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  1. David Anderson (1987). Is the Chinese Room the Real Thing? Philosophy 62 (July):389-93.
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  2. Jay David Atlas, What is It Like to Be a Chinese Room?
    When philosophers think about mental phenomena, they focus on several features of human experience: (1) the existence of consciousness, (2) the intentionality of mental states, that property by which beliefs, desires, anger, etc. are directed at, are about, or refer to objects and states of affairs, (3) subjectivity, characterized by my feeling my pains but not yours, by my experiencing the world and myself from my point of view and not yours, (4) mental causation, that thoughts and feelings have physical (...)
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  3. Hanoch Ben-Yami (1993). A Note on the Chinese Room. Synthese 95 (2):169-72.
    Searle's Chinese Room was supposed to prove that computers can't understand: the man in the room, following, like a computer, syntactical rules alone, though indistinguishable from a genuine Chinese speaker, doesn't understand a word. But such a room is impossible: the man won't be able to respond correctly to questions like What is the time?, even though such an ability is indispensable for a genuine Chinese speaker. Several ways to provide the room with the required ability are considered, and it (...)
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  4. John Mark Bishop (2003). Dancing with Pixies: Strong Artificial Intelligence and Panpsychism. In John M. Preston & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.
  5. M. Bishop & J. Preston (eds.) (2001). Essays on Searle's Chinese Room Argument. Oxford University Press.
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  6. Michael A. Bishop & John M. Preston (eds.) (2001). [Book Chapter] (in Press). Oxford University Press.
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  7. Colin Blakemore & Susan A. Greenfield (1987). Mindwaves: Thoughts on Intelligence, Identity, and Consciousness. Blackwell.
  8. Ned Block (2003). Searle's Arguments Against Cognitive Science. In John M. Preston & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.
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  9. Margaret A. Boden (1988). Escaping From the Chinese Room. In Computer Models of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
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  10. Margaret A. Boden (1988). Computer Models On Mind: Computational Approaches In Theoretical Psychology. Cambridge University Press.
    What is the mind? How does it work? How does it influence behavior? Some psychologists hope to answer such questions in terms of concepts drawn from computer science and artificial intelligence. They test their theories by modeling mental processes in computers. This book shows how computer models are used to study many psychological phenomena--including vision, language, reasoning, and learning. It also shows that computer modeling involves differing theoretical approaches. Computational psychologists disagree about some basic questions. For instance, should the mind (...)
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  11. Peter J. Boettke & J. Robert Subrick (2002). From the Philosophy of Mind to the Philosophy of the Market. Journal of Economic Methodology 9 (1):53-64.
    John Searle has argued against the viability of strong versions of artificial intelligence. His most well-known counter-example is the Chinese Room thought experiment where he stressed that syntax is not semantics. We reason by analogy to highlight previously unnoticed similarities between Searle and F.A. Hayek's critique of socialist planning. We extend their insights to explain the failure of many reforms in Eastern Europe in the 1990's.
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  12. Selmer Bringsjord & Ron Noel (2003). Real Robots and the Missing Thought-Experiment in the Chinese Room Dialectic. In John Preston & John Mark Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.
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  13. Steven Ravett Brown (2000). Peirce and Formalization of Thought: The Chinese Room Argument. Journal of Mind and Behavior.
    Whether human thinking can be formalized and whether machines can think in a human sense are questions that have been addressed by both Peirce and Searle. Peirce came to roughly the same conclusion as Searle, that the digital computer would not be able to perform human thinking or possess human understanding. However, his rationale and Searle's differ on several important points. Searle approaches the problem from the standpoint of traditional analytic philosophy, where the strict separation of syntax and semantics renders (...)
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  14. Graham Button, Jeff Coutler & John R. E. Lee (2000). Re-Entering the Chinese Room. Minds and Machines 10 (1):149-152.
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  15. Terrell Ward Bynum (1985). Artificial Intelligence, Biology, and Intentional States. Metaphilosophy 16 (October):355-77.
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  16. Philip Cam (1990). Searle on Strong AI. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):103-8.
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  17. Lawrence Richard Carleton (1984). Programs, Language Understanding, and Searle. Synthese 59 (May):219-30.
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  18. David J. Chalmers (1992). Subsymbolic Computation and the Chinese Room. In J. Dinsmore (ed.), The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap. Lawrence Erlbaum.
