The paper proposes and defends the following characterization of response dependent property: a property is response-dependent iff there is a response-dependence biconditional for a concept signifying it which holds in virtue of the nature of the property. Finding out whether a property is such is to a large extent a posteriori matter. Finally, colors are response dependent: they are essentially tied to issuing the relevant experiences, so that having those experiences does give access to their, dispositional, nature. Finally, some important (...) contrary views are critically discussed in the paper. (shrink)

In the addenda to his Naming and Necessity, Kripke provides an account of how necessary aposteriori statements are possible. In such a case, there is an apriori general principle telling us that it is necessary if true at all. Though straightforward in its broad compass, this account faces two obvious questions in its application: in each case of necessary aposteriori statements, what is the underlying principle and how is it established apriori? I treat these questions with respect to (...) theoretical identity statements concerning chemical substances, such as ‘water is H2OH2O’. I argue that the general principle underlying the necessity of the statements is that if a chemical substance has a certain chemical composition, then it could not have had any other chemical composition. Then I defend the view that the principle is a conceptual truth by providing a novel derivation of it from the theoretical concept of chemical substance with a sufficient level of formal rigor. The logical principles required for the derivation will also be stated and defended. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to suggest a new direction in our thinking about substantive due process that recognizes human rights in the lived experience of our fellow human beings. The applicability of the approach, at least for equal protection purposes, was hinted at by the Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Romer v. Evans, but it has never been given full consideration.1 There, Justice Kennedy noted the very real impact of a state group of people. What he did not (...) say is how such an amendment might also impact the self-impression gays and lesbians have of themselves, although this would certainly be part of such an amendment’s impact. Moreover, legal and philosophical research in this area suggests that there may be more here than previously thought. While I do not hope to resolve every philosophical question at the heart of my legal analysis, I do intend to bring forth enough substance to answer the indeterminacy charge levied by certain Supreme Court justices and others concerning which rights should count as “fundamental” under substantive due process in part by looking at the impact such rights have on individual self-esteem. I. (shrink)

Contemporary epistemologists typically define a priori justification as justification that is independent of sense experience. However, sense experience plays at least some role in the production of many paradigm cases of a priori justified belief. This raises the question of when experience is epistemically relevant to the justificatory status of the belief that is based on it. In this paper, I will outline the answers that can be given by the two currently dominant accounts of justification, i.e. evidentialism and reliabilism. (...) While for the evidentialist, experience is epistemically relevant only if it is used as evidence, the reliabilist requires that the reliability of the relevant process depends on the reliability of experiential processes. I will argue that the reliabilist account accommodates our pre-theoretic classifications much better. In the final part of my paper I will use the reliabilist criterion to defend the a priori—a posteriori distinction against recent challenges by Hawthorne and Williamson. (shrink)

Saul Kripke’s discussion of the necessary aposteriori in Naming and Necessity and “Identity and Necessity” -- in which he lays the foundation for distinguishing epistemic from metaphysical possibility, and explaining the relationship between the two – is, in my opinion, one of the outstanding achievements of twentieth century philosophy.1 My aim in this essay is to extract the enduring lessons of his discussion, and disentangle them from certain difficulties which, alas, can also be found there. I will argue that (...) there are, in fact, two Kripkean routes to the necessary aposteriori – one correct and philosophically far-reaching, the other incorrect and philosophically misleading. (shrink)

in International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14, 2006: 337-359 (special issue on Donald Davidson ed. M. Baghramian/J. Malpas).

Es conocido que Kripke argumentó que la ilusión de contingencia en el caso de la conciencia no puede explicarse del modo en que se explica en el resto de casos familiares de enunciados necesarios a posteriori. En un artículo reciente, Pérez Otero (2002) argumenta que hay una explicación alternativa, en términos de mera aposterioridad. Argumento en contra de la corrección exegética y de la verdad de esta tesis.Kripke famously argued that the illusion of contingency cannot be explained away, in the (...) case of consciousness, in the way it is explained away in the rest of familiar cases of necessary aposteriori statements. In a recent paper, Pérez Otero (2002) argues that there is an alternative way of explaining it a way, in terms of mere aposteriority. I argue against the exegetical accuracy and the truth of this contention. (shrink)

Kein Hahn kräht mehr nach dem Verifikationsprinzip, das Moritz Schlick zusammen mit seinen Mitstreitern des Wiener Kreises verfochten hat. Seit einem halben Jahrhundert gilt das Prinzip als philosophisch erledigt; doch Totgesagte leben länger. Ich versuche, eine Fassung des Prinzips zu formulieren, die auch unter den Bedingungen der Nachkriegs-Philosophie verteidigt werden kann: Grob gesagt, muss jeder sinnvolle Satz im Prinzip empirisch (oder doch aposteriori) überprüft werden können, einerlei ob verifiziert oder falsifiziert, ob fallibel oder infallibel, ob direkt oder indirekt, ob (...) deduktiv, abduktiv oder induktiv, ob durch Sinneswahrnehmung oder durch Selbstwahrnehmung. Je nach Situation verlangt das Prinzip die unterschiedlichsten Formulierungen; es wäre verfehlt, es ein für allemal zu fixieren. Vermutlich können wir es sogar auf Sätze ausdehnen, die sich apriori rechtfertigen lassen. Anhand einer Serie von Beispielen (die z.T. aus Schlicks Schriften stammen) demonstriere ich, welche guten Dienste das Prinzip leistet. Erstens dient es dazu, intellektuelle Hochstapelei aus dem Spiel zu werfen und von sinnvollen Aussagen zu unterscheiden. Nun gibt es Sätze, an deren Sinn wir nicht gern rütteln lassen wollen, selbst wenn zunächst nicht klar ist, wie sie sich überprüfen lassen sollen. Das legt einen zweiten Einsatz des Prinzips nahe: Wir sind in diesem Fall aufgerufen, mehr Mühe in den scheinbar unüberprüfbaren Satz zu investieren, ihn besser zu explizieren und dabei doch noch einen Weg zu seiner Überprüfung freizuschaufeln. Bei dieser Übung kann sich sogar unser Überprüfungsbegriff verändern (und damit auch der Gehalt des Verifikationsprinzips selbst). Insgesamt sollten wir den Überprüfungsbegriff so fassen, dass laut Prinzip nicht zuviele wichtige Sätze sinnlos erscheinen. In einer aufklärerischen Ethik des klaren Redens, Meinens und Fragens kommt es darauf an, die gegenläufigen Denkbewegungen auszutarieren, in die wir beim verifikationalistischen Philosophieren gezogen werden. Was das heißt, führe ich anhand vermeintlich sinnloser Sätze aus der Raum/Zeit-Philosophie vor. Am Ende des Aufsatzes bringe ich einige Beispiele ausgemachten Unsinns. (shrink)

