The expression of physical motion (the spider crawls across the net) and metaphorical motion (the fear crawls across her heart) shows strong inter-typological differences between language types (German, an S-language vs. Spanish, a V-language) and more subtle intra-typological differences within a language type (German vs. Polish, both S-languages). However, we know relatively less about the extension of these patterns to translated texts. In this study, we focused on physical and metaphorical motion descriptions in written texts (...) in original language and their translations to a language that belongs to the same or a different typological group, to determine whether motion expression in translated texts shows the same patterns of inter-typological and intra-typological variability as it does in original texts. We investigated this question by extracting 450 physical motion (150/language) and 450 metaphorical motion (150/language) descriptions from novels originally written in German, Polish, or Spanish and their translations to typologically different (i.e. inter-typological; German to Spanish, Spanish to German) or typologically similar (i.e. intra-typological; German to Polish, Polish to German) languages. Our results provided evidence for similar patterns of strong inter-typological and more subtle intra-typological variability in translations akin to those observed in original texts – with translated texts largely following the patterns of the target language in their expression of physical and metaphorical motion. Our results also highlighted specificity of event expression in a language as an important factor in the attainment of target language patterns in translated texts. (shrink)

Abstract This paper illustrates how Aristotle's topological theses about change in Physics 5-6 can help address metaphysical issues. Two distinctions from Physics 5. 1 are discussed: changing per se versus changing per aliud ; motion versus change. Change from white to black is motion and alteration, whereas change from white to not white is neither. But is not every change from white to black identical with a change from white to not white? Theses from Physics 6 refute the (...) identity. Is change from white to black at least accompanied by change from white to not white? Perhaps, but given further theses from Physics 6, this supposition yields unwelcome consequences. Most likely, when something changes from white to black it changes merely per aliud , not per se , from white to not white. Genuine change between white and not white is found elsewhere; its admission has bearing on Aristotle's theory of perception. (shrink)

This volume deals with the reception of Aristotle's natural philosophy in Oxford between 1250 and 1270.

A new scheme is proposed in order to deduce an equation of motion for a spinless charged point particle leading to an equivalent Landau–Lifshitz equation of motion. Consequently Larmor’s formula must be substituted by a new expression for the large distance radiation rate of energy. A constraint appears on the applicability of the Maxwell electromagnetic tensor. The particular case of a sudden force is analyzed in order to show the physical results predicted by the new model. A (...) geometrical rearrangement of the energy explains the balance. (shrink)

Inspired by the idea that emotion(s) and motion(s) constitute profoundly intertwined dimensions of physical and cultural embodiment reflected in language, this volume comprises nineteen contributions presenting exploratory and applicative accounts of (e)motion(s) situated across a range of topical research areas.

Expression of physical motion (e.g., man runs by) shows systematic variability not only between language types (i.e., inter-typological) but also within a language type (i.e., intra-typological). In this study, we asked whether the patterns of variability extend to metaphorical motion events (e.g., time runs by). Our analysis of randomly selected 450 physical motion (150/language) and 450 metaphorical motion (150/language) event descriptions from written texts originally produced by German, Polish, and Spanish authors showed strong inter-typological (...) differences in the expression of both event types. German and Polish speakers differed from Spanish speakers in how they packaged manner and path components of a motion event; they also differed in how extensively they expressed each component in their lexicalization of motion. The strong inter-typological differences were accompanied by more modest intra-typological variability: Polish and German writers differed in their packaging and lexicalization of manner and path components of metaphorical—but not physical—motion events. Our results provide evidence for robust inter-typological differences evident in the expression of both physical and metaphorical motion, along with less robust intra-typological differences, largely evident in the expression of metaphorical motion. Our study thus highlights event type as an important factor in determining crosslinguistic variation in motion expression. (shrink)

In this paper, we examine the history of the idea among physicists that there is a fundamental limit to physical measuring processes and that this limit is set by noise. In contrast to previous studies, that have focused on the realization of the existence of such a limit, we focus on the noise aspect of this history. In his monograph entitled Noise from 1954, the Dutch-American physicist and pioneer of noise Alder van der Ziel described how noise came to (...) be seen as of practical importance for measurements:The study of spontaneous fluctuations was primarily theoretical as recently as 1925. At that time it. (shrink)

