Modern education attaches great importance to interdisciplinary skills, among which computational thinking is a core element, and heralds a new era. IT application has shaped education in the 21st century. Computational thinking has provided further impetus for building an all-encompassing social network and fostering a DIY culture enabled by digital technologies. One empirical study used four apps to test children's development in computational thinking and fluency. The article will help students overcome their fears of coding. Peer reviews provide students with (...) an opportunity to learn from each other and become more motivated. These reviews also serve as feedback for teachers to evaluate students' performance. Experimental design is used in this study, and a peer review system is implemented. Freshmen attending a programming class in a university are used as samples. At the class, students write computer programs with f-Chart, which provides a graphical user interface for students to learn programming logic and design. Zuvio, a cloud-based interactive response system, is used to conduct the peer reviews. The data of this study are analyzed through R. The results show not only an improvement in students' learning performance but also a gap between students' peer review scores and teachers' evaluation scores. Learning feedback and evaluation is crucial to transform education between students and teachers into a sustainable cycle system. (shrink)

This study uses a rational ethical decision-making framework to examine the influence of moral intensity (potential harm and social pressure) on whistleblowing intention and behaviour using organisational commitment as a moderator. A scenario was developed, and an online questionnaire was used to conduct an empirical analysis on the responses of 533 participants. The mean age and years of work experience of the respondents were 31 and 8.2 years, respectively. The results show, first, that while moral intensity is correlated with whistleblowing (...) intention, only the potential harm is positively correlated with such intention. Second, potential harm and social pressure differentially affect whistleblower choice of using an internal or external channel. Third, organisational commitment has a moderated mediation effect among moral intensity, whistleblowing intention and behaviour. Fourth, whistleblowers may be grouped into four conceptual types: indifferent, rebel, mature and spoil. Finally, theoretical and managerial implications of the findings are discussed. (shrink)

Selim Berker argues that epistemic consequentialism is pervasive in epistemology and that epistemic consequentialism is structurally flawed. is incorrect, however. I distinguish between epistemic consequentialism and epistemic instrumentalism and argue that most putative consequentialists should be considered instrumentalists. I also identify the structural problem of epistemic consequentialism Berker attempts to pinpoint and show that epistemic instrumentalism does not have the consequentialist problem.

The purpose of this study is to extend prior research on this topic by investigating whether the impact of ownership concentration moderates the link between corporate social performance and financial performance. This study uses a set of unique, hand-collected pollution control data to measure CSP, based on a sample of Taiwanese listed companies during the period from 1996 to 2006. The results of the empirical analysis provide firm support for the idea that the divergence between control rights and the cash (...) flow rights of controlling owners negatively moderates the link between social and short- and long-run FP. (shrink)

To explain why we should be structurally rational – or mentally coherent – is notoriously difficult. Some philosophers argue that the normativity of structural rationality can be explained in terms of substantive rationality, which is a matter of correct response to reason. I argue that the psychological phenomena – positive illusions – are counterexamples to the substantivist approach. Substantivists dismiss the relevance of positive illusions because they accept evidentialism that reason for belief must be evidence. I argue that their evidentialist (...) stance would imply that we are caught in unsolvable dilemmas arising from positive illusions. (shrink)

Virtue epistemology maintains that epistemic normativity is a kind of performance normativity, according to which evaluating a belief is like evaluating a sport or musical performance. I examine this thesis through the objection that a belief cannot be evaluated as a performance because it is not a performance but a state. I argue that virtue epistemology can be defended on the grounds that we often evaluate a performance through evaluating the result of the performance. The upshot of my account is (...) that when a belief is evaluated under performance normativity, what we evaluate is not belief, but cognitive performance. My account of virtue epistemology offers a simple explanation of why knowledge is more valuable than true belief. (shrink)

The moral right to keep and bear arms is entailed by the moral right of self-defense. We argue that the ownership and use of firearms is a reasonable means of exercising these rights. Given their defensive value, there is a strong presumption in favor of enacting civil rights to keep and bear arms ranging from handguns to ‘assault rifles.’ Thus, states are morally obliged as a matter of justice to recognize basic liberties for firearm ownership and usage. Throughout this paper (...) we build upon the relevant criminological and social science research in addition to the work of other philosophers who have in recent years argued in favor of gun rights. Although we believe the statistical evidence supports our case, our argument is primarily non-consequentialist. We do, however, address consequentialist objections in the last section of this paper. (shrink)

