The Kantian idea that some judgments are synthetic even in the area of a priori judgments cannot be accepted in its original version, but a modification of the notions analytic' and 'synthetic' discovers a rational core of that idea. The new definition of 'analytic' concerns concepts and makes it possible to distinguish between analytic concepts, which are effective ways of computing recursive functions, and synthetic concepts, which either define non-recursive functions, or define recursive functions in an ineffective way. To justify (...) this claim we have to construe concepts as abstract procedures not reducible to set-theoretical entities. (shrink)

A recent study has established that thinkers reliably engage in epistemic appraisals of concepts of natural categories. Here, five studies are reported which investigated the effects of different manipulations of category learning context on appraisal of the concepts learnt. It was predicted that dimensions of concept appraisal could be affected by manipulating either procedural factors or declarative factors. While known effects of these manipulations on metacognitive judgements such as category learning judgements and confidence at test were replicated, procedural (...) factors had no reliable effects on the dimensions of concept appraisal. Effects of declarative manipulations on some forms of concept appraisal were observed. (shrink)

Most critics of our contemporary meritocratic practices and institutions believe their arguments speak to the defects of the ideal of meritocracy itself. I argue that this is a misguided generalization because meritocracy can take many forms depending on the conception of the good and broader theory of justice to which the distributive principle of merit it is attached. To illustrate, I contrast two radically different forms of meritocracy – a telic or end-oriented model based on Plato’s Kallipolis and a (...) class='Hi'>procedural model inherent in our free market of careers open to talents. Far from being a unified ideal, meritocracy is a spectrum of social and political arrangements, ranging between the telic and the procedural poles. Thus, identifying ‘merit’ and ‘meritocracy’ as the main sources of injustice in our contemporary societies further conceals the background conditions and underlying commitments that should be subject to our critical scrutiny. (shrink)

Legal systems must proceed in the face of two conceptions of procedural fairness. The first, embodied in the rule of law ideal, calls for clear rules, laid down in advance and susceptible to mechanical application in individual cases. The second calls for a high degree of individuation, on the theory that fairness requires particularized consideration of the whole person. Both conceptions can be found in judicial interpretation of the due process clause of the American Constitution, which sometimes requires rule-bound (...) decisions, and sometimes requires individuation. Both conceptions have a great deal of appeal in particular settings. The choice between the two depends largely on an investigation of the costs of decision and the costs of error. In addition, "planning costs" play a large role; where people need to be able to plan in advance, rule-bound judgments look fairer and much more attractive even if they produce significant unfairness and arbitrariness. (shrink)

Legal systems must proceed in the face of two conceptions of procedural fairness. The first, embodied in the rule of law ideal, calls for clear rules, laid down in advance and susceptible to mechanical application in individual cases. The second calls for a high degree of individuation, on the theory that fairness requires particularized consideration of the whole person. Both conceptions can be found in judicial interpretation of the due process clause of the American Constitution, which sometimes requires rule-bound (...) decisions, and sometimes requires individuation. Both conceptions have a great deal of appeal in particular settings. The choice between the two depends largely on an investigation of the costs of decision and the costs of error. In addition, "planning costs" play a large role; where people need to be able to plan in advance, rule-bound judgments look fairer and much more attractive even if they produce significant unfairness and arbitrariness. (shrink)

