the motion of molecules. Evidence in support of this assertion, however, is difficult to find. Both Hilary Putnam and Saul Kripke have argued convincingly for the existence of a posteriori necessities. Furthermore, Kripke has argued for the existence of a posteriori necessary identities in regard to a particular class of statements involving (...)
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  4. Andrew Brennan (1986). Best Candidates and Theories of Identity. Inquiry 29 (1-4):423-438.
    Attacks on ?closest continuer? and ?best candidate? theories of identity have something correct in them while still failing to discredit the theories they oppose. What follows from Noonan's and Wiggins's objections to such theories is that they need to be so formulated as not to deny the necessity of identity. The best metaphysics for best?candidate theories to adopt is one in which everyday objects are taken to transcend, in a certain sense, their life histories in given worlds. This metaphysics also (...)
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  5. Charles B. Cross (2011). Brute Facts, the Necessity of Identity, and the Identity of Indiscernibles. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1):1-10.
    In ‘Two Spheres, Twenty Spheres, and the Identity of Indiscernibles,’ Della Rocca argues that any counterexample to the PII would involve ‘a brute fact of non-identity [. . .] not grounded in any qualitative difference.’ I respond that Adams's so-called Continuity Argument against the PII does not postulate qualitatively inexplicable brute facts of identity or non-identity if understood in the context of Kripkean modality. One upshot is that if the PII is understood to quantify over modal as well as non-modal (...)
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  6. Charles B. Cross (2009). Causal Independence, the Identity of Indiscernibles, and the Essentiality of Origins. Journal of Philosophy 106 (5):277-291.
    In his well-known 1952 dialogue Max Black describes a counterexample to the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII). The counterexample is a world containing nothing but two purportedly indiscernible iron spheres. Reflecting on Black's example, Robert Adams uses the possibility of a world containing two almost indiscernible spheres to argue for the possibility of the indiscernible spheres world. One of Adams's almost indiscernible spheres has a small impurity, and, Adams writes, "Surely... the absence of the impurity would not make (...)
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  7. Robert Francescotti (2010). Psychological Continuity and the Necessity of Identity. American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (4):337-350.
  8. Robert Francescotti (2010). Psychological Continuity and the Necessity of Identity. American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (4):337-350.
  9. Irwin Goldstein (2004). Neural Materialism, Pain's Badness, and a Posteriori Identities. In Maite Ezcurdia, Robert Stainton & Christopher Viger (eds.), New Essays in the Philosophy of Language and Mind. University of Calgary Press. 261-273.
    Orthodox neural materialists think mental states are neural events or orthodox material properties of neutral events. Orthodox material properties are defining properties of the “physical”. A “defining property” of the physical is a type of property that provides a necessary condition for something’s being correctly termed “physical”. In this paper I give an argument against orthodox neural materialism. If successful, the argument would show at least some properties of some mental states are not orthodox material properties of neural events. Opposing (...)
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  10. Lucas P. Halpin, Analyticity, Identity and Presupposition.
    First, I will sketch an account of identity sentences according to which identity is a device for achieving semantic change. Specifically, it changes which sentences are analytic. Second, I will sketch an account of presupposition according to which presupposition triggers are devices for logical change. More precisely, they change the logic of the language (not the logical form of the sentences in which they occur). The purpose is to sketch a general strategy of appealing to change within a language to (...)
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  11. Tobias Hansson Wahlberg (2011). Can Persistence Be a Matter of Convention? Axiomathes 21 (4):507-529.
    This paper asks whether persistence can be a matter of convention. It argues that in a rather unexciting de dicto sense persistence is indeed a matter of convention, but it rejects the notion that persistence can be a matter of convention in a more substantial de re sense. However, scenarios can be imagined that appear to involve conventional persistence of the latter kind. Since there are strong reasons for thinking that such conventionality is impossible, it is desirable that our metaphysical-cum-semantic (...)
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  12. Saul A. Kripke (1980/1998). Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press.
  13. Saul A. Kripke (1971). Identity and Necessity. In Milton K. Munitz (ed.), Identity and Individuation. New York University Press. 135-164.
    are synthetic a priori judgements possible?" In both cases, i~thas usually been t'aken for granted in fife one case by Kant that synthetic a priori judgements were possible, and in the other case in contemporary,'d-". philosophical literature that contingent statements of identity are ppss. ible. I do not intend to deal with the Kantian question except to mention:ssj~",.
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  14. Simon Langford & Murali Ramachandran (2000). Rigidity, Occasional Identity and Leibniz' Law. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (201):518-526.
