The second volume in the Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science series, this collection presents recent work in the fields of phonology, morphology, semantics, and neurolinguistics. Its overall theme is the relationship between the contents of grammatical formalisms and their real-time realizations in machine or biological systems. Individual essays address such topics as learnability, implementability, computational issues, parameter setting, and neurolinguistic issues. Contributors include Janet Dean Fodor, Richard T. Oehrle, Bob Carpenter, Edward P. Stabler, Elan Dresher, Arnold Zwicky, Mary-Louis Kean, and (...) Lewis P. Shapiro. (shrink)

Could a computer be programmed to make moral judgments about cases of intentional harm and unreasonable risk that match those judgments people already make intuitively? If the human moral sense is an unconscious computational mechanism of some sort, as many cognitive scientists have suggested, then the answer should be yes. So too if the search for reflective equilibrium is a sound enterprise, since achieving this state of affairs requires demarcating a set of considered judgments, stating them as explanandum sentences, and (...) formulating a set of algorithms from which they can be derived. The same is true for theories that emphasize the role of emotions or heuristics in moral cognition, since they ultimately depend on intuitive appraisals of the stimulus that accomplish essentially the same tasks. Drawing on deontic logic, action theory, moral philosophy, and the common law of tort, particularly Terry's five-variable calculus of risk, I outline a formal model of moral grammar and intuitive jurisprudence along the foregoing lines, which defines the abstract properties of the relevant mapping and demonstrates their descriptive adequacy with respect to a range of common moral intuitions, which experimental studies have suggested may be universal or nearly so. Framing effects, protected values, and implications for the neuroscience of moral intuition are also discussed. (shrink)

We consider the use ofevolving algebra methods of specifying grammars for natural languages. We are especially interested in distributed evolving algebras. We provide the motivation for doing this, and we give a reconstruction of some classic grammar formalisms in directly dynamic terms. Finally, we consider some technical questions arising from the use of direct dynamism in grammar formalisms.

A generative grammar for a language L generates one or more syntactic structures for each sentence of L and interprets those structures both phonologically and semantically. A widely accepted assumption in generative linguistics dating from the mid-60s, the Generative Grammar Hypothesis , is that the ability of a speaker to understand sentences of her language requires her to have tacit knowledge of a generative grammar of it, and the task of linguistic semantics in those early days was taken to be (...) that of specifying the form that the semantic component of a generative grammar must take. Then in the 70s linguistic semantics took a curious turn. Without rejecting GGH, linguists turned away from the task of characterizing the semantic component of a generative grammar to pursue instead the Montague-inspired project of providing for natural languages the same kind of model-theoretic semantics that logicians devise for the artificial languages of formal systems of logic, and “formal semantics” continues to dominate semantics in linguistics. This essay argues that the sort of compositional meaning theory that would verify GGH would not only be quite different from the theories formal semanticists construct, but would be a more fundamental theory that supersedes those theories in that it would explain why they are true when they are true, but their truth wouldn’t explain its truth. Formal semantics has undoubtedly made important contributions to our understanding of such phenomena as anaphora and quantification, but semantics in linguistics is supposed to be the study of meaning. This means that the formal semanticist can’t be unconcerned that the kind of semantic theory for a natural language that interests her has no place in a theory of linguistic competence; for if GGH is correct, then the more fundamental semantic theory is the compositional meaning theory that is the semantic component of the internally represented generative grammar, and if that is so, then linguistic semantics has so far ignored what really ought to be its primary concern. (shrink)

The formal sciences, particularly mathematics, have had a profound influence on the development of linguistics. This insightful overview looks at techniques that were introduced in the fields of mathematics, logic and philosophy during the twentieth century, and explores their effect on the work of various linguists. In particular, it discusses the 'foundations crisis' that destabilised mathematics at the start of the twentieth century, the numerous related movements which sought to respond to this crisis, and how they influenced the development (...) of syntactic theory in the 1950s. The book concludes by discussing the resulting major consequences for syntactic theory, and provides a detailed reassessment of Chomsky's early work at the advent of Generative Grammar. Informative and revealing, this book will be invaluable to all those working in formal linguistics, in particular those interested in its history and development. (shrink)