The paper is aimed to prove that the work of the Ukrainian philosopher Hilary Święcicki The origins of philosophy in Ruthenian literature of XI–XVI century (Lviv, 1901) was written under the influence of the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School of philosophy Kazimierz Twardowski. Results of the analysis indicate that this influence was of the methodological nature and it manifested itself in the use by Święcicki aposteriori constructive method, developed by master of Twardowdki – Franz Brentano.

[On the apriori and aposteriori problematic].

Der sensus communis vermittelt Apriori und Aposteriori, Intellektualität und Sinnlichkeit, Inter- und Intrasubjektivität. Die Studie analysiert die Bedeutungen und Funktionen des Begriffs in Kants Gesamtwerk, wobei sie Kants Einteilung der Philosophie folgt: Sie untersucht den sensus communis logicus im theoretischen Bereich, den sensus communis aestheticus im ästhetischen Bereich und den sensus communis practicus im praktischen Bereich.

Introduction to the Two Volumes xi PART ONE: G. E. MOORE ON ETHICS, EPISTEMOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS 1 CHAPTER 1 Common Sense and Philosophical Analysis 3 CHAPTER 2 Moore on Skepticism, Perception, and Knowledge 12 CHAPTER 3 Moore on Goodness and the Foundations of Ethics 34 CHAPTER 4 The Legacies and Lost Opportunities of Moore’s Ethics 71 Suggested Further Reading 89 PART TWO: BERTRAND RUSSELL ON LOGICAL AND LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS 91 CHAPTER 5 Logical Form, Grammatical Form, and the Theory of (...) Descriptions 93 CHAPTER 6 Logic and Mathematics: The Logicist Reduction 132 CHAPTER 7 Logical Constructions and the External World 165 CHAPTER 8 Russell’s Logical Atomism 182 Suggested Further Reading 194 PART THREE: LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN’S TRACTATUS 195 CHAPTER 9 The Metaphysics of the Tractatus 197 CHAPTER 10 Meaning, Truth, and Logic in the Tractatus 214 CHAPTER 11 The Tractarian Test of Intelligibility and Its Consequences 234 Suggested Further Reading 254 PART FOUR: LOGICAL POSITIVISM, EMOTIVISM, AND ETHICS 255 CHAPTER 12 The Logical Positivists on Necessity and Apriori Knowledge 257 CHAPTER 13 The Rise and Fall of the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning 271 CHAPTER 14 Emotivism and Its Critics 300 CHAPTER 15 Normative Ethics in the Era of Emotivism: The Anticonsequentialism of Sir David Ross 320 Suggested Further Reading 346 PART FIVE: THE POST-POSITIVIST PERSPECTIVE OF THE EARLY W. V. QUINE 349 CHAPTER 16 The Analytic and the Synthetic, the Necessary and the Possible, the Apriori and the Aposteriori 351 CHAPTER 17 Meaning and Holistic Verificationism 378 Suggested Further Reading 406 Index 409. (shrink)

Millians about proper names typically claim that it is knowable apriori that Hesperus is Phosphorus. We argue that they should claim instead that it is knowable only aposteriori that Hesperus is Hesperus, since the Kripke-Putnam epistemic arguments against descriptivism are special cases of Quinean arguments that nothing is knowable apriori, and Millians have no resources to resist the more general Quinean arguments.

