Father Marian Morawski was born on the fifteenth of August 1845 in Gräfenberg. He joined the order of the Jesuits in 1863 in Stara Wieś. He began his philosophical studies there in 1866, which he finished in Cracow in 1868. Next he studied theology there during the years 1868-1872. In 1870 he was ordained in Śrem. So educated, he lectured philosophy to young Jesuits at Stara Wieś College. It was at that time, that he prepared and published the work by (...) the titile: Filozofia i jej zadanie [Philosophy and its task]. When, at the request of the editor Edward Podolski, the Jesuits took over the periodical "Przegląd Lwowski" and from 1884 began to publish it by the new title of "Przegląd Powszechny", Morawski became its first editor and published many of his own articles in it concerning science and religion. In this way he created a new breed of theological literature, known as „world-view literature". As a typical example, Wieczory nad Lemanem [Evenings on Leman] as well as the thesis Celowość w przyrodzie. Studium przyrodniczo-filozoficzne [Finality in the nature. A natural-philosophical study] were published multiple times and in many languages. From 1887 to 1899 Morawski was a professor at the Jagiellonian University, and during the years 1894-1895 he was the Dean of the Theology Department. He died in Cracow on the sixth of May 1901. (shrink)

The encychcal Fides et ratio proclaimed by John Paul II on 14 September 1998 is a continuation of doctrinal statements by the Magisterium of the Church on a matter that has been an object of its concern from its very beginnings. This is the problem posed by the relationship between philosophy and faith. The solutions put forward by Vatican Council I in connection with this problem provoked a response in Catholic philosophical and theological circles. One of the most important events (...) in this field in Polish terms was the publication of Father Marian Ignacy Morawski's S J considerable work Filozofia i jej zadanie. This work is the subject of discussion in the article below. (shrink)

The encychcal Fides et ratio proclaimed by John Paul II on 14 September 1998 is a continuation of doctrinal statements by the Magisterium of the Church on a matter that has been an object of its concern from its very beginnings. This is the problem posed by the relationship between philosophy and faith. The solutions put forward by Vatican Council I in connection with this problem provoked a response in Catholic philosophical and theological circles. One of the most important events (...) in this field in Polish terms was the publication of Father Marian Ignacy Morawski's S J considerable work Filozofia i jej zadanie. This work is the subject of discussion in the article below. (shrink)

Father Marian Morawski was born on the fifteenth of August 1845 in Gräfenberg. He joined the order of the Jesuits in 1863 in Stara Wieś. He began his philosophical studies there in 1866, which he finished in Cracow in 1868. Next he studied theology there during the years 1868-1872. In 1870 he was ordained in Śrem. So educated, he lectured philosophy to young Jesuits at Stara Wieś College. It was at that time, that he prepared and published the work by (...) the titile: Filozofia i jej zadanie [Philosophy and its task]. When, at the request of the editor Edward Podolski, the Jesuits took over the periodical "Przegląd Lwowski" and from 1884 began to publish it by the new title of "Przegląd Powszechny", Morawski became its first editor and published many of his own articles in it concerning science and religion. In this way he created a new breed of theological literature, known as „world-view literature". As a typical example, Wieczory nad Lemanem [Evenings on Leman] as well as the thesis Celowość w przyrodzie. Studium przyrodniczo-filozoficzne [Finality in the nature. A natural-philosophical study] were published multiple times and in many languages. From 1887 to 1899 Morawski was a professor at the Jagiellonian University, and during the years 1894-1895 he was the Dean of the Theology Department. He died in Cracow on the sixth of May 1901. (shrink)