A generative grammar for a language L generates one or more syntactic structures for each sentence of L and interprets those structures both phonologically and semantically. A widely accepted assumption in generative linguistics dating from the mid-60s, the Generative Grammar Hypothesis, is that the ability of a speaker to understand sentences of her language requires her to have tacit knowledge of a generative grammar of it, and the task of linguistic semantics in those early days was taken to be that (...) of specifying the form that the semantic component of a generative grammar must take. Then in the 70s linguistic semantics took a curious turn. Without rejecting GGH, linguists turned away from the task of characterizing the semantic component of a generative grammar to pursue instead the Montague-inspired project of providing for natural languages the same kind of model-theoretic semantics that logicians devise for the artificial languages of formal systems of logic, and “formal semantics” continues to dominate semantics in linguistics. This essay argues that the sort of compositional meaning theory that would verify GGH would not only be quite different from the theories formal semanticists construct, but would be a more fundamental theory that supersedes those theories in that it would explain why they are true when they are true, but their truth wouldn’t explain its truth. Formal semantics has undoubtedly made important contributions to our understanding of such phenomena as anaphora and quantification, but semantics in linguistics is supposed to be the study of meaning. This means that the formal semanticist can’t be unconcerned that the kind of semantic theory for a natural language that interests her has no place in a theory of linguistic competence; for if GGH is correct, then the more fundamental semantic theory is the compositional meaning theory that is the semantic component of the internally represented generative grammar, and if that is so, then linguistic semantics has so far ignored what really ought to be its primary concern. (shrink)

This article summarizes the main ideas for formalizing categorial languages genrated by classical categorial grammar originated by K. Ajdukiewicz [1935,1960].This formalization is presented in detail in the author's monographs in Polish "Teorie Języków Syntaktycznie Kategorialnych" ("Theories of Syntactically Categorical Languages"), PWN, Warszawa-Wrocław 1985 and in English "Theory of Language Syntax, Categorial Approach", Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston-London-Dordrecht 1991.

This paper sketches or signals some ideas, results, and proposals connected with the theoretical issues related to the categorial approach to language which originated from the first author and which form the basis for further research by the second author. The main aims are the following: 1) to bring into common use some Polish ideas concerned with classical categorial grammar; 2) to take into consideration a universal and simultaneously formal-logical perspective; 3) to consider Peirce's well-known differentiation of linguistic objects, (...) i.e. their twofold ontological status as tokens and types and, according to this, to consider the biaspectual formalization of language dealing with the two main orientations in the controversy between nominalism and Platonism; 4) to characterize language according to Frege's ontological canons, according to which each expression of language corresponds to its denotation. All of these factors make possible not only the syntactic characterization of language but also the introduction of syntactic and semantic definitions of a true expression and its denotation. These notions correspond here to the old classical, but not necessarily standard, understanding of semantic concepts. The paper is divided into four sections: the first contains a brief characterization of the categorial approach to syntax; the second presents two strains of this approach; the third touches on certain general semantic issues connected with the notion of truth; and the last gives some final remarks. (shrink)

Since a human language consists of an infinite number of sentences, it cannot be adequately described by enumeration. Hence, as Chomsky wrote in the first paragraph of his first book, Syntactic Structures, an adequate description of a language is approached through the specification of a generative device that will generate and structurally describe all the sentences of a language. And since generative devices form a hierarchy in terms of descriptive power, the basic question of grammar is what is the minimum (...) of power needed to generate human languages. What this book does is describe the Chomsky hierarchy in a very clear and accessible way. Finite state grammars are shown to be equivalent in generative power to regular phrase structure grammars. After context free, and context sensitive phrase structure grammars, one finds at the top of the hierarchy transformational grammars, which Kimball has shown to be weakly equivalent to a universal phrase structure grammar, i.e., one in which rules can delete items. This last equivalence allows one to appreciate the central problem in current grammatical theory: that the "standard theory" of Aspects of the Theory of Syntax allows so much power for the construction of grammars that solutions become arbitrary and non-empirical, and hence the problem is to find a principled minimization of the power of transformational grammars. This is a clear, up-to-date, and elegant little book. One admirably suitable as a comparatively undemanding introduction to the abstract theory of grammar, or as a way of brushing-up on the subject.—J.L. (shrink)