    André Gallois (1998) attempts to defend the occasional identity thesis (OIT), the thesis that objects which are distinct at one time may nonetheless be identical at another time, in the face of two influential lines of argument against it. One argument involves Kripke’s (1971) notion of rigid designation and the other, Leibniz’s law (affirming the indiscernibility of identicals). It is reasonable for advocates of (OIT) to question the picture of rigid designation and the version of Leibniz’s law that these arguments (...)
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  15. E. J. Lowe (1982). On the Alleged Necessity of True Identity Statements. Mind 91 (364):579-584.
    A highly contentious issue in recent philosophy of logic has been the question of whether there can be contingently true identity statements. In this paper I want to investigate a possible loop-hole in the standard argument of the necessitarians (i.e., those who maintain that any true identity statement is necessarily true).
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  16. William G. Lycan (1985). In Defense of the Necessity of Identity. Journal of Philosophy 82 (10):572-574.
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  17. Ofra Magidor (2011). Arguments by Leibniz’s Law in Metaphysics. Philosophy Compass 6 (3):180-195.
    Leibniz’s Law (or as it sometimes called, ‘the Indiscerniblity of Identicals’) is a widely accepted principle governing the notion of numerical identity. The principle states that if a is identical to b, then any property had by a is also had by b. Leibniz’s Law may seem like a trivial principle, but its apparent consequences are far from trivial. The law has been utilised in a wide range of arguments in metaphysics, many leading to substantive and controversial conclusions. This article (...)
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  18. Murali Ramachandran (2000). Rigidity, Occasional Identity and Leibniz' Law. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (201):518 - 526.
    André Gallois (1998) attempts to defend the occasional identity thesis (OIT), the thesis that objects which are distinct at one time may nonetheless be identical at another time, in the face of two influential lines of argument against it. One argument involves Kripke’s (1971) notion of rigid designation and the other, Leibniz’s law (affirming the indiscernibility of identicals). It is reasonable for advocates of (OIT) to question the picture of rigid designation and the version of Leibniz’s law that these arguments (...)
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  19. Lawrence D. Roberts (1985). Problems About Material and Formal Modes in the Necessity of Identity. Journal of Philosophy 82 (10):562-572.
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  20. Joshua Schechter (2011). Weakly Classical Theories of Identity. Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (4):607-644.
    There are well-known quasi-formal arguments that identity is a "strict" relation in at least the following three senses: (1) There is a single identity relation and a single distinctness relation; (2) There are no contingent cases of identity or distinctness; and (3) There are no vague or indeterminate cases of identity or distinctness. However, the situation is less clear cut than it at first may appear. There is a natural formal theory of identity that is very close to the standard (...)
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  21. Tuomas E. Tahko (2009). On the Modal Content of A Posteriori Necessities. Theoria 75 (4):344-357.
    This paper challenges the Kripkean interpretation of a posteriori necessities. It will be demonstrated, by an analysis of classic examples, that the modal content of supposed a posteriori necessities is more complicated than the Kripkean line suggests. We will see that further research is needed concerning the a priori principles underlying all a posteriori necessities. In the course of this analysis it will emerge that the modal content of a posteriori necessities can be best described in terms of a Finean (...)
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  22. Alessandro Torza (2012). 'Identity' Without Identity. Mind 121 (481):67-95.
    I introduce and defend the semantic notion of counterfactual identity, distinguishing it from the metaphysical notion of transworld identity. After showing that Lewis's counterpart theory misconstrues counterfactual identity facts, I outline and motivate a ‘Leibnizian counterpart theory’ where the notion of counterfactual identity is adequately modelled. Finally, I show that counterfactual identity can be characterized without relying on some implausible features of Lewis's theory of conditionals.
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  23. Gabriel Uzquiano (2011). Plural Quantification and Modality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (2pt2):219-250.
    Identity is a modally inflexible relation: two objects are necessarily identical or necessarily distinct. However, identity is not alone in this respect. We will look at the relation that one object bears to some objects if and only if it is one of them. In particular, we will consider the credentials of the thesis that no matter what some objects are, an object is necessarily one of them or necessarily not one of them.
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  24. Michael Wreen (1998). Proper Names and the Necessity of Identity Statements. Synthese 114 (2):319-335.
    An identity statement flanked on both sides with proper names is necessarily true, Saul Kripke thinks, if it's true at all. Thus, contrary to the received view – or at least what was, prior to Kripke, the received view – a statement like(A) Hesperus is Phosphorus.
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