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  1. Susan L. Hurley (forthcoming). Varieties of Externalism. In R. Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. Ashgate.
    Externalism comes in varieties. While the landscape isn.
     
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  2. Susan L. Hurley (2008). The Shared Circuits Model. How Control, Mirroring, and Simulation Can Enable Imitation and Mind Reading. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):1-22.
    Imitation, deliberation, and mindreading are characteristically human sociocognitive skills. Research on imitation and its role in social cognition is flourishing across various disciplines; it is here surveyed under headings of behavior, subpersonal mechanisms, and functions of imitation. A model is then advanced within which many of the developments surveyed can be located and explained. The shared circuits model explains how imitation, deliberation, and mindreading can be enabled by subpersonal mechanisms of control, mirroring and simulation. It is cast at a middle, (...)
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  3. Susan L. Hurley (2007). Neural Dominance, Neural Deference, and Sensorimotor Dynamics. In M. Velmans (ed.), Encyclopedia of Consciousness. Blackwell. 640--656.
    Why is neural activity in a particular area expressed as experience of red rather than green, or as visual experience rather than auditory? Indeed, why does it have any conscious expression at all? These familiar questions indicate the explanatory gap between neural activity and ‘what it’s like’-- qualities of conscious experience. The comparative explanatory gaps, intermodal and intramodal, can be separated from the absolute explanatory gap and associated zombie issues--why does neural activity have any conscious expression at all?. Here I (...)
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  4. Susan L. Hurley (2006). Active Perception and Perceiving Action: The Shared Circuits Model. In Tamar Szab Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.
    Recently research on imitation and its role in social cognition has been flourishing across various disciplines. After briefly reviewing these developments under the headings of behavior, subpersonal mechanisms, and functions of imitation, I advance the _shared circuits_.
     
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  5. Susan L. Hurley (2006). Bypassing Conscious Control: Media Violence, Unconscious Imitation, and Freedom of Speech. In S. Pockett, W. Banks & S. Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press.
    Why does it matter whether and how individuals consciously control their behavior? It matters for many reasons. Here I focus on concerns about social influences of which agents are typically unaware on aggressive behavior.
     
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  6. Susan L. Hurley (2006). Bypassing Conscious Control: Unconscious Imitation, Media Violence, and Freedom of Speech. In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press. 301-337.
  7. Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.) (2006). Rational Animals? Oxford University Press.
    To what extent can animal behaviour be described as rational? What does it even mean to describe behaviour as rational? -/- This book focuses on one of the major debates in science today - how closely does mental processing in animals resemble mental processing in humans. It addresses the question of whether and to what extent non-human animals are rational, that is, whether any animal behaviour can be regarded as the result of a rational thought processes. It does this with (...)
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  8. Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (2006). The Questions of Animal Rationality: Theory and Evidence. In Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press.
     
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  9. Susan L. Hurley & Nick Chater (eds.) (2004). Perspectives on Imitation. MIT Press.
    These volumes provide a resource that makes this research accessible across disciplines and clarifies its importance for the social sciences and philosophy as ...
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  10. Susan L. Hurley (2003). Animal Action in the Space of Reasons. Mind and Language 18 (3):231-256.
    I defend the view that we should not overintellectualize the mind. Nonhuman animals can occupy islands of practical rationality: they can have contextbound reasons for action even though they lack full conceptual abilities. Holism and the possibility of mistake are required for such reasons to be the agent's reasons, but these requirements can be met in the absence of inferential promiscuity. Empirical work with animals is used to illustrate the possibility that reasons for action could be bound to symbolic or (...)
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  11. Susan L. Hurley (2003). Action and the Unity of Consciousness. In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
     
