Trust constitutes a fundamental strategy to deal with risks and uncertainty in complex societies. In line with the vast literature stressing the importance of trust in doctor–patient relationships, trust is therefore regularly suggested as a way of dealing with the risks of medical artificial intelligence (AI). Yet, this approach has come under charge from different angles. At least two lines of thought can be distinguished: (1) that trusting AI is conceptually confused, that is, that we cannot trust AI; and (2) (...) that it is also dangerous, that is, that we should not trust AI—particularly if the stakes are as high as they routinely are in medicine. In this paper, we aim to defend a notion of trust in the context of medical AI against both charges. To do so, we highlight the technically mediated intentions manifest in AI systems, rendering trust a conceptually plausible stance for dealing with them. Based on literature from human–robot interactions, psychology and sociology, we then propose a novel model to analyse notions of trust, distinguishing between three aspects: reliability, competence, and intentions. We discuss each aspect and make suggestions regarding how medical AI may become worthy of our trust. (shrink)

Bioethics, Volume 36, Issue 2, Page 154-161, February 2022.

In this paper, I respond to Pierre Le Morvan’s critique of my thesis that ignorance is lack of true belief rather than absence of knowledge. I argue that the distinction between dispositional and non-dispositional accounts of belief, as I made it in a previous paper, is correct as it stands. Also, I criticize the viability and the importance of Le Morvan’s distinction between propositional and factive ignorance. Finally, I provide two arguments in favor of the thesis that ignorance is lack (...) of true belief rather than absence of knowledge. (shrink)

Can only science deliver genuine knowledge about the world and ourselves? Is science our only guide to what exists? Scientism answers both questions with yes. Scientism is increasingly influential in popular scientific literature and intellectual life in general, but philosophers have hitherto largely ignored it. This collection is one of the first to develop and assess scientism as a serious philosophical position. It features twelve new essays by both proponents and critics of scientism. Before scientism can be evaluated, it needs (...) to be clear what it is. Hence, the collection opens with essays that provide an overview of the many different versions of scientism and their mutual interrelations. Next, several card-carrying proponents of scientism make their case, either by developing and arguing directly for their preferred version of scientism or by responding to objections. Then, the floor is given to critics of scientism. It is examined whether scientism is epistemically vicious, whether scientism presents a plausible general epistemological outlook and whether science has limits. The final four essays zoom out and connect scientism to ongoing debates elsewhere in philosophy. What does scientism mean for religious epistemology? What can science tell us about morality and is a scientistic moral epistemology plausible? How is scientism related to physicalism? And is experimental philosophy really a form of scientism tailored to philosophy? (shrink)

"Aux centaines de livres intitulés "Socrate", quel est l'intérêt d'en ajouter un? Simplement parce que celui-ci le regarde autrement, tentant de le saisir en même temps que sa cité. En ajoutant "l'Athénien" à son nom, son titre fait allusion à ce regard nouveau ; d'un mot, il s'agit d'aller de lui à son monde et retour. Mais pourquoi lui? Parce qu'il a vécu dans la seconde partie du Ve siècle à Athènes, parce que la cité offre sur sa propre histoire (...) la plus riche quantité de sources et parce que, plus qu'un autre, il fut décrit par ses contemporains et leurs successeurs : étudier le Socrate d'Athènes, c'est jouir d'un trésor inégalé d'informations. Mais on ne fait pas d'histoire sans question et, dans ce face à face, c'est Athènes qui l'emporte. Cet ouvrage n'est ni un livre de philosophie ni une biographie, ses fins ne sont pas son procès, sa mort. Toute révérence gardée, je me sers de Socrate comme d'un révélateur, un réactif. Ne jamais le regarder sans son contexte - qui me l'explique -, m'aidant à faire de sa cité un portrait, certes fort partiel, mais plus juste. Ce livre jette sur ce transfert d'intérêt trois éclairages analytiques majeurs : lui et ses relations (la société ) ; lui vivant, s'y mouvant (son corps - le sens qu'il lui donne et son image) ; lui et sa conception, son usage du surnaturel : quelles croyances, quelle piété chez lui et les Athéniens?" Pierre Brulé. (shrink)