[What It’s Like, or What It’s About? The Place of Consciousness in the Material World] Summary: The book is both a survey of the contemporary debate and a defense of a distinctive position. Most philosophers nowadays assume that the focus of the philosophy of consciousness, its shared explanandum, is a certain property of experience variously called “phenomenal character,” “qualitative character,” “qualia” or “phenomenology,” understood in terms of what it is like to undergo the experience in question. Consciousness as defined in (...) terms of its phenomenal aspect is often called “phenomenal consciousness.” The major issue that occupies most thinkers is whether this phenomenal character happens to be a physical property, or whether it is rather sui generis. Those who believe the former are materialists; those who conclude the latter are dualists. As the currently dominant metaphysic is materialism – also sometimes called physicalism – the challenge appears to be to slot phenomenal properties among the physical properties that ultimately make up the world. David Chalmers argued powerfully that we can go very far in situating many mental properties in the physical world – namely, the properties that can be understood in functional terms – but that phenomenal properties resist such a treatment. Chalmers calls this “the hard problem” of consciousness. But there are also some quite powerful positive arguments for dualism. The two most influential ones are the modal argument, also offered by Chalmers, and the knowledge argument invented by Frank Jackson. Chalmers invites us to conceive of creatures that are exactly like human beings – physically, functionally, behaviorally – only bereft of phenomenal consciousness. If such creatures are conceivable, says Chalmers, they are metaphysically possible. And if they are metaphysically possible, materialism is false. Jackson, for his part, suggests we imagine Mary who has spent her entire life inside a black-and-white room and has seen the world through a black-and-white TV screen. But she also happens to know everything there is to know about the physics of color. And yet, Jackson suggests that once Mary is finally released from her room and sees a lawn outside, she learns something new: that this is what it is like to experience green color. The current work on consciousness is by and large characterized by attempts to answer these two dualistic arguments. I try to make sense of the positions within the domain of philosophy of consciousness by means of two major distinctions that mutually intersect. First, there is a distinction between dualism and materialism. An apparent third alternative currently on offer, the so-called Russellian monism, is unstable, collapsing into either dualism (panpsychism) or materialism (Russellian physicalism). Materialism comes in two main flavors: either the a posteriori physicalism, which detects an epistemic gap between phenomenal and physical truths, hence denying that the former could be derived from the latter; or the a priori physicalism, which does not acknowledge any such obstacle. The second major distinction is between phenomenism and representationalism. It’s true that Ned Block, who introduced this contrast, meant to distinguish between two kinds of materialism. But I believe that the distinction actually intersects the one between materialism and dualism. We thus arrive at a table with six slots, representing six main positions in the philosophy of consciousness: (1) dualist phenomenism (Chalmers, the early Jackson, and Tyler Burge); (2) dualist representationalism (René Descartes); (3) aposteriori materialist phenomenism (Block); (4) a posteriori materialist representationalism (Michael Tye, Fred Dretske, David Rosenthal); (5) a priori materialist phenomenism (David Lewis); and (6) a priori materialist representationalism (Daniel Dennett, Derk Pereboom). However, this scheme is in fact somewhat misleading. It is true that Dennett is usually classified as an apriori materialist (or, more precisely an apriori materialist representationalist), but I believe that needs to be corrected. In order to understand why, I first analyze varieties of materialist representationalism in detail, in particular various construals of phenomenal character in terms of representation, or intentionality, which includes a discussion of the identity of its content (the issue of externalism). By contrast, Dennett rejects the concept of phenomenal character. Consciousness has no intrinsic, publicly inaccessible properties. On that ground, Dennett builds an empirical, fully functionalist theory of consciousness, which he also tries to integrate within a general Darwinian framework. From that point of view, one can contrast Dennettian and representationalist views on the issue of animal consciousness. In addition to his rejection of phenomenal character, Dennett also abstains from the regular metaphysical departure point of regular materialism. He does not so much ask how an enigmatic property of consciousness fits an antecedently characterized world, but rather how far we can investigate all aspects of the world, including consciousness, using the scientific method. He is thus a methodological naturalist, rather than a metaphysical materialist. While this approach removes obstacles to the science of consciousness, it does not solve what might be called “the hardest problem” – of intentionality, not phenomenal consciousness. The hardest problem consists in the fact that our intentional discourse involves conflicting commitments that prevent a coherent metaphysic of representational states. However, it does not follow that we should give up on this discourse as a theoretical means of reduction as well as a practical tool of explanation. But it might be that intentional discourse is a somewhat pseudo one. (shrink)

SUPPOSE AN INQUIRER WERE TO ASK what analogy might best be taken to signify. The new standard reference work for philosophy as an intellectual discipline today, the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy edited by Edward Craig and published in 1998, is all but silent on the question proposed. Volume 1 of the ten volume work runs from “ Aposteriori” to “Bradwardine,” but, on page 211, there is no entry titled “analogy.” Even the entry for “Analogies in Science” is no more (...) than a cross-reference: “ see Inductive Inference; Models.”. (shrink)

This book examines solutions to the crisis of modernity proposed by the Spanish philosopher Miguel de Unamuno and the Mexican philosopher Antonio Caso. Acceptance of the objective claims of modern scientific rationality and the consequent rejection of the objective validity of artistic, moral, and religious claims generates the crisis of modernity. The problem is that of justifying artistic, moral, and religious claims. Miguel de Unamuno in his classic work, _The Tragic Sense of Life_, addresses the conflict between the belief in (...) personal immortality and modern scientific rationality. Holding that there is no rational justification for the belief in immortality, Unamuno finds a solution in a “saving scepticism” to act “as if” he deserved immortality. In his book _Existence as Economy, as Art, and Charity _Caso attempts to create an _aposteriori _metaphysics based on the “current” results of science supplemented by the intuitions of art and morality. In doing so, Caso believes that he has enlarged the scope of the knowable to include objects of art, morality, and religion. Unamuno, by accepting the strict line of demarcation between faith and reason has no other recourse but to turn to decisionism. By turning to intuitionism, Caso believes that he has blurred the line of demarcation. Decisionism and intuitionism, therefore, are worthy of further exploration. (shrink)

Kripke argued, famously, that proper names are rigid designators. It is often assumed that some kind terms (most prominently natural kind terms) are rigid designators as well. This is thought to have significant theoretical consequences, such as the necessity of certain a posteriori identities involving natural kind terms. However, there is no agreement on what it is for a kind term to be rigid. In this paper I will first take a detailed look at the most common view: that rigid (...) kind terms are those which designate the same kind in all possible worlds. This view has been subjected to much recent criticism. I will argue that, while the proponents of the view do seem to have good answers to some of the arguments presented against it, it fails because this notion of rigidity cannot deliver aposteriori necessities. Time permitting, I will also sketch an alternative view which seems far more promising. (shrink)

In this paper I argue against the view, defended by some philosophers, that it is part of the meaning of mental that being mental is incompatible with being physical. I call this outlook metalinguistic dualism, and I distinguish it from metaphysical theories of the mind-body relation such as Cartesian dualism. I argue that MLD is mistaken, but I don't try to defend the contrary view that mentalistic terms can be definitionally reduced to nonmental ones. After criticizing arguments by certain philosophers (...) which purport to establish MLD, I formulate a criterion for a phenomenon's being mental. I then show that this criterion is neutral between monistic and dualistic theories of the mind-body relation. Since if MLD were true it should be impossible to construct such a criterion, I conclude that it is false. The significance of my paper is that if I am right then I remove one important type of objection to aposteriori, noneliminative forms of the identity theory of mind, namely that such theories ought to be rejected merely on the basis of semantical considerations about the word mental. Beyond that, I believe that my criterion of mental phenomena correctly captures our intuitions about the nature of the distinction between mental and nonmental phenomena. (shrink)