There are several reasons, according to which it is worth analyzing European administrative law. First, this is a rather new branch of law. Second, the European administrative law is treated in different countries from different legal traditions positions, consequently, any effort to unify the approach to it can provide a basis for a unified European administrative law model. Third, there are no works dedicated to the analysis of the phenomenon of the European administrative law in Lithuania. Therefore, this article deals (...) with the concepts of the European administrative law. It is stated that the comprehensive image of the European administrative law reveals three European administrative law concepts. The first concept of the European administrative law characterizes it as the European Union (hereinafter – EU) administrative law, the validity of boundaries of which can be based on three aspects – functional, institutional and procedural. The second concept of the European administrative law identifies it as the law of administrative cooperation., whereas the third concept allows the European administrative law to be seen as the law common to various public administrations of European countries – ius commune. The article focuses on the analysis of the above-mentioned three approaches and the EU set of administrative procedures as an instrument to promote the development of the EU administrative law. The author comes to the conclusion that the concept of the ‘European Administrative Law’ is broader than the concept of the ‘EU Administrative Law’. The European administrative law can be perceived not only as a part of law that establishes the EU administration’s administrative legal status, its’ activity principles, forms and methods, but also as a law of administrative cooperation between states, governmental and non-governmental organizations and various corporations, based on a wide range of multilateral treaties or conventions, which cross the limits of the EU. Moreover, the European administrative law can be understood as a law with common concepts, general principles characteristic to different European countries’ public administrations as well as a science, with the help of which diverse administrative legal systems of various countries could be compared. Taking into account the content of various working documents, the author draws the conclusion that for the further development of the EU administrative law the establishment of uniform operating rules for the EU administration in its’ relations with the society is of exceptional importance. There are a number of important reasons to develop the Law on administrative procedure of the EU. First, it is generally recognized that the EU needs common binding legislation that sets out clear operating rules of the EU administration in its’ relations with legal and natural persons, and that would increase the transparency of the EU administration and its’ accessibility to citizens. Second, the drafting of the law on administrative procedure of the EU lies in the legal framework as well; the importance of the article 298 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union, the articles 41 and 42 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU as well as “soft” law (i.e. codes of good administrative behavior) are obvious here. (shrink)

The present paper deals with an investigation of the conception and development of the idea (principle) of proportionality, the variety of concepts and the procedure for the verification of the principle of proportionality. The genesis of the conception of coercive measures is studied by reviewing the process of the formation of the current principle of proportionality manifested in the historical sources of the law of Prussia, Germany, and the evolution of the principles consolidated in them. The principle of proportionality consolidated (...) in the case-law of the European Court of Justice and of the European Court of Human Rights is analyzed as well. (shrink)

The proposed paper wishes to reflect on the conception of non-self and Shunyta and how these ideas are discerned in the process of remaking of Man as it is understood in the classical Indian philosophy. The concept of non-self is very carefully elaborated in such a way that it could define the unique relationship that thehuman being have with the world of existence where remaking of man is an absolute necessity to transact with the uncertain and indescribable phenomenal world. The (...) paper would prefer to review this aspect based on the method employed by the Madhyamika Buddhist philosophy, using the idea of shnyata where allphenomenal experiences are delineated based on selflessness of the phenomenal world and of the subjective self (dharmanairatmya and pudgalanairatmya). It is argued here that the conception of self is understandable only contextually where a notional subjective self is in contact with phenomenal happenings of the world, but a proper understanding of either of the entities would reveal the conception of selflessness and the notional self. The procedure of “remaking ofman” is explained as the proper discernment of essencelessness of subjective self. The notion of a real self (pudgala) is clearly understood by reconstructing the psychophysical personality of man that the notion of selflessness is revealed by explaining the function of his dispositions and feelings. A proper conception of sunyata and the procedure remaking of man are intrinsically connected. (shrink)

Consent transforms an otherwise illegitimate act into a legitimate one. To be valid, however, it must be adequately informed. The legal requirement is vague and provides little assistance in predicting when it will be satisfied. This is particularly so when a patient consents to a procedure and the physician subsequently varies one of the components of that procedure. Using three legal judgments and one General Medical Council decision as a springboard, I have explored the concept of a medical procedure within (...) the context of consent and developed a theoretical model to elucidate a more predictable and consistent informational requirement. (shrink)

In professional settings, people often have diverse and competing conceptions of responsibility and of when it is fair to hold someone responsible. This may lead to undesirable gaps in the distribution of responsibilities. In this paper, a procedural model is developed for alleviating the tension between diverging responsibility conceptions. The model is based on the Rawlsian approach of wide reflective equilibrium and overlapping consensus. The model is applied to a technological project, which concerned the development of an in-house monitoring (...) system based on ambient technology. The development of this innovative technology raised questions among the technological researchers about its social acceptance and the way issues related to privacy and security should be addressed. The case is analyzed in terms of two procedural norms (reflective learning and inclusiveness), which are based on literature on policy and innovation networks. Analysis of the case shows that, in a pluralist setting, a procedural approach can be useful for encouraging discussion on the legitimacy of different responsibility conceptions and the question what a fair responsibility distribution amounts to. (shrink)

If concepts are explicated as abstract procedures, then we can easily show that each empirical concept is a not an effective procedure. Some, but not all empirical concepts are shown to be of a special kind: they cannot in principle guarantee that the object they identify satisfies the intended conditions.

