This volume is a collective exploration of major themes in the work of Crispin Wright, one of today's leading philosophers. These newly commissioned papers are divided into four sections, preceded by a substantial Introduction, which places them in the context of the development of Wright's ideas. The distinguished contributors address issues such as the rule-following problem, knowledge of our meanings and minds, truth, realism, anti-realism and relativism, as well as the nature of perceptual justification, the cogency of arguments such as (...) G. E. Moore's celebrated proof of an external world, and skepticism about the material world. Some papers explore the relationship of Wright's ideas with those of Ludwig Wittgenstein, whose influence has always been a prominent aspect of Wright's philosophy. The essays collectively testify to the enormous interest and relevance of Wright's seminal contributions for present-day debates in areas as diverse as the philosophy of language and mind, metaphysics, and epistemology, and significantly advance research in these areas. The volume also contains Wright's substantial responses to his critics, which offer the most up-to-date versions of his ideas and a vigorous defense of his philosophy. (shrink)

Cet article expose la critique de Maimon du principe kantien de causalité. Pour ce faire, nous considérerons les deux niveaux sur lesquels cette critique se développe, l’un formel et l’autre matériel. Au premier niveau, Maimon soulève trois objections au jugement hypothétique, relativement à son origine, sa fonction et sa modalité. Selon le deuxième, Maimon développe deux objections, dont la première concerne en général la démonstration kantienne de la validité des catégories, tandis que la seconde concerne en particulier celle du principe (...) de causalité. Cela nous permettra de mieux comprendre le sens de ses deux objections fondamentales contre la philosophie kantienne, formulées à travers les questions quid juris? et quid facti? (shrink)

The paper explores the anti-skeptical bearing of the kind of hinge epistemology I have developed in Extended Rationality. A Hinge Epistemology. It focuses, in particular, on the moderate account of perceptual justification, the constitutive response put forward against Humean skepticism, and the denial of the unconditional validity of the Closure Principle, which is key in rebutting Cartesian skepticism. Along the way, a comparison with Wittgenstein's own views in on Certainty and with the positions held by other prominent hinge epistemologists, particularly (...) Moyal-Sharrock, Pritchard and Wright, is provided. (shrink)

The article introduces the Vygotskian tradition in the realist theoretical discussion of the structure-agency problem. Archer's concept of internal conversation is discussed in terms of internalization and externalization of conversational dynamics. The article addresses in particular the methodological issue of observing how external events trigger internal use of language, and how these internal dynamics are externalized. The experience of talk is proposed as a conceptual key to the understanding of internal conversations and of the relation between structured activity and agency. (...) The experience of talk is defined with the help of the notions of emotional experience, personal sense and inner speech, as they are conceptualized in activity theory and in particular in the works of L.S. Vygotsky and A.N. Leont’ev. Students’ experiences of critical conversational events with teachers are analyzed on the basis of written autobiographical accounts. The experience of talk emerges from the analysis as a form of emotional experience in which the horizon of the individual's subjective view relates to specific circumstances external to the individual. Autobiographical accounts of critical conversations are suggested as a type of data which allows access to the experience of talk. (shrink)

If preference-based freedom rankings are based on all-things-considered preferences, they risk judging phenomena of adaptive preferences as freedom enhancing. As a remedy, it has been suggested to base preference-based freedom rankings on reasonable preferences. But this approach is also problematic. This article argues that the quest for a remedy is unnecessary. All-things-considered preferences retain information on whether the availability of an option contributes to the value that freedom has for a person’s self-expression. If preference-based freedom rankings use all-things-considered preferences to (...) evaluate whether an option contributes to a person’s self-expression, they are immune to the problem posed by adaptive preferences. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic invites a question about how long-standing narratives of alterity and current narratives of disease are entwined and re-enacted in the diagnosis of COVID-19. In this commentary, we discuss two related phenomena that, we argue, should be taken into account in answering this question. First, we address the diffusion of pseudoscientific accounts of minorities’ immunity to COVID-19. While apparently praising minorities’ biological resistance, such accounts rhetorically introduce a distinction between “Us” and “Them,” and in so doing produce new (...) and re-enact old narratives of alterity. Second, these unsubstantiated narratives thrive on fake news and scarcity of data. The second part of this commentary thus surveys the methods through which the COVID-19 test is administered in various countries. We argue that techniques used for data collection have a major role in producing COVID-19 data that render contagion rates among migrants and other minorities invisible. In the conclusion, we provide two recommendations about how COVID-19 data can instead potentially work towards inclusion. (shrink)