The traditional equating of the a priori and the necessary was challenged by Kripke, who indicated the possibility of a priori knowledge of contingently true sentences, as well as a posteriori knowledge of necessarily true sentences. This note discusses a new species of sentences with such properties. One example of this is (1) This sentence is necessarily false which appears to be a contingently false sentence, known a priori, although it is hard to see when it might be true. Further (...) examples are considered, and it is argued that the notions of being known a priori and aposteriori should be examined further, along with the notions of necessary and contingent truths. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to take a fresh look at a discussion about the distinct existences argument that took place between David Armstrong and Frank Jackson more than fifty years ago. I will try to show that Armstrong’s argument can be successfully defended against Jackson’s objections (albeit at the price of certain concessions concerning Armstrong’s view on the meaning of psychological terms as well as his conception of universals). Focusing on two counterexamples that Jackson put forward against Hume’s (...) principle (which is central to Armstrong’s argument), I will argue that they are either compatible with Hume’s principle, or imply a false claim. I will also look at several other considerations that go against Hume’s principle, such as, for example, Kripke’s origin essentialism and counterexamples from aposteriori necessity. (shrink)

The paper challenges the entrenched equation of conceptual with apriori. It develops the idea of at least dual justification of a single piece of belief, at a deep, ultimate level and at the surface, immediately accessible to the thinker. Apriori justification then also admits of different degrees of depth. A proposition is deeply apriori for a cognizer if its ultimate ground is apriori, otherwise it is only superficially apriori . In the case of empirically applicable concepts, some of their concept-analyzing (...) propositions are justified apriori only at the surface. Deeply, they are aposteriori, being originally straightforward empirical propositions. It is argued that there is no reason to suppose that they change their epistemic status once build into a concept. (shrink)

Este artículo analiza el impacto del giro lingüístico en la transformación de la concepción kantiana de los juicios sintéticos a priori. Se centra para ello en dos concepciones contemporáneas de los mismos, a saber, el a priori hermenéutico de Heidegger y el a priori contextual de Putnam, y saca a relucir expresamente tanto sus rasgos similares como sus importantes diferencias: mientras que la concepción heideggeriana mantiene el idealismo transcendental de Kant a través de la suposición hermenéutica de que el significado (...) determina la referencia, la concepción de Putnam rompe por completo con la teoría kantiana de los juicios sintéticos a priori, según la cual éstos no pueden ser modificados por la sola experiencia, al tiempo que rechaza la suposición kantiana de que los juicios sintéticos a priori y aposteriori son dos clases permanentes de juicios. En contraste con Heidegger, Putnam es por eso capaz de mostrar que los juicios sintéticos apriori son modificables bajo condiciones especiales. (shrink)

This article begins with discussions of rationalist, a priori and empiricist, a posteriori thinking in philosophy. It then argues that classically, sociology is rationalist or a priori. Sociology — Weber, Simmel, Durkheim and Marx — moves from Kant's epistemological a priori to the social a priori. It moves from the question of how knowledge is possible to the question of how society is possible. This question of the possibility of society becomes quickly one of social control and social order in (...) functionalism and Parsons. The article argues instead for an aposteriorist, de facto empiricist sociology that breaks with this ultimately normative question. This aposteriorist sociology would instead investigate social processes in their very factuality, their open-endedness, complexity, and path dependency. A priorism in sociology, I would argue, is dominant in both positivism and phenomenology. The article opposes to phenomenology's transcendentaI rationalism a `transcendental empiricism' that is illustrated with Edmund Burke's English and aposteriori aesthetics of the sublime. Sociology today needs to be relevant to study of `emerging' nations like China. The article argues for an aposteriorist, empiricist sociology here, and looks at debates on property law in today's China. Here we look at rationalist and a priori notions of clear, distinct and divisible property in Continental reception of Roman law. We counterpose to this English, empiricist (a posteriori) Common Law notions of property as a bundle of rights, in which property is not clear and distinct but vague like a boundary object. We look at how this is instantiated in China. With François Jullien, we contrast a Chinese, effectively empiricist, aposteriorist notion of the universal to Western rationalist and a priori universalism. We look at the implications for international geopolitics and a possible Chinese route to democracy. With Jullien, we counterpose an aposteriorist Chinese notion of `activity' to the Western a priori notions of `action' found in Weber and Parsons. The Chinese `activity' is more processual, more relational, less goal-oriented, more path-dependent than our Western notion of `action'. The article argues that in the twenty-first century when national social control is partly displaced by global uncertainty, and when the ascendancy of the West is coming increasingly under question, that such an empiricist, aposteriorist sociology is suitable. (shrink)

Evidential holism begins with something like the claim that “it is only jointly as a theory that scientific statements imply their observable consequences.” This is the holistic claim that Elliott Sober tells us is an “unexceptional observation”. But variations on this “unexceptional” claim feature as a premise in a series of controversial arguments for radical conclusions, such as that there is no analytic or synthetic distinction that the meaning of a sentence cannot be understood without understanding the whole language of (...) which it is a part and that all knowledge is empirical knowledge. This paper is a survey of what evidential holism is, how plausible it is, and what consequences it has. Section 1 will distinguish a range of different holistic claims, Sections 2 and 3 explore how well motivated they are and how they relate to one another, and Section 4 returns to the arguments listed above and uses the distinctions from the previous sections to identify holism's role in each case. (shrink)