Why should one person obey another? Why (to ask the question from the first-person perspective) ought I to submit to another and follow her judgment rather than my own? In modern political thought, which denies that some are born rulers and others are born to be ruled, the most prominent answer has been: “Because I have consented to her authority.” By making authority conditional on the subjects’ consent, political philosophers have sought to reconcile authority’s hierarchical structure with the equal moral (...) standing of governor and governed. Yet such consent accounts of authority have long been deemed problematic on a number of grounds, not the least of which is that few citizens have given their consent to the state under whose laws they live. So unless we are willing to deny the state’s authority over those who have not consented, or revert to the pre-modern assumption of a natural political hierarchy, we must find another way of reconciling authority with our standing as free and equal moral agents. In recent political and legal philosophy, the most influential solution to this problem has been Joseph Raz’s service conception of authority, according to which legitimate authority, while it does not require the consent of the governed, must exist for their sake, or serve them. The normal way to justify someone’s authority, on the service conception, is to show that, by treating her directives as binding, the subjects are likely better to conform to reasons that apply to them anyway. The service conception has, however, recently been criticized (by, among others, Thomas Christiano, Scott Hershovitz, and Jeremy Waldron) for being insufficiently attuned to the significance that procedural, and in particular democratic, features of political and legal institutions have for the justification of their authority. If these ‘democratic critics’ are right, then two commitments that many in the liberal-democratic tradition may find independently attractive turn out to be in tension: the liberal idea that authority is normally legitimate only insofar as it serves its subjects, and the democratic idea that legitimate authority can (and regularly does) rest on fair procedures. In this article I argue that the critics’ arguments rest on a misunderstanding of the service conception; yet their worries point the way to an under-appreciated and interesting view of democracy as an authoritative arbitration procedure. After introducing the service conception’s view of justified authority, I briefly distinguish a broad and a narrow interpretation of it, and suggest that we should embrace the latter to make sense of the idea that political authority serves its subjects (Section I). Next I turn to the objection raised by the democratic critics: the service conception, they say, cannot make room for the intrinsic fairness of democratic procedures because it is preoccupied with the quality of outcomes (Section II). But, I argue, the objection rests on an illicit identification of two different kinds of outcomes: the outcome of the decision-making procedure on the one hand, the outcome or result of treating that first outcome as authoritative on the other. Distinguishing between these is crucial for an adequate understanding of democracy’s authority. While the service conception is indeed organized around the latter, this does not commit it to an exclusive concern with the former; yet it is a singular commitment to the former that is problematic from a democratic point of view (Section III). To bring home this point, I sketch a model of authority as arbitration that is frequently overlooked in recent discussions of authority even though it is centrally concerned with procedural (and ultimately democratic) values and fits squarely into the service conception of authority (Section IV). (shrink)

For a decade, we have admired the incisive and broadly informed works of Ladislav Tondl on the foundations of science. Now it is indeed a pleasure to include this book among the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. We hope that it will help to deepen the collaborative scholar ship of scientists and philosophers in Czechoslovakia with the English reading scholars of the world. Professor Ladislav Tondl was born in 1924, and completed his higher education at the Charles University (...) iIi Prague. His doctorate was granted by the Institute of Information Theory and Automation. He was a professor and scientific research worker at the Institute for the Theory and Methodology of Science, which was a component part of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. Tondl's principal fields of interest are the methodology of the empirical and experimental sciences, logical semantics, and cybernetics. For many years, he collaborated with Professor Albert Perez and others at the Institute of Information Theory and Automation in Prague, and he has undertaken fruitful collaboration with logicians in the Soviet and Polish schools, and been influenced by the Finnish logicians as well, among them Jaakko Hintikka. We list below a selection of his main publications. Perhaps the most accessible in presenting his central conception of the relationship between modem information theory and the methodology of the sciences is his 1965 paper with Perez, 'On the Role of Information Theory in Certain Scientific Procedures'. (shrink)