This article introduces the concept of “alterity processing” to account for the simultaneous enactment of individual “Others” and emergent European orders in the context of migration management. Alterity processing refers to the data infrastructures, knowledge practices, and bureaucratic procedures through which populations unknown to European actors are translated into “European-legible” identities. By drawing on fieldwork conducted in Italy and the Hellenic Republic from 2017 to 2018, this article argues that different registration and identification procedures compete to legitimize different chains of (...) actors, data, and metadata as more authoritative than others. Competing procedures have governance implications, as well, with some actors being included and others being excluded. Furthermore, there is evidence that—despite procedural rigidities—applicants themselves propose alternative chains of actors, data, and metadata that are more meaningful to them. In this tension, it is not only the individual Other that is enacted but also specific bureaucratic orders cutting across old and new European actors and distinctive understandings of “Europe.” From a technology studies perspective, this article engages in a dialogue with the emergent debate on Hotspots, the scholarship about the infrastructural construction of Europe and political sociology. (shrink)

Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology provides a novel account of the structure of epistemic justification. Its central claim builds upon Wittgenstein's idea in On Certainty that epistemic justifications hinge on some basic assumptions and that epistemic rationality extends to these very hinges. It exploits these ideas to address major problems in epistemology, such as the nature of perceptual justifications, external world skepticism, epistemic relativism, the epistemic status of basic logical laws, of the Principle of the Uniformity of Nature, of our (...) belief in the existence of the past and of other minds, and the nature of testimonial justification. Along the way, further technical issues, such as the scope of the Principle of Closure of epistemic operators under known entailment, the notion of transmission failure, and the existence of entitlements are addressed in new and illuminating ways. (shrink)

In 1665 Athanasius Kircher published the treatise Mundus Subterraneus, to ex-plore the complex relationships between the visible forms of the landscape and the reasons that produce them. Kircher was peer of Claude Lorrain, who gave a critical contribution in founding landscape as an artistic genre, making indistinguishable its existence as a real place and its representation as a picture. Compared to Kircher, Lorrain had the greatest influence on Western landscape culture. Yet today, thanks to scholars and landscape architecture practitioners, Kircher’s (...) intuition seems effective to describe the contemporary idea of landscape as a performative field, encompassing all living forms, soils and waters, and intangible substances working together, impossible to understand just by the investigation of their visible forms. Today landscape exists because it is perceived and because it works: Lorrain and Kircher have finally met. (shrink)

This book offers a cutting-edge perspective of design for space to increase astronauts’ wellbeing and performance creating a more sustainable and inclusive environment, but without to forget beauty. The relevant aspect is that these design principles are now also supported and promoted by the European Community with the New European Bauhaus project. It is legitimate to affirm that Space Design is a precursor and inspiring these principles. Space exploration has shown us how results of space research inspire management policies addressing (...) important earth issues such as the responsible use of resources as well as ethical behavior leading to sustainable and inclusive choices. The International Space Station (ISS) is the most successful virtuous example of circular economy and sustainability by almost totally recycling the waste produced. Recently the European Space Agency (ESA) launched the first call for “parastronauts” opening the fly possibilities to people with physical disabilities and thus affirming the principle of inclusion in space. Thanks to design—a bridge between science, technology, and beauty—space opens up to new creative experiments, placing the human being at the center of the interplanetary exploration programs to ensure extra-terrestrial habitats safer, more comfortable, and efficient, where crew will feel “like at home”. (shrink)

Does scepticism threaten our common sense picture of the world? Does it really undermine our deep-rooted certainties? Answers to these questions are offered through a comparative study of the epistemological work of two key figures in the history of analytic philosophy, G. E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein.

This article reflects on the effects the media's constant projection of female images of sexually suggestive aesthetic perfection produces on woman's perception of herself and, above all, on her tendency to seek confirmation of her own worth essentially through other people's approving glances. After exploring the analogy between this mechanism and Bentham's Panopticon system, the article goes on to reflect on the profound psychological implications of the awareness of being scrutinized by others, leading to disempowerment and interiorization of the rule. (...) Finally, the article analyses the possible impact of D. Rhode's legal proposals in this area, so as to consider what, if anything, law can do to remedy this kind of oppressive system. (shrink)

This book explores the idea that self-knowledge comes in many varieties. We “know ourselves” through many different methods, depending on whether we attend to our propositional attitudes, our perceptions, sensations or emotions. Furthermore, sometimes what we call “self-knowledge” is not the result of any substantial cognitive achievement and the characteristic authority we grant to our psychological self-ascription is a conceptual necessity, redeemed by unravelling the structure of several interlocking concepts. This book critically assesses the main contemporary positions held on the (...) epistemology of self-knowledge. These include robust epistemic accounts such as inner sense views and theory-theories; weak epistemic accounts such as transparency theories and rational internalism and externalism; as well as expressivist and constitutivist approaches. The author offers an innovative “pluralist” position on self-knowledge, emphasizing the complexity of the phenomenon and its resistance to any “monistic” treatment, to pose new and intriguing philosophical challenges. (shrink)

