Linguists take the intuitive judgments of speakers to be good evidence for a grammar. Why? The Chomskian answer is that they are derived by a rational process from a representation of linguistic rules in the language faculty. The paper takes a different view. It argues for a naturalistic and non-Cartesian view of intuitions in general. They are empirical central-processor responses to phenomena differing from other such responses only in being immediate and fairly unreflective. Applying this to linguistic intuitions yields an (...) explanation of their evidential role without any appeal to the representation of rules. Introduction The evidence for linguistic theories A tension in the linguists' view of intuitions Intuitions in general Linguistic intuitions Comparison of the modest explanation with the standard Cartesian explanation A nonstandard Cartesian explanation of the role of intuitions? Must linguistics explain intuitions? Conclusion. (shrink)

This paper defends an orthodox model of the linguistic intuitions which form a central source of evidence for generative grammars. According to this orthodox conception, linguistic intuitions are the upshot of a system of grammatical competence as it interacts with performance systems for perceiving and articulating language. So conceived, probing speakers’ linguistic intuitions allows us to investigate the competence–performance distinction empirically, so as to determine the grammars that speakers are competent in. This model has been attacked by Michael Devitt in (...) his recent book and a series of papers. In its place, Devitt advances a model of linguistic intuitions whereby they are speakers’ theory-laden judgements about the properties of languages. In this paper, I try to make clear the rationale behind the orthodox model and the inadequacies of Devitt's model. Introduction Intuitions as Evidence 2.1 An example: intuitions about binding 2.2 Acceptability and interpretability 2.3 Other evidence The Orthodox Model: Linguistic Intuitions as Data for Psychological Theories 3.1 How do intuitions bear on competence theories? 3.2 Intuitions and judgements 3.3 Linguistic intuitions and visual impressions 3.4 Are linguistic intuitions the ‘voice of competence’? 3.5 Are linguistic intuitions and visual reports disanalogous? Devitt's Model: Linguistic Intuitions as Theory-laden Judgements 4.1 Devitt's model 4.2 Devitt's model and belief-independence 4.3 Devitt's model and folk theory 4.4 A modification to Devitt's model 4.5 Devitt's alternative view of the evidence Conclusions CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Michael Devitt has argued that Chomsky, along with many other Linguists and philosophers, is ignorant of the true nature of Generative Linguistics. In particular, Devitt argues that Chomsky and others wrongly believe the proper object of linguistic inquiry to be speakers' competences, rather than the languages that speakers are competent with. In return, some commentators on Devitt's work have returned the accusation, arguing that it is Devitt who is ignorant about Linguistics. In this note, I consider whether there might be (...) less to this apparent dispute than meets the eye. (shrink)