ABSTRACT Economists not only failed to anticipate the financial crisis; they may have contributed to it—with risk and derivatives models that, through spurious precision and untested theoretical assumptions, encouraged policy makers and market participants to see more stability and risk sharing than was actually present. Moreover, once the crisis occurred, it was met with incomprehension by most economists because of models that, on the one hand, downplay the possibility that economic actors may exhibit highly interactive behavior; and, (...) on the other, assume that any homogeneity will involve economic actors sharing the economist’s own putatively correct model of the economy, so that error can stem only from an exogenous shock. The financial crisis presents both an ethical and an intellectual challenge to economics, and an opportunity to reform its study by grounding it more solidly in reality. (shrink)

In this topical book, Boudewijn de Bruin examines the ethical 'blind spots' that lay at the heart of the global financial crisis. He argues that the most important moral problem in finance is not the 'greed is good' culture, but rather the epistemic shortcomings of bankers, clients, rating agencies and regulators. Drawing on insights from economics, psychology and philosophy, de Bruin develops a novel theory of epistemic virtue and applies it to racist and sexist lending practices, subprime mortgages, (...) CEO hubris, the Madoff scandal, professionalism in accountancy and regulatory outsourcing of epistemic responsibility. With its multidisciplinary reach, Ethics and the Global Financial Crisis will appeal to scholars working in philosophy, business ethics, economics, psychology and the sociology of finance. The many concrete examples and case studies mean that this book will also prove useful to policy-makers and regulators. (shrink)

The Global Financial Crisis is acknowledged to be the most severe economic downturn since the 1930s, and one that is unique in its underlying causes, its scope, and its wider social, political and economic implications. This volume explores some of the ethical issues that it has raised.

Economists not only failed to anticipate the financial crisis; they may have contributed to it—with risk and derivatives models that, through spurious precision and untested theoretical assumptions, encouraged policy makers and market participants to see more stability and risk sharing than was actually present. Moreover, once the crisis occurred, it was met with incomprehension by most economists because of models that, on the one hand, downplay the possibility that economic actors may exhibit highly interactive behavior; and, on (...) the other, assume that any homogeneity will involve economic actors sharing the economist’s own putatively correct model of the economy, so that error can stem only from an exogenous shock. The financial crisis presents both an ethical and an intellectual challenge to economics, and an opportunity to reform its study by grounding it more solidly in reality. (shrink)

The Islamic finance industry is relatively new and vibrant. It is becoming a mainstream industry in the MENA. The industry is based on a number of Sharia’a maxims and in particular the prohibition of Riba. Islamic law scholars’ emphasis on the ethical dimension of this industry and how it can be seen as a solution to existing capitalism. The current financial crisis presented this industry with an unprecedented test and an opportunity to influence and merge into main stream (...) finance. This paper presents an evaluation of Islamic finance industry in the current financial crisis and whether the governance and ethical foundation of Islamic finance institutions distinguished itself from conventional finance. Thus, this paper begins with an overview of Islamic finance, then it discusses the governance framework structure of Islamic finance institutions and the role of its organs. In addition, this paper will compare between the ethical framework of the Islamic finance institutions and the conventional institutions. Finally, this paper will discover the ethical failure of the current global financial system and its relation with the current financial crisis. (shrink)

The Global Financial Crisis is acknowledged to be the most severe economic downturn since the 1930s, and one that is unique in its underlying causes, its scope, and its wider social, political and economic implications. This volume explores some of the ethical issues that it has raised.

The 2008 global financial crisis raises ethical as much as financial questions. Moral outrage centered on the imbalance between banks profiting from excessive risk-taking in good times and taxpayers suffering the costs in bad times. The paper analyzes this imbalance in terms of ethical theory. It first develops a rights-based framework to answer questions about the moral obligations of states and banks towards each other. It then criticizes standard economic thinking, which de-moralizes the phenomenon of moral hazard. (...) Moral hazard between states and banks arises in a context that cannot be interpreted as normal economic contracting, but should rather be characterized as governed by an implicit social contract giving rise to moral obligations. (shrink)