We present a rendering of some common grammatical formalisms in terms of evolving algebras. Though our main concern in this paper is on constraint-based formalisms, we also discuss the more basic case of context-free grammars. Our aim throughout is to highlight the use of evolving algebras as a specification tool to obtain grammar formalisms.

We show how to encode context-free string grammars, linear context-free tree grammars, and linear context-free rewriting systems as Abstract Categorial Grammars. These three encodings share the same constructs, the only difference being the interpretation of the composition of the production rules. It is interpreted as a first-order operation in the case of context-free string grammars, as a second-order operation in the case of linear context-free tree grammars, and as a third-order operation in the case of (...) linear context-free rewriting systems. This suggest the possibility of defining an Abstract Categorial Hierarchy. (shrink)

Cognitive Science, Volume 46, Issue 2, February 2022.

We show how to encode context-free string grammars, linear context-free tree grammars, and linear context-free rewriting systems as Abstract Categorial Grammars. These three encodings share the same constructs, the only difference being the interpretation of the composition of the production rules. It is interpreted as a first-order operation in the case of context-free string grammars, as a second-order operation in the case of linear context-free tree grammars, and as a third-order operation in the case of (...) linear context-free rewriting systems. This suggest the possibility of defining an Abstract Categorial Hierarchy. (shrink)

Taking as its starting point significant similarities between a formal language model—Grammar Systems—and a grammatical theory—Autolexical Syntax—in this paper we suggest the application of the former to the topic of the latter. To show the applicability of Grammar Systems Theory to grammatical description, we introduce a formal-language-theoretic framework for the architecture of natural language grammar: Linguistic Grammar Systems. We prove the adequacy of this model by highlighting its features (modularity, parallelism, interaction) and by showing the similarity between this (...) framework and accepted and well-known grammatical models (e.g. Autolexical Syntax). (shrink)

Polarized unification grammar (PUG) is a linguistic formalism which uses polarities to better control the way grammar fragments interact. The grammar combination operation of PUG was conjectured to be associative. We show that PUG grammar combination is not associative, and even attaching polarities to objects does not make it order-independent. Moreover, we prove that no non-trivial polarity system exists for which grammar combination is associative. We then redefine the grammar combination operator, moving to the powerset domain, in a way that (...) guarantees associativity. The method we propose is general and is applicable to a variety of tree-based grammar formalisms. (shrink)

It is the aim of INDICES to document recent explorations in the various fields of philosophical logic and formal linguistics and their applications in other disciplines. The main emphasis of this series is on self-contained monographs covering particular areas of recent research and surveys of methods, problems, and results in all fields of inquiry where recourse to logical analysis and logical methods has been fruitful. INDICES will contain monographs dealing with the central areas of philosophical logic (extensional and intensional (...) systems, indexical logics, non-classical logics, philosophy of logic, etc.) as well as studies in which these systems are applied to specific issues in philosophy, in the formal semantics of natural languages, the foundations of linguistic theory, in computational linguistics, and in theoretical computer science. Constructive type theory was first presented in 1970, by the Swedish logician Per Martin-Lof. It has become one of the main approaches used in the foundations of mathematics and computer science. But it has remained relatively unknown among linguists and philosophers, although it provides a considerable extension of the concepts and techniques of logic. The book first gives an introduction to type theory from the point of view of linguistics and the philosophy of language. Type theory is then applied in the areas of quantification, anaphora, temporal reference, and the structure of text and discourse. By virtue of the type-theoretical concepts of proof object and context, various phenomena of dependence and progression in language can be discussed in precise terms, and several well-known problems can be solved. A categorial grammar is presented togenerate formally a fragment of English, together with an example of a computer implementation. (shrink)