    More than a decade ago, philosopher John Searle started a long-running controversy with his paper “Minds, Brains, and Programs” (Searle, 1980a), an attack on the ambitious claims of artificial intelligence (AI). With his now famous _Chinese Room_ argument, Searle claimed to show that despite the best efforts of AI researchers, a computer could never recreate such vital properties of human mentality as intentionality, subjectivity, and understanding. The AI research program is based on the underlying assumption that all important aspects of (...)
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  19. Ronald L. Chrisley, Weak Strong AI: An Elaboration of the English Reply to the Chinese Room.
    Searle (1980) constructed the Chinese Room (CR) to argue against what he called \Strong AI": the claim that a computer can understand by virtue of running a program of the right sort. Margaret Boden (1990), in giving the English Reply to the Chinese Room argument, has pointed out that there isunderstanding in the Chinese Room: the understanding required to recognize the symbols, the understanding of English required to read the rulebook, etc. I elaborate on and defend this response to Searle. (...)
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  20. Paul M. Churchland & Patricia S. Churchland (1990). Could a Machine Think? Scientific American 262 (1):32-37.
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  21. Jon Cogburn & Jason Megil (2010). Are Turing Machines Platonists? Inferentialism and the Computational Theory of Mind. Minds and Machines 20 (3):423-439.
    We first discuss Michael Dummett’s philosophy of mathematics and Robert Brandom’s philosophy of language to demonstrate that inferentialism entails the falsity of Church’s Thesis and, as a consequence, the Computational Theory of Mind. This amounts to an entirely novel critique of mechanism in the philosophy of mind, one we show to have tremendous advantages over the traditional Lucas-Penrose argument.
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  22. L. Jonathan Cohen (1986). What Sorts of Machines Can Understand the Symbols They Use? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 60:81-96.
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  23. David Cole, The Chinese Room Argument. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  24. David J. Cole (1994). The Causal Powers of CPUs. In Eric Dietrich (ed.), Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons. Academic Press.
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  25. David J. Cole (1991). Artificial Intelligence and Personal Identity. Synthese 88 (September):399-417.
    Considerations of personal identity bear on John Searle's Chinese Room argument, and on the opposed position that a computer itself could really understand a natural language. In this paper I develop the notion of a virtual person, modelled on the concept of virtual machines familiar in computer science. I show how Searle's argument, and J. Maloney's attempt to defend it, fail. I conclude that Searle is correct in holding that no digital machine could understand language, but wrong in holding that (...)
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  26. David J. Cole (1991). Artificial Minds: Cam on Searle. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (September):329-33.
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  27. David J. Cole (1984). Thought and Thought Experiments. Philosophical Studies 45 (May):431-44.
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  28. B. Jack Copeland (2003). The Chinese Room From a Logical Point of View. In John M. Preston & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.
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  29. B. Jack Copeland (1993). The Curious Case of the Chinese Gym. Synthese 95 (2):173-86.
    Searle has recently used two adaptations of his Chinese room argument in an attack on connectionism. I show that these new forms of the argument are fallacious. First I give an exposition of and rebuttal to the original Chinese room argument, and then a brief introduction to the essentials of connectionism.
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  30. Jeff Coulter & S. Sharrock (2003). The Hinterland of the Chinese Room. In John M. Preston & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.
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  31. Robert I. Damper (2006). The Logic of Searle's Chinese Room Argument. Minds and Machines 16 (2):163-183.
    John Searle’s Chinese room argument (CRA) is a celebrated thought experiment designed to refute the hypothesis, popular among artificial intelligence (AI) scientists and philosophers of mind, that “the appropriately programmed computer really is a mind”. Since its publication in 1980, the CRA has evoked an enormous amount of debate about its implications for machine intelligence, the functionalist philosophy of mind, theories of consciousness, etc. Although the general consensus among commentators is that the CRA is flawed, and not withstanding the popularity (...)
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  32. Robert I. Damper (2004). The Chinese Room Argument--Dead but Not yet Buried. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (5-6):159-169.
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  33. Daniel C. Dennett (1987). Fast Thinking. In The Intentional Stance. Mit Press.