The fundamental concepts of the theory of knowledge ofKant—“transzendental”, “apriori”, and “aposteriori”, “konstitutiver” and “regulativer Vernunftgebrauch”, “Ding an sich”, “Erkenntnisvermögen”, etc.—are exemplified and examined by the modern theory of axiomatics. Therefrom essential consequences result in respect of modern theoretical biology as well as the elimination of usual misunderstandings about the relation between physics and biology in the philosophical system ofKant. The usual view thatKant would have admitted to physics only the causal-constitutive method of thinking, and on the contrary would (...) have admitted to biology merely a teleologic-regulative process, has to be rejected being entirely erroneous. — Then the theory of the “Ding an sich” is interpreted metabiologically, not metaphysically and finallyKants terminology of knowledge is explained biologically.Les notions fondamentales de la théorie de connaissance deKant — „transzendental”, „apriori” et „aposteriori”, „konstitutiver” et „regulativer Vernunftgebrauch”, „Ding an sich”, „Erkenntnisvermögen” etc. — sont mises en évidence et examinées par la théorie de l'axiomatique moderne. De là s'ensuivent des conséquences essentielles pour la biologie théorique moderne, ainsi que la suppression de malentendus en égard au rapport de la physique et de la biologie dans le système philosophique deKant. L'interprétation usuelle, selon laquelleKant aurait voulu accorder le raisonnement causal-constitutif à seule la physique, et, au contraire, n'aurait voulu accorder qu'un procédé téléologique-régulatif à la biologie, doit être rejetée comme étant entièrement erronnée. Ensuite, la doctrine de la „Ding an sich” est interprétée métabiologiquement au lieu de métaphysiquement, et enfin, la terminologie de la connaissance deKant est expliquée biologiquement. (shrink)

Es conocido que Kripke argumentó que la ilusión de contingencia en el caso de la conciencia no puede explicarse del modo en que se explica en el resto de casos familiares de enunciados necesarios a posteriori. En un artículo reciente, Pérez Otero (2002) argumenta que hay una explicación alternativa, en términos de mera aposterioridad. Argumento en contra de la corrección exegética y de la verdad de esta tesis.Kripke famously argued that the illusion of contingency cannot be explained away, in the (...) case of consciousness, in the way it is explained away in the rest of familiar cases of necessary aposteriori statements. In a recent paper, Pérez Otero (2002) argues that there is an alternative way of explaining it a way, in terms of mere aposteriority. I argue against the exegetical accuracy and the truth of this contention. (shrink)

Purpose. The author will show that metaphysical concepts and the concepts of empirical sciences derive from experience. The only difference is that metaphysical concepts derive from unusual experience, i.e. out-of-body experience, while empirical sciences – from usual one. The example set metaphysical concept of pure being. Methodology. In order to obtain this goal the author uses two methods. The first one is comparative method. With the help of this method the stories of men who experienced clinical death and returned to (...) life are compared with the famous philosophers’ metaphysical statements (Plato, Descartes, and Bonaventura). The second one is transpersonal method. It helps to study the peculiarities of the extraordinary experience in the state of clinical death or mystical ecstasy. Such experience lies in experience of transcendence, pure being as light, ultimate awareness of truth, which are identical to the metaphysical statements of philosophers and mystics. These ultimate experiences belong to different people, who lived and grown in different cultures, but nevertheless metaphysical statements of philosophers or mystics and statements of the ordinary people who experienced clinical death are the same. Therefore we can say that out-of-body experience is transpersonal. Originality. Metaphysics is neither speculative nor withdrawn from experience of a human being sphere. It arises from out-of-body experience while empirical sciences – from usual experience. Therefore, metaphysical concepts, in particular, pure being, are empirical, because they are based also on (extraordinary) experience. In general, metaphysics becomes possible on the basis of out-of-body experience. Conclusions. In this article the author argues that the concepts of metaphysics are not a priori because they originate from out-of-body experience that is from the experience of the distinction between body and soul or body and mind. As a result of such experience appear, for instance, Plato’s metaphysics, Descartes’ metaphysics, and the Christian mysticism of Bonaventure, which theoretical constructs are deriving from experience of pure being (light). In this context metaphysics is seen as the path of gradual separation of a human being from his or her physical body, i.e. “the art of dying” (Plato). Therefore, the author proves that there are no a priori concepts. All concepts are aposteriori, in empirical sciences and in metaphysics as well. We simply talk about two different experiences: usual and unusual experience. The author also argues that there is direct connection between out of body experience and metaphysics, mystics. In the case of out-of-body experience, the temporary death of a human being is the cause of his/her change in perception of himself/herself and the world; it is the cause of metaphysical knowledge. (shrink)

This paper is devoted to the search for an argument for the existence of a posteriori identities. I will try to improve on existing predecessors and defend the result against Scott Soames' critique in his recent book "Beyond Rigidity". First I will inspect Kripke's original argument as well as Soames' reconstruction. This reconstruction, while closely related, is shown to differ from Kripke's original in important respects. I will then ask whether either the original or Soames reconstruction may be considered as (...) satisfactory arguments for the existence of aposteriori identities. I will show that this is not the case. These arguments use objectionable notions of apriority, but this problem can be remedied. The result will still be open to Soames main criticism against Kripkean arguments, namely that they are committed to principles of disquotation, principles of a kind that Kripke himself has later shown to be objectionable. Therefore, I will also sketch a defense of principles of disquotation. (shrink)

XI ABKÜRZUNGSVERZEICHNIS 1 EINLEITUNG A. aber die Möglichkeit einer Fichte-Interpretation überhaupt 1 B. Die Wirklichkeit der Interpretation 4 C. Die Bedeutung der Wissenschaltslehre 8 D. WL I794 und WL I8IO II E. Zum Gang der Arbeit I. KAPITEL MACHTSPRUCH UND REELLE NEGATION: DRITTER GRUNDSATZ 19 A. Subsumtion des A-ist unter das A =A 20 I. Standpunkt des A-ist 20 2. Standpunkt des A=A 21 B. Subsumtion des A =A unter das A-ist 22 I. Standpunkt des A=A 22 2. Standpunkt des (...) A-ist 24 C. Synthese der Subsumtionen 25 I. Absolute Kausalität 26 2. Absolute Substantialität 27 3. Absolute Relation 28 D. Die Dialektik des 3. Grundsatzes 2 3 VIII INHALTSVERZEICHNIS 11. KAPITEL SPRUNG UND EIGENTLICHE NEGATION: ZWEITER GRUNDSATZ 47 A. Interpretation des 3. Grundsatzes 49 B. Die vier Erfahrungsstufen 51 I. Naturschwärmerei 52 2. Intersubjektivität 53 3. Gewissen 55 4. Gottesliebe 56 C. Die Erfahrung der Freiheit 56 D. Die Reflexionsform und das Dasein 66 III. KAPITEL UNGRUND UND SCHWEBEN: ERSTER GRUNDSATZ 1 7 A. Das Absolute als Aposteriori 73 I. Die fünffache Identität des Aposteriori 74 2. Das Wesen des Daseins als das Aposteriori 80 B. Das Absolute als Apriori 82 I. Indikativ und Imperativ 82 2. Gott oder das Sein 86 3. Die" zweite Methode" 88 C. Das Wesen der Wissenschaftslehre 92 I. Die WL als Wahrheit (Prinzip) 92 2. Die WL als Weg (Methode) 94 3. Die WL als Leben (Resultat) 6 9 100 NACHWORT A. (shrink)

