This book offers an introduction to the way art is perceived, interpreted, and felt and approaches these mindful events from a multidisciplinary perspective.

Largely through trial and error, filmmakers have developed engaging techniques that capture our sensations, thoughts, and feelings. Philosophers and film theorists have thought deeply about the nature and impact of these techniques, yet few scientists have delved into empirical analyses of our movie experience-or what Arthur P. Shimamura has coined "psychocinematics." This edited volume introduces this exciting field by bringing together film theorists, philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists to consider the viability of a scientific approach to our movie experience.

The relationship between metacognition and executive control is explored. According to an analysis by Fernandez-Duque, Baird, and Posner (this issue), metacognitive regulation involves attention, conflict resolution, error correction, inhibitory control, and emotional regulation. These aspects of metacognition are presumed to be mediated by a neural circuit involving midfrontal brain regions. An evaluation of the proposal by Fernandez-Duque et al. is made, and it is suggested that there is considerable convergence of issues associated with metacognition, executive control, working memory, and frontal (...) lobe function. By integrating these domains and issues, significant progress could be made toward a cognitive neuroscience of metacognition. (shrink)

How do we appreciate a work of art? Awarded a Guggenheim Fellowship to explore connections between art, mind, and brain, Arthur Shimamura takes findings from psychological and brain sciences to address ways of understanding our aesthetic responses.

This paper presents a new argument to defend the normativity of meaning, specifically the thesis that there are no meanings without norms. The argument starts from the observation inferentialists have emphasized that incompatibility relations between sentences are a necessary part of meaning as it is understood. We motivate this approach by showing that the standard normativist strategy in the literature, which is developed in terms of veridical reference that may swing free from the speaker’s understanding, violates the ought-implies-can principle, but (...) ours does not. In addition, our approach is superior because, unlike the representationalist approach, it can be extended from declarative sentences to non-representational uses of language. In this paper, however, we only formulate the argument for the base case that involves incompatibility relations between declarative sentences. The goal is not to derive norms from something that is not normative, but to explicate the distinctive type of normativity that is built into meaning as it is understood by language-users. The explication proceeds in two steps. (1) For any sentence s a speaker understands, there is an incompatible sentence s’ the speaker understands to be incompatible with s. (2) In virtue of understanding this incompatibility of meanings, she ought not to be committed to both s and s’. This prohibition is not derived from instrumental practical reason, nor is it based on representational correctness, but its source is the incompatibility of meanings. (shrink)

Motivated by semantic inferentialism and logical expressivism proposed by Robert Brandom, in this paper, I submit a nonmonotonic modal relevant sequent calculus equipped with special operators, □ and R. The base level of this calculus consists of two different types of atomic axioms: material and relevant. The material base contains, along with all the flat atomic sequents (e.g., Γ0, p |~0 p), some non-flat, defeasible atomic sequents (e.g., Γ0, p |~0 q); whereas the relevant base consists of the local region (...) of such a material base that is sensitive to relevance. The rules of the calculus uniquely and conservatively extend these two types of nonmonotonic bases into logically complex material/relevant consequence relations and incoherence properties, while preserving Containment in the material base and Reflexivity in the relevant base. The material extension is supra-intuitionistic, whereas the relevant extension is stronger than a logic slightly weaker than R. The relevant extension also avoids the fallacies of relevance. Although the extended material consequence relation is defeasible and insensitive to relevance, it has local regions of indefeasibility and relevance (the latter of which is marked by the relevant extension). The newly introduced operators, □ and R, codify these local regions within the same extended material consequence relation. (shrink)

I present a sequent calculus that extends a nonmonotonic reflexive consequence relation as defined over an atomic first-order language without variables to one defined over a logically complex first-order language. The extension preserves reflexivity, is conservative (therefore nonmonotonic) and supraintuitionistic, and is conducted in a way that lets us codify, within the logically extended object language, important features of the base thus extended. In other words, the logical operators in this calculus play what Brandom (2008) calls expressive roles. Expressivist logical (...) systems have already been proposed for propositional logics (see Hlobil, 2016, and Kaplan, 2018) but not for first-order logics. An advantage of this calculus over standard first-order calculi (e.g., those in Gentzen, 1935/1964) is that universally quantified variables behave as they should even in the presence of arbitrary nonlogical axioms. I claim that because of this robust well-behavedness of variables, this calculus also provides logical inferentialists with a way to understand the meanings of variables in terms of the roles those variables play in a wide range of inferences that is not limited to purely logical ones (e.g, mathematical inferences). (shrink)

A sample of 2,359 sixth-form pupils in Northern Ireland responded in 1998 to Greer's classic question 'Have you ever had an experience of God, for example, his presence or his help or anything else?' Religious experience was reported by 29% of Protestant males, 29% of Catholic males, 39% of Protestant females and 38% of Catholic females. Compared with earlier data these figures reveal a particularly marked decline in reported religious experience among Catholic females . The content of the reported religious (...) experience is analysed and illustrated within nine descriptive categories characterised as: help and guidance, exams, God's presence, answered prayer, death, sickness, conversion, difficulty in describing, and miscellaneous. (shrink)

This study builds on a long-established tradition within the psychology of religion concerned with the analysis and interpretation of prayer. Drawing on 917 prayer-cards le in one rural church over a sixteenth-month period, the analysis distinguishes between three aspects of intercessory and supplicatory prayer defined as reference, intention, and objective. Results of the analysis showed that only 4% of prayer requests had the prayer author as a key focus, and that there was a preference to pray for other people and (...) for world or global issues . Specific concrete issues were not included in 29% of prayer requests, but in the 71% of requests where concrete contexts were provided, 76% of these were concerned with illness, death, and conflict or disaster. Overall, there were more examples of secondary control than primary control , and primary control was found more often in requests which had the prayer author as a key focus and in the categories of illness, growth, work, relationships, and general requests. These results give rise to a number of hypotheses regarding prayers authors' perceptions of prayer and its purpose. (shrink)

A particular amount of punishment is justified if and only if that amount of punishment is deserved and the desert claim is not overridden. In the case of some multiple murderers or people who perform serious violent acts in addition to murder, the deserved punishment must involve torture. I argue that this legitimate desert claim is not overridden by objections based on notions of brutality and inhumanity, the Kantian concern that persons be treated as ends, the intuitive distaste that many (...) persons have for torture, the negative consequences of institutionalized torture, the concern for bias in the imposition of punishment, and the need for accuracy in measuring harms. (shrink)