This paper assesses the current world economic crisis in terms of crucial transformations in global capitalism throughout the neoliberal period. It argues that intense social and spatial restructuring after the crises of 1973–82 produced a new wave of capitalist expansion that began to exhaust itself in the late-1990s. Since that time, new problems of overaccumulation and declining profitability have plagued global capitalism. Interconnected with these problems are contradictions related to a mutation in the form of world-money, as a result (...) of its complete de-linking from gold after 1971, which stimulated a fantastic growth in financial instruments and transactions, and generated a proliferation of esoteric 'fictitious capitals' whose collapse is wreaking havoc across world financial markets. The intersection between general conditions of overaccumulation and a crisis in financial structures specific to neoliberalism has now produced a deep world-slump. Inherent in this crisis is a breakdown in forms of value-measurement that is throwing up intense struggles between the capitalist value-form and popular life-values, the latter of which comprise the grounds for any real renewal of the socialist Left. (shrink)

The paper investigates the distinctly Chinese intertwining of expertise and state & financial capital to enrich the current understanding of neoliberalism as a hegemonic governing rationale. Since the summer of 2015, China has been experiencing one of its most severe financial crises since the adoption of a ‘socialist market economy’ in 1978. However, globally circulating narratives have failed to look beyond a Western-centric corollary, rehashing a critique of the Chinese one-party system and its lack of a ‘genuine’ free (...) market. By exploring the specific genealogy of Chinese capitalism, and the distinctive Chinese financial-market structure, the article will show how the scientific authority of experts formulated amongst neoliberal thinkers never permeated the Chinese idea of knowledge. In the Chinese variety of financial capitalism, expertise is seen to lie not so much in the wisdom of individual experts as in their socio-political support, which legitimises their economic interventions. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe inherent complexity of modern financial systems, and their basis in human behavior, make it hard to establish unequivocally the “who, what, where, when, and why” of the global financial crisis. However, after almost a decade, we know enough to discard much of what has, in the meantime, become folk wisdom about the causes of the debacle, including Wall Street bonus culture, bankers’ greed, the moral hazard of “too big to fail,” government intervention and deregulation. While each (...) of these factors may have played some role, the crisis can be much more accurately described as one of ignorance than malevolence. The common thread tying the emergence of the bubble to the disastrous consequences of its bursting is the misunderstanding of correlation and causation links in three key domains: economic policy, financial modeling, and the regulatory framework. These misunderstandings helped fuel the housing bubble and introduced fragility into the system, making it vulnerable to the bubble’s subsequent, unavoidable burst. (shrink)

Richard Posner avers in his A Failure of Capitalism that managers bear no moral responsibility for the financial crisis. This view has numerous supporters in economics and philosophy, and I shall call it the ‘exemption view’. In this paper, I criticise four arguments for the exemption view and propose a superior alternative, the ‘participation view’. The participation view claims that managers can be co-responsible for harm, even if their actions were not necessary or sufficient conditions for its occurrence. (...) The paper spells out three conditions for moral responsibility according to the participation view. (shrink)

Richard A. Posner's two books on the financial crisis focus on possible macroeconomic (Keynesian) causes of it, neglecting legal causes that would have had only microeconomic effects, yet could have been responsible for the crisis. Specifically, Posner accepts too readily the conventional wisdom that banks? leverage levels, hence their capital cushions, were deregulated; this ignores Basel I, Basel II, and the Recourse rule, which internationally and (in the last case) in the United States minutely regulated not only (...) leverage levels but the composition of banks? assets. These regulations penalized banks for making business loans in comparison to mortgage loans, and it further penalized them for keeping mortgage loans rather than selling them for securitization and then buying back the ?senior? tranches of the resulting mortgage-backed securities. These regulations may explain the overconcentration of mortgage risk in the banks, and thus the financial crisis. (shrink)

Richard A. Posner's two books on the financial crisis focus on possible macroeconomic (Keynesian) causes of it, neglecting legal causes that would have had only microeconomic effects, yet could have been responsible for the crisis. Specifically, Posner accepts too readily the conventional wisdom that banks’ leverage levels, hence their capital cushions, were deregulated; this ignores Basel I, Basel II, and the Recourse rule, which internationally and (in the last case) in the United States minutely regulated not only (...) leverage levels but the composition of banks’ assets. These regulations penalized banks for making business loans in comparison to mortgage loans, and it further penalized them for keeping mortgage loans rather than selling them for securitization and then buying back the “senior” tranches of the resulting mortgage-backed securities. These regulations may explain the overconcentration of mortgage risk in the banks, and thus the financial crisis. (shrink)