The main purpose of this article is to provide some new texts for studying the history of Catholic Church in XIX century. It is a small contribution to the history of Jesuits, but also the history of Poland, Greece and Turkey. The study concerns a very turbulent period in the history of the Society of Jesus, namely the rebirth of the Society in Europe and in the World. It was a very challenging time in the European history as Greece was (...) slowly regaining its independence, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was under the oppression of its occupying powers and was suffering the aftermath of its unsuccessful insurrections, and Turkey was trying to suppress the independence movements. Expelled from Russia and Prussia, the Jesuits arrived to the islands of the Aegean Sea, where they undertook the pastoral work of their fellow brethren from the times before the suppression of the Society in 1773. The research presented in this article was carried out in the Jesuit’s archive in Athens and deals primarily with “Polonica”. It is the first attempt to overview the archive under such aspect. During my research trip to Athens in 2018, Father Gabryel Marangos, the Director of Jesuit Archive in Athens, granted me the access to the collection of letters of the Polish Jesuits, which are preserved in the Athenian Archive of SJ. The method of this research was to check the files which directly regard the letters of Father Tadeusz Kuczyński. According to the Director of Athenian Archive there are more documents related to the subject, but they are dispersed among other files. The first part of the article is a brief overview of the history of Jesuits in Greece, whereas the second one is a presentation of some new sources, such as the letters of Father Tadeusz Kuczyński SJ. It is not the whole Polonica from the Athenian Archive and the remaining letters, the fragments of personal diaries, the Community Diary, Books of Charity, the Books of Bell Ringing will be presented in a coming book. The research has a pioneering character and has to be followed by further studies. In this place I would like to express my gratitude to the Greek and French Jesuits for gathering and preserving these documents. I also extend my gratitude to the governing body of the Ignatianum University for covering the costs of the research. (shrink)

Jan Sieg, Sohn von Marceli und Teresa, geb. Rhunke, wurde am 20. Oktober 1919 in Płocicz, im Kreis Sępólno Krajeńskie in Pommern geboren. In den Jahren 1930 bis 1938 besuchte er die Oberschule in Chojnice und legte dort die Reifeprüfung ab. Am 28. September 1940 ist er dem Jesuitenorden beigetreten, woraufhin er in Stara Wieś bei Krosno ein zweijähriges Noviziat absolvierte. Er studierte Philosophie in Nowy Sącz und Theologie in Stara Wieś und in Krakau. Ordiniert wurde er am 29. Juni (...) in Stara Wieś. (shrink)

Powyższy artykuł jest znacznie skróconą i nieznacznie zmienioną wersją niemieckiego opracowania, które się ukazało w książce: Roman Darowski, Filozofia jezuitów w Polsce w XX wieku. Próba syntezy - Słownik autorów, Kraków 2001, Wyższa Szkoła Filozoficzno-Pedagogiczna Ignatianum - Wydawnictwo WAM, s. 306-329. Zamieszczona tam wersja polska zawiera m.in. pełną bibliografię prac T. Slipki.

The issue of violent extremism has given rise to new policy debates in Norway. A key limitation of these debates, often grounded in naïve assumptions about the peacebuilding effect of education, is the downplay of emotions and dissent in democratic engagement. This article analyses how selected educators in Norway describe encountering and engaging with extremist students for educational interventional purposes. Previous research suggests that educational efforts to counter violent extremism can be exclusionary from the perspective of target audiences. In contrast, (...) this study draws on agonistic pluralism to provide an alternative to understand educational approaches that may help students disengage from violent extremism. The findings show that the selected educators argue the importance of trust, support and tolerance when engaging with extremist students. For these professionals, education should not downplay radical or extreme emotions but rather place them at the centre of educational engagement. Furthermore, it is suggested that educators’ empathic engagement may open the path for young people to disengage from violent extremism. (shrink)

Ontologically, brains are more basic than mental representations. Epistemologically, mental representations are more basic than brains and, indeed, all other non-mental entities: it is, and must be, on the basis of mental representations that we know anything about non-mental entities. Since, consequently, mental representations are epistemically more fundamental than brains, the former cannot possibly be explained in terms of the latter, notwithstanding that the latter are ontologically more fundamental than the former. There is thus an explanatory gap, notwithstanding the presumptive (...) truth of materialism. (shrink)

According to Russell, '... the phi ...' means: 'exactly one object has phi and ... that object ...'. Strawson pointed out that, if somebody asked how many kings of France there were, it would be deeply inappropriate to respond by saying '... the king of France ...': the respondent appears to be presupposing the very thing that, under the circumstances, he ought to be asserting. But it would seem that if Russell's theory were correct, the respondent would be asserting exactly (...) what he was asked to assert. So Russell's theory wrongly predicts that the respondent's answer will be appropriate. Russellians deal with this by saying that this anti-Russellian intuition embodies our reaction not to what is semantically encoded in the respondent's words, but to what is pragmatically imparted by them. So Russell's theory is correct: the fact that it appears wrong is due to the distorting effects of pragmatics. In this paper I show that pragmatic phenomena cannot possibly be responsible for the just mentioned anti-Russellian intuition. No matter how hard we try to put the blame on pragmatics, Russell's theory still falls short. It follows that defi nite descriptions really are what they appear to be: referring expressions. I argue that defi nite descriptions are complex demonstratives; and, within that framework, I deal with cases where defi nite descriptions appear to be functioning non-referentially. I also solve Frege's puzzle within the framework defi ned by my treatment of defi nite descriptions taken in conjunction with Kripke-Kaplan semantics. (shrink)