Previous research highlighted that the desire for neighborhood improvement is an antecedent of the citizens’ involvement in green urban areas maintenance. Nevertheless, the topic of civic participation in the maintenance of green areas is not yet well developed in the literature and a link with local legislation is missing. We investigate the intention of participation in such maintenance through a web-based experiment. We hypothesize that stimuli of poor maintenance will be associated with a higher intention of contributing to the upkeep (...) of green areas following the administrative barter law. The administrative barter is a law approved in Italy, which gives citizens the possibility of a reduction of local taxes in exchange for their involvement in the improvement of the territory. One hundred ninety-six participants were assigned randomly to good maintenance condition or poor maintenance condition. The level of maintenance was manipulated through photographs of a neighborhood depicting good or poor maintenance of the urban green ornamentation. Results pointed out that people showed a greater willingness to engage in the improvement of green urban areas in the poor condition as compared to the good condition, according to the administrative barter law. This study suggests that local legislation may provide an incentive fostering citizens’ involvement in green urban areas maintenance. (shrink)

This paper discusses the thought of the medieval Maghrebin thinker Ibn Khaldun through the prism of the philosophy and sociology of law and politics. I will first try to illustrate how, even if Ibn Khaldun wrote in the fourteenth century, he anticipated many core concepts that are characteristic of modern Western sociological and philosophical thought. The argument is thus made that his thought can, and indeed must, be rescued from the wide neglect that, outside the specialized field of Khaldunian studies, (...) it has so far suffered in our treatment and teaching of the history of politico-legal sociological thought. I will then claim that the scheme he devised to explain the rise and fall of civilizations can also, with due care, be used to frame and understand the political and cultural landscape in which the West and the Islamic world are presently engaged in a difficult dialogue. The discussion is in this sense offered in the hope of making a contribution to the current politico-legal philosophical and sociological debate on multiculturalism, and on the limits of its scope. (shrink)

This book brings together leading representatives of activity-theoretically-oriented and socioculturally-oriented research around the world, to discuss creativity as a collective endeavour strongly related to learning to face the societal challenges of our world. As history shows, major accomplishments in arts and technological innovations have allowed us to see the world differently and to identify new learning perspectives for the future which were seldom limited to individual action or isolated activities. This book, while primarily focused on educational insitutions, extends its examination (...) of creativity and learning to include other settings (such as government agencies) beyond the limits of schooling. (shrink)

In this volume, Engeström's work is used as a springboard to reflect on the question of the use, appropriation, and further development of the classic heritage within activity theory.