Expressiveness and decidability are two core aspects of programming languages that should be thoroughly known by those who use them; this includes knowledge of their metalanguages a.k.a. formal grammars. The van Wijngaarden grammars (WGs) are capable of generating all the languages in the Chomsky hierarchy and beyond; this makes them a relevant tool in the design of (more) expressive programming languages. But this expressiveness comes at a very high cost: The syntax of WGs is extremely complex and (...) the decision problem for the generated languages is generally unsolvable. With this in mind, I provide here a short primer of the syntax of WGs, which includes syntactic restrictions that guarantee decidability for the corresponding generated languages. (shrink)

In recent years, the study of formal semantics and formal pragmatics has grown tremendously showing that core aspects of language meaning can be explained by a few principles. These principles are grounded in the logic that is behind - and tightly intertwined with - the grammar of human language. In this book, some of the most prominent figures in linguistics, including Noam Chomsky and Barbara H. Partee, offer new insights into the nature of linguistic meaning and pave the (...) way for the further development of formal semantics and formal pragmatics. Each chapter investigates various dimensions in which the logical nature of human language manifests itself within a language and/or across languages. Phenomena like bare plurals, free choice items, scalar implicatures, intervention effects, and logical operators are investigated in depth and at times cross-linguistically and/or experimentally. This volume will be of interest to scholars working within the fields of semantics, pragmatics, language acquisition and psycholinguistics. (shrink)

Husserl’s Logical Grammar is intended to explain how complex expressions can be constructed out of simple ones so that their meaning turns out to be determined by the meanings of their constituent parts and the way they are put together. Meanings are thus understood as structured contents and classified into formal categories to the effect that the logical properties of expressions reflect their grammatical properties. As long as linguistic meaning reduces to the intentional content of pre-linguistic representations, however, it (...) is not trivial to account for how semantics relates to syntax in this context. In this paper, I analyze Husserl’s Logical Grammar as a system of recursive rules operating on representations and suggest that the syntactic form of representations contributes to their semantics because it carries information about semantic role. I further discuss Husserl’s syntactic account of the unity of propositions and argue that, on this account, logical form supervenes on syntactic form. In the last section I draw some implications for the phenomenology of thought and conjecture that the structural features it displays are likely to convey the syntactic structures of an underlying language-like representational system. (shrink)

Traditional grammar and current theoretical approaches towards modelling grammatical knowledge ignore language in interaction: that is, words such as huh, eh, yup or yessssss. This groundbreaking book addresses this gap by providing the first in-depth overview of approaches towards interactional language across different frameworks and linguistic sub-disciplines. Based on the insights that emerge, a formal framework is developed to discover and compare language in interaction across different languages: the interactional spine hypothesis. Two case-studies are presented: confirmationals and response markers, (...) both of which show evidence for systematic grammatical knowledge. Assuming that language in interaction is regulated by grammatical knowledge sheds new light on old questions concerning the relation between language and thought and the relation between language and communication. It is essential reading for anyone interested in the relation between language, cognition and social interaction. (shrink)