Teil I »Psychologische Ästhetik für transdisziplinäres Design« -/- Kapitel I »Empirische Ästhetik – Der Konflikt zwischen leichter Verarbeitbarkeit, sparsamer Codierung und neuronaler Aktivierung im Beobachtersystem. Eine Untersuchung über das Wesen der ästhetischen Erfahrung. -/- Jede Designpraxis verlangt täglich eine Vielzahl von Entscheidungen, welche die Wahl von „Etwas vor dem Hintergrund anderer Möglichkeiten“ darstellen. Diese lassen sich als Probleme einer Präferenz-Ästhetik interpretieren, wobei innerhalb eines Repertoires von Alternativen die attraktivste gewählt wird. Eine empirische Ästhetik ist somit ein notwendiger Bestandteil von Designtheorie. (...) Die Überlegung, wer in welcher Situation warum was bevorzugt, führt zur Forschungsfrage: »Was ist der elementare Mechanismus für eine ästhetische Erfahrung?« In der Literatur zur empirischen Ästhetik finden sich vier wesentliche Theorie-Gruppen: (1.) Es wird eine Präferenz für einfach zu verarbeitende Stimuli behauptet und z.B. mit der Processing Fluency begründet. (2.) Andere Ansätze erklären eine maximale Stimulation des Beobachters durch komplexe Objekte zum Ideal, was auch die ästhetische Erfahrung maximieren soll. (3.) Eine dritte Gruppe vermeidet die Probleme der ersten beiden, indem eine mittlere Komplexität als Präferenz behauptet wird. (4.) Und schließlich gibt es Ansätze, die auf eine integrierende Theorie letztlich verzichten und einzelne Phänomene bzw. Effekte katalogisieren. Eine Liste ungelöster Probleme formuliert die Minimal-Anforderungen an eine integrierende Theorie. Hiermit wird geprüft, ob bzw. inwieweit die Integrative Ästhetik von Schwarzfischer (2008 und 2014) jene Probleme lösen kann. Dieser Ansatz schlägt spezifische Re-Codierungs-Prozesse als basalen Mechanismus jeder ästhetischen Erfahrung vor. Hierzu wird ein Prozess-Modell entwickelt, welches die Integrative Ästhetik überprüfbar macht. Bei der Modellbildung werden manche Konzepte der Integrativen Ästhetik erweitert und andere präzisiert. Auch die Anwendungsmöglichkeiten werden durch das Modell vielfältiger, da es nicht nur als Erklärungsmodell, sondern zudem als Gestaltungsmodell einsetzbar ist. Insgesamt zeigt die Überprüfung der Integrativen Ästhetik und des Modells, dass die Gütekriterien in einem vielversprechenden Maß erfüllt werden. Die grundsätzliche Quantifizierbarkeit wird aufgezeigt sowie die Relevanz und die Anwendbarkeit für das Design nachgewiesen. Die Forschungsfrage kann somit als hinreichend beantwortet gelten: »Der elementare Mechanismus für eine ästhetische Erfahrung scheint ein Re-Codierungs-Prozess zu sein (der auf der Nutzung von In­varianzen basiert), welcher extensionale Daten zu intensionalen Gestalten transformiert, wobei eine Ressourcen-Entlastung stattfindet und der Gültigkeitsbereich der Codierung erweitert wird (was nach Jean Piaget als Dezentrierung bezeichnet wird) – was jeweils durch eine ‚Beobachtung zweiter Ordnung‘ festgestellt wird.« -/- Teil II »Transdisziplinäre Ästhetik im Dialog« -/- Kapitel II.A »Profane und heroische Beobachtungs-Experimente: Kunst-Ästhetik als methodisches Artefakt.« -/- Es reicht nicht, eine Liste mit vorgeblich ‚schönen Dingen‘ zu erstellen, um ‚das Schöne‘ zu verstehen. Piaget & Garcia (1989) unterscheiden drei Stufen in jedem Erkenntnis-Prozess: 1. isolierte Fakten, die unabhängig von einander analysiert werden; 2. konkrete Transformationen, durch welche diese Fakten mit einander verbunden sind; 3. eine Struktur, die alle denkbaren Fälle konstruierbar macht. Sie nannten diese drei Stufen ‚intra‘, ‚inter‘ und ‚trans‘. Dies kann auf das ‚höhere Erkenntnisvermögen‘ angewandt werden wie auf das ‚niedere‘. Wissenschaftlichkeit setzt nach Popper die Falsifizierbarkeit einer Theorie voraus – und damit Prognosefähigkeit. Prognosen müssen über den Bereich der bereits bekannten Fälle hinausgehen, und finden sich folglich primär in der Piaget-Phase ‚trans‘. Diese ist davon gekennzeichnet, dass es über die Gegenstände hinausgeht (‚trans-objekt‘). Zu häufig werden Artefakte nur beschrieben (‚intra-objekt‘) oder einzelne, zufällig bekannte Transformationen von Material in Artefakte bzw. von Artefakt in Verständnis aufgezählt (‚inter-objekt‘). Erst eine ‚Integrative Ästhetik‘ jenseits von zufälligen Semantiken, jenseits von sozialen Exklusions-Rhetoriken der Künstler und der ‚Leisure-Class-Eliten‘ (nach Veblen) und jenseits der Hierarchisierung von Wahrnehmungs-Modi kann den Anspruch einlösen (‚trans-objekt‘). Daraus folgen u.a. separierbare Semantiken spezifischem Maßstabs, die sich überhaupt erst dann z.B. als ‚konventionelle Kunst-Auffassung‘ beobachten lassen. Zentrierungen auf solche Semantiken können demnach „als Kunst missverstanden werden“ – obwohl sie keineswegs das allgemeine Prinzip repräsentieren, sondern stets nur Spezial­fall bleiben. -/- Kapitel II.B »Das Gehirn als Hypothesenmaschine – Ästhetische Prozesse als Selbst-Test im Beobachter-System.