Motivated by Hoff and Stiglitz’s :753–763, 2004) theory, we examine empirically how the creation of “rules of the game” affect the behavior of economic agents in a transition economy. Using a sample of Chinese state-owned enterprises in which controlling ownership was transferred to private acquirers between 1994 and 2006, we find that the post-privatization performance of firms depends on institutional factors. Before 2003, we observe severe post-privatization tunneling behaviors by acquirers and worse PPP. However, from 2003, when the State (...) issued regulations against tunneling and strengthened enforcement, the incidence of tunneling behaviors declined, and PPP improved. We find that better implementation of ownership transfer and longer prior experience of private acquirers are key factors that contribute to the improvement. (shrink)

We discuss a simple logic to describe one of our favourite games from childhood, hide and seek, and show how a simple addition of an equality constant to describe the winning condition of the seeker makes our logic undecidable. There are certain decidable fragments of first-order logic which behave in a similar fashion and we add a new modal variant to that class of logics. We also discuss the relative expressive power of the proposed logic in comparison to the standard (...) modal counterparts. (shrink)

We discuss a simple logic to describe one of our favourite games from childhood, hide and seek, and show how a simple addition of an equality constant to describe the winning condition of the seeker makes our logic undecidable. There are certain decidable fragments of first-order logic which behave in a similar fashion with respect to such a language extension, and we add a new modal variant to that class. We discuss the relative expressive power of the proposed logic in (...) comparison to the standard modal counterparts. We prove that the model checking problem for the resulting logic is \(\textsf{P}\) -complete. In addition, by exploring the connection with related product logics, we gain more insight towards having a better understanding of the subtleties of the proposed framework. (shrink)

A situation, in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (point-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. In this article we discuss a class of equal surplus sharing solutions consisting of all convex combinations of the CIS-value, the ENSC-value and the equal division solution. We provide several characterizations of this class of solutions on (...) variable and fixed player set. Specifications of several properties characterize specific solutions in this class. (shrink)

In cooperative Cournot oligopoly games, it is known that the β-core is equal to the α-core, and both are non-empty if every individual profit function is continuous and concave (Zhao, Games Econ Behav 27:153–168, 1999b). Following Chander and Tulkens (Int J Game Theory 26:379–401, 1997), we assume that firms react to a deviating coalition by choosing individual best reply strategies. We deal with the problem of the non-emptiness of the induced core, the γ-core, by two different approaches. The first (...) establishes that the associated Cournot oligopoly Transferable Utility (TU)-games are balanced if the inverse demand function is differentiable and every individual profit function is continuous and concave on the set of strategy profiles, which is a step forward beyond Zhao’s core existence result for this class of games. The second approach, restricted to the class of Cournot oligopoly TU-games with linear cost functions, provides a single-valued allocation rule in the γ-core called Nash Pro rata (NP)-value. This result generalizes Funaki and Yamato’s (Int J Game Theory 28:157–171, 1999) core existence result from no capacity constraint to asymmetric capacity constraints. Moreover, we provide an axiomatic characterization of this solution by means of four properties: efficiency, null firm, monotonicity, and non-cooperative fairness. (shrink)

A new class of values combining marginalistic and egalitarian principles is introduced for cooperative TU-games. It includes some modes of solidarity among the players by taking the collective contribution of some coalitions to the grand coalition into account. Relationships with other class of values such as the Egalitarian Shapley values and the Procedural values are discussed. We propose a strategic implementation of our class of values in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Two axiomatic characterizations are provided: one of the whole class (...) of values, and one of each of its extreme points. (shrink)

A situation, in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (point-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. In this article we discuss a class of equal surplus sharing solutions consisting of all convex combinations of the CIS-value, the ENSC-value and the equal division solution. We provide several characterizations of this class of solutions on (...) variable and fixed player set. Specifications of several properties characterize specific solutions in this class. (shrink)

In the framework of transferable utility games, we modify the 2-person Davis–Maschler reduced game to ensure non-emptiness of the imputation set of the adapted 2-person reduced game. Based on the modification, we propose two new axioms: reduced game monotonicity and reduced dominance. Using RGM, RD, NE, Covariance under strategic equivalence, Equal treatment property and Pareto optimality, we are able to characterize the kernel.