The concept of organizational justice is important to understanding and predicting organizational behavior. A significant development in the research literature has been the separation of distributive and procedural justice. While much of the research has focused on negative outcomes, this research attempted to verify the presence of both forms of justice in the context of positive outcomes. Subjects completed an instrument designed to measure their perceptions of distributive and procedural justice. The subjects also reported their satisfaction and sense (...) of fairness with their salary increases, their belief that the procedures to award the increases had been followed, and their level of information and agreement regarding the salary program. These measures, along with size of salary increase and gender were examined to determine their impact on the subjects' perceived level of justice. The data support the existence of the two distinct forms of justice, but suggest that procedural justice may, in turn, branch out into two aspects. One category involves being informed, and a second appears to deal with acceptance of procedures. A series of relationships are then considered. Significant gender effects were non-existent. (shrink)

This essay reclaims a political proceduralist vision of democracy as the best normative defense of democracy in contemporary politics. We distinguish this vision from three main approaches that are representative in the current academic debate: the epistemic conception of democracy as a process of truth seeking; the populist defense of democracy as a mobilizing politics that defies procedures; and the classical minimalist or Schumpeterian definition of democracy as a competitive method for selecting leaders.

Collective procedural memory is a group’s memory of how to do things, as opposed to a group’s memory of facts. It enables groups to mount effective responses to periodic events (e.g., natural hazards) and to sustain collective projects (e.g., combatting climate change). This article presents an account of collective procedural memory called the Ability Conception. The Ability Conception has various advantages over other accounts of collective procedural memory, such as those appealing to collective know-how and collective identity. (...) It also demonstrates new applications for collective procedural memory. I develop three in this article: to social epistemology, to the ethics of memorialization, and to a pattern of group vulnerability to recurring hazardous events that I call the saeculum effect. (shrink)

We dedicate this book to John Thibaut. He was mentor and personal friend to one of us, and his work had a profound intellectual influence on both of us. We were both strongly influenced by Thibaut's insightful articulation of the importance to psychology of the concept of pro cedural justice and by his empirical work with Laurens Walker in reactions to legal institu demonstrating the role of procedural justice tions. The great importance we accord the Thibaut and Walker work (...) is evident throughout this volume. If anyone person can be said to have created an entire field of inquiry, John Thibaut created the psychological study of procedural justice. (To honor Thibaut thus in no sense reduces our recognition of the contributions of his co-worker, Laurens Walker, in the creation of the field. We are as certain that Walker would endorse our statement as we are that Thibaut, with characteristic modesty, would demur from it. ) Even to praise Thibaut in this fashion falls short of recognizing all of his contributions to procedural justice. Not only did he initiate the psy chological study of the topic, he also built much of the intellectual foun dation upon which the study of procedural justice rests. Thibaut's work with Harold Kelley (1959; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978) created a social psy chological theory of interdependence that, among many other applica tions, serves as the basis for one of the major models of the psychology of procedural justice. (shrink)

Diagnosis of dementia in primary care is both difficult and important. The recommendations by several authors to improve the diagnosis of dementia by general practitioners are important, but insufficient. It is argued that perhaps the disease concept in itself is a cause of confusion for clinicians. Primary care physicians need an adapted procedure, gradually leading to the final diagnosis of dementia. It has to be a stepwise labelling strategy, using global descriptions and non-disease specific labels in the beginning, ending up (...) with well-defined disease criteria. In this process, there is circularity: previous diagnoses have to be kept in mind because symptoms and signs may gradually change during the progression of the disease, leading to reconsideration of previous deleted options. To frame this properly, the primary care physician needs to adopt a broad frail elderly geriatric concept. Implementation of this concept not only helps the diagnostic process, but also stimulates the care for dementing patients and their caregivers. Relevant arguments for early diagnostic involvement of primary care physicians can be put forward on condition that a new concept, adapted procedures and adapted instruments are used. (shrink)

Two semantic paradoxes, the Liar and Curry’s paradox, are analysed using a newly developed conception of procedural semantics (semantics according to which the truth of propositions is determined algorithmically), whose main characteristic is its departure from methodological realism. Rather than determining pre-existing facts, procedures are constitutive of them. Of this semantics, two versions are considered: closed (where the halting of procedures is presumed) and open (without this presumption). To this end, a procedural approach to deductive reasoning is developed, (...) based on the idea of simulation. As is shown, closed semantics supports classical logic, but cannot in any straightforward way accommodate the concept of truth. In open semantics, where paradoxical propositions naturally ‘belong’, they cease to be paradoxical; yet, it is concluded that the natural choice—for logicians and common people alike—is to stick to closed semantics, pragmatically circumventing problematic utterances. (shrink)