Despite a relatively healthy financial sector, the Japanese economy contracted 6.3% in 2009 during the global financial crisis (GFC) after the Lehman shock, the starkest drop among the OECD countries. Since then, the Japanese economy has been slow to recover, although the Japanese government has implemented multiple economic stimulus packages with a high aggregate value.

Based on the research of currency crisis pressure index, bank crisis pressure index, and asset bubble crisis pressure index, this paper introduces an external shock pressure index reflecting the impact of global economic changes on economy and synthesizes systemic financial crisis pressure based on the above four pressure indexes; then, all the alternative early warning indicators and the systemic risk pressure index constructed in this paper were tested for Granger causality. We build financial systemic (...) risk pressure indexes, including currency crisis pressure banking crisis pressure index, bubble crisis pressure index, and external shock pressure index to predict financial crises. Finally, four indicators that have a significant impact on the systemic financial crisis pressure index were selected, namely, the stock price index change rate, industrial added value growth rate, domestic and foreign real deposit interest rate differential, and foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP. A dynamic Logit model with lagging binary variables is constructed, and compared with the traditional static Logit line, the actual dynamic fitting effect is better than the static Logit model. The dynamic Logit model is used to predict the early warning status of systemic financial crisis in 2020, and the forecast of various early warning indicators is realized by the ARIMA model. The final prediction results show that the probability of a systemic financial crisis in China in 2020 is extremely low, almost zero. This is in line with the overall improvement in the international economic situation in 2020 and the steady growth of the domestic economy. (shrink)

The financial crisis was caused by the complex, constantly growing web of regulations designed to constrain and redirect modern capitalism. This complexity made investors, bankers, and perhaps regulators themselves ignorant of regulations previously promulgated across decades and in different “fields” of regulation. These regulations interacted with each other to foster the issuance and securitization of subprime mortgages; their rating as AA or AAA; and their concentration on the balance sheets (and off the balance sheets) of many commercial and (...) investment banks. As a practical matter, it was impossible to predict the disastrous outcome of these interacting regulations. This fact calls into question the feasibility of the century-old attempt to create a hybrid capitalism in which regulations are supposed to remedy economic problems as they arise. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Imagine, as most economists do, that financial-market participants understand the basic structure of the world: While they cannot predict the future with certainty, they are endowed with knowledge of the possible outcomes of their actions and the probability that each of those outcomes will occur. Given these assumptions, if bankers, regulators, investors, and rating agencies were rational, we may conclude that the financial crisis was caused by poor incentives: These actors must have knowingly jeopardized their institutions (...) and the global economy to pursue private gain. Alternatively, market participants, caught up in the mania of crowds, may have irrationally ignored risks of which they were aware and of which they knew the correct probability. Neither of these explanations for the financial crisis stands up to the evidence, since both explanations assume that the participants knew the U.S. housing market was about to crash. A fresh look at the data five years later suggests that they were ignorant of this fact, and that they acted rationally (or at least reasonably) in light of what they (thought that they) knew. This allows a more nuanced understanding of how financial institutions ended up in bedlam, why credit markets collapsed, and why they took so long to recover. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Why did the popping of the housing bubble bring the financial system—rather than just the housing sector of the economy—to its knees? The answer lies in two methods by which banks had evaded regulatory capital requirements. First, they had temporarily placed assets—such as securitized mortgages—in off‐balance‐sheet entities, so that they did not have to hold significant capital buffers against them. Second, the capital regulations also allowed banks to reduce the amount of capital they held against assets that remained (...) on their balance sheets—if those assets took the form of AAA‐rated tranches of securitized mortgages. Thus, by repackaging mortgages into mortgage‐backed securities, whether held on or off their balance sheets, banks reduced the amount of capital required against their loans, increasing their ability to make loans many‐fold. The principal effect of this regulatory arbitrage, however, was to concentrate the risk of mortgage defaults in the banks and render them insolvent when the housing bubble popped. (shrink)