Words have meaning. Sentences also have meaning, but their meaning is different in kind from any collection of the meanings of the words they contain. I discuss two puzzles related to this difference. The first is how the meanings of the parts of a sentence combine to give rise to a unified sentential meaning, as opposed to a mere collection of disparate meanings (UP1). The second is why the formal ontology of linguistic meaning changes when grammatical structure is built (...) up (UP2). For example, the meaning of a sentence is a proposition evaluable for truth and falsity. In contrast, a collection of the meanings of its parts does not constitute a proposition and is not evaluable for truth. These two puzzles are closely related, since change in formal ontology is the clearest sign of the unity of meaning. The most popular strategy for answering them is taking the meanings of the parts as abstractions from primitive sentence meanings. However, I argue that, given plausible psychological constraints, sentence meanings cannot be taken as explanatory primitives. Drawing on recent work in Generative Grammar and its philosophy, I suggest that the key to both unity questions is to distinguish strictly between lexical and grammatical meaning. The latter is irreducible and determines how lexical content is used in referential acts. I argue that these referential properties determine a formal ontology, which explains why and how formal ontology changes when grammatical structure is built up (UP2). As for UP1, I suggest that, strictly speaking, lexical meanings never combine. Instead, whenever grammar specifies a formal ontology for the lexical meanings entering a grammatical derivation, further lexical (or phrasal) meanings can only specify aspects of this recursive grammatical process. In this way, contemporary grammatical theory can be used to address old philosophical problems. (shrink)

The theory of language must predict the possible thought—signal (or meaning—sound or sign) pairings of a language. We argue for a Meaning First architecture of language where a thought structure is generated first. The thought structure is then realized using language to communicate the thought, to memorize it, or perhaps with another purpose. Our view contrasts with the T-model architecture of mainstream generative grammar, according to which distinct phrase-structural representations—Phonetic Form (PF) for articulation, Logical Form (LF) for interpretation—are generated within (...) the grammar. At the same time, our view differs from early transformational grammar and generative semantics: We view the relationship between the thought structure and the corresponding signal as one of compression. We specify a formal sketch of compression as a choice between multiple possible pronounciations balancing the desire to transmit information against the effort of pronounciation. The Meaning First architecture allows a greater degree of independence between thought structures and the linguistic signal. We present three arguments favoring this type of independence. First we argue that scopal properties can be better explained if we only compare thought structures independent of the their realization as a sentence. Secondly, we argue that Meaning First architecture allows contentful late insertion, an idea that has been argued for in Distributed Morphology already, but as we argue is also motivated by the division of the logical and socio-emotive meaning content of language. Finally, we show that only the Meaning First architecture provides a satisfying account of the mixing of multiple languages by multilingual speakers, especially for cases of simultaneous articulation across two modalities in bimodal speakers. Our view of the structure of grammar leads to a reassessment of priorities in linguistic analyses: while current mainstream work is often focused on establishing one-to-one relationships between concepts and morphemes, our view makes it plausible that primitive concepts are frequently marked indirectly or unpronounced entirely. Our view therefore assigns great value to the understanding of logical primitives and of compression. (shrink)

The van Wijngaarden grammars are two-level grammars that present many interesting properties. In the present article I elaborate on six of these properties, to wit, (i) their being constituted by two grammars, (ii) their ability to generate (possibly infinitely many) strict languages and their own metalanguage, (iii) their context-sensitivity, (iv) their high descriptive power, (v) their productivity, or the ability to generate an infinite number of production rules, and (vi) their equivalence with the unrestricted, or Type-0, Chomsky (...) grammars. (shrink)

Lambek categorial grammars is a class of formal grammars based on the Lambek calculus. Pentus proved in 1993 that they generate exactly the class of context-free languages without the empty word. In this paper, we study categorial grammars based on the Lambek calculus with the permutation rule LP. Of particular interest is the product-free fragment of LP called the Lambek-van Benthem calculus LBC. Buszkowski in his 1984 paper conjectured that grammars based on the Lambek-van Benthem (...) calculus (LBC-grammars for short) generate exactly permutation closures of context-free languages. In this paper, we disprove this conjecture by presenting a language generated by an LBC-grammar that is not a permutation closure of any context-free language. Firstly, we introduce an ad-hoc modification of vector addition systems called linearly-restricted branching vector addition systems with states and additional memory (LRBVASSAMs for short) and prove that the latter are equivalent to LBC-grammars. Then we construct an LRBVASSAM that generates a non-semilinear set and thus disprove Buszkowski’s conjecture. Since Buszkowski’s conjecture is false, not so much is known about the languages generated by LBC-grammars or by LP-grammars. The equivalence of LRBVASSAMs and LBC-grammars allows us to establish a number of their properties. We show that LP-grammars generate the same class of languages as LBC-grammars; that is, removing product from LP does not decrease expressive power of corresponding categorial grammars. We also prove that this class of languages is closed under union, intersection, concatenation, and Kleene plus. (shrink)