A solution for cooperative games with transferable utility, or simply TU-games, assigns a payoff vector to every TU-game. In this paper we discuss two classes of equal surplus sharing solutions. The first class consists of all convex combinations of the equal division solution and the center-of-gravity of the imputation-set value. The second class is the dual class consisting of all convex combinations of the equal division solution and the egalitarian non-separable contribution value. We provide characterizations of the two classes (...) of solutions using either population solidarity or a reduced game consistency in addition to other standard properties. (shrink)

Inspired by Scarf, Zhao, Sandholm and Yang and Zhang, we introduce the model of coalitional population games with infinitely many pure strategies, and define the notions of NTU core and TU core for coalitional population games. We next prove the existence results for NTU cores and TU cores. Furthermore, as an extension of the NTU core, we introduce the notion of strong equilibria and prove the existence theorem of strong equilibria.

Digraph games are cooperative TU-games associated to domination structures which can be modeled by directed graphs. Examples come from sports competitions or from simple majority win digraphs corresponding to preference profiles in social choice theory. The Shapley value, core, marginal vectors and selectope vectors of digraph games are characterized in terms of so-called simple score vectors. A general characterization of the class of (almost positive) TU-games where each selectope vector is a marginal vector is provided in terms of game (...) semi-circuits. Finally, applications to the ranking of teams in sports competitions and of alternatives in social choice theory are discussed. (shrink)

The Shapley value is a well-known solution concept for TU games. The Maschler–Owen value and the NTU Shapley value are two well-known extensions of the Shapley value to NTU games. A hyperplane game is an NTU game in which the feasible set for each coalition is a hyperplane. On the domain of monotonic hyperplane games, the Maschler–Owen value is axiomatized. Although the domain of hyperplane game is a very interesting class of games to study, unfortunately, on this (...) domain, the NTU Shapley value is not well-defined, namely, it assigns an empty set to some hyperplane games. A prize game is an NTU game that can be obtained by “truncating” a hyperplane game. As such, a prize game describes essentially the same situation as the corresponding hyperplane game. It turns out that, on the domain of monotonic prize games, the NTU Shapley value is well-defined. Thus, one can define a value which is well-defined on the domain of monotonic hyperplane games as follows: given a monotonic hyperplane game, first, transform it into a prize game, and then apply the NTU Shapley value to it. We refer to the resulting value as the “generalized Shapley value” and compare the axiomatic properties of it with those of the Maschler–Owen value on the union of the class of monotonic hyperplane games and that of monotonic prize games. We also provide axiomatizations of the Maschler–Owen value and the generalized Shapley value on that domain. (shrink)

Digraph games are cooperative TU-games associated to domination structures which can be modeled by directed graphs. Examples come from sports competitions or from simple majority win digraphs corresponding to preference profiles in social choice theory. The Shapley value, core, marginal vectors and selectope vectors of digraph games are characterized in terms of so-called simple score vectors. A general characterization of the class of (almost positive) TU-games where each selectope vector is a marginal vector is provided in terms of game (...) semi-circuits. Finally, applications to the ranking of teams in sports competitions and of alternatives in social choice theory are discussed. (shrink)

A cooperative game with transferable utility–or simply a TU-game– describes a situation in which players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation. A value function for these games assigns to every TU-game a distribution of payoffs over the players. Well-known solutions for TU-games are the Shapley and the Banzhaf value. An alternative type of solution is the concept of share function, which assigns to every player in a TU-game its share in the worth of the grand coalition. In (...) this paper we consider TU-games in which the players are organized into a coalition structure being a finite partition of the set of players. The Shapley value has been generalized by Owen to TU-games in coalition structure. We redefine this value function as a share function and show that this solution satisfies the multiplication property that the share of a player in some coalition is equal to the product of the Shapley share of the coalition in a game between the coalitions and the Shapley share of the player in a game between the players within the coalition. Analogously we introduce a Banzhaf coalition structure share function. Application of these share functions to simple majority games show some appealing properties. (shrink)