This paper shows how key aspects of Aristotle’s core concepts of matter and motion, some of which have recently been shown to help make sense of quantum mechanical indeterminacy, align with some important results of the energy-momentum relationship of special relativity. In this conception, mobility and indeterminacy are inherently linked to each other and to materiality. Applying these ideas to massless particles, which relativity tells us move at the maximal cosmic speed, allows us to draw the conclusion that they (...) must be the most basic physical bodies, that is, mobile substances. The most familiar massless particle, the photon, constitutes light. Furthermore, because the photon composes luminous matter but cannot be decomposed into anything else more basic, it fulfills the definition of element. (shrink)

A new scheme is proposed in order to deduce an equation of motion for a spinless charged point particle leading to an equivalent Landau–Lifshitz equation of motion. Consequently Larmor’s formula must be substituted by a new expression for the large distance radiation rate of energy. A constraint appears on the applicability of the Maxwell electromagnetic tensor. The particular case of a sudden force is analyzed in order to show the physical results predicted by the new model. A (...) geometrical rearrangement of the energy explains the balance. (shrink)

Although Descartes’ natural philosophy marked an important advance in the development of modern science, many of his specific concepts of science have been largely discarded, and consequently neglected, since their introduction in the seventeenth century. Many critics over the years, such as Newton (in his early paper De gravitatione), have presented a series of apparently devastating arguments against Descartes' theory of space and motion; a generally negative historical verdict which, moreover, most contemporary scholars accept. Nevertheless, it is also true (...) that most historians and philosophers of science have not sufficiently investigated the viability and effectiveness of the case against Cartesian space and motion. This book explores the success of the arguments against Descartes’ theory of space and motion by determining if it is possible to formulate a Cartesian theory of science that can avoid the problems raised by Newton, as well as by a host of other past and contemporary philosophers either sympathetic or hostile to the overall design of Cartesian science. In particular, if Descartes' theory of motion can be reconciled with his hypotheses on dynamics, then a Cartesian can successfully resolve the difficulties imposed by his critics. This book comprises, therefore, a sustained attempt to construct a consistent “Cartesian” spacetime theory: i.e., a theory of space and time that incorporates Descartes’ various theories of physics and nature without falling into the kinds of problems and contradictions as charged by, for example, Newton. (shrink)

The author has recently shown that a mathematical question regarding the fundamental constituents of hardrons cannot be resolved unless the classical axioms of nonfinite mathematics are revised in such a way as to produce a new theory of particle motion in continuous space-time. Under this new theory, the instantaneous position of a moving object has a magnitude that is increasing as the object's velocity. The purpose of this paper is to show that, quite apart from the question of Cantorian (...) axiomatics, the new theory of motion is more consistent with what physicists really believe than the traditional theory of motion. (shrink)

It is well known that Aristotle tries to make room for self-motion – an idea he inherits to some extent from Plato – within his other commitments to causal determinism while at the same time modifying the idea. However, one argument in Physics VII 1 seems to pose a problem for the bare possibility of self-motion; in it he seems to argue that everything that moves must be moved by something else. The text in which this argument appears (...) is itself vexed on a number of fronts, because it is not clear how Physics VII fits with the rest of the Physics, and also because there are two distinct manuscript traditions for Physics VII. So the argument in Physics VII 1 has not been adequately taken into account in discussions of self-motion. I argue for a new and charitable reading of Aristotle’s Physics VII 1 α241b35-242a49 / β241b25-242a15. I show that the argument is compatible with Aristotle’s endorsements of self-motion; I defend the argument’s most controversial premise; and I argue that my reading has some useful implications for understanding Aristotelian self-motion. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 29, Issue 1, pp 9 - 38 Hobbes tried to develop a strict version of the mechanical philosophy, in which all physical phenomena were explained only in terms of bodies in motion, and the only forces allowed were forces of collision or impact. This ambition puts Hobbes into a select group of original thinkers, alongside Galileo, Isaac Beeckman, and Descartes. No other early modern thinkers developed a strict version of the mechanical philosophy. Natural philosophies relying (...) solely on bodies in motion require a concept of inertial motion. Beeckman and Descartes assumed rectilinear motions were rectilinear, but Galileo adopted a theory which has been referred to as circular inertia. Hobbes’s natural philosophy depended to a large extent on what he called “simple circular motions.” In this paper, I argue that Hobbes’s simple circular motions derived from Galileo’s belief in circular inertia. The paper opens with a section outlining Galileo’s concept, the following section shows how Hobbes’s physics depended upon circular motions, which are held to continue indefinitely. A third section shows the difficulty Hobbes had in maintaining a strictly mechanistic philosophy, and the conclusion offers some speculations as to why Galileo’s circular inertia was never entertained as a serious rival to rectilinear inertia, except by Hobbes. (shrink)