This is a thesis in formal semantics. It consists of two parts corresponding to the distinction, due to Richard Montague, between universal grammar and specific semantic theories. The first part concerns universal grammar and is intended to provide a precise and unified conceptual framework within which different theories of formal semantics can be represented and compared. ;The second part of the thesis is concerned with intensional logic, i.e., with the logical analysis of discourse involving so called oblique contexts. (...) These contexts are characterized by the apparent failure of certain classically valid principles of substitutivity. Two kinds of reactions among logicians to the appearance of oblique contexts in natural languages are distinguished: (1) the intensional point of view, according to which oblique contexts are seen as genuine counterexamples to classical logic and to the related semantical principle of extensionality: the principle that the denotation of an expression is a function of the denotations of its parts; and (2) the extensional point of view, according to which the conflict between oblique contexts and classical logic is only apparent. The extensional point of view therefore calls for analyses of oblique contexts that preserve the laws of classical logic and the principle of extensionality. In this thesis, we are concerned with the precise formulation of and comparison between different programs for the formal semantic representation of oblique contexts. In Chapter 5, we are concerned with Church's program of representing oblique contexts within a formal language whose semantics is fully extensional and based on Frege's distinction between sense and denotation. The ambiguity between the "direct" and "indirect" denotation of an expression A is avoided by letting A be replaced in oblique contexts by an expression which denotes A's ordinary sense. We provide a possible-worlds semantics for a version of Church's formal language with the following features: (i) Objectual quantification into oblique constructions is accounted for. The treatment of quantification requires for each entity x an essence of x, by which we mean a sense which determines x in those worlds in which x exists and is undefined in all other worlds. (ii) The variables range over actually existing entities only. It is allowed that entities of certain types are contingent, i.e., the same entity may exist in one world and fail to exist in other worlds. (iii) In order to combine a proper treatment of the cross-world identification of functions with varying domains, partial functions are allowed. (iv) Senses are allowed to be partially defined. For example, the sense of a proper name is undefined in a world in which the denotation of the name does not exist. (v) Senses of functions from objects of type a to objects of type b are identified with functions from senses of objects of type a to senses of objects of type b. In Chapters 6 and 7, we pursue the Russellian Alternative in intensional semantics, where a sense/denotation distinction is avoided. Apparent failures of substitutivity principles for singular terms are explained along the lines of Russell's theory of definite descriptions. Failures of substitutivity of coextensional sentences and predicates are explained by Russell's doctrine that sentences and predicate denote propositions and propositional functions , respectively. Russellian semantics is fully extensional in the sense that the Russellian denotation of a designator is a function of the Russellian denotations of its parts. In Chapter 6, a theory of Russellian propositions is developed within set theory. This theory is then applied in Chapter 7 to the task of providing a set-theoretic semantics for Russellian type theory. (shrink)

The label `semiotic grammar' captures a fundamental property of the grammars of human languages: not only is language a semiotic system in the familiar Saussurean sense, but its organizing system, its grammar, is also a semiotic system. This proposition, explicated in detail by William McGregor in this book, constitutes a new theory of grammar. Semiotic Grammar is `functional' rather than `formal' in its intellectual origins, approaches, and methods. It demonstrates, however, that neither a purely functional nor a purely (...) formal account of language is adequate, given the centrality of the sign as the fundamental unit of grammatical analysis. The author distinguishes four types of grammatical signs: experiential, logical, interpersonal, and textural. The signifiers of these signs are syntagmatic relationships of the following types, respectively: constituency, dependency, conjugational and linking. McGregor illustrates and exemplifies the theory with data from a variety of languages including English, Acehnese, Polish, Finnish, Japanese, Chinese, and Mohawk; and from his pioneering research on Gooniyandi and Nyulnyul, two languages of the Kimberleys region of Western Australia. (shrink)