This book explores, in rich and rigorous ways, the possibilities and limitations of “thick” autonomy in light of contemporary debates in philosophy, ethics, and bioethics. Many standard ethical theories and practices, particularly in domains such as biomedical ethics, incorporate minimal, formal, procedural concepts of personal autonomy and autonomous decisions and actions. Over the last three decades, concerns about the problems and limitations of these “thin” concepts have led to the formulation of “thick” concepts that highlight the mental, corporeal, biographical (...) and social conditions of what it means to be a human person and that enrich concepts of autonomy, with direct implications for the ethical requirement to respect autonomy. The chapters in this book offer a wide range of perspectives on both the elements of and the relations between “thin” and “thick” concepts of autonomy as well as their relative roles and importance in ethics and bioethics. This book offers valuable and illuminating examinations of autonomy and respect for autonomy, relevant for audiences in philosophy, ethics, and bioethics. (shrink)

The present work explores the possibility of conciliating the truth-conditional relevance of referential uses of definite descriptions with the assignment of a univocal linguistic meaning to these constructions. It is argued that conciliation is possible if we reject the thesis, central to the debate between Russellians and ambiguity theorists, according to which referential uses are truth-conditionally relevant if and only if they constitute referential meanings. We sketch a framework within which the denial of that thesis has theoretical content, by drawing (...) on the conceptual resources of Relevance Theory and on a pragmatic conception of reference, following Strawson. The linguistic meaning of definite descriptions is analyzed as a procedural meaning that is semantically underdetermined with respect to both referential and attributive readings, and a pragmatic strategy for understanding this ambiguity is sketched. El presente trabajo explora una posible conciliación de la relevancia para las condiciones de verdad de los usos referenciales de descripciones definidas con la postulación de un significado lingüístico unívoco para tales construcciones. Se argumenta que dicha conciliación es posible si se abandona la tesis, central en el debate entre russellianos y teóricos de la ambigüedad, según la cual los usos referenciales son relevantes para las condiciones de verdad si y sólo si constituyen significados referenciales. Se esboza un marco dentro del cual la negación de esta tesis tiene contenido teórico, apelando a los recursos conceptuales de la Teoría de la Relevancia y a una concepción pragmática de la referencia en la línea de Strawson. Se analiza el significado de las descripciones definidas como un significado procedimental, semánticamente subdeterminado respecto de una lectura referencial o atributiva, y se esboza una manera pragmática de entender esta ambigüedad. (shrink)

A fundamental and familiar feature of Aristotle’s natural philosophy is his use of the concept of physis as an explanatory principle of the development and growth of certain kinds of things. Natural things are those that possess within them an original principle of continuous movement towards some completion. Nature is thus said to belong among the causes which are for the sake of something or are purposeful. The concept is crucial, Aristotle argues, if one is to be able to explain (...) the motion and phenomena that constitute life and development in the world. Lacking this concept, as the earlier philosophers did, natural science is seriously incomplete and inadequate. (shrink)

Horsten and Roelants have raised a number of important questions about my analysis of effective procedures and my evaluation of the Church-Turing thesis. They suggest that, on my account, effective procedures cannot enter the mathematical world because they have a built-in component of causality, and, hence, that my arguments against the Church-Turing thesis miss the mark. Unfortunately, however, their reasoning is based upon a number of misunderstandings. Effective mundane procedures do not, on my view, provide an analysis of ourgeneral concept (...) of an effective procedure; mundane procedures and Turing machine procedures are different kinds of procedure. Moreover, the same sequence ofparticular physical action can realize both a mundane procedure and a Turing machine procedure; it is sequences of particular physical actions, not mundane procedures, which enter the world of mathematics. I conclude by discussing whether genuinely continuous physical processes can enter the world of real numbers and compute real-valued functions. I argue that the same kind of correspondence assumptions that are made between non-numerical structures and the natural numbers, in the case of Turing machines and personal computers, can be made in the case of genuinely continuous, physical processes and the real numbers. (shrink)