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  34. Eric Dietrich (1995). AI and the Mechanistic Forces of Darkness. J. Of Experimental and Theoretical AI 7 (2):155-161.
    Under the Superstition Mountains in central Arizona toil those who would rob humankind o f its humanity. These gray, soulless monsters methodically tear away at our meaning, our subjectivity, our essence as transcendent beings. With each advance, they steal our freedom and dignity. Who are these denizens of darkness, these usurpers of all that is good and holy? None other than humanity’s arch-foe: The Cognitive Scientists -- AI researchers, fallen philosophers, psychologists, and other benighted lovers of computers. Unless they are (...)
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  35. Eric Dietrich (ed.) (1994). Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons. Academic Press.
  36. J. Dinsmore (ed.) (1992). The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap. Lawrence Erlbaum.
    This book records the thoughts of researchers -- from both computer science and philosophy -- on resolving the debate between the symbolic and connectionist...
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  37. Richard Double (1984). Reply to C.A. Field's Double on Searle's Chinese Room. Nature and System 6 (March):55-58.
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  38. Richard Double (1983). Searle, Programs and Functionalism. Nature and System 5 (March-June):107-14.
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  39. Michael G. Dyer (1990). Finding Lost Minds. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 2:329-39.
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  40. Michael G. Dyer (1990). Intentionality and Computationalism: Minds, Machines, Searle and Harnad. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 2:303-19.
  41. James H. Fetzer (ed.) (1988). Aspects of AI. D.
  42. Christopher A. Fields (1984). Double on Searle's Chinese Room. Nature and System 6 (March):51-54.
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  43. Justin C. Fisher (1988). The Wrong Stuff: Chinese Rooms and the Nature of Understanding. Philosophical Investigations 11 (October):279-99.
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  44. Jerry A. Fodor (1991). Yin and Yang in the Chinese Room. In D. Rosenthal (ed.), The Nature of Mind. Oxford University Press.
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  45. Jason Ford (2011). Helen Keller Was Never in a Chinese Room. Minds and Machines 21 (1):57-72.
    William Rapaport, in How Helen Keller used syntactic semantics to escape from a Chinese Room, (Rapaport 2006), argues that Helen Keller was in a sort of Chinese Room, and that her subsequent development of natural language fluency illustrates the flaws in Searle’s famous Chinese Room Argument and provides a method for developing computers that have genuine semantics (and intentionality). I contend that his argument fails. In setting the problem, Rapaport uses his own preferred definitions of semantics and syntax, but he (...)
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  46. Joseph S. Fulda (2006). A Plea for Automated Language-to-Logical-Form Converters. RASK 24:87-102.
    This has been made available gratis by the publisher. -/- This piece gives the raison d'etre for the development of the converters mentioned in the title. Three reasons are given, one linguistic, one philosophical, and one practical. It is suggested that at least /two/ independent converters are needed. -/- This piece ties together the extended paper "Abstracts from Logical Form I/II," and the short piece providing the comprehensive theory alluded to in the abstract of that extended paper in "Pragmatics, Montague, (...)
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  47. Matjaz Gams (ed.) (1997). Mind Versus Computer: Were Dreyfus and Winograd Right? Amsterdam: IOS Press.
    M. Gams et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, "Strong AI": an Adolescent Disorder Donald Michie Professor Emeritus, University of Edinburgh, UK Associate ...
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  48. Gordon G. Globus (1991). Deconstructing the Chinese Room. Journal of Mind and Behavior 12 (3):377-91.
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  49. Simone Gozzano (1997). The Chinese Room Argument: Consciousness and Understanding. In Matjaz Gams, M. Paprzycki & X. Wu (eds.), Mind Versus Computer: Were Dreyfus and Winograd Right? Amsterdam: IOS Press.
    In this paper I submit that the “Chinese room” argument rests on the assumption that understanding a sentence necessarily implies being conscious of its content. However, this assumption can be challenged by showing that two notions of consciousness come into play, one to be found in AI, the other in Searle’s argument, and that the former is an essential condition for the notion used by Searle. If Searle discards the first, he not only has trouble explaining how we can learn (...)
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  50. Simone Gozzano (1995). Consciousness and Understanding in the Chinese Room. Informatica 19:653-56.