European states, including Belgium, have looked at the construction of Europe through an economie and a political prism. Both dimensions have evolved following parallel paths. In Belgium a large consensus has always existed concerning the economie dimension of the European construction. In this respect Belgiums post-1945 European policies area direct continuation of the interwar efforts to build a West-European economic area, based on a free trade philosophy and a rejection of economic nationalism which always handicapped small trading states such as (...) Belgium. Even before the second world war the Belgian elite thus accepted the principles of economic multilateralism.In the political dimension however a consensus on a federal Europe only emerged at the end of the seventies. Till then, important parts of the Belgian political elite remained sceptical and even hostile to the construction of a supranational Europe, based on a traditional view on political autonomy and independence. The reasons why Belgian views on the political dimension of Europe slowly shifted to a federal objective were partly domestic and partly the result of the growing awareness that a small countries' political interests in the world can be best pursued through supranationality. (shrink)

Is our experience of the world 'rich' or 'thin'? In other words, are we aware of unattended sensory stimuli, or are the contents of our consciousness constrained by what we attend to? A recent, ingenious, attempt to address this issue offers us a seemingly unavailable, 'moderate' option; our experience is somewhere between the two. But before we make our minds up about this conclusion, we should see that it resulted from conflating two ways of construing the relevant concepts. I claim (...) that, one way of reading 'rich' vs. 'thin', echoes the psychologists' distinction between 'early' vs. 'late' accounts of selective attention, and I argue that 'perceptual load theory', a recent response to this empirical issue, offers us a satisfying solution to our philosophical problem. Ultimately, we are only aware of what we attend to, so we can conclude that our experience of the world is philosophically 'thin'. Nonetheless, the second way of reading 'rich' vs. 'thin' relates to the range of sensory stimuli that we can be aware of. I claim that this range depends upon the attentional load that our sensory systems are placed under. The 'moderate' position, then, merely marks out one possible degree of sensory awareness on a continuum that runs from 'rich' to 'thin'. (shrink)

This paper explores the potential and relevance of an innovative sociological research method known as the Imitation Game for research in health care. Whilst this method and its potential have until recently only been explored within sociology, there are many interesting and promising facets that may render this approach fruitful within the health care field, most notably to questions about the experiential knowledge or ‘expertise’ of chronically ill patients. The Imitation Game can be especially useful because it provides a way (...) to map this experiential knowledge more systematically, without falling in the dual trap of either over-relying on in-depth, but highly specific phenomenological ‘insider’-approaches that are hard to generalize, or, alternatively, problematically reducing the rich life-worlds of patients to a set of indicators in a questionnaire. The main focus of this paper is theoretical and conceptual: explaining the Imitation Game method, discussing its usefulness in the health care domain, and exploring the ways in which the approach can be utilized for chronic illness care. The paper presents both a conceptual and empirical exploration of how the Imitation Game method and its underlying theoretical concepts of ‘contributory expertise’ and ‘interactional expertise’ can be transferred from the sociological realm to the field of health care, what kinds of insights can be gained from the method, which methodological issues it may raise, and what potentially fruitful research routes can be explored. I argue that the Imitation Game can be thought of as a ‘social learning experiment’ that simultaneously enables the participants to learn from each other’s perspectives, allows researchers to explore exciting new possibilities, and also offers the tools to intervene in the practice that is being studied. (shrink)

This book is a volume in the Penn Press Anniversary Collection. To mark its 125th anniversary in 2015, the University of Pennsylvania Press rereleased more than 1,100 titles from Penn Press's distinguished backlist from 1899-1999 that had fallen out of print. Spanning an entire century, the Anniversary Collection offers peer-reviewed scholarship in a wide range of subject areas.