This collection of essays brings together the very best philosophical and legal writings on procedural justice over the last half century. The articles are written by experts from legal and philosophical backgrounds and analyze values such as transparency, predictability, and even-handedness in law-making, law-enforcement and adjudication; discuss core concepts in Anglo-American jurisprudence such as equal protection, due process and the rule of law; and deal with the distinctive branch of justice that involves norms and processes of applying law to (...) citizens. (shrink)

Justification, or at least ‘justification’, bulks large in recent epistemology. The view that knowledge consists of true-justified-belief has been prominent in this century, and the justification of belief has attracted considerable attention in its own right. But it is usually not at all clear just what an epistemologist means by ‘justified’, just what concept the term is used to express. An enormous amount of energy has gone into the attempt to specify conditions under which beliefs of one or another sort (...) are justified; but relatively little has been done to explain what it is for a belief to be justified, what that is for which conditions are being sought. The most common procedure has been to proceed on the basis of a number of obvious cases of justified belief, without pausing to determine what property it is of which these cases are instances. Now even if there were some single determinate concept that all these theoriests have implicitly in mind, this procedure would be less than wholly satisfactory. For in the absence of an explicit account of the concept being applied, we lack the most fundamental basis for deciding between supposed intuitions and for evaluating proposed conditions of justification. And in any event, as philosophers we do not seek merely to speak the truth, but also to gain an explicit, reflective understanding of the matters with which we deal. We want to know not only when our beliefs are justified, but also what it is to enjoy that status. True, not every fundamental concept can be explicated, but we shall find that much can be done with this one. (shrink)

Grounded procedures of separation are conceptualized as a learned concept. The simultaneous cultural universality of the general idea and immense diversity of its implementations might be better understood through the lens of dual inheritance theories. By drawing on examples from developmental psychology and emotion theorizing, we argue that an innate blueprint might underlie learned implementations of cleansing that vary widely.

This dissertation is dedicated to developing a principle of autonomy that is suited to human rational agents situated in particular and contingent settings. In doing so, I start out by examining a very influential conception of autonomy which defines autonomy in terms of an agent's ability to "transcend" her particular and contingent life-situation. I call such a conception of autonomy deontological autonomy. I argue that there is an inherent inconsistency in the deontological approach since deontological autonomy cannot accommodate the inescapable (...) contingency in the concrete and particular life of each individual. I propose the notion of procedural autonomy as a more plausible conception of autonomy for humans, since it is achievable in one's particular and concrete setting. ;What makes us procedurally autonomous in contingent human conditions is the process of critical deliberation which consists of two stages: The first stage requires that an agent should examine hierarchically lower intentions and beliefs with her plan of life, the hierarchically most prior set of intentions and beliefs. In the second stage an agent must choose an adequate plan of life for herself, which can be chosen only when the agent is fully aware of various alternative life plans and has given each serious consideration for adoption. The injunction that an agent should be engaged in the two stages of critical deliberation in order to be procedurally autonomous is termed the Principle of Procedural Autonomy. This principle is an ethical principle that is hierarchically prior to moral principles, and it is a procedural principle which is primarily concerned with how one should act rather than what ends should be attained. ;I conclude by applying the Principle of Procedural Autonomy to the debate concerning moral maturity of rational agents in which certain feminist objections have been raised against the concept of autonomy; I argue that procedural autonomy escapes their criticism. ;In developing my position I consider Kant and Aristotle, and a number of contemporary thinkers including J. Rawls, M. Bratman, D. Parfit, B. Williams, C. Gilligan and N. Noddings, among others. (shrink)

For a decade, we have admired the incisive and broadly informed works of Ladislav Tondl on the foundations of science. Now it is indeed a pleasure to include this book among the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. We hope that it will help to deepen the collaborative scholar ship of scientists and philosophers in Czechoslovakia with the English reading scholars of the world. Professor Ladislav Tondl was born in 1924, and completed his higher education at the Charles University (...) iIi Prague. His doctorate was granted by the Institute of Information Theory and Automation. He was a professor and scientific research worker at the Institute for the Theory and Methodology of Science, which was a component part of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. Tondl's principal fields of interest are the methodology of the empirical and experimental sciences, logical semantics, and cybernetics. For many years, he collaborated with Professor Albert Perez and others at the Institute of Information Theory and Automation in Prague, and he has undertaken fruitful collaboration with logicians in the Soviet and Polish schools, and been influenced by the Finnish logicians as well, among them Jaakko Hintikka. We list below a selection of his main publications. Perhaps the most accessible in presenting his central conception of the relationship between modem information theory and the methodology of the sciences is his 1965 paper with Perez, 'On the Role of Information Theory in Certain Scientific Procedures'. (shrink)