This paper explores Brian Orend's contribution to the just war tradition, specifically his proposed jus post bellum criteria and his idea of pre-commitment to jus in bello and jus post bellum as part of an expanded jus ad bellum criterion of right intention. The latter is based on his interpretation of Kant's work: that as part of the original decision to begin a war, a state should commit itself to certain rules of conduct and appropriate war termination, and if it (...) cannot so commit, it should not continue further down the path to using force. Orend's revised right intention brings jus post bellum ?into the fold? of the just war tradition, requiring that state obligations go beyond correct conduct in war. The article argues that whatever the nature of the just cause, there is a compelling argument for committing to jus in bello and jus post bellum as part of jus ad bellum right intention. The justness of the cause in the contemporary era requires strictness rather than leniency in the conduct and termination of war for a state to remain legitimate in the eyes of the world. In the context of Orend's proposals, this would require that states ?do their homework? and ?tie themselves to the mast?; this includes providing proof that the situation on the ground is understood, conducting a feasibility test on the proposed intervention and publicly identifying and committing to their obligations and responsibilities during and after war. Recognising the practical and political obstacles to adopting this idealistic revision of the just war tradition, the paper nevertheless concludes that Orend's contribution is significant and worthy of exploration: it offers a kernel of hope for counteracting pressures to lower the threshold of resort to force, delivering greater justice for the innocent victims of war and providing greater probability of durable peace post-war. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.1 (2002) 41-46 [Access article in PDF] On What There Really Is to Our Notion of Ownership of a Thought Annalisa Coliva JOHN CAMPBELL'S REPLY to my paper aims at reestablishing the point that there are two strands to our notion of ownership of a thought. There are two ways of cashing out this idea. 1 First, one could say that A is the (...) owner of a thought if and only if both the following two independent conditions apply 2 : (1) X is introspectively aware of a token thought and (2) X is the person who formed that token thought. Second, one may hold that there are twodifferent and independent notions of ownership of a thought, call it O1 and O2, corresponding to (1) and (2), respectively. For brevity, I will refer only to the first interpretation. But what I will be saying will apply, mutatis mutandis, to both.On this view, thought insertion would be a case in which someone thinks that (1) is satisfied, while (2) is not and, therefore, denies that the thought she is introspectively aware of is her own. 3 Campbell's explanation of thought insertion is quite clear: the subject has prima facie reasons to think that she is not the person who formed that token thought—maybe because she does not experience that thought as formed by herself—and, therefore, has prima facie reasons to deny that she is its owner, but she is mistaken in identifying the producer of the thought and what she says is false, yet reasonable. 4 Notice, however, an important consequence of Campbell's model. If (1) and (2) are independent conditions, then one could obtain without the other. Hence, it must be conceivable that one is introspectively aware of a thought that one has not produced. Indeed, cases of multiple personality, if taken literally, might be taken as examples of this kind of situation: person A and person B inhabit the same body, A can have access to B's thoughts, yet B remains their producer. So A could actually say something like "I'm thinking (i.e. I am immediately aware) that p, but this is not my thought (it is not the thought I produced), it's B's (the thought that B produced)" and what she would be saying would in fact be true.Yet, a simple-minded reaction one may have toward this line of explanation is this: If the subject is either saying something false, but reasonable, or, indeed, something altogether true, when she says "I'm thinking 'Kill God,' but this isn't my thought, it's Chris'," why should we consider her report as an expression of some kind of cognitive illusion, 5 which we take as a symptom of mental illness, as opposed to, at most, a possible mistake in identifying the producer of the thought? And, connectedly, why should we try to cure her, rather than just, at most, correct her? [End Page 41]Hence, the whole dispute between Campbell and me hinges on whether it is logically possible for one to be introspectively aware of a thought and yet not be its producer. Campbell claims that it is, whereas I deny that this is a genuine possibility. He holds that these are two independent conditions and that the one can obtain without the other, whereas I hold that they are not independent and that they stand or fall together. Campbell is fully aware of being making a surprising claim because, as he points out, "[The two strands in the ordinary notion of ownership of a thought] do not ordinarily even seem to come apart" (Campbell 2002, italics mine). Yet he offers in its support no more than an analogy between being the person who produced a certain signature and being the person who produced a given token thought. Let us look at it closer.Consider the following situation: a person NN looks at a piece of paper with NN written on it and wonders whether she is the... (shrink)

Integrating information systems has become a key goal for governments worldwide. Systems of “authentic registers,” for instance, provide government agencies with information from databases acknowledged as the only legitimate sources of data. Concerns are thus arising about the risks for democratic accountability constituted by more and more integrated governmental IS. Studies call for a new research agenda that investigates the redistribution of authority and accountability entailed by interoperable IS. This article contributes to this endeavor by suggesting the “vectorial glance” as (...) a research framework that works along two lines. First, by recovering the science and technology studies notion of “infrastructural inversion,” it looks at the technical minutiae of interoperability projects as strategic sites where institutional shifts—and eventually state transformation—can become visible. Second, by defining interoperability as a performative process of boundary reordering, it opens research to the possibility that institutional identities be reconstituted along different lines. Just as vector graphics are based on paths that lead through control points without being bound to underlying pixels, so the vectorial glance runs across boundaries without implicitly assuming that they are immutable and/or a priori relevant for the analysis. This article draws on a case study observed while working at a major project of civil registers integration in Italy. (shrink)

In _Hinge Epistemology_, eminent epistemologists investigate Wittgenstein's concept of basic or 'hinge' certainty as deployed in _On Certainty_ and show its importance for mainstream epistemology.

Hinge epistemology has to dispel the worry that disagreeing over hinges is rationally inert. Building on a companion piece (Coliva and Palmira 2020), this paper offers a constitutivist solution to the problem of rational inertia by maintaining that a Humean sceptic and a hinge epistemologist disagree over the correct explication of the concept of epistemic rationality. The paper explores the implications of such a solution. First, it clarifies in what sense a disagreement over hinges would be a conceptual disagreement. Secondly, (...) it uses considerations about the (alleged) rational inertia of hinge disagreement to offer a test whereby to demarcate genuine hinges from merely entrenched beliefs. Thirdly, it offers a response to the challenge of explaining why we have reason to engage in the epistemic practices that hinges are constitutive of in the first place. Fourthly, it argues that the constitutivist approach to hinge disagreement does not result in a relativist view. (shrink)