Websites (e.g. intervention websites targeting health risk behaviors) can be effective in achieving their goals if they are used. The actual use, however, is often very low. This study aimed to assess the effect of visual complexity on intention to use websites, by using within-subjects manipulations of visual complexity and cognitive load (1097 trials, N = 93). The results indicate that high visual complexity has a negative effect on intention to use websites ( F (1, 1095) = 14.81, p < (...) .001), but this is fully mediated through attitude towards the website based on the first impression ( F (1, 1094) = 13.41, p < .001). This clearly demonstrates the powerfulness of a first impression before interacting with a website and stresses the need for evidence-based insight into how this first impression is constituted. Keywords: visual complexity; websites; intention to use. (shrink)

Websites can be effective in achieving their goals if they are used. The actual use, however, is often very low. This study aimed to assess the effect of visual complexity on intention to use websites, by using within-subjects manipulations of visual complexity and cognitive load. The results indicate that high visual complexity has a negative effect on intention to use websites = 14.81,p<.001), but this is fully mediated through attitude towards the website based on the first impression = 13.41,p<.001). This (...) clearly demonstrates the powerfulness of a first impression before interacting with a website and stresses the need for evidence-based insight into how this first impression is constituted. Keywords: visual complexity; websites; intention to use. (shrink)

Websites can be effective in achieving their goals if they are used. The actual use, however, is often very low. This study aimed to assess the effect of visual complexity on intention to use websites, by using within-subjects manipulations of visual complexity and cognitive load. The results indicate that high visual complexity has a negative effect on intention to use websites = 14.81, p <.001), but this is fully mediated through attitude towards the website based on the first impression = (...) 13.41, p <.001). This clearly demonstrates the powerfulness of a first impression before interacting with a website and stresses the need for evidence-based insight into how this first impression is constituted. Keywords: visual complexity; websites; intention to use. (shrink)

What does "nature" mean? This general question, central to the social construction of nature, is addressed here by examining one of nature's particulars, Pacific salmon, and by looking at how one group of people, salmon biologists, imbue the fish with meaning. Based upon historical, comparative, and qualitative data, it appears that nature is socially constructed through both cognitive and physical processes. "Salmon"- and indirectly nature - emerges not as a monolithic, timeless, certain entity, but rather as one that is manipulable, (...) fleeting, and the product of a variety of social relations. In particular, public policy and economics appear to have profoundly influenced salmon biologists' cognitive and physical constructions of salmon. (shrink)

This book develops and defends a theory of responsible belief. The author argues that we lack control over our beliefs, but that we can nonetheless influence them. It is because we have intellectual obligations to influence our beliefs that we are responsible for them.

Philosophical accounts of visual perception have long had to contend with questions of perceptual relativity: visual phenomenology seems to be influenced by factors independent of the objective properties of the external objects we perceive. More recently, a host of such examples has emerged from psychological studies on visual attention. In two prominent accounts of the consequences of this research, Block argues that these effects occur without changes in the way one visually represents the world to be. If true, this would (...) undermine representationalist accounts of the phenomenology of perception, which share a commitment to the claim that phenomenal character supervenes on representational content. Block’s thesis is based on experiments involving non-selective attention, and he draws the metaphysical conclusion that the resources representationalists need to distinguish veridical from illusory perception are nonexistent. The empirical evidence he considers is highly compelling, as is the ‘landscape’ model of attention that appears to underwrite it. However, in discussing these issues, Block also considers a representative example of selective attention, wherein he concedes a point that provides grounds for a plausible representationalist response. I assemble and assess this response, revealing the contradiction at the heart of Block’s thesis, and conclude, that the representationalist should remain unmoved. (shrink)