The recent financial crisis has triggered an intense debate about the role of banks in society, presumably changing the criteria used in the evaluation of organizations. Against this backdrop, we investigate the changing role of banks’ organizational features in shaping different dimensions of banks’ organizational reputation. Using the media as an important evaluator, we measure the reputational dimension of visibility based on the frequency of newspaper articles and the reputational dimension of favorability based on the sentiment of newspaper (...) articles. Drawing on social judgment research for developing our hypotheses, we expect that organizational features such as financial performance and familiarity become more important determinants of organizational reputation in times of crisis. Our results support this expectation, suggesting stronger effects of these organizational features on the visibility and favorability of banks during a crisis. These findings provide novel empirical evidence on how the importance of drivers of organizational reputation changes in times of crisis and highlight areas for managerial attention. (shrink)

The idea that the ethical values of professionals in finance have played a role in the global financial crisis is widespread. The crisis-of-ethics debate is important, concerning one of the main policy challenges of our times, but is based on popular lore and anecdotes rather than systematic evidence. We analyze the self-enhancement and self-transcendence values of PIFs vis-à-vis the general population and test for patterns of variation that are consistent with the idea of a crisis of (...) values, meaning patterns of variation that would implicate PIFs’ values in the GFC. Employing pre-crisis data allows for an unbiased assessment. Results reveal only minor differences in values between PIFs and the general population, too small to support the idea of a crisis of ethical values by objective standards. Extensive robustness checks confirm these findings, sometimes actually revealing values differences counter to the crisis of ethical values idea. We conclude that the financial system would not have fared better had we had a different breed of PIFs. Rather, situational forces can induce severe disregard for the welfare of others, also in people with ordinary, decent values. Hence, if anything, the GFC shows that the financial services industry has been providing an environment highly conducive to unethical behavior. The practical implication is that fixes to the financial system can only come from improved regulatory design. (shrink)

This short theoretical paper elucidates a plausible theory about the Global Financial Crisis and the role of senior financial corporate directors in that crisis. The paper presents a theory of the Global Financial Crisis which argues that psychopaths working in corporations and in financial corporations, in particular, have had a major part in causing the crisis. This paper is thus a very short theoretical paper but is one that may be very important (...) to the future of capitalism because it discusses significant ways in which Corporate Psychopaths may have acted recently, to the detriment of many. Further research into this theory is called for. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The financial crisis was in large part caused, prolonged, and worsened by a series of government actions and interventions. The housing boom and bust that precipitated the crisis were enabled by extraordinarily loose monetary policy. After the housing boom came to an end, the Federal Reserve misdiagnosed financial markets' uncertainty about the location and value of risky subprime mortgage‐backed securities as being, instead, a liquidity problem, and it took inappropriate compensatory actions that had side effects (...) that included raising the price of oil. Finally, in mid‐September 2008, the government's ad‐hoc bailouts, and the unpredictable terms of the proposed tarp legislation, appear to have caused a sharp spike in uncertainty in the financial markets. (shrink)

Develops a framework using resources from Rawls and Nagel for understanding injustices due to the sale of defective real estate instruments by banks whose solvency was globally important in 2007-2008. The leaderships of some of these banks were partly responsible for the world financial crisis that started in 2008.

This case study examines five dimensions of the 2007–2009 financial crisis in the United States: the devastating effects of the financial crisis on the U.S. economy, including unparalleled unemployment, massive declines in gross domestic product, and the prolonged mortgage foreclosure crisis; the multiple causes of the financial crisis and panic, such as the housing and bond bubbles, excessive leverage, lax financial regulation, disgraceful banking practices, and abysmal rating agency performance; the extraordinary efforts (...) of the Federal Reserve, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and the Department of the Treasury to stem the financial freefall triggered by the crisis and resuscitate financial institutions, the ethical implications of the unprecedented actions by government institutions to rescue financial institutions and drag the country back from the brink of global financial collapse, and the conduct of the various parties contributing to the financial crisis, such as the shoddy behavior of mortgage brokers, the massive securitization of mortgages into overly complex bonds, the excessive leverage of financial institutions, the disgraceful work of bond rating firms, the abysmal risk management systems employed by financial institutions, and the massive operations of the shadow banking and over-the-counter derivatives markets; and the major provisions of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act signed into law to in response to the financial crisis and for the purpose of correcting the egregious conduct of major financial institutions. (shrink)