    In this paper I submit that the “Chinese room” argument rests on the assumption that understanding a sentence necessarily implies being conscious of its content. However, this assumption can be challenged by showing that two notions of consciousness come into play, one to be found in AI, the other in Searle’s argument, and that the former is an essential condition for the notion used by Searle. If Searle discards the first, he not only has trouble explaining how we can learn (...)
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  51. Patricia Hanna (1985). Causal Powers and Cognition. Mind 94 (373):53-63.
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  52. Stevan Harnad, Searle's Chinese Room Argument.
    Computationalism. According to computationalism, to explain how the mind works, cognitive science needs to find out what the right computations are -- the same ones that the brain performs in order to generate the mind and its capacities. Once we know that, then every system that performs those computations will have those mental states: Every computer that runs the mind's program will have a mind, because computation is hardware independent : Any hardware that is running the right program has the (...)
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  53. Stevan Harnad (2003). Minds, Machines, and Searle 2: What's Right and Wrong About the Chinese Room Argument. In John M. Preston & John Mark Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.
    When in 1979 Zenon Pylyshyn, associate editor of Behavioral and Brain Sciences (BBS, a peer commentary journal which I edit) informed me that he had secured a paper by John Searle with the unprepossessing title of [XXXX], I cannot say that I was especially impressed; nor did a quick reading of the brief manuscript -- which seemed to be yet another tedious "Granny Objection"[1] about why/how we are not computers -- do anything to upgrade that impression.
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  54. Stevan Harnad (2001). What's Wrong and Right About Searle's Chinese Room Argument? In Michael A. Bishop & John M. Preston (eds.), [Book Chapter] (in Press). Oxford University Press.
    Searle's Chinese Room Argument showed a fatal flaw in computationalism (the idea that mental states are just computational states) and helped usher in the era of situated robotics and symbol grounding (although Searle himself thought neuroscience was the only correct way to understand the mind).
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  55. Stevan Harnad (2001). Rights and Wrongs of Searle's Chinese Room Argument. In M. Bishop & J. Preston (eds.), Essays on Searle's Chinese Room Argument. Oxford University Press.
    "in an academic generation a little overaddicted to "politesse," it may be worth saying that violent destruction is not necessarily worthless and futile. Even though it leaves doubt about the right road for London, it helps if someone rips up, however violently, a.
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  56. Stevan Harnad (1995). Thoughts as Activation Vectors in Recurrent Nets, or Concentric Epicenters, Or.. Http.
    Churchland underestimates the power and purpose of the Turing Test, dismissing it as the trivial game to which the Loebner Prize (offered for the computer program that can fool judges into thinking it's human) has reduced it, whereas it is really an exacting empirical criterion: It requires that the candidate model for the mind have our full behavioral capacities -- so fully that it is indistinguishable from any of us, to any of us (not just for one Contest night, but (...)
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  57. Stevan Harnad (1990). Lost in the Hermeneutic Hall of Mirrors. 2:321-27.
    Critique of Computationalism as merely projecting hermeneutics (i.e., meaning originating from the mind of an external interpreter) onto otherwise intrinsically meaningless symbols. Projecting an interpretation onto a symbol system results in its being reflected back, in a spuriously self-confirming way.
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  58. Stevan Harnad (1989). Minds, Machines and Searle. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 1 (4):5-25.
    Searle's celebrated Chinese Room Argument has shaken the foundations of Artificial Intelligence. Many refutations have been attempted, but none seem convincing. This paper is an attempt to sort out explicitly the assumptions and the logical, methodological and empirical points of disagreement. Searle is shown to have underestimated some features of computer modeling, but the heart of the issue turns out to be an empirical question about the scope and limits of the purely symbolic (computational) model of the mind. Nonsymbolic modeling (...)
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  59. David Harrison (1997). Connectionism Hits the Chinese Gym. Connexions 1.
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  60. Larry Hauser, Searle's Chinese Room Argument. Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.
    John Searle's 1980a) thought experiment and associated 1984a) argument is one of the best known and widely credited counters to claims of artificial intelligence (AI), i.e., to claims that computers _do_ or at least _can_ (roughly, someday will) think. According to Searle's original presentation, the argument is based on two truths: _brains cause minds_ , and _syntax doesn't suffice_ _for semantics_ . Its target, Searle dubs "strong AI": "according to strong AI," according to Searle, "the computer is not merely a (...)