La fille grecque passe directement de ses jouets au lit de celui auquel son père l'a donnée. Certes, pour énoncer cette vérité, il convient de traquer les maigres sources à notre disposition. Il est alors recommandé de s'adresser aux poètes qui disent de la façon la plus complète et la plus évocatrice ce que signifie ce passage direct de l'enfance à l'érotique adulte et à la maternité. Le tableau de ce « pivotement du sacré », qui est la lecture religieuse (...) du passage, montre l'importance des divinités conductrices dans cette transition, les déesses qui aident la fille à faire ce bond dans l'inconnu : Artémis, du côté de l'enfance, Peithô (“Persuasion”) et Aphrodite, du côté d'Eros. Les hommes, la cité, s'intéressent évidemment à cet échange des filles entre les « maisons » que constitue le mariage et l'on trouve dans les textes normatifs ­ juridiques ­ des preuves de l'existence de mariages d'impubères en Grèce et ­ plus généralement ­ du très grand écart d'âge entre les époux. (shrink)

La fille grecque passe directement de ses jouets au lit de celui auquel son père l'a donnée. Certes, pour énoncer cette vérité, il convient de traquer les maigres sources à notre disposition. Il est alors recommandé de s'adresser aux poètes qui disent de la façon la plus complète et la plus évocatrice ce que signifie ce passage direct de l'enfance à l'érotique adulte et à la maternité. Le tableau de ce « pivotement du sacré », qui est la lecture religieuse (...) du passage, montre l'importance des divinités conductrices dans cette transition, les déesses qui aident la fille à faire ce bond dans l'inconnu : Artémis, du côté de l'enfance, Peithô (“Persuasion”) et Aphrodite, du côté d'Eros. Les hommes, la cité, s'intéressent évidemment à cet échange des filles entre les « maisons » que constitue le mariage et l'on trouve dans les textes normatifs ­ juridiques ­ des preuves de l'existence de mariages d'impubères en Grèce et ­ plus généralement ­ du très grand écart d'âge entre les époux. (shrink)

Femmes voilées : les Grecs aussi. À propos d’un livre de Lloyd Llewellyn-Jones. 2003 marque une date importante dans l’historiographie de l’Antiquité grecque : le livre de Lloyd Llewellyn-Jones « ose » comparer de façon systématique le port du voile par les Grecques à d’autres usages, à d’autres référents culturels comme ceux du monde araboislamique. Ce court hommage a pour objet d’insister sur l’originalité et l’importance de cette contribution majeure à l’histoire des femmes grecques ; il s’agit aussi de dénoncer (...) le silence et l’aveuglement des érudits. (shrink)

To study how expertise impacts the understanding of a complex system like the vineyard, three measures were used with 259 participants (190 non-experts, 34 winemakers and/or winegrowers, and 35 biologists): a questionnaire to check for expertise (the Plant Biology Questionnaire), a task about the Structure, Behaviour and Function model, and a measure of the content of the participants? discourse with the ALCESTE software. Results showed that biologists mentioned functions significantly more often than behaviours, whereas it was the opposite for winegrowers. (...) Non-experts mentioned functions and behaviours significantly less frequently than experts did. The content analysis confirmed the differential expression of each kind of expertise: scientific wording for biologists, technical wording for winegrowers, and words focused on perceptible structures for the non-experts. Results from all tasks were highly correlated and allowed for an interpretation of expertise in terms of mental models of the vineyard. (shrink)

a brief history of the study of ignorance. There is a lack of serious investigation into ignorance: apart from the apophatic tradition in the ancient world and the Middle Ages and the more recent fields of agnotology, philosophy of race, and feminist philosophy, ignorance itself has received little philosophical attention. It is then laid out how the field that one would expect to have studied ignorance in detail, namely, epistemology, has failed to do so. The chapter also explores why this (...) could be the case. Subsequently, it is explained what is new about this book and how this fills the important gap in the study of ignorance: it develops and applies an epistemology of ignorance. Finally, it gives a brief overview of the chapters ahead. (shrink)

This research explores the role of emotions in goal-directed behaviour. A model is provided for an emotional goal system whereby appraisals of the consequences of achieving or not achieving a goal are hypothesised to elicit anticipatory emotions; the anticipatory emotions are expected, in turn, to contribute to volitions in the service of goal pursuit (namely, intentions, plans, and the decision to expend energy); goal-directed behaviours next arise in response to volitions and lead to goal attainment; and the latter then functions (...) as the basis for a new set of appraisals and accompanying goaloutcome emotions. The model was tested in a longitudinal study of the responses of 406 adults (243 women, 163 men) in The Netherlands. The context for the study was the regulation of one's bodyweight via exercising and dieting. (shrink)