This interdisciplinary book considers the relationship between language and thought from a philosophical perspective, drawing both on the philosophical study of language and the purely formal study of grammar, and arguing that the two should align. The claim is that grammar provides homo sapiens with the ability to think in certain grammatical ways and that this in turn explains the vast cognitive powers of human beings. Evidence is considered from biology, the evolution of language, language disorders, and linguistic phenomena.

'Philosophy arises through misconceptions of grammar', said Wittgenstein. Few people have believed him, and probably none, therefore, working in the area of the philosophy of mathematics. Yet his assertion is most evidently the case in the philosophy of Set Theory, as this paper demonstrates (see also Rodych 2000). The motivation for twentieth century Set Theory has rested on the belief that everything in Mathematics can be defined in terms of sets [Maddy 1994: 4]. But not only are there notable items (...) which cannot be so defined, including numbers and mereological sums, the very notion of a set, as formalized within this tradition, is based on a series of grammatical confusions. (shrink)

This book addresses fundamental issues in linguistic theory, including the relation between formal and cognitive approaches, the autonomy of syntax, the content of universal grammar, and the value of generative and functional approaches to grammar. It focuses on the grammar of case relations, signalled by morphological case, prepositions, and word order. Part I offers a critical history of modern grammars of case, focussing on the last four decades and setting this in the context of earlier, including ancient, developments. (...) The subjects considered include the evolution of ideas concerning deep structure and semantic and grammatical relations, and arguments for the maintenance of the traditional central position of case in the grammar. In parts II and III Professor Anderson examines the category of case and central unresolved issues in the grammar of case. The latter include questions relating to the idea of an ontologically-based grammar, particularly the degree to which syntactic categories and relationships are grounded in meaning, and the notion of linguistic creativity. This involves a consideration of the way in which cases may be identified and whether their distribution is determined through semantics. The book sheds new light on the interactions between meaning and grammar and on the structure and development of lexical and grammatical systems. The argument and its far-reaching consequences will be of wide interest to linguists, philosophers and others seeking to understand the workings of language. (shrink)

The paper demonstrates that dependency-based syntax is in a strong position to produce principled and economical accounts of the syntax of constructs. The difficulty that constituency-based syntax has in this regard is that very many constructs fail to qualify as constituents. The point is evident with the box diagrams and attribute value matrices (AVMs) that some construction grammars (CxGs) use to formalize constructions; these schemata often represent fragments rather than constituents. In dependency-based syntax in contrast, constructions are catenae, whereby (...) a catena is a chain of words linked together by dependencies. The catena is a novel but well-defined unit of syntax associated with dependency grammar (DG). The constructs of CxGs are more amenable to analyses in terms of the catenae of dependency-based syntax than to analyses in terms of the constituents of constituency-based syntax. (shrink)

One of the cardinal assumptions about the nature of grammar is that it is a formal system, meaning that the operations and symbols in the grammar should have a precise meaning, so that one can tell precisely how it functions, and whether a given structure is in fact created by the grammar. The issue of how much information is available to the grammar, viewed as a computational device that computes structures, is called the issue of computational complexity. The computational (...) powers of various grammars, and the capacity of recognition devices to characterize as licit or not the structures that they generate, has been the province of mathematical linguistics, but has also occasionally been felt to have implications for empirical syntactic theory. One central question that has raised its head over the years is the question of whether or not grammar ( which is now referred to as CHL, for Computation of Human Language (Chomsky (1995)) is Markovian, an issue first raised in Chomsky (1957). For a computational device to be Markovian, it can only make reference to the current state that the device is in, when deciding what the next state of the device can be; it cannot, for example, make reference to alternative states, earlier states, future states, or , as a consequence of its being a formal system, factors outside of the computational device. (shrink)