« -/- Die historische Trennung zwischen Techne, Poiesis und Aisthesis scheint nach der „konstruktivistischen Wende“ obsolet geworden zu sein. Jede Beobachtung kann als Handlung betrachtet werden und setzt adaptive Aspekte schon voraus. Jedoch fehlte bislang eine tragfähige konstruktivistische Ästhetik, deren Gültigkeitsbereich hinreichend groß ist: So ist die Beschränkung auf Kunst ebenso unnötig wie jene auf Kommunikation in sozialen Systemen (also auf „Kunst-Diskurse“) oder auf eine Produktions-, Werk- bzw. Rezeptions-Ästhetik. Die definitorische Auflösung des Kunst-Begriffes (z.B. bei Gernot Böhme) löst diese Schwierigkeiten nicht. Im Wesentlichen bleibt die resultierende phänomenologische Ästhetik eine Rezeptions-Ästhetik. Ähnlich begrenzt bleibt der Anwendungsbereich der Informations-Ästhetik mit kybernetischen Wurzeln. Auch die Einbettung in eine evolutionäre Ästhetik oder Neuroästhetik scheint problematisch. Daher muss eine „Integrative Ästhetik“ sehr unterschiedliche Sichtweisen in sich vereinigen. Inzwischen klassisch zu nennende kybernetische, systemtheoretische oder informations-ästhetische Ansätze verwenden meist die Logik einer Bottom-Up-Verarbeitung (Input-Processing-Output), wie sie auch die kognitive Psychologie der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts dominierte. Dass laut Schlicht et al. (2013: S.475) selbst im visuellen Kortex nur ca. 5% der neuronalen Verknüpfungen bottom-up verschaltet sind (und der „Rest” von 95% top-down oder lateral arbeitet), stellt auch die empirische Ästhetik vor Probleme. Dieser Beitrag stellt jene Integrative Ästhetik vor, welche diese Antworten auf diese Fragen zu geben vermag – und den genannten Beschränkungen nicht unterliegt. Der elementare Prozess einer ästhetischen Erfahrung besteht hier in einer Re-Codierung von extensionalen Daten zu intensionalen Codierungen. Durch die sparsamere Codierung stellt dies eine erhebliche neuronale Entlastung dar und erhöht zudem beträchtlich den Gültigkeitsbereich des Codierten. Vom Beobachter-System wird dies subjektiv als Dezentrierung (nach Piaget) positiv erlebt. Zentral ist, dass es nun mit einem einheitlichen methodischen Rahmen möglich ist, entweder bottom-up die Wahrnehmung zu analysieren oder top-down die subjektive Motivation (z.B. die erlebte Autonomie oder die erlebte Entlastung) des Akteurs zu thematisieren. Die Richtung der Prozesse wird umkehrbar. Zudem wird die konstruktivistische Wahrnehmungs-Handlung zu einer Art von Selbst-Test des Wahrnehmungs-Systems: „Funktioniere ich sensorisch und kognitiv überhaupt? Funktioniere ich korrekt, also konsistent? Und, funktioniere ich effizient?“ -/- Kapitel II.C »Beobachtende Systeme – Dezentrierende Gestalt-Integration als Basis einer Ästhetik des Alltags.« -/- An der ästhetischen Erfahrung irritiert traditionell, dass der Effekt bekannt ist, nicht aber die Ursachen und der funktionale Mechanismus. Dies leistete Mystifikationen Vorschub, was zu diversen metaphysischen Kunst-Ästhetiken führte: Der Künstler als Schamane oder Magier. Dieser Beitrag möchte dagegen einen systemsemiotischen Ansatz für eine empirische Ästhetik vorstellen. Die aktive Rolle des Beobachters im Wirkungszusammenhang soll den Blinden Fleck erhellen, aufgrund dessen sich das Phantom eines passiven Rezipienten und „quasi-aktiver“ ästhetischer Objekte so hartnäckig halten konnte. Ausgehend von gestalttheoretischen Überlegungen wird Gestalt als implizite, algorithmische Codierung begriffen. Neuere empirische Ergebnisse der „Neuro-Ökonomie“ postulieren einen Effekt der „kortikalen Entlastung“ (bei der Forschung nach der Wirkung von Marken). Der hier vertretene Ansatz verknüpft nun beide Aspekte und glaubt, daraus eine konsistente Theorie für die empirische Ästhetik des Alltags entwickeln zu können. Es muss jedoch ein weiterer Aspekt hinzu genommen werden, den Piaget „Dezentrierung“ nennt. Ästhetische Erfahrung wird dann definierbar als das Erlebnis eines Umcodierungs-Prozesses – oder genauer: als das Erlebnis einer dezentrierenden Gestalt-Integration durch das beobachtende System. Sowohl beobachtende Systeme als auch Gestalt-Integrationen sind in unserem Ansatz als multiple zu denken. Eine semiotische Differenzierung ist nun entscheidend: Die herkömmliche Informations-Ästhetik thematisierte nur die syntaktischen Aspekte des Stimulus, ohne den Beobachter in seiner aktiven Rolle zu begreifen. Gestalt-Integrationen samt deren dezentrierender Wirkung sind jedoch auch in semantischer und pragmatischer Hinsicht zu finden. Diese werden im Beitrag dargelegt. Denn erst so kann die Vielschichtigkeit ästhetischer Erfahrungen erklärt werden, wo z.B. syntaktische und pragmatische Aspekte konkurrieren können. Auch vordergründig destruktive Akte und Artefakte sind dann als Gestalt-Integrationen anderer Dimensionen oder differierender Bezugssysteme begreifbar. (Dies streift etwa auch Fragen der Ressourcen-Allokation.) Zudem muss die Kontingenz von Beobachtungs-Maßstäben, Wahrnehmungs-Modi, Struktur-Determinanten (des beobachtenden Systems) und kultur-semiotischen Prägungen mit in Betracht gezogen werden. Erst hierdurch wird der Möglichkeitsraum potenzieller Gestalt-Integrationen (der eigentlich aus einem präsentationalen und einem repräsentationalen Raum besteht) prinzipiell beschreibbar. Wenn auch die Probleme bzw. Grenzen der praktischen Durchführbarkeit entsprechender Analysen nicht unterschlagen werden sollen: Die Möglichkeiten entsprechen gut den Erfordernissen zur ästhetischen Analyse des menschlichen Alltages – schließen die Lebenswelten von nicht-anthropozentrischen Seinsformen aber wohl methodisch aus. Dieser Beitrag möchte ich primär eine empirische Ästhetik zur Diskussion stellen, die mir als Rahmen für die weitere Forschung sehr leistungsfähig erscheint. Und doch ist nichts weniger als ein theoriebildender Ansatz das Vorhaben. Eine der Konsequenzen aus diesem Ansatz ist die These, dass es sich bei Kants Diktum vom „interesselosen Wohlgefallen“ zwar für das Individuum um ein Apriori handelt, bei der Gattung Mensch jedoch evolutionär um ein Aposteriori. (shrink)