Nombre d’exégètes ont déjà montré comment le nom a fonctionné comme un tremplin pour donner à la pensée mythique grecque une impulsion particulière. Ces noms sont souvent « parlants », mais il en est de géographiques, ainsi celui d’Eurôpè dans ses rapports avec l’Europe. Eurôpè apparaît plusieurs fois dans des récits généalogiques, et spécialement dans la Bibliothèque d’Apollodore. Elle est incluse dans des lignées, et sa présence leur donne tout leur sens. C’est l’occasion de revenir sur les qualités de ce (...) cadre narratif minimum que constituent ces généalogies. Productrices d’un passé spécifique, elles ne donnent point l’Histoire : insuffisamment structurées et porteuses de valeurs extrinsèques. Elles sont aussi productrices d’espace. Les noms des acteurs de ces récits, par leur simple présence, et aussi par l’ordre dans lequel ils apparaissent dessinent une géographie qui est celle d’un cosmos fort remodelé par le caractère très narcissique de cette pensée, refermée sur son hellénité.Geography and History of genealogical accounts. Many scholars have already shown how names have functioned as a springboard giving mythic Greek thought a particular direction. These names are often “speaking” names, but some are geographic like that of Eurôpè in their relations with Europe. Eurôpè appears many times in genealogic accounts, and especially in Apollodore’s Library. She is included in some lines and her presence gives them their entire signification. This provides the opportunity to return to this minimum narrative scope: the genealogic accounts. They give only a specific past, no history, because they are insufficiently structured and have outer values. They also give space. The names of the actors, simply by their presence, and also by the order in which they appear, draw a map, that of a cosmos, – but one remodelled by the highly narcissistic character of this thought, closed by its Hellenic conception. (shrink)

Any plausible ethics of belief must respect that normal agents are doxastically blameworthy for their beliefs in a range of non-exotic cases. In this paper, we argue, first, that together with independently motivated principles this constraint leads us to reject occurrentism as a general theory of belief. Second, we must acknowledge not only dormant beliefs, but tacit beliefs as well. Third, a plausible ethics of belief leads us to acknowledge that a difference in propositional content cannot in all contexts count (...) as a criterion for belief individuation. In some contexts, we need to individuate beliefs in a different manner, namely in such a way that they have at least part of their causal history essentially. (shrink)

Le Serment d’Hippocrate, sans doute le texte que la postérité a retenu comme le plus fameux des écrits médicaux de l’Antiquité grecque, prend en une phrase position sur l’avortement : « Je ne remettrai pas non plus à une femme de pessaire abortif ». Les commentaires de ce passage du Serment ont été et sont toujours nombreux et donnent lieu à de multiples controverses. Mais une lecture littérale permet d’affirmer qu’il ne s’agit nullement d’une interdiction pure et simple de l’avortement, (...) mais seulement d’une interdiction d’un type de pratique abortive en raison de sa dangerosité. Car les femmes grecques se mutilent et meurent d’avoir des enfants, mais aussi de ne pas pouvoir en avoir et sûrement de ne pas en vouloir. Les médecins le savent. (shrink)

There are convincing counter-examples to the widely accepted thesis that we cannot believe at will. For it seems possible that the truth of a proposition depend on whether or not one believes it. I call such scenarios cases of Truth Depends on Belief and I argue that they meet the main criteria for believing at will that we find in the literature. I reply to five objections that one might level against the thesis that TDB cases show that believing at (...) will is possible, namely that mind-reading is impossible, in TDB cases, one's belief is caused by one's desire, in TDB scenarios, one chooses not a belief but something else, TDB cases are reducible to Feldman cases, and that if truth depends on belief, we are on the road to a regress. Of course, TDB scenarios hardly, if ever, occur in real life. For three reasons, they are nonetheless important. First, they show that the thesis that it is conceptually impossible to believe at will is simply false. Second, they provide us with an imp.. (shrink)