This article cybernetically (isomorphically) investigates the causes of the Hellenic financial crisis. It (1) describes the crisis and its commonly assessed root cause: systemic corruption coupled to the decisions of ample numbers of Greeks to endure the problem rather than resolve it; (2) reviews SYRIZA's 2015 anti‐austerity campaign and identifies incompatibilities within its apparent collective purposes that imply processes more fundamental than corruption and bad faith may be causing the crisis; (3) situates cybernetics within a sociological (...) framework to analyze those processes appropriately; (4) propositionally reduces them to a general rule—the tragedy of the commons—operating more or less within the collective conscience of the Greek people; and (5) and exposes the parameter's self‐similar manifestation in social actions that have contributed to the crisis. (shrink)

According to an existing “environmental” narrative, the financial crisis of 2007-2009 was due in part to executive compensation packages in the financial services industry that incentivized excessive risk-taking. Also according to this narrative, those who have a duty to protect society – principally, government regulators, but also firms themselves – are open to blame for how executives were paid, and must take steps to change executive compensation. This narrative is important but incomplete. I offer a supplementary “agential” (...) narrative. According to this narrative, executives are open to blame for the financial crisis for taking socially excessive risks. Moreover, since executives can play a role in shaping their compensation, they have an obligation to ensure that it does not incentivize them to take such risks. (shrink)

The economic crisis has exposed shortcomings in standard economic theory and provided an impetus for new economic thinking. But the theoretical debate in the wake of the crisis has been unduly constrained by the terms of the mainstream approach to economic theory. Like any approach, it is characterised by a way of framing reality, giving meaning to terms and setting criteria for good argument. It also determines how any economic theory is understood, whether from the history of economic (...) thought or from the contemporary literature. But there are other approaches to economics which would open up the field to a much wider range of possibilities for new economic thinking. Addressing the challenge that any reader bases her understanding on her own approach, the purpose of this paper is to attempt to explain what it means to consider different approaches and why it matters for policy. This is done by discussing two features of the financial crisis which pose particular problems for economic theory. These are the role of changing market sentiment in driving asset prices on the one hand and the breakdown of trust relationships in banking on the other (the moral hazard issue). We will see how these are addressed by mainstream theory and by alternative approaches. First, market sentiment is discussed within the mainstream rational-optimising framework, where risk is quantifiable, and compared with the Keynesian approach based on the general uncertainty of knowledge, where reason, evidence and sentiment are integrated. The moral hazard issue is then discussed in its mainstream form in terms of rational opportunism and in its institutionalist form in terms of the foundation of social relations (including relations between institutions) in trust. It is shown that different ways of approaching theorising in each case imply different policy measures. It is argued further that an exclusively deductive mathematical approach to analysis of market sentiment and trust is unduly limiting and that a more pluralist approach would more fully address the issues. (shrink)

The Great Financial Crisis that broke in 2008 and the Great Recession that followed has led many to question the very structure of contemporary economies. Some argue that the economic model of the past forty years is now broken. Criticism has also been directed at the orthodoxies of economics. For example, neoclassical equilibrium economics, the mainstream economics of the day, is accused of failing to understand some of the most basic aspects of the modern economy, of supporting policies (...) that have led to the economic breakdown, and of failing to see the crisis coming. Consequently, heterodox thinking in economics is getting a hearing as never before. Heterodox economics offers itself as the requisite radical reconstruction of the science of economics and also proposes policies for the radical reconstruction of the major economics.Yet to talk of the reconstruction of the modern market economy is at the same time to raise the ethical question: what shape ought the market economy to take? Heterodox economics may acutely analyse the inadequacies of real economies and propose plausible reforms, but as an essentially descriptive science there will be limits on its ability to state what ought to be. Rather, what is required seems to be a systematic prescriptive ethics. In other words, recent events in the world of economics have provided an opening for what ethical philosophy should be best at providing. Determining whether a specific ethical philosophy, to be identified shortly, has the capacity to address the questions raised by heterodox economics is the task of this paper. (shrink)