I shall discuss some of the relations among metaphysical modality, essence, and explanation. Marion Godman, Antonella Mallozzi and David Papineau have recently argued that the essence of a kind consists in its super-explanatory property—a single property that is causally responsible for a multitude of commonalities shared by the instances of the kind. And they argue that this super-explanatory account of essence offers a principled account of aposteriori necessities concerning kinds. I shall examine their arguments and argue that they are (...) fallacious. Along the way, a general problem will also emerge that applies to any account that tries to explicate the notion of essence in terms of an explanatory relation. (shrink)

Beyond Rigidity is divided into two parts. Part 1 is devoted to the semantics and pragmatics of names, and the sentences, including attitude ascriptions, that contain them. In part 2, the model developed in part 1 is extended to natural kind terms, and simple predicates in which they occur. The model is then used to explain the necessity of certain aposteriori statements containing such predicates.

While central to the Christian religion, the act of faith has been notoriously difficult to define. This essay is an attempt to illuminate, with the aid of insights from cognitive science and process philosophy, what it means for a Christian to have faith, specifically in God. In doing so, the apriori and aposteriori aspects of faith are explored, along with its connections to science and empirical evidence, revelation, knowledge, doubt, morality, and additional Christian beliefs.

The contemporary view of the fundamental role of time in physics generally ignores its most obvious characteric, namely its flow. Studies in the foundations of relativistic mechanics during the past decade have shown that the dynamical evolution of a system can be treated in a manifestly covariant way, in terms of the solution of a system of canonical Hamilton type equations, by considering the space-time coordinates and momenta ofevents as its fundamental description. The evolution of the events, as functions of (...) a universal invariant world, or historical, time, traces out the world lines that represent the phenomena (e.g., particles) which are observed in the laboratory. The positions in time of each of the events, i.e., the time of their potential detection, are, in this framework, controlled by this universal parameter τ, the time at which they are generated (and may proceed in the positive or negative sense). We find that the notion of thestate of a system requires generalization; at any given τ, it involves information about the system at timest(τ) ≠ τ. The correlation of what may be measured att(τ) with what is generated at τ is necessarily quite rigid, and is related covariantly to the spacelike correlations found in interference experiments. We find, furthermore, that interaction with Maxwell electromagnetism leads back to a static picture of the world, with no real evolution. As a consequence of this result, and the requirement of gauge invariance for the quantum mechanical evolution equation, we conclude that electromagnetism is described by a pre-Maxwell field, whose τ-integral (or asymptotic behavior as τ → ∞) may be identified with the Maxwell field. We therefore consider the world of events in space time, interacting through τ-dependent pre-Maxwell fields, as far as electrodynamics is concerned, as the objective dynamical reality. Our perception of the world, through laboratory detectors and our eyes, are based onintegration over τ over intervals sufficiently large to obtain an aposteriori description of the phenomena which coincides with the Maxwell theory. Fundamental notions, such as the conservation of charge, rest on this construction. The decomposition of the common notion of time into two essentially different aspects, one associated with an unvarying flow, and the second with direct observation subject to dynamical modification, has profound philosophical consequences, of which we are able to explore here only a few. (shrink)

In Beyond Rigidity I argue that, like ‘red’, ‘water’ can be used both as a singular term, and as a predicate – as illustrated by and. 1a. Red is a color. b. Bill’s shirt is red. 2a. Unlike gold, which is an element, water is a compound. b. The liquid in the glass is water. Just as ‘red’ designates a kind instances of which constitute the extension of the predicate ‘is red’, so ‘water’ designates a kind instances of which constitute (...) the extension of the predicate ‘is water’. This observation is used in analyzing examples of the necessary aposteriori like those in, which have the force of quantified conditionals in which both the grammatical subjects and ‘is H2O’ function as mass predicates, true of all instances of the associated kinds. 3a. Water is H2O. b. Ice is H2O. c. Water vapor is H2O. (shrink)