This article offers an analysis of ignorance. After a couple of preliminary remarks, I endeavor to show that, contrary to what one might expect and to what nearly all philosophers assume, being ignorant is not equivalent to failing to know, at least not on one of the stronger senses of knowledge. Subsequently, I offer two definitions of ignorance and argue that one’s definition of ignorance crucially depends on one’s account of belief. Finally, I illustrate the relevance of my analysis by (...) paying attention to four philosophical problems in which ignorance plays a crucial role. (shrink)

William Alston has argued that the so-called deontological conception of epistemic justification, on which epistemic justification is to be spelled out in terms of blame, responsibility, and obligations, is untenable. The basic idea of the argument is that this conception is untenable because we lack voluntary control over our beliefs and, therefore, cannot have any obligations to hold certain beliefs. If this is convincing, however, the argument threatens the very idea of doxastic responsibility. For, how can we ever be responsible (...) for our beliefs if we lack control over them? Several philosophers have argued that the idea that we bear responsibility for our beliefs can be saved, because absence of voluntary control over our beliefs is perfectly compatible with having obligations to hold particular beliefs. With others, I call this view ‘doxastic compatibilism’. It comes in two varieties. On the first variety, doxastic obligations do not require any kind of doxastic control whatsoever. I argue that this variety of doxastic compatibilism fails because it confuses doxastic responsibility with other closely related phenomena. On the second variety, doxastic obligations do not require voluntary doxastic control, but only compatibilist doxastic control (roughly, reason-responsiveness) and we do in fact have such control. I grant that we have such control, but also argue that having such control is insufficient for bearing doxastic responsibility. The plausibility of the examples put forward by doxastic compatibilists in support of the claim that it is sufficient for doxastic responsibility derives from the fact that in these examples, the subjects have control over factors that influence what they believe rather than control over those beliefs themselves. (shrink)

In recent years, the healthcare field welcomed an emerging field of practices captured under the umbrella term ‘Big Data’. This term is surrounded with positive rhetoric and promises about the ability to analyse real-world data quickly and comprehensively. Such rhetoric is highly consequential in shaping debates on Big Data. While the fields of Science and Technology Studies and Critical Data Studies have been instrumental in elaborating the neglected and problematic dimensions of Big Data, it remains an open question how and (...) to what extent such insights become embedded in other fields. In this paper, we analyse the epistemological claims that accompany Big Data in the healthcare domain. We systematically searched scientific literature and selected 206 editorials as these reflect on developments in the domain. Through an interpretive analysis, we construct five ideal-typical discourses that all frame Big Data in specific ways. Three of the discourses frame Big Data in positive terms and disseminate a compelling rhetoric. Metaphors of ‘capturing’, ‘illuminating’ and ‘harnessing’ data presume that Big Data are benign and leading to valid knowledge. The scientist and critical-interpretive discourses question the objectivity and effectivity claims of Big Data. Metaphors of ‘selecting’ and ‘constructing’ data illustrate another political message, framing Big Data as limited. We conclude that work in the critical-interpretive discourse has not broadly infiltrated the medical domain. Ways to better integrate aspects of the discourse in the healthcare domain are urgently needed. (shrink)

This paper assesses five main empirical scientific arguments against the reliability of belief formation on the basis of introspecting phenomenal states. After defining ‘reliability’ and ‘introspection’, I discuss five arguments to the effect that phenomenal states are more elusive than we usually think: the argument on the basis of differences in introspective reports from differences in introspective measurements; the argument from differences in reports about whether or not dreams come in colours; the argument from the absence of a correlation between (...) visual imagery ability and the performance on certain cognitive tasks; the argument from our unawareness of our capacity of echolocation; the argument from inattentional blindness and change blindness. I argue that the experiments on which these arguments are based do not concern belief formation on the basis of introspection in the first place or fail to show that it is unreliable, even when limited to introspection of phenomenal states. (shrink)