The Russian financial crisis of August 1998, which occurred between the Asian recession and the devaluation of the Brazilian real in January 1999, put a question-mark over many certainties. It demonstrated that the most destructive speculative activities of financial players can only have free rein when there is a collapse of the state. The crisis proved that the markets need a state and cannot replace it. It was also the moment when people became aware of the (...) dynamics of a globalized financial economy (Stiglitz, 1999a; 1999b), leading to a critical rereading of the policies recommended in the 1990s and a direct questioning of the IMF and its actions. In Russia it caused a paradigm shift that could turn out to be salutary. In this regard the August 1998 crisis looks like the endpoint on the route followed since 1992 by the transition in Russia (Sapir, 1999a). We can see in the crisis both elements directly linked to the financial liberalization of 1985-95 and structural elements peculiar to the consequences of the transition and the policies adopted. This is why it suggests a reinterpretation of the entire development of the transition in Russia starting from 1992. (shrink)

In The Global Financial Crisis, contributors argue that the complexity of the Global Financial Crisis challenges researchers to offer more comprehensive explanations by extending the scope and range of their traditional investigations.

The article turns to Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of state capitalism and their theorization of money and debt in their critique of capitalism to develop an analysis of the governmental management of the current crisis determined by ordo- and neoliberalism. The paper argues that analyses which fail to properly recognize the power of capital to determine both state apparatuses and economic policy thereby fail to grasp the real functioning of money, debt and the Euro in the crisis and (...) end up unwittingly supporting liberalism. This is true of positions such as heterodox theory that, though critical of conventional and neoliberal political economy, nevertheless continue to uphold the state as an independent or mediating mechanism in relation to the power of capital. The neglect of the role which money plays in the strategies of capital to control both the creation of value and the functioning of the state is to be found even in Foucault’s genealogy of neoliberalism, a neglect which undermines his analysis of power. The paper highlights the implications of the standpoint of state capitalism for a more incisive analysis of the current crisis that reveals what is at stake for political struggles. (shrink)

This Article discusses the impact of the international financial crisis on Brazilian capital markets. While the banking industry was not severely affected, leading nonfinancial corporations experienced severe financial turmoil. Two Brazilian corporations cross-listed in the United States - Sadia S.A. and Aracruz Celulose S.A. - suffered billion-dollar losses when the Brazilian real unexpectedly plummeted in relation to the dollar. Despite earlier disclosure that these companies had engaged only in pure hedging activity, these great losses were found to (...) be the result of their highly speculative trading in currencyderivatives. Consequently, several private lawsuits were filed both in the United States and in Brazil. This Article takes a novel approach to the transnational securities litigation debate by examining the particular consequences of private litigation in a developed and in an emerging country. It compares the types of lawsuits filed and their final outcomes. Despite substantially similar alleged wrongdoing, the outcomes for securities holders in each jurisdiction contrast strikingly. Only U.S. investors of both companies were able to obtain substantial financial recoveries; Brazilian investors obtained none. This Article examines the reasons behind these discrepant results and the consequent economic distributional effects on global securities markets after the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Morrison. The Article argues that Morrison aggravates such shareholder cross-border non pro rata compensation and transfers of company value from foreign to U.S. investors. It identifies a set of costs borne by foreign investors, and so far neglected by scholars, as a consequence of the current status of U.S. and international securities law regimes. These costs are the result not only of the typical “circularity problem” in securities litigation, but also of a “double circularity problem” as they fall on foreign shareholders who also suffered equivalent damages to those experienced by the U.S. class being compensated. The Article then discusses potential policy reforms for fixing transnational securities litigation. (shrink)

I argue that epistemic failings are a significant and underappreciated moral hazard in the financial services industry. I argue further that an analysis of these epistemic failings and their means of redress is best developed by identifying policies and procedures that are likely to facilitate good judgment. These policies and procedures are “best epistemic practices.” I explain how best epistemic practices support good reasoning, thereby facilitating accurate judgments about risk and reward. Failures to promote and adhere to best epistemic (...) practices contributed to the 2008 financial crisis. I identify and discuss some of the ways in which best epistemic practices were violated in the events that led to the crisis, with a focus on the role of the credit rating agencies. I go on to discuss some of the ways in which these failings have been redressed. I conclude by observing how proactive regulation for best epistemic practices might help us to anticipate and avoid future crises. (shrink)