The paper presents a brief outline of Michał Heller’s programme of theology of science, with specific attention to its collocation and critical role with respect to both theology and science. The former consideration is based on a third domain of truths (Hans Urs von Balthasar), while the latter is inspired by Józef Tischner’s presentation of religious thinking. Theology of science as such will be described with reference to Larry Laudan’s approach, considered here as a very useful and pragmatic tool for (...) the description of basic concepts of this theology. (shrink)

Argues that the key distinction between human and nonhuman social cognition consists in our complex, diverse and flexible capacities to shape each other's minds in ways that make them easier to interpret.

Argues that the key distinction between human and nonhuman social cognition consists in our complex, diverse and flexible capacities to shape each other's minds in ways that make them easier to interpret.

We are aware of truths (e.g. the truth that the shoes I'm now wearing are uncomfortably tight) and also of states of affairs (e.g. the uncomfortable tightness of said shoes). My awareness of the tightness of my shoes---not, be it emphasized, of the corresponding truth, but of the shoe-related mass-energy-distribution underlying that truth---is an instance, not of truth-awareness, but of fact-awareness or, as I prefer to put, object-awareness. The aforementioned truth-awareness corresponding to that object-awareness is the result of my conceptualizing (...) that object-awareness. The distinction between truth-awareness, which is conceptual, and object-awareness, which is non-conceptual, is often overlooked. Because self-knowledge originally consists of object-awarenesses, only later taking the form of truth-awarenesses, a failure to distinguish between object- and truth-awareness has led many to advocate the false contention that self-conscious creatures, such as ourselves, can be categorically mistaken as to what it is that they are consciously experiencing. In this paper, it is argued that, once the distinction between object- and truth-awareness is taken into account, the mistaken judgments that people make as to their conscious conditions embody erroneous conceptualizations of veridical awarenesses of said conditions. (shrink)

In this target article by Morain and Largent (2023), the authors focus on an investigator’s duty to patient-subjects specifically regarding incidental or collateral findings within the context of e...

The paper considers certain properties of intermediate and moda propositional logics.The first part contains a proof of the theorem stating that each intermediate logic is closed under the Kreisel-Putnam rule xyz/(xy)(xz).

A person with one dollar is poor. If a person with n dollars is poor, then so is a person with n + 1 dollars. Therefore, a person with a billion dollars is poor. True premises, valid reasoning, a false a conclusion. This is an instance of the Sorites-paradox. (There are infinitely many such paradoxes. A man with an IQ of 1 is unintelligent. If a man with an IQ of n is unintelligent, so is a man with an IQ (...) of n+1. Therefore a man with an IQ of 200 is unintelligent.) Most attempts to solve this paradox reject some law of classical logic, usually the law of bivalence. I show that this paradox can be solved while holding on to all the laws of classical logic. Given any predicate that generates a Sorites-paradox, significant use of that predicate is actually elliptical for a relational statement: a significant token of "Bob is poor" means that Bob is poor compared to x, for some value of x. Once a value of x is supplied, a definite cutoff line between having and not having the paradox-generating predicate is supplied. This neutralizes the inductive step in the associated Sorites argument, and the would-be paradox is avoided. (shrink)

This is a new edition of the manual published in 1974 and 1984. Compared with those earlier editions it is revised, enlarged and more precise in its argumentation. In its beginnings the manual aimed at meeting the didactic needs to present students of the Faculty of Christian Philosophy at the ATK a complete handling of Christian ethics. The author, who wrote his manual in difficult times of communist ideology, decided to include in one work, besides a positive exposition of Christian (...) ethics, a critical discussion with other ethical systems as well as his own explicit theory on Augustinian and Thomistic ethics, which he endeavoured to develop. Thus the work interlocked the didactic objectives and the process of growth and justification of the Author's views, Krakow 2001, p. 308). (shrink)