While rules and exemplars are usually viewed as opposites, this paper argues that they form end points of the same distribution. By representing both rules and exemplars as (partial) trees, we can take into account the fluid middle ground between the two extremes. This insight is the starting point for a new theory of language learning that is based on the following idea: If a language learner does not know which phrase‐structure trees should be assigned to initial sentences, s/he allows (...) (implicitly) for all possible trees and lets linguistic experience decide which is the “best” tree for each sentence. The best tree is obtained by maximizing “structural analogy” between a sentence and previous sentences, which is formalized by the most probable shortest combination of subtrees from all trees of previous sentences. Corpus‐based experiments with this model on the Penn Treebank and the Childes database indicate that it can learn both exemplar‐based and rule‐based aspects of language, ranging from phrasal verbs to auxiliary fronting. By having learned the syntactic structures of sentences, we have also learned the grammar implicit in these structures, which can in turn be used to produce new sentences. We show that our model mimicks children’s language development from item‐based constructions to abstract constructions, and that the model can simulate some of the errors made by children in producing complex questions. (shrink)

I argue that the ability to compute phrase structure grammars is indicative of a particular kind of thought. This type of thought that is only available to cognitive systems that have access to the computations that allow the generation and interpretation of the structural descriptions of phrase structure grammars. The study of phrase structure grammars, and formal language theory in general, is thus indispensable to studies of human cognition, for it makes explicit both the unique type (...) of human thought and the underlying mechanisms in virtue of which this thought is made possible. (shrink)

Providing a compositional interpretation procedure for discourses in which descriptions of complex dependencies between interrelated objects are incrementally built is a key challenge for formal theories of natural language interpretation. This paper examines several quantificational phenomena and argues that to account for these phenomena, we need richly structured contexts of interpretation that are passed on between different parts of the same sentence and also across sentential boundaries. The main contribution of the paper is showing how we can add structure (...) to contexts in an incremental way, starting with the basic notion of context in classical first-order logic, i.e., interpretation contexts formalized as single total variable assignments. (shrink)

We evaluate the “story grammar” approach to story understanding from three perspectives. We first examine the formal properties of the grammars and find only one to be formally adequate. We next evaluate the grammars empirically by asking whether they generate all simple stories and whether they generate only stories. We find many stories that they do not generate and one major class of nonstory that they do generate. We also evaluate the grammars' potential as comprehension models (...) and find that they would add nothing to semantic models that focus on the story content. Hence we advocate a story content oriented approach to studying story understanding instead of the structural story grammar approach. (shrink)

This commentary argues that dialogue alignment can be explained if parsing-directed grammar formalisms are adopted. With syntax defined as monotonic growth of semantic representations as each word is parsed, alignment between interlocutors is shown to be expected. Hence, grammars can be evaluated according to relative success in characterizing dialogue phenomena.

This self-contained introduction to natural language semantics addresses the majortheoretical questions in the field. The authors introduce the systematic study of linguistic meaningthrough a sequence of formal tools and their linguistic applications. Starting with propositionalconnectives and truth conditions, the book moves to quantification and binding, intensionality andtense, and so on. To set their approach in a broader perspective, the authors also explore theinteraction of meaning with context and use (the semantics-pragmatics interface) and address some ofthe foundational questions, especially in (...) connection with cognition in general. They also introducea few of the most accessible and interesting ideas from recent research to give the reader a bit ofthe flavor of current work in semantics. The organization of this new edition is modular; after theintroductory chapters, the remaining material can be covered in flexible order. The book presupposesno background in formal logic (an appendix introduces the basic notions of set theory) and only aminimal acquaintance with linguistics. This edition includes a substantial amount of completely newmaterial and has been not only updated but redesigned throughout to enhance itsuser-friendliness. (shrink)