We examine the politics of financial crisis response in Japan and the United States. Many existing accounts of Japan's of the 1990s have emphasized Japan-specific factors, such as structural problems, policy errors, and political dysfunction. We argue that Japan may have been subject to a form of first-mover disadvantage. Like innovation in the private sector, developing effective solutions to novel policy problems requires a messy process of discovery, experimentation, and repeated failure. Much as late-industrializing countries adapted the methods (...) and technologies of early developers, second-movers can apply effective policies demonstrated by first-movers in a more targeted, efficient, and rapid manner. We show that the behavior of Japan and the United States during their respective financial crises is broadly consistent with this theory. In addition, policy adoption in the United States most clearly reflected lessons from Japan in areas where the lessons were considered clear and implementation was less politicized. (shrink)

Resisting Corporate Corruption teaches business ethics in a manner very different from the philosophical and legal frameworks that dominate graduate schools. The book offers twenty-eight case studies and nine essays that cover a full range of business practice, controls and ethics issues. The essays discuss the nature of sound financial controls, root causes of the Financial Crisis, and the evolving nature of whistleblower protections. The cases are framed to instruct students in early identification of ethics problems and (...) how to work such issues within corporate organizations. They also provide would-be whistleblowers with instruction on the challenges they’d face, plus information on the legal protections, and outside supports available should they embark on that course. Some of the cases illustrate how ‘The Young are the Most Vulnerable,’ i.e. short service employees are most at risk of being sacrificed by an unethical firm. Other cases show the ethical dilemmas facing well-known CEOs and the alternatives they can employ to better combine ethical conduct and sound business strategy. Through these case studies, students should emerge with a practical toolkit that better enables them to follow their moral compass. Finally, the cases provide an in depth look at how a corporation becomes progressively corrupted (Enron), how the Financial Crisis was rooted in ethical decay at institutions as diverse as Countrywide, Goldman Sacks, Citigroup, Fannie Mae and Moody’s, and at the ethical challenges that persist in the post-Crisis, post-Dodd-Frank environment. (shrink)

This paper addresses two main issues. First, it develops a systematic mechanism to examine corporate social orientation by contextualizing the researcharound the 2007 global financial crisis and second, it applies this mechanism to compare the CSOs across the U.S., Germany and India. Using a 7-code index of CSO on a sample of financial companies across the three countries, this paper captures the dissolution of loose couplings between corporate private intentions and corporate public pretentions thereby exposing the de-facto (...) CSOs. The results provide evidence of country of origin effects on CSO and capture the dynamic aspect of CSO, not yet shown in previous studies. (shrink)

The essays in this volume delve deeper into the cultural and intellectual foundations, philosophical ideas, political traditions, and economic movements that underlie the greatest financial crisis in nearly a century.

The aim of this article is to show how the critically acclaimed and award winning film Margin Call may be used in business ethics teaching. Set in a fictional investment bank at the dawn of the financial crisis, the film zooms in on the motivations and decision-making of people who had much to lose from the crash of the hitherto very profitable mortgage-backed securities market. The film offers rich material for analysis of behaviours that contributed to the (...) class='Hi'>crisis. The article will set out topics for classroom discussion, including the impact of incentives and power structures, contextual factors that distance people from the consequences of their actions, and considerations of how the banking industry may be transformed. (shrink)

This paper examines the impact of the recent financial crisis on the relation between a firm’s risk and social performance using a sample of non-financial U.S. firms covering the period 1991–2012. We find that the relation between SP and risk is significantly different in the crisis period compared to the pre-crisis period. SP reduces volatility during the financial crisis. The risk reduction potential of SP is mainly due to the strengths component of SP. (...) Since the relation of risk is stronger with SP strengths than SP concerns, this implies an asymmetric relation between these SP components and a firm’s risk. Specifically, strengths act as a risk reduction tool during an adverse economic environment. (shrink)