A popular evidentialist argument against pragmatism is based on reason internalism: the view that a normative reason for one to φ must be able to guide one in normative deliberation whether to φ. In the case of belief, this argument maintains that, when deliberating whether to believe p, one must deliberate whether p is true. Since pragmatic considerations cannot weigh in our deliberation whether p, the argument concludes that pragmatism is false. I argue that evidentialists fail to recognize that the (...) question whether to φ is essentially the question whether one should φ. Furthermore, the question of whether one should believe p can be answered on pragmatic grounds. The internalist argument turns out to favor pragmatism. (shrink)

Python language has become the most popular computer language. Python is widely adopted in computer courses. However, Python language’s effects on the college and university students’ learning performance, motivations, computer programming self-efficacy, and maladaptive cognition have still not been widely examined. The main objective of this study is to explore the effects of learning Python on students’ programming learning. The junior students of two classes in a college are the research participants. One class was taught Java language and the other (...) class was taught Python language. The learning performance, motivations, and maladaptive cognition in the two classes were compared to evaluate the differences. The results showed that the motivations, computer programming self-efficacy, and maladaptive cognition on the learning performance were significant in the Python class. The results and findings of this study can be used in Python course arrangement and development. (shrink)

Virtue epistemology argues that knowledge is more valuable than Gettierized belief because knowledge is an achievement, but Gettierized belief is not. The key premise in the achievement argument is that achievement is apt (successful because competent) and Gettierized belief is inapt (successful because lucky). I first argue that the intuition behind the achievement argument is based wrongly on the fact that ‘being successful because lucky’ implicates ‘being not competent enough’. I then offer an argument from moral luck to argue that (...) virtue epistemologists should maintain that knowledge is no more valuable than Gettierized belief. (shrink)

This article sets out to undertake a thorough, point-by-point examination of the theory postulated by Campbell (2007), in which an attempt is made to specify the conditions under which corporations may or may not act in socially responsible ways. In order to ensure the overall reliability of our study, and to attempt to provide a new understanding of, and greater insights into, whether corporate social responsibility (CSR) is affected by financial and institutional variables, we empirically investigate a total of 520 (...) financial firms in 34 countries, between the years 2003 and 2005. Our empirical findings are: (i) finns with larger size are more CSR minded, and the financial performance and CSR are not related; (ii) finns would actually act in more socially responsible ways to enhance their competitive advantages when the market competitiveness is more intense; (iii) financial firms in countries with stronger levels of legal enforcement tend to engage in more CSR activities; however, interestingly and rather strikingly, those finns in countries with stronger shareholder rights tend to engage in less CSR activities; and (iv) self-regulation within the financial industry has a significantly positive effect on CSR, with firms being found to act in more socially responsible ways in those countries which have more cooperative employer-employee relations, higher quality management schools, and a better macroeconomic environment. (shrink)

This paper argues that the concept of primal wonder in P4C, proposed by Thomas E. Jackson, can be seen as a “sprout” or seed of intellectual virtue. My understanding of his insight is inspired by Mengzi’s view of moral cultivation and Aristotle’s eudaimonist account of virtue ethics. According to Mengzi, all humans possess four innate sprouts of virtue, and the aim of moral education is to nurture these moral sprouts so that they can grow up into fully ripened virtues. In (...) terms of P4C, Jackson contends that all of us are born already with a special feeling of wonder which he refers to as “primal wonder”. Synthesizing his statement with Mengzi’s agricultural metaphor of moral sprouts, I shall take one step forward by arguing that the innate sense of wonder within every child can be seen as a sprout of virtue. Additionally, once children’s primal wonder has been transformed into a virtue through implementing P4C in the classroom, this admirable character trait, I suggest, should be understood as an intellectual virtue according to Aristotelian virtue ethics. This is because the virtue of wonder can promote children’s intellectual flourishing, which is fully endorsed by Aristotle’s contention that the happiest kind of life is a philosophical one, and that philosophy begins in wonder. In short, if primal wonder as a sprout of intellectual virtue can lead to the highest good for human beings, then one of the main educational goals of doing philosophy with children, I suggest, is to turn their primal wonder into a virtuous habit so that they can live an examined life. (shrink)

如果機器人的發展要能如科幻想像一般，在沒有人類監督下自動地工作，就必須確定機器人不會做出道德上錯誤的行為。 根據行為主義式的道德主體觀，若就外顯行為來看，機器人在道德上的表現跟人類一般，機器人就可被視為道德主體。從這很自然地引伸出機器人的道德擬人主義：凡適用於人類的道德規則就適用於機器人。我反對道德擬人主義 ，藉由史特勞森對於人際關係與反應態度的洞見，並以家長主義行為為例，我論述由於機器人缺乏人格性，無法參與人際關係，因此在關於家長主義行為上，機器人應該比人類受到更嚴格的限制。.