The scientific activity of Michael Faraday is examined by focusing on the procedural aspects of his activity. Procedurality is shown to be a fundamental characteristic of his work at a variety of levels: metacognitive, heuristic, schematic, and theoretical. The evolution of his ideas about the goals of science is shown to reflect fundamental roots in a procedural epistemology, closely tied to his concept of field. The implications of this analysis for the philosophy of science are briefly considered.

Acts of civil disobedience and conscientious objection provide valuable indications of the congruence of political outcomes with citizens’ conceptions of justice and the good. As their primary concern is substantive, their logic seems extraneous to procedural approaches to justice. Accordingly, it has often been argued that these latter condemn citizens to a ‘deaf-and-blind’ acceptance of the outcomes of agreed procedures. A closer analysis of such acts of contestation shall reveal that although, for proceduralism, the outcomes of just procedures cannot (...) be contested as unjust, they may be contested on the ground of values other than justice, such as someone’s religious/ethical allegiances. Proceduralism about justice will be thus shown to be consistent with the commitment to realising certain outcome-oriented values. (shrink)

: This paper provides a simultaneously reflexive and analytical framework to think about obstacles to truly informed consent in social science and biomedical research. To do so, it argues that informed consent often goes awry due to procedural misconceptions built into the research context. The concept of procedural misconception is introduced to describe how individuals respond to what is familiar in research settings and overlook what is different. In the context of biomedical research, procedural misconceptions can be (...) seen to function as root causes of therapeutic misconceptions. (shrink)

Research on deliberative procedures uses normative concepts not only to justify the democratic legitimacy of these procedures but also as analytical tools to understand their empirical effects. This leads to a normativist bias in deliberation research. I argue that deliberative procedures should instead be regarded as a type of opinion-shaping social technology. I introduce a theoretical scheme that helps researchers analyze the interplay between formal and informal aspects of deliberative procedures. The usefulness of the scheme is shown in a case (...) study of the EuroPolis Deliberative Poll. (shrink)

In this paper I aim to lay out the major aspects of a procedural, pragmatist account of objectivity in ethics. This account is “procedural” insofar as it holds that the objectivity of inquiry depends not on what the results of that inquiry are, but rather whether the proper procedure of inquiry was followed to generate the results. The account is “pragmatic” insofar as it coheres with a broader approach to ethics that conceives of ethical inquiry and progress in (...) terms of resolving problems (Roth 2010a, 2012). Why should we want this sort of account of ethical objectivity? In addition to its contribution to a larger pragmatist conception of ethical inquiry, this account has two desirable features. First .. (shrink)

The whistleblower system assumes that an element necessary for proper functioning about an organization is to see irregularities occurring in it. For this reason, whistleblowing and follow-up internal investigations occupy a central place in the organization’s compliance management system and an important role in the organization’s culture. These two areas constantly complement each other. However, compliance systems seem to be a broader concept, where the organization’s culture is part of it. The culture of an organization represents the habits, traditions, and (...) customs of organizations, which are not always written down. It is often referred to as the “company atmosphere.” Compliance is a system of procedures and rules, most often written down, which define procedures for dealing with specific situations, rights and obligations of employees, co-workers, or contractors. The regulations that emerge from the compliance system derive from laws, industry regulations, ethical norms, including the culture of a particular organization. Well-developed and implemented whistleblowing procedures that become part of the organization’s culture for good influence the existence of a highly developed compliance system that guarantees the multifaceted success of the organization. (shrink)