Philosophy -- Entry foundations -- Phenomenology of immediacy -- Polarized braids and little primoridal frames -- Emergence of primordial minkowski frames -- Majorana space-time spinors -- Color braids -- Motion and method -- Envisioned memory.

What is Aristotle's considered view of animal self-motion? According to several scholars, Aristotle ends up rejecting this very notion as a result of his criticism of Plato's theory of a self-moving soul. Contrary to this still widespread assumption, the present study argues that his critical engagement with Plato is not confined to negative results, but achieves largely positive outcomes, which add up to a rich and nuanced picture of self-motion. Ferro makes his case by offering a novel reading (...) of a handful of controversial passages from De Anima and Physics VIII, where Aristotle reacts to three aspects of Plato's theory of self-motion: the claim that soul itself is a self-mover, the assumption that self-movers enjoy strong causal autonomy, and the link between motion, desire and soul partition. Through a careful reading of the relevant passages, which does justice to their proper context and significance, Ferro shows that Aristotle's critical re-appropriation of self-motion results in a largely coherent doctrine with major repercussions for Aristotelian psychology and philosophy of nature. (shrink)

By defending the following views – that Aristotle identifies the generator and perhaps the obstacle remover as an essential cause of the natural sublunary elemental motion in Physics VIII 4; that this view is consistent with the view of Physics II 1 that the sublunary simple bodies have a principle of internal motion; and that the sublunary and the celestial elements have a nature in the very same way – I shall offer what has so far eluded Aristotelian (...) commentators: a consistent interpretation of Aristotle's theory of the natural motions of the sublunary and also the celestial elements. (shrink)

This is about the tension between Epicurean and Galilean accounts of motion in Gassendi. For my more recent thoughts on this, see http://philpapers.org/rec/LOLCEG.

IN PHYSICS 2, Aristotle defines nature as the source and cause of being moved and of being at rest. Yet some recent translations have moved Aristotle's "being moved" into an active form. I shall argue that an active translation of this definition is potentially misleading, and that the implications of such a reading have had their place in the history of Aristotelian debate.

A part of chapter 1, Book II of the Physics of the Šif¯ ' is dedicated to the aristotelian definition of motion . The developments to which the treatment of this question gives rise are distinctive of the Avicennian style in his Physics . By assuming the notion of double entelechy, Avicenna is following the most classical exegetical tradition. However, by setting a correspondence between the double entelechy and the double notion of motion: 1) motion as an (...) intermediary state, which can be ascribed to a moving object at any instant of its trajectory, and 2) motion as a traversal of a given distance, which cannot be ascribed to the moving object, but at the end-point of its trajectory, Avicenna gives a new content to a lieu commun of the exegetical tradition. (shrink)

Walter Burley is mostly known for his defense of realism against William of Ockham. The concept of time that he developed in his late literal commentary on Aristotle's Physics has even been labelled 'extremely realistic,' in contrast to William of Ockham's so-called 'extremely subjectivistic' alternative. However, as is shown in this article, when Burley's concept of time is viewed against the background of medieval theories of time, it appears that it is mainly a restatement and further elaboration of opinions held (...) by Averroes. A detailed investigation of Burley's explanation of the reality, definition, and unicity of time, as well as of the relation between time and the intellective soul shows that his realism is certainly far less extreme than it has been believed. (shrink)

Mach's principle is discussed as a fundamental statement on kinematics, and an apparent contradiction is identified in the Lorentz-Minkowski form of the inertial metric. To resolve the incompatibility, length is redefined so that the speed of light is a field-dependent variable, although still constant for all inertial observers at a point in space-time. Gravitational theories with variableG are considered, and it is shown that a redefinition of length and time results in constantG and variablec.