It is known that peer group games are a special class of games with a permission structure. However, peer group games are also a special class of digraph games. To be specific, they are digraph games in which the digraph is the transitive closure of a rooted tree. In this paper we first argue that some known results on solutions for peer group games hold more general for digraph games. Second, we generalize both digraph games as well as games with (...) a permission structure into a model called games with a local permission structure, where every player needs permission from its predecessors only to generate worth, but does not need its predecessors to give permission to its own successors. We introduce and axiomatize a Shapley value-type solution for these games, generalizing the conjunctive permission value for games with a permission structure and the β\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\beta $$\end{document}-measure for weighted digraphs. (shrink)

Cet article interroge l’originalité ludique du dispositif sociotechnique conçu par les réseaux socionumériques autour du profil pour organiser les différentes activités en ligne. Alors que les jeux constituent une des activités les plus prisées par les membres du réseau à laquelle ils consacrent un temps important, peu de recherches se sont focalisées sur l’analyse des activités ludiques sur les réseaux socionumériques. Par l’application de cadres conceptuels éprouvés pour analyser les jeux et activités ludiques, il est possible d’interroger la spécificité des (...) modalités de jeux qui sont proposées sur les réseaux socionumériques. Une analyse centrée sur les fonctionnalités offertes par Facebook conduit à interroger de façon critique la nature même de l’activité ludique menée dans le contexte particulier des réseaux socionumériques.This article looks into the distinctively “playful” nature of the socio-technical system that social networking sites construct around user profiles in order to organize different online activities. Although games some of the most popular activities among network members, to which they devote a considerable amount of time, there have been few analyses to date of game-playing on social networking sites. A number of proven conceptual frameworks can be used to analyze online games and game-playing and to examine the particular patterns found on the social networking sites. Based on an analysis of Facebook features, we offer an in-depth discussion of the nature of the game-playing that takes place in the particular context of social networking sites. (shrink)

We introduce values for rooted-tree and sink-tree digraph games axiomatically and provide their explicit formula representation. These values may be considered as natural extensions of the lower equivalent and upper equivalent solutions for line-graph games studied in van den Brink et al. (Econ Theory 33:349–349, 2007). We study the distribution of Harsanyi dividends. We show that the problem of sharing a river with a delta or with multiple sources among different agents located at different levels along the riverbed can be (...) embedded into the framework of a rooted-tree or sink-tree digraph game correspondingly. (shrink)

We introduce a new allocation rule, called the sequential equal surplus division for rooted forest TU-games. We provide two axiomatic characterizations for this allocation rule. The first one uses the classical property of component efficiency plus an edge deletion property. The second characterization uses standardness, an edge deletion property applied to specific rooted trees, a consistency property, and an amalgamation property. We also provide an extension of the sequential equal surplus division applied to the problem of sharing a river with (...) bifurcations. (shrink)

For centuries, many have turned to Confucianism for its wisdom on ethics and politics, while its distinctive contribution to spirituality has often been overlooked. In this remarkable collection, leading scholars of Confucianism explore this spiritual and religious dimension more deeply. Now available for the first time in English are insights into the Confucian understanding of themes such as holism, divinity, piety, religious virtue, and spiritual progress. Volume One of this collection offers as overview of Confucianism, its formation and rituals. The (...) forthcoming Volume Two examines self-cultivation, the development of the tradition, and Confucianism's flowering in our world today. Book jacket. (shrink)

We revisit the characterization of the Shapley value by van den Brink (Int J Game Theory, 2001, 30:309–319) via efficiency, the Null player axiom, and some fairness axiom. In particular, we show that this characterization also works within certain classes of TU games, including the classes of superadditive and of convex games. Further, we advocate some differential version of the marginality axiom (Young, Int J Game Theory, 1985, 14: 65–72), which turns out to be equivalent to the van (...) den Brink fairness axiom on large classes of games. (shrink)

Mencius’ claim that human nature is good is well known among students of classical Confucian thought. It has been taken for granted that underlying Mencius’ deceptively simple thesis is an appeal to intuition. No persuasive argument is offered, except the insistence that the moral propensities, such as the “four germinations” are inherent in human nature. A corollary of this insistence is the unquestioned belief that human beings all have the inner ability to commiserate with others, to feel ashamed of themselves, (...) to have a sense of humbleness, and to differentiate right from wrong. And the only example of an attempt to “prove” the thesis which approximates a kind of empiricist procedure seems no more than a commensense observation. (shrink)