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  12. Susan L. Hurley (2003). Action, the Unity of Consciousness, and Vehicle Externalism. In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press. 78--91.
  13. Susan L. Hurley (2003). Making Sense of Animals: Interpretation Vs. Architecture. Mind and Language 18 (3):273-280.
    i>: We should not overintellectualize the mind. Nonhuman animals can occupy islands of practical rationality: they can have specific, context-bound reasons for action even though they lack full conceptual abilities. Holism and the possibility of mistake are required for such reasons to be the agent’s reasons, but these requirements can be met in the absence of inferential promiscuity. Empirical work with animals is used to illustrate the possibility that reasons for action could be bound to symbolic or social contexts, and (...)
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  14. Susan L. Hurley & No (2003). Neural Plasticity and Consciousness. Biology and Philosophy 18 (1):131-168.
    and apply it to various examples of neural plasticity in which input is rerouted intermodally or intramodally to nonstandard cortical targets. In some cases but not others, cortical activity ‘defers’ to the nonstandard sources of input. We ask why, consider some possible explanations, and propose a dynamic sensorimotor hypothesis. We believe that this distinction is important and worthy of further study, both philosophical and empirical, whether or not our hypothesis turns out to be correct. In particular, the question of how (...)
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  15. Susan L. Hurley & Alva Noe (2003). Neural Plasticity and Consciousness: Reply to Block. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):342.
    Susan Hurley Susan Hurley Susan Hurley Susan Hurley1111 andAlva Noë andAlva Noë andAlva Noë andAlva Noë2222.
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  16. Alva Noë & Susan L. Hurley (2003). The Deferential Brain in Action. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (5):195-196.
    binding of colour and alphanumeric form in synaesthesia. Nature 410.
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  17. Susan L. Hurley, Consciousness in Action: Clarifications.
    Philosophy of neuroscience may seem an odd thing to do. What can a philosopher add to what neuroscience itself has to say, other than at some very abstract level, far removed from empirical details and the interests of scientists? At some point you take a deep breath, acknowledge the methodological questions, and just go ahead, spurred on by the sheer philosophical interest and excitement abroad in the neurosciences today. So it is very gratifying to a philosopher of neuroscience for such (...)
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  18. Susan L. Hurley, Is There a Substantive Disagreement Here? Reply to Chemero and Cordeiro.
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  19. Susan L. Hurley (2002). Luck, Responsibility, and the 'Natural Lottery'. Journal of Political Philosophy 10 (1):79–94.
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  20. Susan L. Hurley, Precis of Consciousness in Action.
  21. Susan L. Hurley, The Space of Reasons Vs. The Space of Inference: Reply to Noe.
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  22. Susan L. Hurley (2001). Overintellectualizing the Mind. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):423-431.
  23. Susan L. Hurley (2001). Perception and Action: Alternative Views. Synthese 129 (1):3-40.
    A traditional view of perception and action makestwo assumptions: that the causal flow betweenperception and action is primarily linear or one-way,and that they are merely instrumentally related toeach other, so that each is a means to the other.Either or both of these assumptions can be rejected.Behaviorism rejects the instrumental but not theone-way aspect of the traditional view, thus leavingitself open to charges of verificationism. Ecologicalviews reject the one-way aspect but not theinstrumental aspect of the traditional view, so thatperception and (...)
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  24. Susan L. Hurley (2000). Clarifications: Responses to Kobes and Kinsbourne. Mind and Language 15 (5):556–561.
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  25. Susan L. Hurley (2000). Is Responsibility Essentially Impossible? Philosophical Studies 99 (2):229-268.
    Part 1 reviews the general question of when elimination of an entity orproperty is warranted, as opposed to revision of our view of it. Theconnections of this issue with the distinction between context-drivenand theory-driven accounts of reference and essence are probed.Context-driven accounts tend to be less hospitable to eliminativism thantheory-driven accounts, but this tendency should not be overstated.However, since both types of account give essences explanatory depth,eliminativist claims associated with supposed impossible essences areproblematic on both types of account.Part 2 applies (...)
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  26. Susan L. Hurley (1999). Responsibility, Reason, and Irrelevant Alternatives. Philosophy and Public Affairs 28 (3):205–241.
  27. Susan L. Hurley (1998). Active Perception and Vehicle Externalism. In , Consciousness in Action. Harvard University Press.
    Certain empirical results suggest a way of challenging two natural and widespread assumptions about the mind. One assumption is about the relations between perception and action. This shows up in the widespread conception of perception and action in terms of input and output, respectively. Perception is conceived as input from world to mind and action is conceived as output from mind to world. The other assumption is about the relations between mind and world. It influences various opposed views about whether (...)
     
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  28. Susan L. Hurley (1998). Consciousness in Action. Harvard University Press.
  29. Susan L. Hurley (1998). Nonconceptual Self-Consciousness and Agency: Perspective and Access. Communication and Cognition 30 (3-4):207-247.
  30. Susan L. Hurley (1998). Self-Consciousness, Spontaneity, and the Myth of the Giving. In Consciousness in Action. Cambridge.
    From my Consciousness in Action, ch. 2; see Consciousness in Action for bibligraphy. This chapter revises material from "Kant on Spontaneity and the Myth of the Giving", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1993-94, pp. 137-164, and "Myth Upon Myth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1996, vol. 96, pp. 253-260.
     
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  31. Susan L. Hurley (1998). Unity, Neuropsychology, and Action. In Consciousness in Action. Harvard University Press.
  32. Susan L. Hurley (1998). Vehicles, Contents, Conceptual Structure and Externalism. Analysis 58 (1):1-6.
    We all know about the vehicle/content distinction (see Dennett 1991a, Millikan 1991, 1993). We shouldn't confuse properties represented in content with properties of vehicles of content. In particular, we shouldn't confuse the personal and subpersonal levels. The contents of the mental states of subject/agents are at the personal level. Vehicles of content are causally explanatory subpersonal events or processes or states. We shouldn't suppose that the properties of vehicles must be projected into what they represent for subject/agents, or vice versa. (...)
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  33. Susan L. Hurley (1998). Wittgenstein on Practice and the Myth of the Giving. In Consciousness in Action. Harvard University Press.
    This is the text of The Lindley Lecture for 1995, given by Susan Hurley (1954-2007), an American philosopher.
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  34. Susan L. Hurley (1996). Myth Upon Myth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:253-260.
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  35. Susan L. Hurley (1994). Unity and Objectivity. In Christopher Peacocke (ed.), Objectivity, Simulation, and the Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press. 49--77.
     
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