RésuméLa théorie avicenienne du mouvement des orbes célestes représente un aspect important de sa cosmologie qui n'a cependant pas encore été l'objet d'une étude approfondie. Cet article compte combler ce manque en fournissant une analyse des différents principes à l'origine du mouvement céleste, ainsi qu'une réflexion sur le rôle des disciplines astronomique, physique, et métaphysique dans les explications que fournit Ibn Sīnā à ce sujet. L'accent est mis sur le rapport des intelligences aux orbes et sur la problématique du passage (...) de l'intellectif au physique, un moment charnière dans la cinématique avicenienne. En outre, l'étude remet en question l'adhésion d'Ibn Sīnā à la théorie farabienne des dix intelligences et entreprend une reconstitution de son modèle cosmologique. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with an important variant reading discovered at the beginning of Book VIII of Aristotle’s _Physics_. The reading is found in J, the oldest manuscript of this work (Vind. phil. gr. 100, 9th c.): at VIII 1.250b13, J reads εἰ ἦν, “if it [_scil_. the movement] was”, instead of ἀεὶ ἦν, “it always was”, the only reading so far taken into account. Several early witnesses support J: E (Paris. gr. 1853, 10th c.), the Greek into Latin translation (...) by James of Venice (first half of the 12th c., _si erat_); the earliest Arabic version (_ap_. Jabir ibn Hayyan, انكنات, “if [the movement] was”). Such early sources thus agree as witnesses of a hypothetical premise concerning the eternity of cosmic motion against the standard vulgate text of the _Physics_. Once the if-reading at 250b13 is accepted, as opposed to the vulgate, Aristotle’s conclusion about the eternity of motion will apply not absolutely, but under the condition of the given premise that in no plausible way could motion have begun in time. The difference is important on several grounds. In particular, it fits better with the manner in which the argument is then developed by Aristotle throughout chapter 1 of _Phys_. VIII and with the parallel discussion about the eternity of the cosmos in _De caelo_ I 10 and _Metaphysics_ Λ 6. However, favouring the variant reading of J for _Phys_. 250b13 raises the problem of evaluating with special care the authority of manuscript J for the textual constitution of the _Physics_, which remains an open question for future scholarship. (shrink)

Margaret Cavendish is widely known as a materialist. However, since Cavendishian matter is always in motion, “matter” and “motion” are equally important foundational concepts for her natural philosophy. In Philosophical Letters (1664), she takes to task her materialist rival Thomas Hobbes by assaulting his account of accidents in general and his concept of “rest” in particular. In this article, I argue that Cavendish defends her continuous-motion view in two ways: first, she claims that her account avoids seeing (...) accidents as capable of generation and annihilation, which she argues is inconceivable; and second, she contends that according to Hobbes’s own view “rest” is an absurd conception since it cannot be drawn from experience. Beyond its function as a defense, I claim that Cavendish’s focused criticism of “rest” shows that she is a perceptive reader of Hobbes’s natural philosophy, insofar as her criticisms undercut the two a priori principles of Hobbesian physics. Finally, I show how her views developed in more detail in Philosophical and Physical Opinions (1663) and Observations upon Experimental Philosophy ([1666] 2001) avoid the worries she raises for Hobbesian materialism. (shrink)

The concept of Substantial motion (حركت جوهرى) is fundamentally flawed and severely muddled. Aristotle and Mulla Sadra’s conception of motion, substance (جوهر) and substantial form صورت نوعيه)) were all based on a severe misunderstanding of nature as later was established by the scientists and philosophers that came after them. Here, by recalling the established facts of modern science, particularly the universally accepted scientific fact that, properties of objects are reducible to the motion of their electrons and there’s (...) no such thing as ‘substantial form’ much less substance, the author puts an end to a 400-year-old glorious error called ‘substantial motion’. Naturally any attempt to reconcile the paradigms of modern physics with Aristotle/Sadra paradigms of form/matter and substance/accidents, and to try to draw parallel between the two and revive their philosophy would be an exercise in futility. (shrink)