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  61. Larry Hauser (2003). Nixin' Goes to China. In John M. Preston & John Mark Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.
    The intelligent-seeming deeds of computers are what occasion philosophical debate about artificial intelligence (AI) in the first place. Since evidence of AI is not bad, arguments against seem called for. John Searle's Chinese Room Argument (1980a, 1984, 1990, 1994) is among the most famous and long-running would-be answers to the call. Surprisingly, both the original thought experiment (1980a) and Searle's later would-be formalizations of the embedding argument (1984, 1990) are quite unavailing against AI proper (claims that computers do or someday (...)
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  62. Larry Hauser, The Chinese Room Argument.
    _The Chinese room argument_ - John Searle's (1980a) thought experiment and associated (1984) derivation - is one of the best known and widely credited counters to claims of artificial intelligence (AI), i.e., to claims that computers _do_ or at least _can_ (someday might) think. According to Searle's original presentation, the argument is based on two truths: _brains cause minds_ , and _syntax doesn't_ _suffice for semantics_ . Its target, Searle dubs "strong AI": "according to strong AI," according to Searle, "the (...)
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  63. Larry Hauser, Chinese Room Argument. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The Chinese room argument is a thought experiment of John Searle (1980a) and associated (1984) derivation. It is one of the best known and widely credited counters to claims of artificial intelligence (AI)—that is, to claims that computers do or at least can (someday might) think. According to Searle’s original presentation, the argument is based on two key claims: brains cause minds and syntax doesn’t suffice for semantics. Its target is what Searle dubs “strong AI.” According to strong AI, Searle (...)
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  64. Larry Hauser (1997). Searle's Chinese Box: Debunking the Chinese Room Argument. Minds and Machines 7 (2):199-226.
    John Searle's Chinese room argument is perhaps the most influential andwidely cited argument against artificial intelligence (AI). Understood astargeting AI proper – claims that computers can think or do think– Searle's argument, despite its rhetorical flash, is logically andscientifically a dud. Advertised as effective against AI proper, theargument, in its main outlines, is an ignoratio elenchi. It musterspersuasive force fallaciously by indirection fostered by equivocaldeployment of the phrase "strong AI" and reinforced by equivocation on thephrase "causal powers" (at least) equal (...)
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  65. Larry Hauser (1993). Searle's Chinese Box: The Chinese Room Argument and Artificial Intelligence. Dissertation, University of Michigan
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  66. Patrick Hayes, Stevan Harnad, Donald R. Perlis & Ned Block (1992). Virtual Symposium on Virtual Mind. 2 (3):217-238.
    When certain formal symbol systems (e.g., computer programs) are implemented as dynamic physical symbol systems (e.g., when they are run on a computer) their activity can be interpreted at higher levels (e.g., binary code can be interpreted as LISP, LISP code can be interpreted as English, and English can be interpreted as a meaningful conversation). These higher levels of interpretability are called "virtual" systems. If such a virtual system is interpretable as if it had a mind, is such a "virtual (...)
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  67. Reese Heitner (2005). Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Minds and Machines 15 (1):97-106.
  68. Douglas R. Hofstadter (1981). Reflections on Searle. In Douglas R. Hofstadter & Daniel C. Dennett (eds.), The Mind's I. Basic Books.
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  69. Douglas R. Hofstadter & Daniel C. Dennett (eds.) (1981). The Mind's I. Basic Books.
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  70. Susan Hurley & Nick Chater (eds.) (2005). Perspectives on Imitation: From Mirror Neurons to Memes, Vol II. MIT Press.
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  71. Dale Jacquette (1990). Fear and Loathing (and Other Intentional States) in Searle's Chinese Room. Philosophical Psychology 3 (2 & 3):287-304.
    John R. Searle's problem of the Chinese Room poses an important philosophical challenge to the foundations of strong artificial intelligence, and functionalist, cognitivist, and computationalist theories of mind. Searle has recently responded to three categories of criticisms of the Chinese Room and the consequences he attempts to conclude from it, redescribing the essential features of the problem, and offering new arguments about the syntax-semantics gap it is intended to demonstrate. Despite Searle's defense, the Chinese Room remains ineffective as a counterexample, (...)
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  72. Dale Jacquette (1989). Adventures in the Chinese Room. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (June):605-23.