This paper presents a theory of the syntactic aspects of human sentence production. An important characteristic of unprepared speech is that overt pronunciation of a sentence can be initiated before the speaker has completely worked out the meaning content he or she is going to express in that sentence. Apparently, the speaker is able to build up a syntactically coherent utterance out of a series of syntactic fragments each rendering a new part of the meaning content. This incremental, left‐to‐right mode (...) of sentence production is the central capability of the proposed Incremental Procedural Grammar (IPG). Certain other properties of spontaneous speech, as derivable from speech errors, hesitations, self‐repairs, and language pathology, are accounted for as well.The psychological plausibility thus gained by the grammar appears compatible with a satisfactory level of linguistic plausibility in that sentences receive structural descriptions which are in line with current theories of grammar. More importantly, an explanation for the existence of configurational conditions on transformations and other linguistics rules is proposed.The basic design feature of IPG which gives rise to these psychologically and linguistically desirable properties, is the “Procedures + Stack” concept. Sentences are built not by a central constructing agency which overlooks the whole process but by a team of syntactic procedures (modules) which work—in parallel—on small parts of the sentence, have only a limited overview, and whose sole communication channel is a stack.IPG covers object complement constructions, interrogatives, and word order in main and subordinate clauses. It handles unbounded dependencies, crossserial dependencies and coordination phenomena such as gapping and conjunction reduction. It is also capable of generating self‐repairs and elliptical answers to questions. IPG has been implemented as an incremental Dutch sentence generator written in LISP. (shrink)

We approach the topic of solution equivalence of propositional problems from the perspective of non-constructive procedural theory of problems based on Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL). The answer we put forward is that two solutions are equivalent if and only if they have equivalent solution concepts. Solution concepts can be understood as a generalization of the notion of proof objects from the Curry-Howard isomorphism.

Since the mid-twentieth century, the concept of the Turing machine has dominated thought about effective procedures. This paper presents an alternative to Turing's analysis; it unifies, refines, and extends my earlier work on this topic. I show that Turing machines cannot live up to their billing as paragons of effective procedure; at best, they may be said to provide us with mere procedure schemas. I argue that the concept of an effective procedure crucially depends upon distinguishing procedures as definite courses (...) of action(- types) from the particular courses of action(-tokens) that actually instantiate them and the causal processes and/or interpretations that ultimately make them effective. On my analysis, effectiveness is not just a matter of logical form; `content' matters. The analysis I provide has the advantage of applying to ordinary, everyday procedures such as recipes and methods, as well as the more refined procedures of mathematics and computer science. It also has the virtue of making better sense of the physical possibilities for hypercomputation than the received view and its extensions, e.g. Turing's o-machines, accelerating machines. (shrink)

The article deals with a discussion of the concept and implementation of the procedure within a reasonable time as a legal principle. The main purpose of the article is to reveal the content and functioning of this principle. The author presents new insights into this principle. From time to time this legal ground evolves into new forms or the criteria, on which it depends, changes; therefore, such issues have to be taken as the basis for evaluating this principle. The following (...) conclusion is drawn in the article: the effect of the principle of the procedure within a reasonable time is not only tied to the obvious suspicion or indictment, but also to any reasonable assumption about the probable prosecution due to various actions carried out by criminal procedure officers under the Code of Criminal Procedure. After summing up the arguments, the author concludes that it is important to estimate the procedural interest of the suspect, defendant or sentenced person. (shrink)

To talk about simple concepts presupposes that the notion of concept has been aptly explicated. I argue that a most adequate explication should abandon the set-theoretical paradigm and use a procedural approach. Such a procedural approach is offered by Tichý´s Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL). Some main notions and principles of TIL are briefly presented, and as a result, concepts are explicated as a kind of abstract procedure. Then it can be shown that simplicity, as applied to concepts, is (...) well definable as a property relative to conceptual systems, each of which is determined by a finite set of simple (‘primitive’) concepts. Refinement as a method of replacing simple concepts by compound concepts is defined. (shrink)

Schwartz [A Procedural Condition Necessary and Sufficient for Cyclic Social Preference, J. Econ. Theory 137 (2007), 688–695] provides a generalization of the voting paradox by using the impotence‐partition condition. This paper aims to clarify his result by providing several remarks. We show that a main result of Schwartz can be strengthened by replacing strong Pareto by weak Pareto. We also discuss how the impotence partition is related to the standard concept of decisiveness, which is widely employed in the literature (...) on social choice. (shrink)