The article presents two concepts of indexicality. The first, more standard and narrow, identifies indexicality with systematic (meaning controlled) context-sensitivity. The second, broader (derived from the work of Jerzy Pelc), conceives indexicality in terms of the potential variability of the general semiotic characteristics expressions (with respect to the context of use). The text introduces the concept of a pragmatic matrix that serves for a schematic representation of contextual variation. I also recapitulate briefly the views of Jerzy Pelc on the meaning (...) (manner of use) and use of expressions, and briefly indicate its relationship approaches with contemporary debates around contextualism and status of non-sentential speech acts. Finally, the relationship between the broader notion of indexicality and the directival theory of meaning is analyzed. (shrink)

This essay attempts to solve the so‐called paradox of analysis: if one is to have any questions about x, one must know x; but if one knows x, one has no questions about x. The obvious solution is this: one can inquire into x if one knows some, but not all, of x's parts. But this solution is erroneous. Let x′ be those parts of x with which one is acquainted, and let S be the percipient in question. As with (...) x, either S knows x′, in which case he has no questions about it; or S does not know x′, in which case he has no questions about it. My solution is this. Perception and cognition give us, not the thing‐in‐itself, but a certain analogue of the thing‐in‐itself. To inquire into x, it is necessary to know not x, but only some analogue of x; and to learn more about x is to become acquainted with increasingly precise analogues of x. (shrink)

This paper puts forth two reasons to hold that at least some mental entities are not physical entities. First argument: Some mental entities (namely, pains and other qualia) cannot possibly differ from how they seem to be, and since this cannot possibly be true of any non-mental entity, it follows that some mental entities are not physical. Second argument: It is necessarily on theoretical grounds, as opposed to strictly experiential grounds, that mental entities are identified with physical entities. Water is (...) legitimately believed to consist of microparticles of a certain kind because there is independent reason to believe that entities relevantly similar to such particles, supposing them to exist, are relevantly similar to water, so far as the latter can be directly observed. It is not, nor could it possibly be, on the basis of some directly observed concomitance between molecule-activity and water-activity that we believe the former to constitute the latter. It obviously isn't on the basis of any directly observed concomitance between brain-activity and mental-activity that the former is believed to mediate the latter. At the same time, there cannot possibly be any other legitimate basis for that belief. The reason for this is that nothing relevantly similar to mental activity can possibly be observed to accompany anything relevantly similar to brain activity. And the reason for the latter fact is that, even if brain-activity and mental-activity occur in the same physical space, they occur in different data-spaces: when you experience a pain, it is not given to you as occurring in the same spatial manifold as the falling of a stone or any other physical event. In general, mental events, whether or not they in fact have spatial coordinates, cannot possibly be observed (experienced) as having such coordinates, and for this reason they cannot be observed as having the same coordinates as brain-events. Thus, there can be no reason to grant the existence of the concomitances whose existence is needed to legitimate the bridge principles on the basis of which the mental could legitimately be identified with the physical. Note on the second argument: This argument doesn't show that the mental is non-physical; it shows only that there cannot possibly be any justification for the belief that the mental to be physical or, at any rate, that, if there is such a justification, it isn't comparable to the justification for the belief that water consists of molecules. (shrink)

I argue for two claims. First I argue against the consensus view that accurate behavioral prediction based on accurate representation of cognitive states, i.e. mind reading , is the sustaining function of propositional attitude ascription. This practice cannot have been selected in evolution and cannot persist, in virtue of its predictive utility, because there are principled reasons why it is inadequate as a tool for behavioral prediction. Second I give reasons that favor an alternative account of the sustaining function of (...) propositional attitude ascription. I argue that it serves a mind-shaping function. Roughly, propositional attitude ascription enables human beings to set up regulative ideals that function to mold behavior so as to make it easier to coordinate with. (shrink)

Maximilian de Gaynesford has argued against the standard view that the reference of the first-person pronoun ‘I’ is determined by a rule linking the referent to some feature of the context of use. In this paper, we argue that de Gaynesford's arguments are inconclusive. Our main aim, however, is to formulate a novel version of the reference rule for ‘I’. We argue that this version can deal with several problematic cases. Our strategy involves analysing the so-called agent of the context (...) as the person responsible for a particular speech act. From this analysis, we exclude a particular class of uses of ‘I’, uses that we believe are best understood as demonstrative. (shrink)