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  73. Dale Jacquette (1989). Searle's Intentionality Thesis. Synthese 80 (August):267-75.
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  74. Neal Jahren (1990). Can Semantics Be Syntactic? Synthese 82 (3):309-28.
    The author defends John R. Searle's Chinese Room argument against a particular objection made by William J. Rapaport called the Korean Room. Foundational issues such as the relationship of strong AI to human mentality and the adequacy of the Turing Test are discussed. Through undertaking a Gedankenexperiment similar to Searle's but which meets new specifications given by Rapaport for an AI system, the author argues that Rapaport's objection to Searle does not stand and that Rapaport's arguments seem convincing only because (...)
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  75. C. Kaernbach (2005). No Virtual Mind in the Chinese Room. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (11):31-42.
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  76. Robert W. Kentridge (2001). Computation, Chaos and Non-Deterministic Symbolic Computation: The Chinese Room Problem Solved? Psycoloquy 12 (50).
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  77. D. King (2001). Entering the Chinese Room with Castaneda's Principle (P). Philosophy Today 45 (2):168-174.
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  78. Michael Kober (1998). Kripkenstein Meets the Chinese Room: Looking for the Place of Meaning From a Natural Point of View. Inquiry 41 (3):317-332.
    The discussion between Searle and the Churchlands over whether or not symbolmanipulating computers generate semantics will be confronted both with the rulesceptical considerations of Kripke/Wittgenstein and with Wittgenstein's privatelanguage argument in order to show that the discussion focuses on the wrong place: meaning does not emerge in the brain. That a symbol means something should rather be conceived as a social fact, depending on a mutual imputation of linguistic competence of the participants of a linguistic practice to one another. The (...)
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  79. Kevin B. Korb (1991). Searle's AI Program. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 3:283-96.
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  80. Peter Kugel (2004). The Chinese Room is a Trick. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (1):153-154.
    To convince us that computers cannot have mental states, Searle (1980) imagines a “Chinese room” that simulates a computer that “speaks” Chinese and asks us to find the understanding in the room. It's a trick. There is no understanding in the room, not because computers can't have it, but because the room's computer-simulation is defective. Fix it and understanding appears. Abracadabra!
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  81. Diane Law, Searle, Subsymbolic Functionalism, and Synthetic Intelligence.
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  82. Alan M. Leslie & Brian J. Scholl (1999). Modularity, Development and 'Theory of Mind'. Mind and Language 14 (1).
    Psychologists and philosophers have recently been exploring whether the mechanisms which underlie the acquisition of ‘theory of mind’ (ToM) are best charac- terized as cognitive modules or as developing theories. In this paper, we attempt to clarify what a modular account of ToM entails, and why it is an attractive type of explanation. Intuitions and arguments in this debate often turn on the role of develop- ment: traditional research on ToM focuses on various developmental sequences, whereas cognitive modules are thought (...)
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  83. Neil Levy (2011). Searle's Wager. AI and Society 26 (4):363-369.
    Nicholas Agar has recently argued that it would be irrational for future human beings to choose to radically enhance themselves by uploading their minds onto computers. Utilizing Searle’s argument that machines cannot think, he claims that uploading might entail death. He grants that Searle’s argument is controversial, but he claims, so long as there is a non-zero probability that uploading entails death, uploading is irrational. I argue that Agar’s argument, like Pascal’s wager on which it is modelled, fails, because the (...)
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  84. J. Christopher Maloney (1987). The Right Stuff. Synthese 70 (March):349-72.
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  85. John McCarthy, John Searle's Chinese Room Argument.
    John Searle begins his (1990) ``Consciousness, Explanatory Inversion and Cognitive Science'' with
    ``Ten years ago in this journal I published an article (Searle, 1980a and 1980b) criticising what I call Strong
    AI, the view that for a system to have mental states it is sufficient for the system to implement the right sort of
    program with right inputs and outputs. Strong AI is rather easy to refute and the basic argument can be
    summarized in one sentence: {it a system, (...)
    The Chinese Room Argument can be refuted in one sentence. (shrink)
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  86. Ron McClamrock (1995). Existential Cognition: Computational Minds in the World. University of Chicago Press.