An exposition of the core Confucian text, the Analects, is a rich resource for thinking philosophically about aesthetics, ethics, and religion. Indeed, the Analects is an inspiration for doing philosophy as a dialogical, rather than a dialectic, dialogue and an edifying conversation. The four integrated dimensions of Confucian humanism as embodied in Confucius’ “anthropocosmic” philosophy encompass the sacredness of earth, body, family, community, and the world. Specifically, it envisions that the full realization of the way of learning to be human (...) consists of (1) the integration of the body and mind, (2) the fruitful interaction between the individual and society, (3) the sustainable and harmonious relationship between humanity and nature, and (4) the mutual responsiveness between the human hear-mind and the Way of Heaven. Furthermore, it transcends the concepts of rationality in the Enlightenment mentality and provides a philosophy of life rooted in the sensitivity, sympathy, and compassion inherent in human nature. Confucius’ “anthropocosmic” philosophy is one of the most profound spiritual legacies in rethinking the human in the twenty-first century. (shrink)

By focusing on the Confucian ideal of forming one body with Heaven, Earth, and myriad things, I argue that the distinctive feature of Chinese cosmology is not the absence of cosmogonist concerns, but faith in the interconnectedness of all modalities of being as the result of the continuous creativity of the cosmic process.

The ideal Chinese thinker is a scholar‐official who is informed by a profound historical consciousness, well seasoned in the fine arts of poetry, lute and calligraphy, and deeply immersed in the daily routine of government. If philosophy is loosely defined as disciplined reflection on insights, Chinese philosophy is distinguished in its commitment to and observation of the human condition. It is a disciplined engaged reflection with insights derived primarily from practical living. The Chinese thinker, unlike the Greek philosopher, the Hebrew (...) prophet, the Indian guru, the Christian priest, or the Buddhist monk, is engaged in society, involved in politics, and dedicated to the spiritual transformation of the world from within. (shrink)

By focusing on the Confucian ideal of forming one body with Heaven, Earth, and myriad things, I argue that the distinctive feature of Chinese cosmology is not the absence of cosmogonist concerns, but faith in the interconnectedness of all modalities of being as the result of the continuous creativity of the cosmic process.

I. The "Moral Universal" from the Perspectives of East Asian Thought jl\ defining characteristic of East Asian thought is the widely accepted proposition ...

This article discusses the set of Harsanyi payoff vectors of a cooperative TU-game, also known as the Selectope. We reconsider some results on Harsanyi payoff vectors within a more general framework. First, an intuitive approach is used, showing that the set of Harsanyi payoff vectors is the core of an associated convex game. Next, the set of individual rational Harsanyi payoff vectors, the Harsanyi imputations in short, is considered. Existence conditions are provided, and if non-empty, we provide a (...) description as the core of a well-defined convex game, and show that it is an externally stable set. (shrink)

Language plays an essential role in social life, and especially in the life of our modern information society. Studies of language have long been a vital part of philosophical research in the West. In ancient Greek philosophy, Socrates investigated word meaning and Plato universals. Aristotle separated the essence of the matter from accidental factors, postulating that the essence of a thing determines our study of its concept. Closer to our own time, Francis Bacon proposed the concept of "Idols of the (...) market-place," which deals with mistakes caused by different interpretations of word meanings. Thomas Hobbes developed the theory of names and referents. John Locke created the ideational theory of meaning. John Stuart Mill proposed the theory of word meaning and extension. Franz Brentano created the theory of intentionality. To sum up, from Ancient Greece to modern times, language has always been the focus of attention for many philosophers. However, these philosophers never regarded their investigations as a necessary condition and a prerequisite of philosophical research. (shrink)

Tu (Chinese history and philosophy, Harvard U.) offers a panoramic view of the core values of Confucian intellectual thought that have kept it vital for more than two millennia, and underlie the recent resurgence in eastern Asia. Of interest to students of either China or religion and ethics. Paper edition (unseen), $14.95. Annotation copyright by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.