    While the notion of the mind as information-processor--a kind of computational system--is widely accepted, many scientists and philosophers have assumed that this account of cognition shows that the mind's operations are characterizable independent of their relationship to the external world. Existential Cognition challenges the internalist view of mind, arguing that intelligence, thought, and action cannot be understood in isolation, but only in interaction with the outside world. Arguing that the mind is essentially embedded in the external world, Ron McClamrock provides (...)
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  87. Philip Murray McCullough (2010). Otto in the Chinese Room. Spontaneous Generations 4 (1).
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  88. Andrew Melnyk (1996). Searle's Abstract Argument Against Strong AI. Synthese 108 (3):391-419.
    Discussion of Searle's case against strong AI has usually focused upon his Chinese Room thought-experiment. In this paper, however, I expound and then try to refute what I call his abstract argument against strong AI, an argument which turns upon quite general considerations concerning programs, syntax, and semantics, and which seems not to depend on intuitions about the Chinese Room. I claim that this argument fails, since it assumes one particular account of what a program is. I suggest an alternative (...)
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  89. James R. Mensch (1991). Phenomenology and Artificial Intelligence: Husserl Learns Chinese. Husserl Studies 8 (2):107-127.
    For over a decade John Searle's ingenious argument against the possibility of artificial intelligence has held a prominent place in contemporary philosophy. This is not just because of its striking central example and the apparent simplicity of its argument. As its appearance in Scientific American testifies, it is also due to its importance to the wider scientific community. If Searle is right, artificial intelligence in the strict sense, the sense that would claim that mind can be instantiated through a formal (...)
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  90. Ruth G. Millikan (2005). Some Reflections on the Theory Theory - Simulation Theory Discussion. In Susan Hurley & Nick Chater (eds.), Perspectives on Imitation: From Mirror Neurons to Memes, Vol II. MIT Press.
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  91. James H. Moor (1988). The Pseudorealization Fallacy and the Chinese Room Argument. In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Aspects of AI. D.
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  92. Josef Moural (2003). John Searle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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  93. Josef Moural (2003). The Chinese Room Argument. In John Searle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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  94. Ajit Narayanan (1991). Logical Foundations. New York: St Martin's Press.
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  95. Ajit Narayanan (1991). The Chinese Room Argument. In Logical Foundations. New York: St Martin's Press.
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  96. Natika Newton (1989). Machine Understanding and the Chinese Room. Philosophical Psychology 2 (2):207-15.
    John Searle has argued that one can imagine embodying a machine running any computer program without understanding the symbols, and hence that purely computational processes do not yield understanding. The disagreement this argument has generated stems, I hold, from ambiguity in talk of 'understanding'. The concept is analysed as a relation between subjects and symbols having two components: a formal and an intentional. The central question, then becomes whether a machine could possess the intentional component with or without the formal (...)
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  97. Natika Newton (1988). Machine Understanding and the Chinese Room. Philosophical Psychology 1 (2):207 – 215.
    John Searle has argued that one can imagine embodying a machine running any computer program without understanding the symbols, and hence that purely computational processes do not yield understanding. The disagreement this argument has generated stems, I hold, from ambiguity in talk of 'understanding'. The concept is analysed as a relation between subjects and symbols having two components: a formal and an intentional. The central question, then becomes whether a machine could possess the intentional component with or without the formal (...)
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  98. Donald Nute (2011). A Logical Hole the Chinese Room Avoids. Minds and Machines 21 (3):431-433.
    Searle’s Chinese room argument (CRA) was recently charged as being unsound because it makes a logical error. It is shown here that this charge is based on a misinterpretation of the modal scope of a major premise of the CRA and that the CRA does not commit the logical error with which it is charged.
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  99. K. K. Obermeier (1983). Wittgenstein on Language and Artificial Intelligence: The Chinese-Room Thought-Experiment Revisited. Synthese 56 (September):339-50.
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  100. Carlo Penco (2012). Updating the Turing Test. Wittgenstein, Turing and Symbol Manipulation. Open Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):189-194.
    This is my personal homage to Turing in his centenary anniversary. I don't deal with details of the Turing-Wittgenstein debate during the lectures on the foundation of Mathematics in '39, but I hint at a possible redefinition of Turing test inside a vision of thinking as use of symbols, in a (not new) Wittgensteinian fashion.
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